State v. Schuster

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23-

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1

Opinion Number: 2

Filing Date: July 8, 2026 3

NO. S-1-SC-40419 4

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 5

Plaintiff- Respondent, 6

v. 7

BRYAN SCHUSTER, 8

Defendant- Petitioner. 9

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI 10

Melissa A. Kennelly, District Judge 11 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 12 Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender 13 MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15

for Petitioner 16

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General 17 Santa Fe, NM 18

Michael J. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor General 19 Albuquerque, NM 20

for Respondent21

1

OPINION 1

BACON, Justice. 2

{1} Defendant Bryan Schuster challenges the Court of Appeals' reversal of the 3 district court's grant of his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy 4 trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 5 enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."); see also N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 ("In 6 all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to have . . . a speedy 7 public trial."). Defendant was arrested pursuant to a traffic stop and charged with 8 receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, 9 false evidence of title and registration, driving with a suspended license, and driving 10 without insurance. Three years elapsed between Defendant's arrest and the district 11 court's disposition of his motion to dismiss, though Defendant was released on his 12 own recognizance throughout. 13

{2} Speedy trial challenges in New Mexico are governed by "the four-factor test 14 set forth in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)], balancing the length of 15 delay, the reason[s] for delay, the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, 16 and the prejudice to the defendant." State v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 4, 406 P.3d 17

505. Defendant challenges three of the Court of Appeals' determinations under 18 Barker as improper in differing from the district court's correct determinations. 19

2

Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded the reasons-for-delay factor weighs 1

"moderately to heavily" for Defendant rather than "heavily," the assertion-of-the-2 right factor does not weigh heavily against the State, and Defendant did not show 3 particularized prejudice. See State v. Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶¶ 7, 22, 4 25 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2024) (nonprecedential). Defendant further asserts the 5 Court of Appeals ignored its own precedent in concluding his claimed prejudice was 6 not particularized. 7

{3} Under our weighing of the Barker factors, we hold the first three factors weigh 8 heavily against the State. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals without 9 reaching analysis of the prejudice factor. In addition, to guide lower courts, we 10 explain in detail our departure from the Court of Appeals' analysis regarding the 11 reasons-for-delay and assertion-of-the-right factors. 12

I. BACKGROUND 13

{4} Defendant was arrested on March 8, 2019, and released on his own 14 recognizance the same day under conditions of release set by the magistrate court 15 and subsequently largely adopted by the district court. On March 15, 2022, more 16 than three years later, the district court conducted a hearing on Defendant's Motion 17 to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Rights, which the court granted. We discuss 18

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the intervening procedural background below as relevant to the lower courts' speedy 1 trial determinations. 2

{5} In granting Defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court's findings 3 included that "[t]his is a simple case, in which a delay of longer than one year is 4 presumptively prejudicial to Defendant." In State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2, 5

146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387, we "update[d] our guidelines for determining the 6 length of delay necessary to trigger the speedy trial inquiry[:] twelve months for 7 simple cases, fifteen months for cases of intermediate complexity, and eighteen 8 months for complex cases" (Garza guidelines). Accordingly, the district court found 9 the three-year length of delay—being three times the Garza guideline—to be 10 presumptively prejudicial to Defendant, thereby triggering further inquiry into the 11 Barker factors. See State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 11, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 12 1061 ("The first factor, the length of the delay, serves two functions. Initially, the 13 length of delay must cross a threshold to establish a presumption of prejudice and to 14 trigger further inquiry into the other factors. Once that threshold has been crossed, 15 the burden of persuasion shifts to the [s]tate to show that, considering the four factors 16 as a whole, the defendant's constitutional rights have not been violated."). 17

{6} Analyzing the reasons-for-delay factor, the district court began by attributing 18 two months to Defendant, due to his requested extension pursuant to the preliminary 19

4

examination; six months to neither party, due to COVID-19-related suspensions of 1 jury trials; and the remaining two years and four months to the State. Regarding the 2 State's culpable delay, the district court then took notice in its findings of the judicial 3 backlog "situation . . . unique to Colfax County," New Mexico, stemming from a 4 prosecutorial "policy of prosecuting all types of cases to the fullest extent and 5 offering plea agreements that provide relatively little benefit to defendants, without 6 regard for the effect that such a policy has on the [c]ourt's caseload, on the 7 administration of justice, on defendants, or on victims and the community." The 8 court further found "[t]he unintended effect of the Colfax County prosecutors' policy 9 has been to create an ever-expanding jury trial docket (from about 50 cases in 2019 10 to about 175 cases as of February 2022)," resulting in "an untenable bottleneck that 11 has rendered it impossible for defendants to get speedy trials that are guaranteed by 12 the federal and state constitutions." The court stated the situation is not explained by 13 the effects of COVID-19, as even "[w]ithout the pandemic, the jury trial docket 14 would still contain around 150 or more cases and would still be expanding each 15 month." The hearing on the motion to dismiss included extensive discussion of this 16 context, including the court questioning how the prosecutor's office planned to 17

"triage" the backlog of simple fourth-degree felony cases like this one. The 18 prosecutor, serving that jurisdiction since 2017, did not refute the court's 19

5

characterization and offered no clear plan to resolve the situation. Notably, the 1 prosecutor did not refute the court's analysis of the plea terms offered to Defendant, 2 offered three times without alteration, as "not a great plea," nor the court's 3 perspective that such "lukewarm plea agreement[s]" have resulted in "a whole 4 docket flooded with low-level felonies." In its order, the court stated it "has raised 5 this issue with the prosecution in 2020 and again in 2021, and nothing has changed." 6 Under this analysis, the court implicitly weighed "the reasons for the delay in this 7 case and other cases like it" heavily against the State. 8

{7} For the assertion-of-the-right factor, the district court found that "Defendant 9 has more than adequately asserted his speedy trial right in this case by filing about 10 five demands for speedy trial, in addition to the present motion to dismiss." 11

{8} For the prejudice factor, the district court found particularized prejudice in 12 Defendant having "lost employment and housing opportunities, his liberty [having] 13 been restricted to the boundaries of Colfax County for three years, and [his having] 14 been subject to arrest at any time during the past three years if he violates that 15 restriction." The court found exacerbation of "typical stress and anxiety" in such a 16 case due to "the extreme delay . . . attributable to the government." Alternatively, 17 the district court found presumed prejudice under "the prosecution's bureaucratic 18 indifference to the capacity of the criminal justice system [which] has caused a delay 19

6

so excessive that no showing of particularized prejudice is necessary." As support 1 for this presumed prejudice theory, the court cited State v. Taylor, 2015-NMCA-2 012, ¶ 25, 343 P.3d 199, which it summarized as holding "the defendant's speedy 3 trial right was violated without a particularized showing of prejudice" and quoted 4 State v. Palacio, 2009-NMCA-074, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 594, 212 P.3d 1148, "'It is well 5 established that bureaucratic indifference weighs against the [s]tate and can establish 6 a speedy trial violation.'" 7

{9} In granting Defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court implicitly 8 weighed the Barker factors and concluded, under a finding of either presumed or 9 particularized prejudice, that Defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated. The 10 State timely appealed. 11

{10} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court in a memorandum opinion, 12 concluding that Defendant failed to show particularized prejudice and that the other 13 three factors did not all weigh heavily to support a claim of presumed prejudice. 14 Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 26; see Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39 15 ("[G]enerally a defendant must show particularized prejudice of the kind against 16 which the speedy trial right is intended to protect. However, if the length of delay 17 and the reasons for the delay weigh heavily in [the] defendant's favor and [the] 18 defendant has asserted [the] right and not acquiesced to the delay, then the defendant 19

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need not show prejudice for a court to conclude that the defendant's right has been 1 violated."). 2

{11} Applying the Barker factors, the Court of Appeals first deferred to the district 3 court's written finding that this is a simple case, determined the three-year length of 4 delay triggered further analysis under Barker, and weighed the length-of-delay 5 factor heavily against the State. Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶¶ 3-4 & n.1. 6

{12} Analyzing the reasons-for-delay factor, the Court of Appeals organized the 7 total delay between arrest and dismissal into six specific periods, organization that 8 the parties do not contest and we adopt below. Id. ¶ 7. 9

{13} During Period (A), March 8, 2019, to June 14, 2019 (three months and one 10 week), the case was before the magistrate court. Id. ¶ 8. The Court of Appeals 11 attributed two months of this period to Defendant for his requested extension of time 12 regarding the preliminary examination and the remaining one month and one week 13 of the period to the State as negligent or administrative delay. Id. ¶ 9. 14

{14} During Period (B), June 15, 2019, to March 16, 2020 (nine months), the case 15 was bound over to the district court. Id. ¶ 7. The Court of Appeals confirmed and 16 accepted the State's concession that the delay during Period (B) was negligent or 17 administrative, noting the State "actively moved the case forward" only between 18 June and August. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Subsequent to the State's filings on August 26, 2019, 19

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the record reflects no action by the State in this period to advance the case and 1 includes a continuance due to the State not having obtained lab results as of March 2 2, 2020. The Court's assessment of Period (B) included a prior continuance of two 3 months attributable to Defendant's failure to appear at the docket call on January 6, 4 2020.¹Id. ¶ 10. 5

{15} During Period (C), March 17, 2020, to July 15, 2020 (four months), jury trials 6 were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. ¶ 12. The district court did not 7 assign this delay to either party, and accordingly, the Court of Appeals "presume[d] 8 the district court was correct." Id. ¶ 13. 9

{16} During Period (D), July 16, 2020, to November 15, 2020 (four months), the 10 suspension of jury trials was lifted, but the Court of Appeals concluded the State did 11 not take "any action to move the case forward." Id. ¶ 14. The Court weighed Period 12

(D) against the State as negligent or administrative delay. Id. 13

{17} During Period (E), November 16, 2020, to January 1, 2021 (one month and 14 two weeks), jury trials were again suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. ¶ 15

9

15. As with Period (C), the Court of Appeals again presumed the district court was 1 correct and did not assign this delay to either party. Id. 2

{18} Period (F), January 2, 2021, to March 16, 2022 (fourteen months and two 3 weeks), commenced when the suspension of jury trials was again lifted. Id. ¶ 16. The 4 Court of Appeals determined "the State made no attempt to move the case forward" 5 during Period (F), including representing to the district court in February 2022 "that 6 it had neither subpoenaed nor contacted its witnesses even though the trial was 7 scheduled in three weeks." Id. The Court also recognized that trial was rescheduled 8 twelve times by the district court during Period (F) without any reason being 9 provided and that Defendant filed two additional written demands for a speedy trial 10 and his motion to dismiss. Id. The Court of Appeals weighed Period (F) against the 11 State as "negligent or administrative delay related to a 'congested docket.'" Id. 12 (brackets omitted) (quoting Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 29). 13

{19} In weighing the aggregated periods of delay, the Court of Appeals recognized 14

"[t]he State's twenty-eight[-]month delay is twice as long as that necessary to trigger 15 a speedy trial inquiry of a simple case" and that, while "the State made some efforts 16 to take the case to trial, . . . there are long periods of time in which it either was 17 inactive, caused further delay, or did not move the case forward." Id. ¶ 17. The Court 18 then concluded "the State's delay weighs moderately to heavily" and that, "[b]ecause 19

10

the State's period of delay goes well beyond the [period of delay attributed to 1 Defendant and the neutral periods of delay], . . . this factor in total weighs 2 moderately to heavily against the State." Id. ¶ 18. 3

{20} Analyzing the assertion-of-the-right factor, the Court of Appeals concurred 4 with the district court "that Defendant 'more than adequately asserted his speedy 5 trial right'" but nonetheless did not weigh this factor heavily against the State. Id. ¶ 6

22. The Court stated that any one of Defendant's five assertions "would suffice"—7 we note six assertions in the record²—but explained two reasons for not weighing 8 the factor heavily. Id. ¶ 20. 9

First, other than his motion to dismiss, his assertions are pro forma and 10 therefore are given little weight. See [Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 41]. 11 Defendant's three written demands are identical to each other, the body 12 of each is one sentence, and none contain any argument or provide 13 details about the alleged violation. Second, Defendant's written 14 assertions and motion to dismiss were all filed within months of 15 scheduled trials. Such assertions merit less weight because, "the closer 16 to trial an assertion is made, the less weight it is given." [State v.] 17 Gurule, 2025-NMSC-010, ¶ 39[, 536 P.3d 775] (text only) (citation 18 omitted). 19

Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 20. 20

11

{21} For the prejudice factor, the Court of Appeals determined Defendant did not 1 show particularized prejudice, finding no evidentiary support in the record 2 substantiating the district court's conclusion otherwise. Id. ¶ 25 (citing State v. 3 Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 39, 283 P.3d 272); see Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, 4 ¶ 39 ("Allegations of counsel are not generally considered evidence."). 5

{22} The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of the motion to dismiss on the basis 6 of the lack of particularized prejudice and the other three Barker factors not weighing 7 heavily against the State as required under a presumed prejudice analysis. Id. ¶ 26. 8 Defendant timely appealed, and this Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari 9 as to whether the Court of Appeals properly weighed the Barker factors. 10

II. DISCUSSION 11

{23} In reviewing a speedy trial claim under the four-factor test in Barker, "We 12 defer to the district court's factual findings . . . but weigh each factor de novo." 13 Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 4. "The speedy trial analysis is not a rigid or mechanical 14 exercise, but rather 'a difficult and sensitive balancing process.'" Id. ¶ 5 (quoting 15 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). "The speedy trial right is 'amorphous, slippery, and 16 necessarily relative.'" Id. (quoting Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89 (2009)); see 17 also Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13 ("Barker's formulation 'necessarily compels 18 courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis'" (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. 19

12

at 530)). Notwithstanding its unique character among constitutional rights, Barker, 1

407 U.S. at 519, discussed further below, we remain mindful that "the right to a 2 speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment." 3 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). 4

A. The Length-of-Delay Factor Weighs Heavily Against the State 5

{24} The total delay in this case is more than three years between Defendant's 6 arrest and the grant of the motion to dismiss. Being three times the Garza guideline 7 for a simple case, this length of delay is presumptively prejudicial and requires 8 further inquiry into the Barker factors. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 21; see also State 9

v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 26, 366 P.3d 1121 ("A delay that crosses the threshold 10 for presumptive prejudice necessarily weighs in favor of the accused; the only 11 question is, how heavily?"). But see Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 49 ("We emphasize 12 that these guidelines should not be construed as bright-line tests. Rather, they are 13 meant to guide the district courts' determination of 'presumptively prejudicial' 14 delay."). 15

{25} As the first factor, the length of delay is not at issue here, as we agree with 16 both lower courts and both parties that this factor weighs heavily against the State. 17 See Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA ("The argument [of the brief in chief] shall set forth 18 a specific attack on any finding, or the finding shall be deemed conclusive."); Rule 19

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12-318(B) ("An answer brief shall conform to the requirements of the brief in 1 chief."). 2

B. The Reasons-for-Delay Factor Weighs Heavily Against the State 3

{26} As we explain herein, when analyzing the reasons-for-delay factor, the Court 4 of Appeals should have assigned heavy weight to the State's protracted delay 5 because that delay constituted bureaucratic indifference. Concurrently, this delay 6 was exacerbated by the prosecutorial policy of taking every case to trial and offering 7 pleas without favorable terms—a policy recognized by the district court as effecting 8 systemic delay in Colfax County. Under either of these considerations, we hold this 9 factor weighs heavily against the State. We additionally caution that when 10 determining the weight of this factor, courts should not apply methodologies that 11 improperly defray or excuse governmental culpability. 12

{27} "Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to 13 justify the delay. The reasons for a period of the delay may either heighten or temper 14 the prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay." Garza, 2009-15 NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the Court of 16 Appeals correctly noted, Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 23, the Barker test 17 considers three types of delay: 18

First, [a] deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the 19 defense should be weighted heavily against the government. Second, 20

14

negligent or administrative delay weighs less heavily but nevertheless 1 weighs against the [s]tate because the ultimate responsibility for such 2 circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the 3 defendant. Third, neutral delay, or delay justified by a valid reason, 4 does not weigh against either party. 5

Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 18 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 6 and citations omitted); see Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ("[D]ifferent weights should be 7 assigned to different reasons."). 8

1. The reasons-for-delay factor weighs heavily due to the protractedness of 9

the negligent delay and the inaction by the State amounting to 10

bureaucratic indifference 11

{28} Importantly for this case, we have recognized, "The degree of weight we 12 assign against the [s]tate for negligent delay is closely related to the length of delay: 13 '[O]ur toleration of such negligence varies inversely with its protractedness, and its 14 consequent threat to the fairness of the accused's trial.'" Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 15 26 (second alteration in original) (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 16 657 (1992)). We have further recognized that negligent delay may rise to the level 17 of bureaucratic indifference, which "weigh[s] more heavily against the state than 18 [negligence based on] simple case overload, particularly when the defendant has 19 attempted to safeguard his rights." Zurla v. State, 1990-NMSC-011, ¶ 16, 109 N.M. 20 640, 789 P.2d 588. As our Court of Appeals has stated, such bureaucratic 21 indifference may be demonstrated by "[t]he [s]tate's failure to act." Palacio, 2009-22

15

NMCA-074, ¶ 19. While Zurla and Palacio both concerned the state's insufficient 1 efforts to locate incarcerated defendants, the principle we cite is not bound to that 2 context. See Zurla, 1990-NMSC-011, ¶ 15 (criticizing "an unacceptable indifference 3 by the prosecution to its constitutional duty 'to make a diligent, good-faith effort to 4 bring a defendant to trial'" (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969))); see 5 also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 ("[P]ersistent neglect in concluding a criminal 6 prosecution indicates an uncommonly feeble interest in bringing an accused to 7 justice."); State v. Moore, 2016-NMCA-067, ¶ 14, 378 P.3d 552 (weighing eight 8 months heavily against the state where its "actions [in the magistrate court], or lack 9 thereof, qualify as bureaucratic indifference"); Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 15-17 10 (assigning heavy weight to the reasons-for-delay factor where "the [s]tate did 11 nothing to bring the case to trial . . . and offers no explanation for its inaction"); State 12

v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 25, 140 N.M. 676, 147 P.3d 885 ("[T]he [s]tate's 13 inaction in this case can be characterized as 'bureaucratic indifference,' which we 14 have held to weigh against the state more heavily than mere negligence." (quoting 15 State v. Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 17, 134 N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591)). 16

{29} The Court of Appeals characterized the State's culpable delay in the present 17 case—identified by the Court in Periods (A), (B), (D), and (F)—as negligent or 18 administrative, noting that "nothing in the record suggests deliberate or intentional 19

16

delay." Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶¶ 8-17. As discussed, the Court 1 weighed this factor moderately to heavily against the State, explaining that result as 2 follows: 3

The State's twenty-eight[-]month delay is twice as long as that 4 necessary to trigger a speedy trial inquiry of a simple case. During those 5 twenty-eight months, the record shows that the State made some efforts 6 to take the case to trial, but there are long periods of time in which it 7 either was inactive, caused further delay, or did not move the case 8 forward. 9

Id. ¶ 17 (citation omitted). 10

{30} We conclude the Court of Appeals underweighed the State's culpability where 11 Period (F) alone constitutes a period of negligent delay so protracted as to weigh this 12 factor heavily against the State and where the State's persistent inaction constitutes 13 bureaucratic indifference. The case remained in apparent limbo for more than a year 14 during Period (F), rescheduled almost every month without any stated reason, and 15

"the State made no attempt to move the case forward" during this period. Id. ¶ 16. 16 Meanwhile, Defendant asserted his desire for a speedy trial during Period (F) 17 through two written motions and his motion to dismiss, thereby "attempt[ing] to 18 safeguard his rights" in a manner further supporting heavy State culpability. Zurla, 19 1990-NMSC-011, ¶ 16. Despite these facts, and despite this fourteen-month-and-20 two-week period of delay ending only due to dismissal, the Court of Appeals 21 classified the delay as ordinary negligent or administrative delay. Schuster, A-1-CA-22

17

40322, mem. op. ¶ 16. Further, we note the State's final action in the record to 1 actually advance this case occurred on August 26, 2019, during Period (B)—one 2 year and four months before Period (F) began—thus resolving any doubts as to 3 whether the State's inaction was sufficiently protracted to result in heavy weight of 4 the factor. See id. ¶¶ 10-16. We exclude the five months and two weeks of delay of 5 Periods (C) and (E) from this consideration, during which periods jury trials were 6 suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic; even with that exclusion, however, the 7 facts otherwise between August 29, 2019, and the grant of the motion to dismiss on 8 March 16, 2022, clearly demonstrate the State's bureaucratic indifference in this 9 case, bolstering the heavy weight of the factor in favor of Defendant's claim. 10

{31} The State does not meaningfully refute these facts. The State primarily argues 11 that the factor should not weigh heavily where "[t]here is nothing in the record 12 suggesting that the delay was intentional or tantamount to intentional." Attempting 13 to answer Defendant's invocation of Taylor, the State further claims, without 14 supporting detail, that this case does not involve conduct that falls within the 15

"'inexcusably indifferent'" governmental conduct in that case. 16

{32} The State's cursory arguments fail. First, as our caselaw cited herein 17 establishes, intentionality is not a requirement for concluding heavy weight of the 18 factor either under protractedness of negligent delay generally or under bureaucratic 19

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indifference specifically. Second, Taylor characterized as "inexcusably indifferent" 1 the state's complete inaction during a fifteen-month period of delay between a 2 continuance and a trial setting, in dereliction of its constitutional duty to bring the 3 defendant to trial. 2015-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 14-16; see id. ¶ 16 ("[T]his is a case in which 4 the [s]tate was inexcusably indifferent to its affirmative obligation to bring a simple 5 case to trial."). Given the comparable facts of Period (F), much less the State's 6 inaction dating back to Period (B), we see the characterization in Taylor as aptly 7 invoked here by Defendant, and the State presents no meaningful argument under 8 the facts otherwise. The State's anemic rebuttal is significant here, as the State, 9

"consistent with general principles regarding claims of prejudice to a criminal 10 defendant's constitutional rights," bears the burden "to demonstrate that, on balance, 11 the defendant's speedy trial right was not violated." Zurla, 1990-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 28-12

29. 13

{33} The dissent asserts that classifying otherwise negligent delay as bureaucratic 14 indifference requires evidence the state took no affirmative steps to advance a case 15 despite possessing available resources to do so, whereas "[h]ere there is no action 16 the State failed to take." Dissent ¶¶ 83-86. We agree that the essence of bureaucratic 17 indifference under Zurla, Palacio, and Taylor is the state's failure to act where it 18 otherwise could do so. Zurla, 1990-NMSC-011, ¶ 15; Palacio, 2009-NMCA-074, ¶ 19

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19; Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 14-16. However, the dissent's suggestion that the 1 State took all available steps to advance this case, dissent ¶ 85, is refuted both by the 2 governmental inaction in the record, discussed above, and by our caselaw's frequent 3 recognition that "[i]t is ultimately the state's duty to make sure that defendants are 4 brought to trial in a timely manner." Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 25 (citing Barker, 5

407 U.S. at 527); see Barker, 407 U.S. at 527 ("A defendant has no duty to bring 6 himself to trial; the [s]tate has that duty as well as the duty of [e]nsuring that the trial 7 is consistent with due process."); see also Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 (quoting 8 Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 25). We echo the conclusion in Stock that the state has a 9 responsibility "to ascertain what [is] happening in [a] case or to move the case 10 forward," and nothing in this case would support that the State exerted appreciable 11 effort to meet such a responsibility. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 25. For these reasons, 12 we weigh this factor heavily against the State. 13

2. The reasons-for-delay factor weighs heavily due to the prosecutorial 14

policy exacerbating delay as found by the district court 15

{34} Additionally, Defendant points to the district court's findings "that the delay 16 in this case resulted from the policy of the Colfax County district attorney's office" 17 of refusing to offer "meaningful pleas or diversion [programs]" even for low-level 18 felonies, resulting in unique systemic congestion that rendered speedy trials 19 unavailable to defendants in that jurisdiction. 20

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{35} The Court of Appeals made no mention whatsoever of the district court's 1 findings regarding the determinative role in the delay played by the relevant 2 prosecutorial "policy of prosecuting all types of cases to the fullest extent and 3 offering plea agreements that provide relatively little benefit to defendants." This 4 absence is significant because (1) the district court specifically attributed the reasons 5 for the two-year-and-four-month governmental delay to the "untenable bottleneck" 6 of the county's trial docket created by this prosecutorial policy and (2) factual 7 findings by the district court in a speedy trial claim are entitled to deference, Serros, 8 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 20. Applying that deference, and in the absence of relevant 9 rebuttal by the State, we conclude the prosecutorial policy identified by the district 10 court provides an independent basis for the reasons-for-delay factor to weigh heavily 11 against the State. 12

{36} As discussed above, the district court found that the prosecutorial policy in 13 question was responsible "for the delay in this case and other cases like it" where 14 the resultant congestion of the trial docket "has rendered it impossible for defendants 15 to get speedy trials." The court further found the relevant policy had been exercised 16 for at least five years, the "ever-expanding jury trial docket" was not attributable to 17 the COVID-19 pandemic, and "nothing has changed" in this situation despite the 18 court raising the issue with the prosecution in each of the previous two years. These 19

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findings in the district court's order followed extensive discussion of these issues at 1 the hearing on the motion to dismiss. The discussion included the following 2 characterizations by the court, unrebutted by the prosecutor: 3 Analyzing the plea that was offered [in this fourth-degree felony case], 4 it's not a great plea. . . . What's happening now is we just have a whole 5 docket flooded with low-level felonies. . . . The court can't possibly 6 have 100, 150 jury trials. We don't even have enough people in the 7 county to serve on those juries. . . . The way I see it is that it's the 8 [prosecutor's] office that's in complete control over how many cases 9 are maintained on the court's docket [and over] how many cases that 10 the public defenders have to have on their caseload. 11

While the issues were discussed at length by the court and counsel for both parties, 12 the existence and effect of the prosecutorial policy at issue was not meaningfully 13 rebutted by the State at the hearing. Under the foregoing evidence, we have no 14 trouble concluding the district court's findings regarding the relevant prosecutorial 15 policy are sufficiently substantiated by the record to warrant deference. 16

{37} Before this Court, the State effectively concedes the issue. The State 17 acknowledges the district court's relevant findings and relies on the premise that, 18

"even if the prosecution's plea bargaining approach resulted in more trials and a 19 larger trial docket, that does not equate to intentional delay or anything functionally 20 equivalent." As we have discussed, intentionality is not a requirement for heavy 21 culpability for this factor. 22

22

{38} The dissent contends the district court's findings are not entitled to deference 1 because they were not supported by substantial evidence in the record, where the 2 hearing consisted only of discussion between the court and counsel for both parties. 3 Dissent ¶¶ 88-90. While we agree the evidentiary value of this hearing was limited, 4 the dissent ignores that the district court inherently took judicial notice of 5 adjudicative facts well within its purview under Rule 11-201 NMRA. Under the rule, 6 a court "at any stage of the proceeding" may sua sponte take notice of facts "not 7 subject to reasonable dispute because [they are] generally known within the court's 8 territorial jurisdiction[ or] can be accurately and readily determined from sources 9 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Rule 11-201(B)-(D). In its order, 10 regarding "the reasons for the delay in this case and other cases like it," the district 11 court implicitly took judicial notice of facts sufficient to establish the relevant policy 12 based on the court's own experience in its territorial jurisdiction, including: 13

• The absence of a "rule of criminal procedure in the district courts setting forth 14 a time limit for trial as there is in the magistrate courts" which would provide 15

"incentive for prosecutors in Colfax County to seek early and efficient 16 resolution of cases"; 17

• The "policy" exercised by "[t]he prosecutors who have worked in Colfax 18 County over the last five years or more, and more particularly the prosecutors 19

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who have been involved [in] this case" "of prosecuting all types of cases to 1 the fullest extent and offering plea agreements that provide relatively little 2 benefit to defendants"; 3

• The court's "ever-expanding jury trial docket (from about 50 cases in 2019 to 4 about 175 cases as of February 2022)," resulting in "an untenable bottleneck 5 that has rendered it impossible for defendants to get speedy trials"; 6

• The effects of the pandemic not being responsible for the congested jury trial 7 docket in Colfax County, which "would still contain around 150 or more cases 8 and would still be expanding each month" under the prosecutorial policy; and 9

• The court having "raised this issue with the prosecution in 2020 and again in 10 2021, and nothing has changed." 11

Additionally, the concerns of Rule 11-201(E) (opportunity to be heard) are not 12 raised, as the State had ample opportunity to address the court's noticed facts at the 13 hearing and since, including in its briefing here. In that context, the lack of rebuttal 14 by the prosecutor on relevant circumstances is significant. The dissent cites 15 anecdotal information shared by the prosecutor at the hearing, such as that her own 16 personal caseload had decreased during the relevant period, dissent ¶ 89, but nothing 17 in the prosecutor's commentary or the State's briefing here impugns the district 18

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court's factual findings supporting the existence of the relevant policy affecting the 1 Colfax County trial docket generally. 2

{39} The dissent also asserts the district court's commentary on the specific plea 3 terms offered to Defendant was improper. Dissent ¶ 102. We disagree. The issue 4 before the court included whether the State was culpable for unreasonable delay in 5 violation of Defendant's right to a speedy trial. Discussion at the hearing relevantly 6 included whether a prosecutorial policy existed in tension with the State's obligation 7 to move cases forward, including Defendant's case. In that context, it was not 8 improper for the court to consider whether the prosecution had taken available steps 9 to advance Defendant's three-year-old case, including offering reasonable plea 10 terms. This was not a hearing for judicial approval of the plea itself, and thus the 11 dissent's citations invoking the specter of judicial curtailment of prosecutorial 12 discretion are inapposite. Dissent ¶ 103. Discussion of a potential violation of a 13 defendant's speedy trial right does not bear on the prosecutor's discretion to offer 14 plea terms, and such discretion does not affect the district court's ability to act in 15 furtherance of a defendant's rights. The dissent's misplaced concerns distract from 16 our weighty interests here: "For more than one hundred years this Court has 17 recognized the authority of courts to act to protect a defendant's fundamental rights." 18 State v. Vasquez, 2025-NMSC-008, ¶ 17, 563 P.3d 901 (citing State v. Garcia, 1914-19

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NMSC-065, ¶ 18, 19 N.M. 414, 143 P. 1012 (on motion for rehearing)); see Garcia, 1 1914-NMSC-065, ¶ 18 ("There exists in every court, however, an inherent power to 2 see that a [person]'s fundamental rights are protected in every case."). 3

{40} We have previously recognized the role of a prosecutorial policy in 4 contributing to the heavy weight of the reasons-for-delay factor. In Serros, the state 5 exercised a policy in sexual abuse cases of "restrict[ing] interviews of the victim and 6 the victim's family" until the conclusion of plea negotiations. 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 7

71. While "mindful of the need to avoid re-traumatizing victims and their families," 8 we concluded the resultant delay in that case "illustrates the havoc that such a policy 9 can wreak on an accused's right to a speedy trial." Id. ¶ 72. In combination with 10 other negligent delay by the state, we held this prosecutorial policy resulted in the 11 factor weighing heavily in the defendant's favor. Id. ¶ 75. 12

{41} In this case, deferring to the district court's findings, we conclude the pattern 13 of unexplained trial continuances—sixteen between January 2020 and February 14 2022, only two of which were filed during pandemic-related trial suspensions—was 15 exacerbated, if not fully caused, by the prosecutorial policy at issue. Under this 16 conclusion, the systemic delay created by the policy and faced by Defendant would 17 sustain our holding of heavy weight for this factor even apart from our analysis 18 above regarding negligent delay and bureaucratic indifference. Doubtless, in the 19

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present case these causes of heavy delay are intertwined. We address them separately 1 to clarify the importance of a court incorporating each into its reasons-for-delay 2 analysis. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (summarizing that the factors "must be 3 considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant"). 4

3. Proper methodology in weighing the reasons-for-delay factor 5

{42} We take this opportunity to review methodologies the Court of Appeals may 6 have applied in reaching its moderate-to-heavy result for the reasons-for-delay 7 factor. We clarify that proper reasons-for-delay analysis focuses on the actual 8 culpability of the parties, not relative culpability or a balancing of the months of 9 delay attributable to each party. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3 ("The supreme court 10

. . . shall have a superintending control over all inferior courts."). The Court of 11 Appeals assessed that "[d]uring those twenty-eight months [attributable to the State], 12 the record shows that the State made some efforts to take the case to trial, but there 13 are long periods of time in which it either was inactive, caused further delay, or did 14 not move the case forward." Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 17. This language 15 invites the question of how the Court weighed this factor. 16

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{43} Because the Court of Appeals did not assign individual weights to the six 1 specific periods of delay,³we do not know how it reached its conclusion. For 2 instance, if the Court determined the cited "long periods" of governmental delay that 3 clearly exceeded the applicable Garza guideline should weigh only moderately to 4 heavily against the State, then the law dictates a different result, as discussed. That 5 is, while the Court's methodology would be proper if it focused on the culpability of 6 the parties for the extreme delay, with the ultimate inquiry being whether the State's 7 actions created unconstitutional delay, its ultimate conclusion was incorrect. 8

{44} Alternatively, however, if the Court of Appeals' conclusion of moderate-to-9 heavy weight reflects either that the Court (1) was describing the range of the State's 10 culpability across its multiple periods of delay or (2) averaged the weights of those 11 multiple periods of delay, then applying either methodology was error. If the former, 12 the Court's result presumably conveys the range between the State's moderate 13 culpability in Periods (A) and/or (B) and its heavy culpability in Periods (D) and/or 14 (F); if the latter, the Court's result presumably conveys the State's heavy culpability 15

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in one or more periods in combination with periods of lesser culpability. The effect 1 of either methodology is to improperly reduce or excuse the State's culpability. 2

{45} In a case such as this one, wherein a sufficiently prolonged period of negligent 3 delay or a sufficient period of bureaucratic indifference warrants heavy weight of 4 the factor against the state, such a critical mass of heavy delay cannot be ameliorated 5 or exonerated by the existence of additional delay of lesser weight. We offer an 6 extreme hypothetical to illustrate the improper effect otherwise: a defendant seeking 7 a speedy trial who initially experiences six months of negligent delay warranting 8 only moderate weight against the state, then endures five years of complete inaction 9 by the state in dereliction of its constitutional duty to bring the defendant to trial. In 10 such a case, the initial six-month period of delay is ancillary to the critical analysis: 11 is the state responsible for delay of sufficient length and culpability to constitute 12 heavy weight of the factor? To be clear, a result of less-than-heavy weight would be 13 error in the hypothetical if reached either through characterizing the range of the 14 initial six-month and subsequent five-year periods of delay or through averaging the 15 two periods; put simply, governmental delay that crosses such a factual threshold of 16 length and degree warrants heavy weight of the reasons-for-delay factor against the 17 state, and dissipation of that weight by additional delay is patently illogical. 18

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{46} In this vein, we also caution against the Court of Appeals' implicit 1 consideration of an improper offset or counterbalancing proposition in concluding 2 its reasons-for-delay analysis. The Court ended its weighing of the periods of delay 3 by assessing two months of delay against Defendant, six neutrally, and twenty-eight 4 against the State. Then, the Court closed by stating, "Because the State's period of 5 delay goes well beyond the others, we conclude this factor in total weighs moderately 6 to heavily against the State." Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 18 (emphasis 7 added). This articulation directly implies that the Court's result in weighing the 8 periods of delay would have been different if the twenty-eight months of State 9 culpability had been exceeded in length by the delay attributable to Defendant or 10 neutrally; implicitly, for example, thirty months of delay by Defendant or of neutral 11 delay would have offset or counterbalanced the State's twenty-eight months of 12 delay, thereby exonerating a blatant violation of the State's constitutional duty. 13

{47} Nothing in Barker or its progeny directs application of an offset or 14 counterbalancing proposition within the reasons-for-delay factor, and we caution 15 lower courts against applying such a methodology. In the ultimate balancing of the 16 four factors, Barker referred to factors on one side of the analysis 17

"counterbalancing" factors on the other side, 407 U.S. at 534, as makes sense in any 18 balancing test, but no such approach has been applied in this line of cases within the 19

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reasons-for-delay analysis to mitigate or excuse governmental responsibility. We 1 recognize that the Doggett Court paraphrased reasons-for-delay analysis as "whether 2 the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that [uncommonly 3 long] delay," but that was in the context of a single eight-and-a-half-year block of 4 delay where the government's culpability for that single block was at issue. See 505 5 U.S. at 651-52 (emphasis added). 6

{48} The reasons-for-delay factor "has been described as the focal inquiry in the 7 speedy trial balancing test." State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 60, 128 N.M. 192, 8

991 P.2d 477 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Barker instructs that 9 to analyze this second factor, we consider "the reason the government assigns to 10 justify the delay." 407 U.S. at 531. We interpret this to mean that the focus of the 11 reasons-for-delay factor is to what degree, if any, the state bears responsibility for 12 the pretrial delay. See Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 26 ("A delay that crosses the 13 threshold for presumptive prejudice necessarily weighs in favor of the accused; the 14 only question is, how heavily?"). The focus of the second factor is not length-of-15 delay or the defendant's actions; these are the focus of factors one and three. While 16 the other factors are "[c]losely related" to the reasons for delay, and extreme delay 17 can increase the culpability of a party, see Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Zurla, 1990-18 NMSC-011, ¶ 15, analysis of this factor should center on the length and degree of 19

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delay at the hands of the state. Using methodologies that calculate the state's relative 1 culpability—that effectively mitigate or even excuse the state's actual culpability—2 loses sight of the ultimate inquiry: was the state responsible for unconstitutional 3 delay? We therefore abrogate any cases inasmuch as they improperly offset delay 4 between the parties. See, e.g., State v. Castro, 2017-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 22-24, 402 P.3d 5 688; State v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 28, 396 P.3d 171; State v. Eskridge, 1997-6 NMCA-106, ¶ 15, 124 N.M. 227, 947 P.2d 502. 7

C. The Assertion-of-the-Right Factor Weighs Heavily Against the State 8

{49} In analyzing the third Barker factor, the Court of Appeals agreed with the 9 district court that "Defendant adequately asserted his right to a speedy trial" but 10 nonetheless did "not assign heavy weight to these [assertions]." Schuster, A-1-CA-11 40322, mem. op. ¶ 20. Citing precedent, the Court reasoned that less weight was 12 warranted where (1) Defendant's assertions, other than the motion to dismiss, were 13 pro forma and (2) "Defendant's written assertions and motion to dismiss were all 14 filed within months of scheduled trials." Id. In other words, the Court assigned less-15 than-heavy weight to Defendant's assertions based on their lack of force and their 16 proximity to trial. Under Barker, Garza, and Ochoa, we conclude the evidence 17 supports heavy weight of this factor in Defendant's favor. 18

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{50} The Barker Court adopted the assertion-of-the-right factor in significant part 1 as a means to discern the legitimacy of a defendant's stated desire for a speedy trial, 2 as this right—"generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the 3 Constitution for the protection of the accused"—may operate "in opposition to[] the 4 interests of the accused." 407 U.S. at 519; id. at 521 ("[D]eprivation of the right may 5 work to the accused's advantage. Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic."). Thus, 6 by adopting "the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy 7 trial" as a factor, the Barker Court recognized this approach "allows the trial court 8 to exercise a judicial discretion based on the circumstances . . . [and] would also 9 allow a court to weigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed to 10 attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection." Id. at 528-29. Barker 11 thereby emphasized discretion and flexibility for courts in seeking to discern under 12 its assertion-of-the-right analysis whether a defendant legitimately sought a speedy 13 trial or was merely pursuing such a claim as a tactic. The Barker Court further stated 14 that, because "[t]he more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to 15 complain," an assertion of the right "is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in 16 determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right." Id. at 531-32. 17 Notably, the determinative consideration in Barker in rejecting the defendant's claim 18 was evidence refuting the legitimacy of his assertions of the right: the defendant 19

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initially acquiesced to delay—"[t]he probable reason" being his "gambling" on his 1 codefendant's acquittal—and then began objecting to continuances only after the 2 codefendant's conviction. Id. at 534-36 ("More important than the absence of serious 3 prejudice[] is the fact that Barker did not want a speedy trial."). 4

{51} Garza and Ochoa reflect this perspective on the role of the assertion-of-the-5 right factor under Barker, pointing to relevant considerations that may help a court 6 in reaching an accurate assessment of the legitimacy of the defendant's stated desire 7 for a speedy trial. In Garza, we explained that the timing and manner of a defendant's 8 assertions of the right inform the "'frequency and force'" of such assertions as 9 considered in Barker, and that "the defendant's actions with regard to the delay" 10 may be relevant to the weight of this factor. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 32 (quoting 11 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529); see id. ("[T]he timeliness and vigor with which the right 12 is asserted may be considered as an indication of whether a defendant was denied 13 needed access to speedy trial over his objection or whether the issue was raised on 14 appeal as afterthought."). Following Barker, we read this guidance in Garza to direct 15 that a defendant's acquiescence or contribution to delay may cast doubt on the 16 legitimacy of the defendant's stated desire for a speedy trial. 17

{52} Similarly in Ochoa, we reiterated "the importance of closely examining the 18 circumstances of each case," including "a defendant's actions with regard to the 19

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delay, such as filing frivolous motions or procedural maneuvers." 2017-NMSC-031, 1 ¶ 42. In this vein, courts "also consider the consistency of a defendant's legal 2 positions with respect to the delay," echoing the ultimate analysis and holding in 3 Barker against the defendant. Id. On the other hand, such consistency of a 4 defendant's legal position will be bolstered by numerous assertions, even if pro 5 forma, as such assertions are nonetheless "entitled to strong evidentiary weight." 6 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32 (emphasis added). So, while a pro forma speedy trial 7 demand filed by defense counsel upon entering appearance is "afforded relatively 8 little weight," Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 16, consistent, "clear and repeated 9 assertions throughout the entirety of [a] case" should be given more weight, even if 10 pro forma, Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 11 Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 77); see Serros, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶ 77 (holding that 12 three pro forma assertions were entitled to weight); see also Urban, 2004-NMSC-13 007, ¶¶ 7, 16 (holding that a pro forma speedy trial demand, a pro se motion for 14 speedy trial filed directly after arraignment, and a motion to dismiss for a speedy 15 trial violation filed twelve days before trial weighed against the state); State v. 16 Montoya, 2015-NMCA-056, ¶ 24, 348 P.3d 1057 (explaining that the defendant's 17 pro forma demand for a speedy trial was not "insignificant in light of the overall 18 circumstances [of the] case"). 19

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{53} We note, however, these considerations do not shift the state's burden. Ochoa, 1 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 14 ("[T]he burden of persuasion rests on the [s]tate to 2 demonstrate that, on balance, there was no violation of the right to a speedy trial." 3 (citing Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 22)). 4

{54} From these precedential perspectives, we glean an important principle: where 5 the facts such as the force and frequency of the defendant's assertions establish the 6 legitimacy of the defendant's stated desire for a speedy trial and where that 7 conclusion is not refuted by contrary evidence, the critical inquiry in Barker is 8 satisfied. In such a case, the factor should weigh heavily in favor of the defendant, 9 rather than a court applying a hypertechnical standard that effectively underweighs 10 a legitimate assertion of the right. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; Garza, 2009-11 NMSC-038, ¶ 32 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 529); Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 42; 12 see also Seth Osnowitz, Note, Demanding a Speedy Trial: Re-Evaluating the 13 Assertion Factor in the Barker v. Wingo Test, 67 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 273, 295 14 (2016) ("Ambiguous standards for what constitutes a sufficiently vigorous or timely 15 assertion—and the omnipresent argument of defendants acquiescing to delays—16 make the assertion[-of-the-right] factor an excuse for courts to unjustly refuse to 17 dismiss cases."). 18

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{55} The dissent mistakes our clarification of precedent regarding the assertion-of-1 the-right factor as announcing a new rule which "overrules our precedent" by 2

"assigning heavy weight to pro forma assertions" rather than "assigning [them] little 3 weight." Dissent ¶¶ 115-16. This mischaracterization of our discussion above 4 ignores the premise of our stated principle: while a single pro forma assertion of the 5 right in isolation warrants only little weight under our precedent, a defendant's 6 collective assertions—including pro forma assertions—should weigh heavily when 7 their combined force and frequency indicate the legitimacy of the defendant's stated 8 desire for a speedy trial, unless refuted by contrary evidence. As Barker made clear, 9 the responsibility to convey such a desire with sufficient force and frequency rests 10 with the defendant. 407 U.S. at 529, 532-33. Because Defendant's collective 11 assertions demonstrate such sufficiency, we need not clarify the principle further. 12

{56} Applied here, we agree with the district court that "Defendant . . . more than 13 adequately asserted his speedy trial right in this case" through his six⁴assertions of 14 the right, including his motion to dismiss. While Defendant's written demands for a 15 speedy trial prior to the motion to dismiss were each a single-sentence assertion of 16

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the right unaccompanied by further argument under the facts or legal authority, the 1 limited force of these assertions individually does not end the analysis. First, Barker 2 identified force and frequency as relevant considerations in assigning proper weight 3 to this factor, without suggesting that imperfection in either consideration precludes 4 the factor from weighing heavily. 407 U.S. at 529. The frequency of Defendant's 5 assertions, including multiple assertions during the course of the unexplained 6 continuances, support a conclusion that his stated desire for a speedy trial is 7 legitimate. Stated differently, we conclude Defendant's six assertions over the span 8 of this case refute the concern raised in Garza that a defendant may have raised the 9 issue simply as an "afterthought." 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 32. Second, this conclusion 10 of legitimacy is bolstered by the substantial force of Defendant's motion to dismiss, 11 and the cursory nature of the other written assertions, though relevant, does not undo 12 the evidence supporting the conclusion. Third, the circumstances of this case, 13 including Defendant's actions with regard to the governmental delay, include no 14 contrary evidence to refute the legitimacy of his stated desire for a speedy trial. 15 Accordingly, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' implicit determination that the 16 weight of the factor should be diminished by some of Defendant's assertions lacking 17 force because they were deemed pro forma; such an approach loses sight of the larger 18 purpose of the factor analysis under Barker. 19

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{57} As to timeliness, on this record we cannot reduce the weight of Defendant's 1 second, third, and fourth written assertions due to being filed close to scheduled trials 2 considering they occurred within an almost uninterrupted pattern of monthly trial 3 continuances. In other words, amid such a string of continuances—as discussed, 4 sixteen between January of 2020 and February of 2022—how could a written 5 demand for a speedy trial not fall "within months of scheduled trials"? Schuster, A-6 1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 20. Accordingly, the timing of Defendant's written 7 demands does not raise concerns that his stated desire was no more than a last-ditch 8 stratagem as trial neared. See, e.g., State v. Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 24, 134 N.M. 9 648, 81 P.3d 591 ("Because [the d]efendant waited until the eleventh hour to 10 specifically and meaningfully invoke a ruling on the speedy trial issue, we find this 11 factor weighs only slightly in his favor."). 12

{58} In sum, the frequency of Defendant's assertions and the force of his motion to 13 dismiss support the legitimacy of his stated desire for a speedy trial, and apart from 14 his initial sixty-day continuance pursuant to the preliminary examination,⁵nothing 15

39

in the record presents contrary evidence refuting that Defendant's stated desire to 1 exercise his constitutional right was genuine. Further, we do not penalize the 2 evidence supporting heavy weight of the factor based on the timing or manner of the 3 assertions. Consequently, the critical inquiry for this factor is satisfied, and we weigh 4 this factor heavily in Defendant's favor. 5

D. We Reverse Without Reaching Analysis of the Prejudice Factor 6

{59} As discussed, Defendant challenges the Court of Appeals' determination that 7 Defendant did not show particularized prejudice, further asserting the Court of 8 Appeals ignored its own precedent in concluding his claimed prejudice was not 9 particularized. 10

{60} Because we have held that each of the first three factors weighs heavily 11 against the State, however, we need not reach prejudice analysis to conclude that 12 Defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39. As 13 we stated in Zurla: 14

[W]hen the state unjustifiably has delayed a defendant's trial beyond a 15 reasonable time, disregarding the defendant's demand for an early trial, 16 undue emphasis should not be placed on whether the defendant is able 17 to adduce evidence of identifiable prejudice. To hold otherwise would 18 in effect attribute to this factor "talismanic qualities" antithetical to the 19 understanding that animated Barker. 20

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