ALJ'S ORDER AWARDING BENEFITS.
Rural King argues that the ALJ erred in awarding permanent total disability because the evidence shows Sallie is still capable of performing sedentary work, pointing to her own statements that she could "probably"
perform an office job with the ability to elevate her leg, her documented history of clerical and managerial positions, and medical opinions—particularly Dr. Jenkinson's—that do not restrict her from such work. Rural King contends that Sallie's year‑long return to work, albeit accommodated, demonstrates she is not completely and permanently unable to perform any type of employment as required by statute, and thus the ALJ's conclusion was not supported by the substantial evidence standard. We disagree.
An ALJ is the finder of fact in workers' compensation claims and can grant or deny benefits. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.275; Lexington Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't v. Gosper, 671 S.W.3d 184, 200 (Ky. 2023) "As the
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finder of fact, the ALJ, 'and not the reviewing court, has the authority to determine the quality, character and substance of the evidence presented.'"
Thompson Catering & Special Events v. Costello, 701 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Ky. 2024) (quoting Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985)). Additionally, the "ALJ has sole discretion to decide whom and what to believe, and may reject any testimony and believe or disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of whether it comes from the same witness or the same adversary party's total proof." Gosper, 671 S.W.3d at 198 198. The Board conducts the first level of review, which focuses on error correction. KRS 342.285. The Court of Appeals conducts the second level of review to verify precedent was properly identified and followed and to check for flagrant errors causing gross injustice. KRS 342.290. Although appeals to this Court are authorized under Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution, our review is limited to novel statutory questions, reconsideration of precedent, or constitutional issues, and we do not "third guess" the Board and Court of Appeals on the same evidence. Gosper, 671 S.W.3d at 200; W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Ky. 1992).
We review factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard, which means the findings must be unreasonable under the evidence presented. Lab'y Corp of Am. v. Smith, 701 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Ky. 2024); Gosper, 671 S.W.3d at
199. When the party bearing the burden of proof prevails before the ALJ, appellate review under KRS 342.285 is highly deferential: the decision must be affirmed so long as it is supported by any substantial evidence, and an
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appellate court may not reweigh the record or substitute its judgment for the fact‑finder's. Gosper, 671 S.W.3d at 199 (quoting Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986)). Substantial evidence is evidence that is meaningful and relevant, and strong enough to persuade a reasonable person to reach a conclusion. Estate of Perkins by Perkins v. N. Am. Stainless, 724 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Ky. 2025); Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971).
The ALJ found that Sallie sustained a serious, work‑related crush injury to her right foot that resulted in lasting pain, neuropathic symptoms, limited mobility, and functional restrictions documented throughout her medical treatment. The ALJ relied on the restrictions imposed by Dr. Manson and Dr. McEldowney—both of whom limited her standing and walking, prohibited climbing, squatting, kneeling, crouching, and stooping, and required that she elevate her foot as needed—which the ALJ found were incompatible with the physical demands of both her pre‑injury job at Rural King and her previous clerical and managerial positions. The ALJ also credited Sallie's testimony describing unpredictable daily pain, swelling, difficulty balancing, the need to keep her foot elevated, and her inability to perform job tasks reliably, as well as her failed attempt to return to work despite significant accommodations such as reduced hours, the ability to sit on a stool, and reliance on coworkers to perform essential duties. Taken together, the ALJ found that Sallie could not perform work on a regular and sustained basis in a competitive economy and
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therefore awarded permanent total disability benefits beginning on the date of injury, with appropriate offsets for post‑injury wages. Based on the evidence presented, the ALJ's findings are not unreasonable and so we will not disturb them. The essence of Rural King's argument is that other evidence—testimony from Sallie and Dr. Jenkinson— supported a finding that Sallie could work. This argument does not justify reversal because "[a]lthough a party may note evidence which would have supported a conclusion contrary to the ALJ's decision, such evidence is not an adequate basis for reversal on appeal." Ira A. Watson Dep't Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Ky. 2000) (citing McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 514 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1974)).
The ALJ rejected Rural King's claim that Sallie's testimony showed she could work, explaining that although she acknowledged she might "probably"
perform some seated tasks, her overall testimony described unpredictable daily pain, the need to elevate her foot frequently, difficulty standing or walking even for short periods, and an inability to be a reliable employee; when considered alongside the significant medical restrictions and her failed, heavily accommodated attempt to return to work, the ALJ found her testimony credible and supportive of the conclusion that she could not sustain regular employment in a competitive economy.
The ALJ also rejected Rural King's reliance on the medical opinion suggesting Sallie could return to work. One evaluator—Dr. Jenkinson— assigned no formal restrictions, which the ALJ noted in its order. This does not
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compel reversal, though, because the law empowers ALJ's to weigh "the conflicting medical testimony, determine[ ] the quality, character, and substance of the evidence, and assess[ ] what it believed to be an appropriate impairment rating." Smith, 701 S.W.3d at 235. The question of resolving conflicting medical testimony is within the exclusive province of the finder of fact. Pruitt v. Bugg Bros., 547 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Ky. 1977). The ALJ found that more persuasive and detailed medical evidence came from Dr. Manson and Dr. McEldowney, both of whom documented significant functional limitations incompatible with regular employment. The ALJ found that these latter opinions were more consistent with Sallie's long-term treatment records, her persistent neuropathic symptoms, and her unsuccessful return to work despite accommodations. Therefore, the ALJ found that the isolated opinion suggesting she could work did not outweigh the substantial evidence of ongoing disability.
Given the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's findings—including Sallie's credible testimony, the significant restrictions documented by Dr. Manson and Dr. McEldowney, and her accommodated, but unsuccessful return to work—the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the award. Because Rural King's arguments ultimately seek to reweigh evidence the ALJ was entitled to credit, and because the record amply supports the determination of permanent total disability, we likewise affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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III. CONCLUSION
The ALJ based his decision on substantial evidence. Both the Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ's award of benefits. We find no error in the ALJ's findings of fact and decision to award Sallie permanent total disability benefits. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals' opinion. All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, RURAL KING SUPPLY, INC.:
W. Clayton Stone, II
Donnie James Niehaus
Walton Niehaus Law, PLLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, EVELYN SALLIE:
McKinnley Morgan
W. Gerald Vanover
Morgan Collins Yeast & Salyer Michael Fleet Johnson
Michael Fleet Johnson Law Office, PSC
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
Hon. Greg Allen
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD:
Michael Wayne Alvey, Chairman