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Thus, despite the Nonprofits' argument to the contrary, we cannot see how the order can be construed to be an exercise of § 705's authority to postpone the effective date of the challenged agency actions. Indeed, the Nonprofits styled their motion for relief under § 705 as a motion for a preliminary injunction, and it was that motion that the District Court granted.
Nonetheless, as the Nonprofits point out, § 705 empowers a court to "issue all necessary and appropriate process [(1)] to postpone the effective date of an agency action or [(2)] to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 705 (emphasis added). And the District Court expressly stated that the order in question "shall apply to the maximum extent provided for by" § 705.
Thus, because the Government itself agrees that the District Court did not style its order as an exercise of the
"postponement" authority that § 705 concerns, we understand the challenged relief to be an exercise of the additional remedial authority that § 705 confers to "issue all necessary and appropriate process . . . to preserve status or rights pending"
judicial review. Id. § 705. Otherwise, it is hard to see how that order could apply -- as the District Court made clear was its intention -- to the maximum extent that § 705 allows. Accordingly, the critical question is whether the District Court's order is overbroad even though the District Court
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issued it pursuant to § 705's grant of authority to "issue all necessary and appropriate process . . . to preserve status or rights pending" judicial review. And so, we must address that question as well.
3.
The Government appears to contend that we must resolve that question in its favor -- and so conclude that District Court's order still is overbroad -- because § 705 itself "incorporates"
traditional equitable limitations on nonparty relief. Indeed, anticipating the possibility that the order might be construed as a stay rather than as an injunction, the Government argues at some length that a postponement of the effective date of the challenged agency action "would still properly be limited to redressing [the Nonprofits'] irreparable harm." We are not persuaded.
a.
For starters, the Government fails to adequately defend the premise of its assertion about the limited nature of the authority that § 705 confers -- namely, that § 705 does not authorize non-party relief even in authorizing the postponement of the effective date of an agency action. Notably, several of our sister circuits have held to the contrary as to that precise issue. See Make the Road N.Y. v. Noem, No. 25-5320, 2025 WL 3563313, at *35-36 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 2025) (per curiam); Career Colls. & Schs. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 98 F.4th 220, 255 (5th Cir. 2024);
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see also Nat'l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2025) (affirming universal stay because partial postponement was unworkable due to "binary" nature of challenged agency action under the relevant statute). But cf. Immigrant Defs. L. Ctr. v. Noem,
145 F.4th 972, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2025) (limiting universal stay issued under § 705 to the plaintiff's "current and future clients"
because that was "the more equitable approach 'to preserve status [and] rights pending'" judicial review (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 705)).
The text of § 705 would appear to accord with those rulings, as it refers to postponing "the effective date of an agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 705 (emphasis added). As the District of Columbia Circuit recently well explained, "agency orders, regulations, and rules almost always have but one effective date. If a court orders that an agency action shall not apply against certain individuals, but that the agency can apply that action against everyone else, the effective date of the action has not been postponed." Make the Road N.Y., 2025 WL 3563313, at *35. Moreover, these other circuits' understanding of the postponement portion of § 705 nicely aligns with § 706(2), which provides that reviewing courts may "set aside" unlawful agency actions and has long been understood to authorize vacatur of such actions. See Corner Post, 603 U.S. at 826 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The broader construction of § 705's postponement
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authority would thus appear to enable a district court, by postponing "the effective date" of the challenged agency action, to provide the "[r]elief pending review," 5 U.S.C. § 705, that preserves the remedy -- vacatur -- to which a plaintiff, if ultimately successful, is entitled, see id. § 706(2). Of course, as we have explained, we do not understand the District Court here to have relied on the authority that § 705 confers to postpone the effective date of an agency action in ordering the relief at issue. Instead, we understand the District Court's order to operate as an injunction because it operates directly on the agency actors by enjoining them from engaging in certain agency decision-making and does not merely vacate or set aside an agency action already taken. Cf. Nken, 556 U.S. at 529 (explaining that a stay "temporarily suspend[s] the source of the authority to act" whereas an injunction "direct[s]" the actor's conduct).
Our discussion of the postponement authority that § 705 confers is still relevant, though, to the scope-of-the-relief issue that we must resolve. It explains why we do not agree with the Government -- at least given the arguments that it has made on appeal -- that § 705 fails to contemplate any nonparty relief. Put differently, that discussion explains why we cannot accept the key premise of the Government's argument for concluding that,
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because the District Court's order is "universal" in scope, it is overbroad even if it rests on § 705.
The upshot of our analysis to this point, then, is that the Government can succeed in showing that the challenged order is overbroad only if it can explain why, even though § 705 does not bar all such nonparty relief, the portion of § 705 that authorizes a district court to "issue all necessary and appropriate process . . . to preserve status or rights pending" judicial review does bar such relief. But, as we will explain, the Government has offered no such explanation.
b.
The Government does point out that relief under § 705 may be issued only "to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury." 5 U.S.C. § 705. We cannot agree with the Government's contention, though, that this provision in and of itself shows that the remedial authority that § 705 confers is limited to redressing party-specific harms.
This provision appears to limit the relief that may be granted from a challenged agency action to only those parts of the agency action that are imposing an irreparable injury. See Make the Road N.Y., 2025 WL 3563313, at *35. For example, if an agency action contains severable components, this provision "just means that courts should [postpone] the effective date only of those portions of the agency action that are inflicting injury" and "let
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the other portions of the [agency action] take effect as scheduled." Id. But we do not see how the "irreparable injury"
constraint speaks to the scope of the relief that may be ordered to redress such an injury -- and so speaks to whether the relief that may be issued once the irreparable injury has been shown must be limited to redressing only party-specific harm or may be universal in nature to preserve the rights that could be obtained through vacatur.
Indeed, as we have explained, the power to postpone the effective date of an agency action confers the power to order a form of relief that, in its nature, appears to do more than simply redress a party-specific harm. So, it is not evident that the "to the extent necessary" language in § 705 in and of itself dictates, as to any relief that may be issued pursuant to § 705, that such relief cannot be universal.
The Government also points out that § 702 of the APA, which identifies who may bring an APA suit and contains the statute's sovereign immunity waiver, states that "[n]othing" in that provision affects "the power or duty of the court" to "deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground." 5 U.S.C. § 702. The Government then goes on to argue that this provision shows that the APA "requires courts to decline to enter universal relief" when a narrower remedy would provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.
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Once again, though, this argument is premised on an understanding of the scope of the postponement authority that the Government has not shown to be correct. After all, this argument would require even that remedial authority to be party-specific. Yet the Government has not explained how the savings clause in § 702 has the asserted limiting effect as to some parts of § 705 but not others.
The Government next directs our attention to a piece of legislative history to support its position that, across the board, § 705 precludes universal relief. The Government relies on the House Report that accompanied the APA, which states that § 705
"would normally, if not always, be limited to the parties complainant." H.R. Rep. No. 79-1980, at 277 (1946). In explaining that § 705 relief "would normally" be limited to the parties to the litigation, however, the House Report itself contemplates that relief under § 705 may, in some circumstances, extend to nonparties. We also note that the corresponding Senate Report merely describes § 705 as permitting courts "to maintain the status quo" "if the proper showing be made," and explained that it should be used "to prevent irreparable
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injury or afford parties an adequate judicial remedy." S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 213 (1945).14
So, given that the Government bears the burden on appeal, we conclude that it has not advanced a persuasive argument for us to hold that the District Court abused its discretion by issuing relief of the present scope. Rather, as we have explained, its only arguments for concluding otherwise are premised on the mistaken understanding that even the postponement authority in § 705 must be so limited.15
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C.
We make one final observation concerning the scope-of-the-relief issue. Although we do not definitively resolve in this appeal the extent of the remedial authority that the non-postponement portion of § 705 confers, due to the limited nature of the arguments that the Government has advanced to us about that portion, we are aware that the District Court issued this relief before CASA was decided. We also are aware that the Nonprofits themselves argue on appeal that the remaining portions of the District Court's remedial order -- those that we have concluded do not exceed the APA's sovereign immunity waiver -- are best construed to be an exercise of the "postponement" authority that § 705 confers -- and so not to be a universal injunction at all.
Thus, if a party successfully were to seek -- or the District Court otherwise were to make -- a modification of the order on remand based on § 705's postponement authority alone, that modification might moot any questions about the extent of the authority indicating that vacatur is itself a remedy that Congress may authorize. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 890 n.2 (1990) (noting that a successful APA suit can affect the entire challenged agency action); Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 827 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) ("The Federal Government and the federal courts have long understood § 706(2) to authorize vacatur of unlawful agency rules . . . ."); see also, e.g., Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 36 & n.7 (2020) (affirming vacatur of agency rule).
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remedial authority that the non-postponement portion of § 705 confers. That reality, we conclude, points against our addressing any such questions in this case, given that the Government has developed no meaningful arguments about how they should be resolved.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate paragraph 3 of the April 15, 2025 order and otherwise affirm the District Court's opinion and order of injunctive relief.