People v. Williams

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CR-24-0892

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People v Williams

2026 NY Slip Op 04455 July 16, 2026

Appellate Division, Third Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

Trevon Williams, Appellant.

Decided and Entered:July 16, 2026

CR-24-0892

Calendar Date: May 27, 2026

Before: Aarons, J.P., Pritzker, Ceresia, Fisher And Mcshan, JJ.

Scott P. Benjamin, Rosendale, for appellant.

Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), for respondent. [*1]

Aarons, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Tatiana Coffinger, J.), rendered November 8, 2023, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. In the early morning hours of February 5, 2022, police officers were pursuing a vehicle when the driver, later identified as defendant, lost control and crashed into a snowbank. A brief foot chase ensued, and the driver ultimately surrendered and was taken into custody. Shortly thereafter, officers responding to the scene discovered a loaded handgun and a key fob near the vehicle. Defendant was charged with, among other crimes, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possessing a loaded firearm outside of his home or place of business and sentenced to a prison term of 12 years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

As charged to the jury, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when "such person possesses any loaded firearm" outside of "such person's home or place of business" (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) Defendant first contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence because there was no direct proof or forensics connecting him to a loaded firearm. While a different verdict would not have been unreasonable considering the absence of eyewitness or physical evidence of defendant's possession, "[a] defendant may be found to possess a firearm through actual, physical possession or through constructive possession" (People v Malloy, 228 AD3d 1068, 1068 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 42 NY3d 971 [2024]; accord People v Everett,

231 AD3d 1296, 1297 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1052 [2024]).The latter "may be established through circumstantial evidence, and does not require proof that a defendant has exclusive access to the area where a weapon is found" (People v Gerhard, 244 AD3d 1313, 1315 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 45 NY3d 936 [2026]).

Here, the evidence adduced at trial revealed that police pursued the vehicle defendant was driving â a red Ford SUV â because it matched the description of a vehicle seen fleeing the scene of a shooting a few hours earlier on the evening of February 4, 2022, and was reportedly involved in a shooting a few days prior, on February 2, 2022. A police officer observed defendant exit the vehicle after crashing into a snowbank and flee on foot. Once defendant was apprehended, investigators discovered a loaded firearm near the driver side door of the vehicle. Although no one saw defendant drop or throw the gun from the vehicle, officers testified that the area was lightly trafficked on that particular night and the gun was found atop fresh snow, indicating that it had been recently placed. It is undisputed that the gun was loaded and operable[*2]. Defendant's DNA was not recovered from the gun, but he admitted, in a recorded jail call, that he

"ha[d] a gun on [him] . . . allegedly." Thus, viewing this evidence in a neutral light and according appropriate deference to the jury's factual findings and credibility determinations (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), we are satisfied that the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence (see People v Cotto, 231 AD3d 1356, 1360-1361 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 962 [2025]; People v Colter, 206 AD3d 1371, 1375 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1149 [2022]; People v Smith, 173 AD3d 1441, 1443-1444 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 954 [2019]).^FN1 We are unpersuaded by defendant's argument that County Court's Molineux ruling with respect to evidence of the shooting incident on February 4, 2022 was erroneous. "In reviewing a Molineux ruling, this Court must first assess whether the People have identified some issue, other than mere criminal propensity, to which the evidence is relevant"

(People v Riddick, 242 AD3d 1438, 1441 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 44

NY3d 1054 [2025]). Evidence is relevant to a nonpropensity purpose when, as pertinent here, it "is inextricably interwoven with the charged crime[ ], provides necessary background or completes a witness's narrative" (People v Henehan, 238 AD3d 1336, 1339 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 43 NY3d 1055 [2025]). If the People meet their burden, "we consider whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice" (People v Tefair, 41 NY3d 107, 114 [2023] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Bohn, 242 AD3d 1357, 1367 [3d Dept 2025]).

Here, County Court appropriately determined that evidence of the February 4, 2022 shooting was relevant to the extent it explained why police were pursuing defendant as he drove a red Ford SUV (see People v Henehan, 238 AD3d at 1339). The court also reduced the risk of prejudice by limiting the People to proving only that the February 4 shooting incident occurred and that a red Ford SUV had been linked to that incident.^FN2 So limited, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the evidence of the February 4 shooting incident outweighed the risk of prejudice to defendant (see People v Valentin, 29 NY3d 150, 157 [2017]; People v Gannon, 174 AD3d 1054, 1059 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 980 [2019]).

Also unavailing is defendant's related contention that County Court should have granted his mistrial motion when the People elicited prejudicial testimony regarding a bullet hole in the windshield of the red SUV. The court immediately instructed the jury to "strike" the testimony they just heard about the bullet hole â instructions that indicate the jury should disregard such testimony and that we presume the jury followed (see People v McCarty, 221 AD3d 1360, 1368 [3d Dept 2023], [*3]lv denied 40 NY3d 1093 [2024]). In any event, examined in context, the single mention of a bullet hole was not so "powerfully incriminating" that it could not "be overcome by curative instructions" (People v Stone, 29 NY3d 166, 171 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Hajratalli, 200 AD3d 1332, 1338 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 1033 [2022]). To the extent defendant challenges the content of the curative instruction, this argument is unpreserved for our review (see People v Osman, 228 AD3d 1007, 1015 [3d Dept 2024]). Accordingly, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial (see People v Hajratalli,

200 AD3d at 1338-1339; People v Hilts, 187 AD3d 1408, 1416 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 973 [2020]). Next, although we agree with defendant that, upon learning that a police sergeant testifying as a witness for the People was defense counsel's brother-in-law and close friend, County Court should have conducted a conflict-of-interest inquiry (see People v Gomberg, 38 NY2d 307, 313 [1975]), the failure to do so does not compel reversal. Such a failure

"requires reversal only if the conflict is an actual one. Where the conflict is merely potential, reversal is mandated only if the defendant can establish that the conflict operated on the defense" (People v Payton, 22 NY3d 1011, 1014 [2013]; accord People v Gibson, 185 AD3d 1101, 1102 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1066 [2020]). Here, the witness confirmed that nothing about this relationship with counsel would cause him to give "false or misleading" testimony and further stated that he avoided discussing the case with defense counsel. The record further reflects that the witness responded to the scene of defendant's crime for five minutes to "check[ ] on" the responding officers and defendant, who had already been taken into custody. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the conflict was "necessarily preclusive of single-minded advocacy" (People v Mero, 43 NY3d 407, 416 [2024] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Nor has defendant offered any examples as to how counsel could have acted in a "more vigorous, less inhibited manner" (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and our review of the record confirms that counsel subjected this witness to an appropriately rigorous and thorough cross-examination as the People's other witnesses (see People v Smart, 96 NY2d 793, 795 [2001]; People v Allen, 216 AD2d 569, 570 [2d Dept 1995], affd 88 NY2d 831 [1996]; cf. People v McCutcheon, 109 AD3d 1086, 1087 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1042 [2013]). Finally, defendant's contention that his sentence was illegally imposed as a penalty for exercising his right to a trial is unpreserved for our review (see People v Hayward, 213 AD3d 989, 995 [3d Dept 2023], affd 42 NY3d 753 [2024]), as is his argument that the sentence violated the Second, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (see People v Pena, 28 NY3d [*4]727, 730 [2017]).^FN3 Under the circumstances, and upon due consideration of the relevant factors, we also do not perceive defendant's sentence to be unduly harsh or severe (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]; People v Brisman, 43 NY3d 322, 331 [2025]; People v Moore, 247 AD3d 1251, 1254 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Murdaugh, 240 AD3d 1089, 1090 [3d Dept 2025]; People v Hunter, 219 AD3d 975, 981 [3d Dept 2023]). Defendant's remaining contentions have been examined and, to the extent they are not specifically addressed, we conclude that they are meritless. Pritzker, Ceresia, Fisher and McShan, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Footnotes

Footnote 1 Defendant's further contention that County Court erred in failing to give a circumstantial evidence charge is unpreserved for our review (see People v Hilton, 185 AD3d 1147, 1151 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1095 [2020]). To the extent defendant argues that the failure to issue a circumstantial evidence charge is a mode of proceedings error, he offers no compelling reason why such failure should fall into this "very narrow exception to the preservation rule" (People v Mack, 27 NY3d 534, 540 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Footnote 2

Contrary to defendant's claim, County Court did not permit the People to use evidence of the February 4, 2022 shooting incident while ruling all evidence of the February 2 shooting incident inadmissible. Instead, the court's Molineux ruling reflects that it imposed similar limitations on the People's use of the evidence of the February 2 shooting incident, to wit, that the incident occurred and that a red Ford SUV had been identified as involved (seePeople v Henehan, 238 AD3d at 1339).

Footnote 3 Notably, this Court recently rejected an as-applied constitutional challenge to the sentencing scheme for weapon possession offenses, concluding that the imposition of harsher penalties for possession outside the home, as opposed to inside it, did not violate the Second or Eighth Amendments (see People v Santana, 248 AD3d 1429, 1432 [3d Dept

2026]).

People v. Williams

People v. Williams

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