Michael Baluja v. City of Coral Gables

2 Opinion of the Court 25-13258 of 1994 ("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) et seq. On appeal, Baluja argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his lawsuit because it found that he lacked standing. Additionally, Baluja asks us to hold that his complaint stated a claim.

We write only for the parties who are already familiar with the facts. Therefore, we include only so many of the facts as is ap- propriate to understand our opinion.

I. FACTS

Baluja is an officer in the Coral Gables Police Department and has worked in that capacity for over twenty years. He also serves in the United States National Guard and has been on eight overseas deployments. In his complaint,¹Baluja alleged that he had been removed from both the Marine Patrol and SWAT teams, har- assed for deploying, subjected to illegal requirements for taking the deployments, and improperly placed on administrative leave for a month. He alleged that all of these things had resulted in his being denied the same pension benefits, pay, and seniority he would have had had the City not discriminated against him.

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25-13258 Opinion of the Court 3 After Baluja filed his complaint, the City moved for dismissal for, among other reasons, lack of standing. Baluja's initial com- plaint had recounted that the City had provided him in 2021 with backpay, pay corrections, and corrections with respect to his leave. The district court granted the motion, reasoning that the com- plaint did not make clear which of his alleged injuries have or have not been addressed by the City. Baluja then filed an amended com- plaint that omitted several causes of action and the information that the City had provided him with backpay, pay corrections, and corrections with respect to his leave. The district court noted the omission and reasoned that Baluja was attempting to evade the standing issue. The district court once again dismissed the com- plaint for lack of standing, stating that Baluja had not clarified which actions have and have not been corrected by the City.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standing We have explained the requirements of standing recently:

To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressa- bility. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560- 61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). . . . [T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing each of these elements. See id. at 561,

112 S. Ct. 2130. "[E]ach element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plain- tiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-13258 and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Id. (citations omitted). At the pleading stage, general factual allega- tions of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice to establish standing. See id.; Moody [v. Hol- man], 887 F.3d [1281] at 1286 [(11th Cir. 2018)]. That is because "we presume that general allegations em- brace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S. Ct. 2130. Reeves v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Corr., 23 F.4th 1308, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2022).

Injury in fact means "an invasion of a legally protected in- terest that is both (a) 'concrete and particularized' and (b) 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" Lewis v. Gov. of Ala- bama, 944 F.3d 1287, 1296 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). Causation is the "causal connection" between her injury and the challenged action of the defendant—i.e., the injury must be "fairly . . . trace[able]" to the defendant's conduct, as opposed to the action of an absent third party." Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at

560).

With respect to the third prong of the standing analysis, we have stated that we ask if "a decision in a plaintiff's favor would

"significant[ly] increase . . . the likelihood" that she "would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury" that she claims to have suf- fered. Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1260 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010) (ci- tation omitted). Also, "it must be the effect of the court's judgment on the defendant"—not an absent third party—"that redresses the

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25-13258 Opinion of the Court 5 plaintiff's injury, whether directly or indirectly." Lewis, 944 F.3d at 1301(internal quotations and citations omitted).

The USERRA ensures that reservists like Baluja cannot be discriminated against because of their military service. The statute provides that a "member of . . . a uniformed service shall not be denied . . . any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that membership." 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). "An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited . . . if the person's membership . . . in the uniformed services is a motivating factor in the employer's action, unless the employer can prove that the ac- tion would have been taken in the absence of such membership . .

. ." Id. § 4311(c)(1). Remedies under the statute consist of injunctive relief, re- payment of lost wages and benefits, interest, and liquidated dam- ages. Specifically, § 4323(d)(1) states:

(A) The court may require the employer to comply with the provisions of this chapter.

(B) The court may require the employer to compen- sate the person for any loss of wages or benefits suf- fered by reason of such employer's failure to comply with the provisions of this chapter.

(C) The court may require the employer to pay the person the amount referred to in subparagraph (B) and interest on such amount, calculated at a rate of 3 percent per year.

(D) The court may require the employer to pay the person the greater of $50,000 or the amount equal to

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-13258 the amounts referred to in subparagraphs (B) and (C) as liquidated damages, if the court determines that the employer knowingly failed to comply with the provisions of this chapter.

Id. § 4323(d)(1). The statute also grants the district court the ability to use its equitable powers "to vindicate fully the rights or benefits of persons under this chapter." Id. § 4323(e).

The focus of the district court was its perception that the operative complaint does not explain what remains (of the alleg- edly owed pay and benefits) after the City made corrective pay- ments to Baluja. However, the operative complaint alleges that Baluja is also entitled to a number of other, different remedies. For example, he alleged, inter alia, that he is entitled under USERRA to re-employment in positions equivalent in seniority, status, and pay to what he occupied before (e.g. reassignment to the Marine Patrol Unit and the SWAT team). This injunctive relief, permitted under § 4323(d)(1)(A) and (e), could reasonably cover not just salary but also benefits of the job, such as other opportunities that go along with such positions (e.g. opportunities for advancement, overtime, off-duty details, pension benefits, etc.). These allegations are not affected in any way by the allegations from the initial complaint which the district court incorporated and relied on (i.e. City's pay- ment of backpay, pay corrections, and corrections with respect to his leave). At least, there are reasonable inferences to this effect. Moreover, Baluja pled willful discrimination, which would entitle him to liquidated damages. Id. § 4323(d)(1)(D).

In addition, we believe that the district court overlooked rea- sonable inferences from the operative complaint (even incorporat- ing paragraphs 60-61 and 120-23 of the initial complaint that the

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25-13258 Opinion of the Court 7 district court relied on).²These reasonable inferences suggest that there remain (in addition to the reinstatement remedy itself ) lost wages and benefits not yet corrected. For example, the operative complaint pleads that the failure of the City to reinstate Baluja to the Marine Patrol Unit and the SWAT team caused lost opportuni- ties for advancement, overtime, and off-duty details. We conclude that there are reasonable inferences from the operative complaint that the corrections previously provided by the City—upon which the district court relied—would not have included wages and ben- efits from such lost opportunities.

We conclude that Baluja has alleged sufficient facts, the rea- sonable inferences from which establish standing for claims of dis- crimination in violation of USERRA. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND with directions for the district court to reexamine the standing issues and for other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.³ VACATED and REMANDED.

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