Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Request is granted in part as to costs in the amount of $660.28 and denied in part as to Ralston's requested attorney's fees. (Emphasis added.)
4. Certiorari proceedings
Ralston applied for a writ of certiorari challenging the denial of his attorney fees, which we granted. He presents two related questions: "In the most general terms, did the ICA err when it denied Ralston's request for attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine? And more specifically:
Does a plaintiff need to obtain relief to satisfy the private attorney general doctrine?"
RTH reiterates its position that Ralston fails to meet the three-prong PAG test, but does not otherwise opine on the ICA's conclusion that the PAG doctrine does not apply where relief is not fully determined. BLNR did not respond to Ralston's certiorari application.
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III. Standard of Review
This court reviews an ICA order granting or denying attorney's fees and costs under the abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs where the court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.
Cowan v. Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC, 156 Hawaiʻi 268, 272, 574 P.3d 288, 292 (2025) (citations and quotation marks omitted). When a party seeks to recover fees under the PAG doctrine, however, "we review de novo whether the [lower] court disregarded rules or principles of law that arise in deciding whether or not a party satisfies the three factors of the private attorney general doctrine." Asato v. Procurement Pol'y Bd., 132 Hawaiʻi 333, 357, 322 P.3d 228, 252 (2014) (quoting citation omitted).
IV. Discussion
For more than two decades, the private attorney general doctrine has served as "an essential tool for promoting the vindication of public rights" in Hawaiʻi courts. Pub. Access Trails Haw. v. Haleakala Ranch Co., 153 Hawaiʻi 1, 4, 526 P.3d 526, 529 (2023). As an exception to the "American Rule" that mandates "each party is responsible for paying [their] own litigation expenses," the PAG doctrine:
allows courts in their discretion to award attorney's fees to plaintiffs who have vindicated important public rights. Courts applying this doctrine consider three basic factors:
(1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant
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burden on the plaintiff, [and] (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. Superferry II, 120 Hawaiʻi at 218, 202 P.3d at 1263 (quoting citation and brackets omitted).
Because eligible plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees, the PAG doctrine enables litigation in the public's interest by relieving otherwise prohibitive costs and burdens assumed by individuals and public interest groups. To date, the PAG doctrine has promoted litigation aimed at the preservation and conservation of Hawaiʻi's land and natural resources, as well as litigation vindicating the rights of the Native Hawaiian community. The viability of the PAG doctrine hinges on plaintiffs being able to rely on the doctrine's promise that they will receive reasonable compensation for their efforts on behalf of the public. Pub. Access Trails Haw., 153 Hawaiʻi at 4, 526 P.3d at 529. In various instances, this court has concluded that prevailing litigants failed to satisfy the three-prong PAG test. See e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole II), 96 Hawaiʻi 27, 32, 25 P.3d 802, 807 (2001) (plaintiffs challenged the decision of a tribunal in an adversarial setting rather than an established government policy or action); Goo v. Arakawa, 132 Hawaiʻi 304, 319, 321 P.3d 655, 670 (2014) (litigation did not involve the enforcement of a law of general statewide applicability). We have also, however, cautioned against "an overly-formalistic application of what it means to vindicate an important public policy." Honolulu Constr. & Draying Co. v. Dep't of Land & Nat. Res. (Irwin Park II), 130 Hawaiʻi 306, 315,
310 P.3d 301, 310 (2013). Where "[o]ur case law has long reflected our concern about barriers facing community members
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seeking meaningful participation in an agency's proceedings and determinations on matters affecting the environment," Ralston's successful appeal squarely falls within the scope of the PAG doctrine. See Sierra Club v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 156 Hawaiʻi 382, 386, 575 P.3d 472, 476 (2025).
Against this backdrop, we hold the PAG doctrine does not require the prevailing party to obtain relief beyond the ICA's holding here, that a contested case hearing was required. Under the circumstances of this case, all three prongs are met. Ralston is entitled to attorney fees under the PAG doctrine.
A. The PAG doctrine does not require the prevailing party to first obtain relief
Ralston challenges the ICA's conclusion that because "it has not yet been determined what relief [he] can obtain," the three-prong PAG test is not satisfied. We agree with Ralston. Under the PAG doctrine, the prevailing party is not required to obtain relief beyond the ICA's holding here, that a contested case hearing was required, before collecting attorney fees. This court has previously awarded attorney fees under the PAG doctrine where the scope of relief on remand was not yet determined. For example, in Kaleikini, Native Hawaiian cultural practitioner Paulette Kaleikini sought to enjoin the City and County of Honolulu and the State from approving the Honolulu rail project until a comprehensive archaeological inventory
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survey ("AIS") was completed. Kaleikini v. Yoshioka (Kaleikini I), 128 Hawaiʻi 53, 56, 283 P.3d 60, 63 (2012). We agreed with Kaleikini on four of the six counts at issue, and concluded the rules adopted under HRS Chapter 6E required a completed AIS for the entire project area before the City and State could approve the rail project. Kaleikini I, 128 Hawaiʻi at 68, 283 P.3d at
75. Instead of entering judgment in Kaleikini's favor, we noted:
Although Kaleikini requests that we enter summary judgment in her favor, we note that Kaleikini sought a wide range of relief in the circuit court, and the rationale for granting or denying that relief has not been fully developed. Moreover, additional information may have become available since the City's motion [for summary judgment] was decided, and it is not clear what impact these additional facts may have on the relief Kaleikini seeks.
Kaleikini I, 128 Hawaiʻi at 81, 283 P.3d at 88. When we later awarded Kaleikini attorney fees under the PAG doctrine, we again noted that the case was "remanded to the circuit court to determine the proper relief to be awarded."
Kaleikini II, 129 Hawaiʻi at 462, 304 P.3d at 260. Although relief was not yet determined, we expressly held that "the private attorney general doctrine does not require that a plaintiff receive a final judgment in [their] favor before fees may be awarded." Id.
Last year in Unite Here!, we similarly awarded attorney fees pursuant to the PAG doctrine although the "determination of an appropriate remedy" by the circuit court was still pending.
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Unite Here! Local 5 v. PACREP LLC (Unite Here! I), 157 Hawaiʻi 442, 458, 580 P.3d 622, 638 (2025); Unite Here! Local 5 v. PACREP LLC (Unite Here! II), 156 Hawaiʻi 338, 342-43, 574 P.3d 1286, 1290-91 (2025) (awarding Local 5's attorney fees under the PAG doctrine). There, the Local 5 labor union challenged the sufficiency of the final environmental assessments ("FEAs") for the now completed two tower Ritz-Carlton Residences in Waikīkī. Unite Here! I, 157 Hawaiʻi at 446, 580 P.3d at 626. We held in favor of Local 5. While we declined to invalidate the FEAs, we concluded relief in the form of proper environmental review can still be granted. Unite Here! I, 157 Hawaiʻi at 459, 580 P.3d at
639. We remanded the case to the circuit court to determine "an appropriate remedy" and to address whether the FEAs sufficiently addressed environmental effects of the project. Unite Here! I,
157 Hawaiʻi at 458, 465, 580 P.3d at 638, 645. The ICA's determination that the PAG doctrine cannot apply because "it has not yet been determined what relief Ralston can obtain" is contrary to both Kaleikini and Unite Here!, and our holding that "the private attorney general doctrine does not require that a plaintiff receive a final judgment in [their] favor before fees may be awarded." Kaleikini II, 129 Hawaiʻi at 462, 304 P.3d at 260. Just as we remanded those matters to the circuit court to determine the relief available to the
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prevailing party, the ICA remanded this case to the circuit court to determine the relief available to Ralston. Instead of invalidating the now expired 2022 RP 7915, the ICA opted to remand the case to the circuit court "to determine what, if any, relief is available." Although the ICA noted Ralston's challenge "appears to be moot," it nonetheless concluded it fell under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" and "public interest" exceptions to the mootness doctrine. In doing so, it held that "Ralston was denied procedural due process and was entitled to participate in a contested case hearing on the renewal of RP 7915." This holding, that a contested case hearing was required, constituted important and significant "relief."
Even if the circuit court later determines no further relief is available on remand with respect to the 2022 permit, Ralston's successful appeal to the ICA "promote[d] vindication of important public rights," including protecting the public's right to a clean and healthful environment through a contested case hearing. See Superferry II, 120 Hawaiʻi at 219, 202 P.3d at 1264 (quoting Arnold v. Dep't of Health Servs., 775 P.2d 521, 537 (Ariz. 1989)). To deny Ralston attorney fees because additional relief is not yet determined or may not be available — despite prevailing on the underlying merits of his appeal — is contrary to and undermines the purpose of the PAG doctrine.
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B. Ralston meets the three-prong PAG test
In its order denying Ralston's attorney fee request, the ICA concluded Ralston "has not shown that he has met all three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine," and appeared to suggest Ralston met the first two prongs, but failed to satisfy the third prong, "the number of people standing to benefit from [its] decision." We respectfully disagree. While Ralston's challenge to RTH's revocable permit to use a small parcel of public land fronting the Kahala Hotel may not affect all residents of the state, present and future, the underlying procedural due process principles animating his appeal fall within the PAG doctrine.
This court's recent opinion in Sierra Club v. BLNR, 156 Hawaiʻi 382, 575 P.3d 472 (2025), is instructive. Just as the BLNR here denied Ralston's request for a contested case hearing on RTH's 2022 renewal of RP 7915, the BLNR there denied Sierra Club's request for a contested case hearing on Alexander & Baldwin's 2021 renewal of its revocable permit to divert water from East Maui streams. See Sierra Club, 156 Hawaiʻi at 388, 575 P.3d at 478. Similar to the ICA's conclusion in this case, we held in Sierra Club that a contested case hearing was required by Sierra Club's constitutionally protected right to a clean and healthful environment. See 156 Hawaiʻi at 394-95, 575 P.3d at 484-85 ("If a party demonstrates a constitutionally protected
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property interest affected by a government agency's decision, that party has a due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."). With underlying legal issues analogous to the instant case — the due process right to a contested case hearing on an annual revocable permit renewal to use public trust resources — we concluded Sierra Club met all three prongs of the PAG doctrine:
Sierra Club's appeal vindicated important public policies, including defense of a due process right to a contested case hearing before BLNR's renewal of A&B's "temporary" RPs to divert fresh water from East Maui streams. Private enforcement of these policies was essential, as no other party sought to test BLNR's reasoning behind setting a 45 mgd cap on water diversion and the change in the agency's definition of water waste. And Sierra Club's advocacy on their members' behalf could benefit the public generally, for example, in assessing potential water waste and vindicating procedural rights.
Sierra Club, 156 Hawaiʻi at 401, 575 P.3d at 491. Similarly, here, (1) Ralston's appeal to the ICA vindicated the due process right to a contested case hearing before BLNR's renewal of a revocable permit to occupy public lands; (2) private enforcement was necessary as Ralston was the sole party to challenge the BLNR's denial of a contested case hearing and renewal of RP 7915; and (3) Ralston's advocacy benefits the public in vindicating procedural rights under HRS § 171-55, a law of general applicability that governs the issuance of
"permits for the temporary occupancy of state lands."
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1. Ralston vindicated the public's due process rights in renewals of revocable permits for use of public lands
Ralston's appeal easily meets the first prong of the PAG doctrine, the strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation. See Sierra Club, 156 Hawaiʻi at 401, 575 P.3d at 491 (noting "Sierra Club's appeal vindicated important public policies, including defense of a due process right to a contested case hearing"). His successful appeal to the ICA vindicated the public's due process right to meaningfully participate in revocable permit renewals to utilize public lands, which are considered at public BLNR meetings with no opportunity to introduce evidence or cross-examine witnesses. It also reinforced the public's right to a clean and healthful environment, including the "conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources." Haw. Const. Art. XI, § 9. RTH contends Ralston fails to meet the first prong because the ICA's summary disposition order was "not as groundbreaking as [Ralston] leads on" and carries little precedential value. This argument lacks merit.
In an opinion awarding attorney fees to a third-party intervenor in a challenged development to Irwin Park in Downtown Honolulu, we emphasized, "[s]imply because this case relates to a discrete piece of property does not mean that [the intervenor] has not advocated an important public policy." Irwin Park II,
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130 Hawaiʻi at 314, 310 P.3d at 309. There, the underlying court ruling upheld a deed provision, which ensured the future use of Irwin Park as a public park and historic site. Id. In preserving the parcel's status as a public park and historic site, we held those interests were of significant public concern even if the case only related to a "discrete piece of property."
Id.
In that same vein, while the ICA's unpublished summary disposition order in the instant case only pertains to a
"discrete piece of property," Ralston's efforts to ensure the public can meaningfully participate in revocable permit renewals before the BLNR advance the enforcement of the public's right to a clean and healthful environment and the procedural due process afforded under that right.
2. Private enforcement was necessary because BLNR denied Ralston's contested case hearing request
Ralston also meets the second prong of the PAG doctrine,
"the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff." See Waiahole II, 96 Hawaiʻi at 31-32, 25 P.3d at 806-07. This prong focuses on "the role played by the government," and considers whether the prevailing party "served as the sole representative of the vindicated public interest" and whether "[t]he government either completely
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abandoned, or actively opposed, the [prevailing party]'s cause."
Waiahole II, 96 Hawaiʻi at 31, 25 P.3d at 806. Ralston's appeal challenged the BLNR's denial of his request for a contested case hearing and approval of RP 7915 for the 2022 calendar year — two decisions BLNR actively defended on appeal. RTH contends that BLNR did not "actively oppose[]"
Ralston because it gave him "ample opportunity" to provide written and oral testimony at its public meetings. This argument, however, ignores BLNR's defense of its decisions on appeal and the ICA's holding that "other procedural protections afforded by a contested case hearing were lacking" in this case. Private enforcement was necessary as no other party sought to challenge BLNR's decision to renew RP 7915 without a contested case hearing.
3. Ralston's appeal benefits all who seek meaningful participation in an agency's proceedings
Finally, we conclude Ralston meets the third prong of the PAG doctrine, which considers the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. See Asato, 132 Hawaiʻi at 357, 322 P.3d at 252. This conclusion is consistent with our previous opinions which held the third prong was satisfied where prevailing parties "vindicated causes that included procedural rights related to environmental review, Native Hawaiian cultural rights, and historic preservation." Id. (citations omitted).
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It is also consistent with our emphasis that "the types of causes which the [PAG] doctrine is applicable, 'do not involve the fortunes of a single individual to the extent necessary to encourage their private vindication in the courts.'" Id. (quoting Irwin Park II, 130 Hawaiʻi at 315, 310 P.3d at 310 (citations and emphasis omitted)).
Here, the ICA's decision concerned the procedural due process rights of members of the public under HRS § 171-55, a law of general statewide applicability that governs the issuance of "permits for the temporary occupancy of state lands."
Specific to Lot 41, the ICA vindicated the procedural due process rights of members of the public such as Ralston who recreationally enjoy Kāhala Beach. Beyond Lot 41, Ralston's appeal underscores the "barriers facing community members seeking meaningful participation in an agency's proceedings and determinations on matters affecting the environment," and the importance of the ICA's decision in chipping away at those barriers. See Sierra Club, 156 Hawaiʻi at 386, 575 P.3d at 476. In suggesting Ralston failed to meet the third prong, the ICA cites Asato, which concerned a bidder's challenge to regulations under the State Procurement Code. 132 Hawaiʻi at 336-37, 322 P.3d at 231-32. This court agreed with the bidder's claims, and invalidated the challenged regulations, which we held exceeded the Procurement Policy Board's authority granted
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by the legislature. Asato, 132 Hawaiʻi at 346, 322 P.3d at 241. Although the bidder prevailed on appeal, we explained the court's holding would only apply to "future cases where there are fewer than three qualified bidders for professional services contracts," and interested parties would be financially incentivized to bring a future lawsuit. Asato, 132 Hawaiʻi at 357-58, 332 P.3d at 252-53. Therefore, we concluded the third prong was not satisfied.
Asato, however, is inapt to Ralston's appeal. The context of procurement — where bidders for professional services have a financial incentive to bring suit — differs significantly from the context surrounding Ralston's appeal, where a member of the public seeks to hold BLNR accountable to its public trust obligations under the Hawaiʻi Constitution. Indeed, Ralston's appeal is exactly the situation where we noted the third prong of the PAG doctrine has been satisfied — "plaintiffs have vindicated causes that included procedural rights related to environmental review." Asato, 132 Hawaiʻi at 357, 332 P.3d at
252.
RTH contends the third prong cannot be satisfied here because the ICA's decision was "fact specific and will not benefit substantial numbers of people." They note that only Ralston and his counsel testified in opposition to the 2022 permit renewal. In countering RTH's position, Ralston points
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out that many members of the public enjoy Kāhala Beach, particularly Lot 41, and others have voiced their opposition to RP 7915 in previous years and at neighborhood board meetings. Regardless of how well used Lot 41 is, the result of Ralston's appeal enforced the public's due process rights in renewals of permits to temporarily occupy public lands — a cause
"that ha[s] value to society as a whole, but . . . would not necessarily be vindicated by a single individual." See Irwin Park II, 130 Hawaiʻi at 319, 310 P.3d at 314. Just as we concluded that "litigation [which] concerned a specific property, but the result vindicated the dedication of public parks and historic sites across the state" satisfied the third prong in Irwin Park II, the third prong is similarly satisfied here, as the result of Ralston's appeal vindicated the due process right to meaningfully participate in BLNR's decision- making on the renewal of revocable permits to use public lands. See 130 Hawaiʻi at 318, 310 P.3d at 313.
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reasonableness of Ralston's attorney fees and whether RTH is liable for them.
David Kimo Frankel
for petitioner
Tyler Ralston
Sianha M. Gualano
for respondent
Board of Land and
Natural Resources
William M. Harstad,
Puananionaona P. Thoene, and
Derek B. Simon
for respondent
Resorttrust Hawaii, LLC
/s/ Vladimir P. Devens
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
/s/ Jeannette H. Castagnetti
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