NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________
No. 25-11948
Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
COREY JEREMAINE BURROUGHS,
Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cr-00187-MHT-SMD-1 ____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM:
Corey Burroughs appeals his convictions for possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possessing fentanyl
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-11948 with intent to distribute, and maintaining a drug premises. He ar- gues that the district court erred in denying (1) his motion to sup- press all evidence derived from a stop of his vehicle, (2) his motion in limine to exclude certain videos extracted from his phone, and
(3) his motion for judgment of acquittal. After careful review, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Police began investigating Burroughs after they recovered multiple cell phones in Alabama prisons with phone numbers reg- istered to him. Through their investigation, police learned that Burroughs was smuggling synthetic cathinones (a category of drugs commonly referred to as flakka or bath salts) into Alabama prisons by spraying the drugs onto fake legal papers to sneak them past the prisons' mail inspection.
As part of the investigation, Detective Tyler Curlee of the Montgomery Police Department surveilled a house at 2100 Locust Street in Montgomery, Alabama, which Burroughs had listed as his residence when he was released from prison in 2019. On April 18, 2023, Curlee saw Burroughs leave the house in his car and began following him. After Curlee observed Burroughs speeding in a res- idential zone and failing to use turn signals, he pulled Burroughs over.
As Curlee approached the driver-side window, he smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle. Curlee explained to Bur- roughs the reason for the traffic stop, informed Burroughs that he
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25-11948 Opinion of the Court 3 could detect the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, and ordered Burroughs to step out of the car.
Once Burroughs was secured by another officer, Curlee searched the vehicle. He found a marijuana cigarette in the driver- side door pocket and, in a backpack on the front passenger seat, legal papers later determined to have been soaked with flakka. Based on the evidence from the car search and the surveil- lance of the house, police obtained and executed a search warrant for 2100 Locust Street. In the kitchen, police found over 500 grams of methamphetamine, over 50 grams of fentanyl, indeterminate amounts of marijuana and flakka, a square kilo press, a vacuum sealer, baggies, and other drug paraphernalia.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Burroughs was indicted on one count of possession with in- tent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, see id. § 841(a)(1), and one count of knowingly maintain- ing a drug premises, see id. § 856(a)(1). We'll focus on the parts of the district court proceedings relevant to Burroughs's ap- peal: (1) his motion to suppress evidence resulting from the stop;
(2) his motion in limine to exclude videos found on his phone; and
(3) his motion for judgment of acquittal. A. Motion to Suppress
After the indictment, Burroughs moved to suppress the evi- dence derived from the traffic stop, arguing that the stop violated
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-11948 the Fourth Amendment because it was pretextual. At a suppres- sion hearing before a magistrate judge, Detective Curlee testified that he'd been monitoring 2100 Locust Street because the state sus- pected Burroughs of smuggling flakka into its prisons. He stopped Burroughs after witnessing him commit multiple "traffic offenses under Title 32 of the Alabama Code" as Burroughs drove away from the house. Curlee knew Burroughs had driven "well over the speed limit" because Curlee had to drive ten or fifteen miles per hour above the posted speed limit "just to keep up." He'd also
"personally observed" Burroughs make three turns without signal- ing.
After the hearing, the magistrate judge issued a recommen- dation denying the suppression motion, concluding that Curlee had probable cause for the stop because Burroughs had violated traffic laws and Curlee's subjective motivations for conducting the stop were irrelevant. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation over Burroughs's objection. B. Motion in Limine
The day before trial, Burroughs moved to exclude videos ex- tracted from his phone that showed Burroughs handling drugs at 2100 Locust Street and other locations between 2021 and 2023. One video showed Burroughs counting out ounces of marijuana at 2100 Locust Street next to a drug press and a sealer. Another de- picted Burroughs at 2100 Locust Street with wet paper laid out to dry, stating that he was "in the kitchen with his cooking a--." A
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25-11948 Opinion of the Court 5 third video showed Burroughs standing outside a vehicle with vac- uum-sealed drugs saying he was "about to flood this place with this sh-t." A fourth showed Burroughs remodeling and putting in tile and carpet inside the home. Still others showed Burroughs display- ing or counting out various drugs, including methamphetamine, marijuana, and fentanyl.
According to Burroughs, these videos were inadmissible be- cause they were "irrelevant" and would "unlawfully taint [his] character." The government responded that the videos established that Burroughs constructively possessed the drugs found in the kitchen and rebutted Burroughs's defense that he didn't know that drugs were being made and kept inside the house. The district court denied the motion, explaining that the vid- eos were relevant because they tended to show that Burroughs
"clearly knew what was going on and was using that house to man- ufacture drugs," which was "the thrust of this case." This "circum- stantial evidence" also "show[ed] a pattern" of Burroughs's in- volvement with the house, which "refute[d] [Burroughs's] . . . the- ory" that he didn't know what was going on inside. The district court therefore found that any prejudice to Burroughs from the videos "d[id] not substantially outweigh the[ir] probative value"
and allowed the government to introduce the videos into evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-11948 C. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal At trial, following the government's case-in-chief, Bur- roughs moved for a judgment of acquittal. He argued that the gov- ernment failed to show "direct evidence of [his] possessing the nar- cotics found . . . during the[] search warrant" or "evidence of who ha[d] ownership of" the Locust Street residence. The government responded that police apprehended Burroughs leaving the home with narcotics shortly before they executed the search warrant and that the videos extracted from his phone showed "an ongoing pat- tern of him maintaining these premises for drug trafficking pur- poses." The district court denied the motion.
Burroughs then took the stand in his own defense. He ad- mitted that he was the person handling drugs in the videos ex- tracted from his phone, but testified that the drugs actually be- longed to someone named Tamika. Burroughs also told the jury that he never lived at 2100 Locust Street and did not possess any drugs found at that address. The defense then rested. After closing arguments, the jury convicted Burroughs on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 195 months' impris- onment.
DISCUSSION
The district court didn't err in denying Burroughs's three motions. We address them in the order they were litigated below.
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25-11948 Opinion of the Court 7 A. Motion to Suppress
First, Burroughs argues that the district court erred by deny- ing his motion to suppress because the traffic stop was not sup- ported by probable cause.1The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of" a person. Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996) (citation modified). That seizure is reasonable—and thus permitted under the Fourth Amendment—"where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. at 810; see also United States
v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889, 908 (11th Cir. 2020) ("[T]he probable-cause standard is satisfied when a police officer witnesses a driver commit a traffic violation.").
Here, Detective Curlee had "probable cause to believe that a traffic violation . . . [had] occurred." See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. At the suppression hearing, Curlee testified that Burroughs was driving ten or fifteen miles per hour above the posted speed limit
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-11948 and failed to use his turn signals three times, which were "traffic offenses under Title 32 of the Alabama Code." The magistrate judge credited this testimony. Burroughs did not present any evi- dence to the contrary, so he has none to point to on appeal. Given Detective Curlee's uncontradicted testimony and the "substantial deference" we afford "to the factfinder's explicit and implicit credi- bility determinations," United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.4th 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified), we see no clear error in the de- termination that Curlee saw Burroughs commit traffic violations, and no legal error in the conclusion that Curlee had probable cause to stop Burroughs.
Burroughs nevertheless objects that the stop was "pre- textual" because Detective Curlee intended to "stop the vehicle by any means necessary." But probable cause is "an objective inquiry"
that "regulates conduct rather than thoughts." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011) (citation modified). So long as "the cir- cumstances, viewed objectively, justify the challenged action," that action is "reasonable whatever the subjective intent motivating the relevant officials." Id. (citation modified); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable- cause Fourth Amendment analysis."). Here, Curlee had probable cause to stop Burroughs for any one of multiple traffic violations, so his subjective intent was irrelevant. The district court therefore correctly denied the suppression motion.
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25-11948 Opinion of the Court 9 B. Motion in Limine
Next, Burroughs argues that the district court erred in deny- ing his motion in limine because "the [g]overnment knew the vid- eos d[id] not b[ear] any relevance as to the substantive issues in this cause and the [g]overnment wished to submit the same simply to unlawfully taint the character of Mr. Burroughs."2As a general matter, "[r]elevant evidence is admissible," and evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and "the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. But, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, "the court may" nevertheless "exclude rele- vant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cu- mulative evidence." Id. R. 403.
"Against the background principle that relevant evidence is admissible . . . Rule 403 'is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly[.]'" United States v. McGregor, 960 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1051 (11th Cir. 1991)). Because Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy,
"courts must look at the evidence in a light most favorable to ad- mission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact." Id. (citation modified).
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-11948 The videos were highly probative because they showed Bur- roughs at 2100 Locust Street producing and handling the same kinds of drugs later found by the police at the same location. The videos also demonstrated his intent to "flood this place with this sh-t," that is, to distribute the drugs he possessed. This evidence was particularly probative because it contradicted Burroughs's de- fense theory that he had nothing to do with the Locust Street resi- dence or the drugs found there.
On the other side of the scale, Burroughs did not explain to the district court why the videos were unfairly prejudicial or why that unfair prejudice substantially outweighed their probative value. Of course, "[r]elevant evidence is inherently prejudicial."
Cauchon v. United States, 824 F.2d 908, 914 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation modified). That's why Rule 403 is concerned only with unfair prej- udice—evidence that "lure[s] the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged." Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997); see also Cauchon, 824 F.2d at 914 (noting that "'[u]nfair prejudice' cannot be simplistically defined as evidence having adverse effects on a party's case"). Yes, the videos here made Burroughs seem like a drug dealer who operated out of the Locust Street residence, but this was ex- actly what the government needed to prove, no "different from [the] proof specific to the offense charged." Old Chief, 519 U.S. at
180. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burroughs's motion in limine to exclude the videos.
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25-11948 Opinion of the Court 11 C. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Finally, Burroughs argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to establish his possession of the drugs or that he controlled 2100 Locust Street.3To convict Burroughs "under [sec- tion] 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute methampheta- mine and fentanyl, the government had to 'prove three elements:
(1) knowledge; (2) possession; and (3) intent to distribute.'" United States v. Cremades, 160 F.4th 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also
21 U.S.C. § 841(a). The government could establish possession through either actual or constructive possession, "which exists when a defendant has 'dominion or control over the premises' in which the object is kept." Id. (quoting United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir. 1998)). To convict under section 856(a) for knowingly maintaining a drug premises, the government had to prove that Burroughs "(1) knowingly, (2) operated or maintained a place, (3) for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance." United States v. Pineiro, 389 F.3d 1359,
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12 Opinion of the Court 25-11948 1367 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1090 (11th Cir. 1992)); see also 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to sus- tain Burroughs's convictions. Police found over 500 grams of methamphetamine and over fifty grams of fentanyl at 2100 Locust Street. Burroughs listed 2100 Locust Street as his residence on his prison release paperwork, which he admitted on the witness stand. He was arrested leaving 2100 Locust Street with marijuana and flakka on his person, both of which were also found at the residence shortly after the arrest. The videos extracted from Burroughs's phone showed him inside 2100 Locust Street producing the same kinds of narcotics found at the residence and packaging them for distribution using the same kind of equipment found at the resi- dence. Burroughs admitted that he was the person handling drugs in the videos. And the videos also showed that Burroughs main- tained the house by remodeling and renovating it. This was sufficient to show that Burroughs possessed meth- amphetamine and fentanyl with intent to distribute under sec- tion 841(a). The videos showed that Burroughs had knowledge about the drugs and that he had "dominion or control" over 2100 Locust Street, demonstrating his constructive possession of the fentanyl and methamphetamine found there. Cremades, 160 F.4th at 1302; see also United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d 1314, 1317- 18, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant had constructive possession of drugs found at a residence where the defendant was found standing in
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25-11948 Opinion of the Court 13 the driveway of the home where the drugs were found with the housekey in his pocket, the arresting officer saw him enter and exit the house before it was searched, a letter addressed to the defend- ant was found in the home, and the defendant's daughter acknowl- edged that he frequented the home).
Curlee testified that the amounts of fentanyl and metham- phetamine Burroughs was charged with possessing were "dealer amount[s]" several times the amount ordinarily possessed by a rec- reational user. The amounts possessed, together with his self-pro- fessed intent to "flood this place with this sh-t," showed that he had the intent to distribute. See Cremades, 160 F.4th at 1302 (finding that intent to distribute can be proven by circumstantial evidence and
"'inferred from the amount of the drug involved.'" (citation modi- fied)).
The same evidence supported Burroughs's conviction for maintaining a drug premises under section 856(a). As above, Bur- roughs was apprehended leaving 2100 Locust Street with the same kind of drugs found inside. And the videos showed that Burroughs used the residence to produce drugs and prepare them for distribu- tion since at least two years prior to his arrest, and that he main- tained the house by remodeling and renovating it. This demon- strated that he knowingly maintained 2100 Locust Street for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing controlled substances. See Pineiro, 389 F.3d at 1368; see also Clavis, 956 F.2d at 1091 (noting that factors such as "control, duration, acquisition of the site, rent- ing or furnishing the site, repairing the site, supervising, protecting,
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14 Opinion of the Court 25-11948 supplying food to those at the site, and continuity" are "evidence of knowingly maintaining the place considered alone or in combi- nation with evidence of distributing from that place"). In short, the evidence was more than enough to convince a juror beyond a reasonable doubt that Burroughs possessed meth- amphetamine and fentanyl with intent to distribute under sec- tion 841(a), and that he knowingly maintained a drug premises un- der section 856(a). The district court did not err by denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
AFFIRMED.
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