II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
¶54 The majority agrees that summary judgments are appealable. However, the majority does not consider that failing to review summary judgments using the record at summary judgment effectively denies review. The majority, while claiming that summary judgments are reviewable, holds that denials of summary judgments are de facto unreviewable. In Wisconsin, summary judgment is to be granted "'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2010 WI 25, ¶25,
323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2) (2007-08)). The party opposing summary judgment "'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings'" but instead, through affidavits or otherwise, "'must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id., ¶26 (quoting § 802.08(3)). On a motion for summary judgment, the court decides whether there is a genuine issue of material fact; the court does not decide the fact. § 802.08(2); Oracular Milwaukee, 323 Wis. 2d 682, ¶25.
¶55 Summary judgment prevents unnecessary trials. Caulfield v. Caulfield, 183 Wis. 2d 83, 91, 515 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1994). It saves judicial resources, preserves witnesses' time and expenses associated with trial,
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prevents delaying just resolutions, incentivizes circuit court judges to resolve legal issues that are unfit for a jury to decide, and saves litigants money helping to keep the courthouse doors open to all those who need the justice system.
¶56 In Wisconsin, denied motions for summary judgment are nonfinal judgments. See WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1). As a nonfinal judgment, litigants cannot appeal their denied motion for summary judgment as of right. See id. (stating that a "final judgment or a final order of a circuit court may be appealed as a matter of right to the court of appeals unless otherwise expressly provided by law"). That leaves litigants with an ultimatum: seek an interlocutory appeal or proceed to trial. ¶57 Historically, parties that proceeded to trial waived their right to appeal an order denying their earlier motion for summary judgment. See e.g., Wittke v. State ex rel. Smith, 80 Wis. 2d 332, 259 N.W.2d 515 (1977); Richie
v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 22 Wis. 2d 133, 125 N.W.2d 381 (1963). But when those cases were decided, Wisconsin allowed parties to appeal a denied summary judgment motion as of right. See WIS. STAT. § 274.33 (1963- 64); WIS. STAT. § 817.33 (1975-76).
¶58 Since then, the rule has changed. Now, litigants no longer have the right to appeal denied motions for summary judgment. In fact, one month after Wittke was decided, the legislature rewrote the laws governing Wisconsin's appellate system to create Wisconsin's court of appeals. Ch. 187, Laws of 1977 (Dec. 1, 1977). By doing so, the legislature affirmatively revoked a litigant's right to appeal denied motions for summary judgment and created the intermediary appellate court system that did not exist when Wittke and Richie were decided. With the creation of an intermediate appellate court, litigants may only request permission to appeal the nonfinal order resulting from their denied motion for summary judgment from the appellate court, i.e., an interlocutory appeal. See Corning v. Carriers Ins. Co., 88 Wis. 2d 17, 20, 276 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979) ("An order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable as a matter of right, but may be appealed with permission.").
¶59 As practitioners know, interlocutory petitions are almost always denied. Faced with an almost-certain denial, litigants must decide:
exhaust time and money filing for leave to file an interlocutory appeal with the circuit court—which will likely not be granted—while simultaneously petitioning an appellate court's review—also unlikely to be granted—and
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frustrate civil court proceedings, or proceed to trial just to get a final judgment which then can be appealed as of right.
¶60 Recognizing this conundrum, Wisconsin's rule preserves a litigant's right to have their denied motion for summary judgment reviewed on appeal. The Wisconsin rule states that "[a]n appeal from a final judgment or final order brings before the court all prior nonfinal judgments, orders and rulings adverse to the appellant and favorable to the respondent made in the action or proceeding not previously appealed and ruled upon." WIS. STAT. § (Rule) 809.10(4) (emphases added). Thus, under § 809.10(4), parties need not seek interlocutory review of nonfinal judgments or orders— including those on dispositive motions, like motions for summary judgment—to preserve their right to appeal from those nonfinal judgments or orders after a subsequent final judgment or order is entered. Mani v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 2026 WI App 6, ¶18 n.9, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.3d ___. But now, it is unclear whether the court's decision today is an implicit instruction to attempt to get that review because none will be afforded after trial.
¶61 When, post-trial, a denied motion for summary judgment is appealed, this court should begin by reviewing de novo the record as it existed at summary judgment, ignoring the jury's verdict. Here, there is no question that Pabst's partially-denied motion for summary judgment is before the court for review. It is now entitled to review of that denial. Accordingly, I would analyze the record at summary judgment and conclude that summary judgment should have been granted to Pabst. WISCONSIN'S SAFE-PLACE STATUTE
¶62 Wisconsin's safe-place statute, WIS. STAT. § 101.11(1), is a negligence statute that imposes a heightened, non-delegable duty on employers or property owners to (1) construct, (2) repair and (3) maintain public buildings and workplaces in as safe a condition as the nature of the premises reasonably permits. McGuire v. Stein's Gift & Garden Ctr., Inc., 178 Wis. 2d 379, 398, 504 N.W.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1993); Dykstra v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 100 Wis. 2d 120, 130-31, 301 N.W.2d 201 (1981). The safe-place statute deals with unsafe conditions of the workplace premises—not with the employee's activities conducted on the premises. Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 779- 80; and see Viola v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 2014 WI App 5, ¶18, 352 Wis. 2d 541,
842 N.W.2d 515 (differentiating between "hazardous condition[s]
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result[ing] from an unsafe condition associated with the structure" and
"reckless or negligent acts of persons on the premises"). ¶63 These safe-place duties are ongoing and extend to employees and "frequenters." Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 778. An independent contractor's employee working on the premises is considered a frequenter. Hortman, 92 Wis. 2d at 226. The statute also requires employers to furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, and to adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render the place of employment safe. WIS. STAT. § 101.11(2)(a). Yet, these duties are not without exception. ¶64 The safe-place statute differentiates between an employer's duty to its employees and a building owner's duty to those same employees, imposing different, fewer requirements upon owners. Gennrich
v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2010 WI App 117, ¶7, 329 Wis. 2d 91, 789 N.W.2d 106. Under the statute, "employers" must furnish a safe "place of employment"
for its "employees therein and for frequenters thereof" and "furnish employment which shall be safe for the employees therein." WIS. STAT. § 101.11(1). Employers "shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, and shall adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render such employment and places of employment safe, and shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such employees and frequenters." Id. The statute requires less from an "owner." An owner of a place of employment or a public building must "construct, repair or maintain such a place of employment or public building as to render the same safe." Id. Thus, an employer's duties to its employees are broader in scope than an owner's duty to someone else's employees as those employers must provide safe employment. Id.; Miller v. Paine Lumber Co., 202 Wis. 77, 90, 227 N.W. 933,
229 N.W. 35, 230 N.W. 702 (1930). These distinctions become acutely relevant when a building owner hires an independent contractor to use its expertise to perform a dangerous task, and even more germane to the question of the owner's liability when the building is safe when the independent contractor begins its work.
¶65 Under the safe-place statute and our precedent, owners are absolved of their statutory duties when they have (1) relinquished complete control and custody of the premises to the contractor, and the (2) premises are in a safe condition at that time. See Potter, 268 Wis. at 372 (absolving an owner of its safe-place duty when it relinquished complete control of the premises to the contractor in a safe condition); Kaltenbrun v. City of Port Washington, 156 Wis. 2d 634, 646, 457 N.W.2d 527 (Ct. App. 1990) ("A safe-
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place duty is imposed upon an owner only when there is retention of a right of control beyond mere legal ownership or right of inspection."). ¶66 Thus, to be liable under the safe-place statute, Pabst must have either (1) retained control over the premises,6or (2) turned the premises over to Lorbiecki in an unsafe condition. At summary judgment, Lorbiecki argued only the latter and nothing in the record supports that contention. The circuit court made no findings that the premises were in an
"unsafe condition" before the contractor began its work, nor could it have based on the evidence at the time of summary judgment. This case never should have proceeded further.
1. At Summary Judgment, Lorbiecki Did Not Contend That Pabst Retained Control.
¶67 At summary judgment, Lorbiecki did not assert that Pabst controlled the premises where he was working. In his own words, the control exception did not apply:
The "supervision and control" element, however, is not a requirement in 'unsafe conditions' cases like [Lorbiecki's] case against Pabst. Accordingly, [Lorbiecki] is not required to prove that Pabst maintained supervision or control before this Court can find that Pabst retained a heightened, nondelegable duty to provide [] Gerald Lorbiecki a safe environment free from danger to his life, health, safety, or welfare. Instead, Lorbiecki relied solely on the "unsafe condition" exception to Pabst's presumption of non-liability.
¶68 Without attempting to make an argument, the only conclusion that could be made is that Pabst relinquished control over its bottle house to the independent contractor. See Indus. Risk Insurers v. Am. Eng'g Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82 ("[W]e will not abandon our neutrality to develop arguments."). Perhaps
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because Lorbiecki did not argue control, the circuit court did not identify any dispute or facts at summary judgment that the control exception applied.
2. At Summary Judgment, Lorbiecki Did Not Introduce Any Evidence That Pabst's Brewery Contained An Unsafe Condition. ¶69 Under the safe-place statute, "safe" is relative. Megal v. Green Bay Area Visitor & Convention Bureau, Inc., 2004 WI 98, ¶10, 274 Wis. 2d 162,
682 N.W.2d 857. It does not mean "completely free of any hazards." Id. It means "such freedom from danger to the life, health, safety or welfare of employees or frequenters" and "such reasonable means of notification, egress and escape in case of fire . . . as the nature of the employment, place of employment, or public building, will reasonably permit." WIS. STAT. § 101.01(13) (emphasis added). "Just because a place could be made more safe, it does not necessarily follow that an employer or owner" violated the safe-place statute. Megal, 274 Wis. 2d 162, ¶10.
¶70 As the brewery's owner, Pabst's duty was to furnish a safe place. Gennrich, 329 Wis. 2d 91, ¶7. It was Lorbiecki's employer's duty to
"do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety or welfare of [its] employees." WIS. STAT. § 101.11(1), (2); see also Deaton v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 265 Wis. 349, 352-53, 61 N.W.2d 552 (1953) (announcing the safe-place statute does not make the employer or owner an insurer of the safety of a frequenter on the premises); Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶17, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810 ("[I]mposing liability on [an owner] for injuries sustained by an independent contractor's employee runs counter to the notion that [the owner] has relinquished control to the independent contractor.").
¶71 Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent absolves a building owner, like Pabst, of liability if it turns over safe premises to contractors. The timing of when the asbestos became airborne, thus unsafe, is critical to the analysis of a building owner's liability. In Barth, 71 Wis. 2d 775, we affirmed the circuit court's order "setting aside the jury verdict" against the
"owner" because of the limitations of owner liability under safe-place law.
71 Wis. 2d at 785. There, a general contractor hired a subcontractor to dismantle and remove ventilation ducts as part of remodeling an arena. Id. at 775-76. Barth, an employee of the subcontractor, was injured when a ventilation duct bottomed out, causing Barth to fall and land on the floor. Id. at 777. We held that "[o]rdinarily . . . an owner hiring an independent contractor to do work on his building . . . reserves no right or control of the
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work excepting that of inspection or of changing the plan with reference to the construction to be furnished." Id. at 780. "The element of duty imposed by the safe place statute [was] completely absent under the circumstances"
because when the contractor began work there was "no unsafe condition,"
and the general contractor did not control the subcontractor's employee's work. Id. at 782. The independent contractor's own actions in dismantling ventilation ducts created the danger. Id. at 776-77. Barth answers the question presented to the court today.
¶72 Our court in Potter, 268 Wis. 361, similarly rejected the argument that a building owner is liable under the safe-place statute if once- safe premises become dangerous because of the independent contractor's work. After the owner hired an independent contractor to install a sewer, one of the contractor's employees died during its excavation. 268 Wis. at
363. The "north bank of the trench" he was excavating to furnish the sewer
"fell down" and "trapped" him. Id. "Since the premises were initially safe when turned over to the contractor by the [owner], and since the change of the premises which produced the damage resulted entirely from the action of the contractor, the [premises' owner] having retained no control over the same," was not liable on summary judgment. Id. at 376-77. Potter is directly on point.
¶73 No doubt, airborne asbestos exposure resulting from the repair or maintenance of asbestos-containing insulation surrounding pipes can create an "unsafe condition" within the meaning of the safe-place statute. See e.g., Viola, 352 Wis. 2d 541, ¶25; Anderson v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Prods. Co., 924 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (E.D. Wis. 2013), and Calewarts v. CR Meyer and Sons Co., No. 2011AP1414, unpublished slip op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App. July 3, 2012). But even these cases that the majority relies upon demonstrate that a building owner's liability is not automatic. See infra, ¶¶90-92. As the brewery owner, Pabst's duty was to furnish a safe place at the time that it turned the premises over to Lorbiecki's employer, the independent contractor. Gennrich, 329 Wis. 2d 91, ¶7. It did. The plaintiff must carry the burden at summary judgment to demonstrate that an already existing, unsafe condition existed on the premises when the owner turned it over to the independent contractor. The record is completely absent of any such evidence or findings.
¶74 Importantly, the record reflects that Lorbiecki did not allege or provide evidence at summary judgment that Pabst brought Lorbiecki onto unsafe premises. Pabst's brewery indeed contained asbestos-filled insulation which, as a steamfitter, Lorbiecki worked with and near, but that
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fact does not support the building owner's liability unless the asbestos was airborne before he began his work for his employer. At summary judgment, Lorbiecki's argument was that the presence of asbestos in the bottle house's insulation rendered the premises unsafe because his work for his employer caused the asbestos to become airborne. He argued that he "gathered evidence to support [his] position that asbestos-containing products were being used on Pabst's premises" (emphasis added). Lorbiecki claimed that "[h]is job duties required that he work with and in close proximity to asbestos- containing insulation, gaskets, and packing," that "the word 'asbestos' would be marked on insulation," "all of the high-pressure piping, specifically the piping in the bottling house, used asbestos-containing insulation," and that more "likely than not [] Mr. Lorbiecki was exposed to asbestos during his work at the Pabst Brewery," all because "asbestos- containing insulation was used on Pabst's premises." But, Lorbiecki never contended that he initially came into a facility that had existing airborne asbestos. Although all agreed that the asbestos had been on site for quite some time, Lorbiecki's argument was that the existence of asbestos, regardless of its form, constituted an "unsafe condition."7His argument was that the asbestos was an unsafe condition because he would have to disturb it as a part of his job. In other words, Lorbiecki's argument was that because asbestos existed at the premises, even if undisturbed until his employer began its work, Pabst is liable. The circuit court concluded that safe-place law "seems to suggest that if you've got the product there, they [steamfitters] do the type of work that is likely to expose them to asbestos, it gets released into the air, [and] that's enough to warrant a jury finding that there's exposure and cause." But this conclusion is incorrect as a matter of law. No evidence was ever produced, nor did the parties dispute, that
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the asbestos was not airborne, hence "unsafe," before the independent contractor's work began.
¶75 The mere existence of undisturbed asbestos-containing insulation does not alone constitute an unsafe condition, and there was no evidence at summary judgment that might support that contention. The dearth of evidence to find an existing "unsafe condition," is also reflected by the fact that the parties did not dispute that an unsafe condition existed before the independent contractor's work began. The law does not hold the building owner liable unless it turned over premises that were unsafe. In other words, the building owner is not liable for airborne asbestos that first became airborne by the contractor's work. Potter, 268 Wis. at 376-77. The record, the arguments, and the circuit court findings all demonstrate that there is no support in the record for a conclusion that airborne asbestos was on the premises before the contractor's work began. This temporal determination is missing and without it, the building owner cannot be liable as a matter of law. In the absence of affidavits, pleadings, discovery responses, admissions, or even averments, the record does not and could not support an inference that any of the asbestos was airborne, in an unsafe condition, before Lorbiecki arrived at Pabst.
¶76 Lorbiecki's sole argument was that because the building contained asbestos insulation it was unsafe. He never contended that Pabst's building was unsafe before his employer began its work. His own argument was that his asbestos exposure was caused by his steamfitting duties.8He argued, "[t]he removal of insulation, whether by Mr. Lorbiecki or another individual working in close proximity to Mr. Lorbiecki, created dust which Mr. Lorbiecki breathed." Even Lorbiecki's fellow steamfitter's deposition testimony made that very point. Lorbiecki's colleague, Mr. Schroeder, never saw him working at Pabst; Schroeder worked in a different building than Lorbiecki and could not recall who was Lorbiecki's employer. But Schroeder testified during his deposition that Lorbiecki's work would have involved removing old pipe and asbestos-filled insulation before replacing the pipe. That work, according to Schroeder, created the dust that steamfitters inhaled. The fact that Lorbiecki does not contend that any asbestos was airborne before he and his coworkers arrived
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at Pabst places Pabst's liability to Lorbiecki outside the scope of the safe- place statute. See Stefanovich, 86 Wis. 2d at 167 (holding that the safe-place statute applies to unsafe conditions at workplaces—not "an act in the process of taking place"); Deaton, 265 Wis. at 352-53 (deciding that WIS. STAT. § 101.11 deals with unsafe conditions of the employer's premises and not with an employee's activities conducted on the premises). ¶77 Given Lorbiecki's own arguments and evidence, the work he performed for his employer was what created the unsafe condition at Pabst's brewery. At summary judgment, Lorbiecki did not argue that Pabst retained control of the brewery. Instead, Lorbiecki argued that the existence of asbestos on the premises itself constituted an unsafe condition. His argument and the circuit court's legal conclusions misunderstand the temporal part of the liability analysis: the premises being safe or unsafe when they were turned over to the independent contractor. The circuit court never identified anything that would support the conclusion that asbestos at Pabst was disturbed prior to Lorbiecki's arrival; thus, it could not conclude that the building was in an "unsafe condition." Nonetheless, the circuit court did decide that Pabst could be found liable even though the asbestos became disturbed because of Lorbiecki's work for his employer. Because safe-place law does not support the circuit court's legal conclusions regarding Pabst's liability to Lorbiecki and no evidence at summary judgment supports the contention that Pabst turned over an unsafe building to the independent contractor, Pabst should have been granted summary judgment.
III. TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL ¶78 The legal errors committed at summary judgment permeate throughout this case and continue because the majority relies on the jury verdict without any consideration of the general rule that a building owner is not liable to the employee of an independent contractor unless an exception is demonstrated. This case was treated as if it was an ordinary safe place case, as is demonstrated by the standard jury instruction on control. There is no discussion of absolving Pabst of liability because it handed off control to Lorbiecki's employer. The circuit court and now the majority, err by giving no weight to the fact that Lorbiecki worked for an independent contractor and that work disturbed the asbestos. The majority blurs the distinction between the duty an independent contractor owes to its employees and the duty the building owner owes to that same employee. This case proceeded to trial against the building owner without the foundational legal conclusions of "control," or "unsafe condition." And to
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the extent that the majority may be relying on the circuit court referencing airborne asbestos as an unsafe condition, the majority errs by not analyzing that legal conclusion further. The law requires much more than this record demonstrates. It was error for this case to proceed to trial and denial of the post-verdict motions exacerbated the same errors that existed at summary judgment. To be clear, Pabst's summary judgment motion should have been granted, but because the majority rests its conclusions on the jury verdict, I will further address the law and the additional evidence adduced at trial. This exercise also demands reversal.
A. PABST RELINQUISHED CONTROL OF ITS BREWERY.
¶79 Although Lorbiecki did not argue that Pabst exhibited control at summary judgment, the arguments have shifted and the jury was given the standard instruction on control as if Pabst's liability to an independent contractor's employee is of no legal consequence. Lorbiecki now argues control on appeal, and the majority seizes on what it concludes is Pabst's control. But the law on control requires more than what the majority concludes.9And, the proper control analysis is absent. ¶80 To avoid liability, Pabst had to relinquish complete control of the property. Kaltenbrun, 156 Wis. 2d at 646. But, as our cases make clear,
"complete" control does not really mean complete. If it did, an owner would always be liable. Instead "control" centers around who controls the details of the work. See Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 781 ("The test [for control] our court has stated is whether the owner . . . 'stood in the shoes of the (immediate) employer by reason of his retention of control of the premises.'"). And safe-place liability is not a strict liability standard for all building owners.
¶81 Owners do not need to completely abandon control of the entire premises. In fact, the owner must retain some control over the premises to carry out its ongoing duty to furnish a safe place of employment to its own employees. Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 607, 111
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N.W.2d 495 (1961). Instead, the owner must relinquish control only of the part of the premises that the contractor is working in. Anderson, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04. And, owners need not surrender every aspect of
"control."
¶82 Undoubtably, owners can relinquish "control" while retaining their right to suspend work to inspect its progress. Potter, 268 Wis. at 376. Owners may also change the work's plan without having control of the premises. Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 780. Even retaining the right to stop construction progress does not establish control under the law. Berger v. Metro. Sewerage Comm'n of Milwaukee Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 741, 750, 203 N.W.2d 87 (1973); Luterbach v. Mochon, Schutte, Hackworthy, Juerisson, Inc.,
84 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 267 N.W.2d 13 (1978). ¶83 Instead, the law requires that a building owner "control" the details of an independent contractor's work. See Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 781 (concluding that a subcontractor failed to establish the retention or exercise of control over the details of the work sufficient to find "control" under the safe-place statute); and see Weber v. Hurley, 13 Wis. 2d 560, 569, 109 N.W.2d 65 (1961) (distinguishing—for determining who controlled construction—between restrictions or specifications relating to the end result and the actual manner in which the work was accomplished). ¶84 Owners may periodically inspect the work, change plans, halt activities, and ensure contractual compliance without retaining "control" as that term is used for safe-place purposes. Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 780-81. The legal analysis must be on who exhibits "control over the details of the work." Id. at 781. When an independent contractor is hired, the contractor creates a place of employment when they begin working on the premises. Because that contractor dominates its own workplace, it owes a safe-place duty to its employees. Yet, the jury never was instructed on these legal principles.
¶85 Despite this applicable law, the majority nonetheless concludes that "a reasonable jury could find that Pabst retained control over the place where [Lorbiecki] worked" because "Pabst owned the brewery,"
conducted daily inspections where Lorbiecki worked, "imposed safety and sanitation requirements on contractors and mandated notification to Pabst 'whenever the contractors' employees [were] going to weld or cut, so that all necessary precautions are taken to prevent a fire or explosion in and around [Pabst's] plant.'" Majority op., ¶23. But none of these factors satisfy the "control" element of safe-place parlance. If they did, every building
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owner would be liable to a contractor's employees for the independent contractor's work and practices.
¶86 Merely owning the brewery is insufficient to establish Pabst's control of the premises, but this case was tried as if it is. Kaltenbrun, 156 Wis. 2d at 646. Inspecting the work, sending a memorandum imposing OSHA's safety requirements, and knowing when certain procedures would occur does not amount to control over the details of the work. Id. At first blush, Pabst's notification and safety precautions might seem to be a closer call. But enforcing OSHA-required regulations to ensure employee safety in other parts of the brewery falls short of establishing that Pabst exercised any dominion "over the details of the work." Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 781; see also Luterbach, 84 Wis. 2d at 9-10; Berger, 56 Wis. 2d at 750. The record refutes the notion that Pabst exercised any control over its independent contractor's work. There is no circuit court finding in that regard. In fact, Schroeder testified that Pabst never told him—and presumably never told Lorbiecki—how to perform his duties. Specifically, at his deposition, Schroeder was asked, "And Pabst never told you how to perform your duties, correct?" He answered, "No. Pabst didn't have anything to do with it. . . . Pabst didn't tell us what to do, no."
¶87 Instead, the things the majority says constitute "control"
actually demonstrate Pabst's compliance with its own ongoing safe-place duties to its employees and evolving OSHA regulations. Considering that the safe-place statute imparts an ongoing duty on Pabst to keep its premises safe for its employees and frequenters, these requirements serve those ends. Pabst had a duty to protect its employees and other frequenters from, for example, a potential fire, and being aware of the independent contractor's projects allowed Pabst to provide "reasonable means of notification, egress and escape in case of fire." See WIS. STAT. § 101.01(13). It was for such legitimate purposes that Pabst mandated Lorbiecki's employer to notify it before beginning its cuts and welds. See majority op., ¶24 ("The memo makes clear that Pabst needed to be notified of the welds or cuts in advance 'to prevent a fire or explosion in and around the plant.'"). Punishing owners for complying with their ongoing safe-place duties disincentivizes compliance with the portions of the safe-place statute concerning fire hazards when an owner hires an independent contractor. These practices are hardly sufficient to demonstrate Pabst maintained control over the details of Lorbiecki's work. It merely shows Pabst's compliance with its duties to its employees and other frequenters under safe-place law. Nothing in the record, and no circuit court finding, demonstrates that Pabst controlled the details of Lorbiecki's work, like which pipes he would work
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on, where he worked, which welds and cuts he would make, when he would make them, how he would make them, what tools and safety measures he would employ, any other practices he may use or avoid, or any of the other methods Lorbiecki would employ concerning the actual manner in which his work was accomplished. See Weber, 13 Wis. 2d at 569 (distinguishing between restrictions and specifications and the actual manner in which the work was accomplished).
¶88 Simply put, Pabst never "stood in the shoes of the (immediate) employer by reason of [its] retention of control of the premises." Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 781. The majority, like the circuit court, adopts a strict liability standard for building owners who hire independent contractors rather than analyzing the legal standard of control over the details of the manner in which the work is accomplished. The majority's definition of control, when it applies to a building owner's liability to an independent contractor's employee, is sweeping. See id. The majority should be applying the proper legal standard of "control," analyzing the lack of evidence of "control" at trial, reviewing what the jury was instructed on "control," and concluding that no reasonable jury could have found Pabst liable under the facts of this case. As a matter of law, no evidence supports Pabst's liability based upon its "control."
B. PABST'S BREWERY DID NOT HAVE AN UNSAFE
CONDITION ON THE PREMISES.
¶89 The facts also do not support a finding that an "unsafe condition" existed when Pabst relinquished control to Lorbiecki's employer. Safe-place law does not hold every building owner liable to an independent contractor's employee. Although a jury instruction was requested by Pabst,10the record is absent of any indication that the jury was
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instructed on the duty a building owner owes to the employee of an independent contractor who is injured as a result of the work done for his employer. Nonetheless, the majority relies on the jury's conclusions without any regard for the distinction between the duty an independent contractor owes to its own employees, with the building owner's duty to those same employees, to turn premises over to their employer in a safe condition. With lean analysis of our case law on point, see supra, ¶¶71-72, and without regard for the absence of evidence in the record, the majority nonetheless reconciles its support for the jury verdict with cases that are distinguishable from Lorbiecki's. Viola, 352 Wis. 2d 541, Anderson, 924 F. Supp. 2d 996, and Calewarts, No. 2011AP1414. In each of these cases, the frequenters arrived to workplaces where asbestos had already been disturbed. In other words, each of the workers in those cases arrived on premises where airborne asbestos already existed. Unlike those cases, Lorbiecki was not brought into an environment where preexisting, airborne asbestos was present. His employer, the independent contractor, was hired to do steamfitting, which by necessity meant working with and replacing the pipes that were insulated with asbestos-filled products. As a part of this project, the independent contractor's employees were the first to disrupt the asbestos and did so as a part of their work. Unlike the cases that the majority relies upon, it was the independent contractor's work, not preexisting airborne asbestos, that created the unsafe condition. As a matter of law, no
"unsafe condition" existed at the relevant time. ¶90 More specifically, in Viola, an independent contractor routinely repaired asbestos-covered pipes alongside tradesmen who
"toiled together in partially enclosed spaces where the release of asbestos dust would circulate for all the workers to breath[e]." 352 Wis. 2d 541, ¶5. Previous "installation, repair, and removal of asbestos-containing products" ensured that the contractor was "constant[ly in] contact with the necessary precautions and determine the standard of ordinary care.
Employees of the contractor should have no claim against a principal for their own or the contractor's failure to use ordinary care in carrying out the contractor's assignment. Nor should a principal be liable to a contractor or its employees simply by reason of employing the contractor to engage in inherently dangerous activity. Nor can a principal/owner be held liable for negligent selection of the contractor as a principal/owner cannot be held liable for any passive negligence.
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asbestos dust" such that his clothes looked like they were "dipped in flour"
by the end of his shift. Id. The building owner knew about the dangers of airborne asbestos "years before" the contractor began maintaining the pipes, but "did nothing to alleviate the dangers of asbestos exposure" in the more than 25 years that the contractor worked at the facility. Id., ¶¶7, 9. The court of appeals held that the independent contractor's employee sufficiently pled that there was an unsafe condition on the premises because
"[t]he regular maintenance . . . of the premises required that the asbestos be disturbed" and the employer "knew about the asbestos and its health hazards, but failed to protect [the contractor] from these hazards." Id., ¶25. The airborne asbestos dust predated the contractor's employment and rendered the premises unsafe. Id. In fact, Viola instructs that Lorbiecki's claim fails, as it was his work that first created the unsafe condition, and he did not come into an already existing unsafe premises because of airborne asbestos.
¶91 In Anderson v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Products Co., asbestos dust was routinely released into the air during regularly-conducted repair work in a paper mill before the plaintiff began his employment. 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1003. In that case, an employee sued the building owner because he was subjected to an already existing unsafe condition that the building owner allowed: airborne asbestos. As an electrician the independent contractor spent over two decades "exposed to asbestos in a number of ways." Anderson, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 999. A "normal, everyday process" for the electrician required "removing or cutting [asbestos-filled] insulation" creating a "plume of cloud dust" for the contractor to work in. Id. at 1000. The paper mill's owner controlled the independent contractor's employee's work schedule and furnished him with the materials necessary to complete his work but never warned him "about the dangers of asbestos, or even that the pipe insulation contained asbestos at all." Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that the asbestos dust in the air exposed the electrician to an unsafe condition on the premises. Id. at 1003. Once again, the building's owner ignored its duty to maintain safe conditions on its premises and allowed unwitting contractors to work in airborne asbestos that predated the independent contractor's employment without mitigating the dangers.
¶92 And, in Calewarts v. CR Meyer and Sons Co., factory employees were exposed to asbestos while operating various machines at the factory. Calewarts, No. 2011AP1414, at ¶¶6-8, 24, 45. There, a factory employee sued the building owner because he had been subjected to an already-existing unsafe condition that the building owner never remedied. The factory
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worker worked with steam-powered printing presses for nearly 40 years. Id., at ¶4. The pipes that supplied the steam to power the presses were
"covered with asbestos insulation" and "'invariably' leak[ed]" requiring weekly repairs. Id., at ¶¶6-7. During the repairs, the asbestos-filled insulation was constantly "torn off" or "knocked off" covering the presses and press ovens with asbestos dust, which was blown around the factory creating an environment where there was "always dust." Id. Though the frequency of the repairs made it "certain" that the employee was working
"where piping was being repaired," the employer was the building owner and never gave the employee protective gear, safety warnings or instructions, nor abated the asbestos. Id., at ¶¶6-8. The court of appeals concluded that the employer failed to maintain a safe premises in which the employees worked. Id., at ¶32. The factory was an existing, unsafe place. Id., at ¶¶6-8.
¶93 Unlike Lorbiecki's case, in each of the cases that the majority relies upon to uphold the jury verdict, the place of employment was unsafe before the plaintiff arrived. In each case, the premises either had existing airborne asbestos predating the contractor's employment on the premises that was created by the building owner's employees, or the asbestos was disturbed by someone other than the contractor, leaving the building owner responsible because of the existing "unsafe condition." Instead of relying upon Viola, Anderson, and Calewarts, the majority should instead look to our Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent (Barth, 71 Wis. 2d 775; Potter, 268 Wis.
361) which present facts and legal principles more akin to those of Lorbiecki's case. See supra, ¶¶71-72.
¶94 Even at trial, Lorbiecki's evidence did not demonstrate that Pabst provided Lorbiecki with an unsafe building with existing airborne asbestos. Asbestos first became airborne because of the kind of work that Lorbiecki did for the independent contractor. The independent contractor was hired to remove and replace the asbestos-covered pipes. ¶95 Before trial began, the parties agreed that "asbestos in place"
"does not cause any harm" and "is not a hazard." Instead, "the asbestos really needs to be airborne for there to be a potential inhalation exposure."
During trial, Schroeder testified that the kind of work Lorbiecki performed would require him to chisel and hammer away at asbestos-containing insulation that "sent insulation dust flying into the air." According to Schroeder—who could not verify Lorbiecki's work at Pabst during the relevant time nor for the relevant employer—the removal of insulation caused the visible, airborne dust that Lorbiecki would have inhaled. And,
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an expert witness confirmed that "'extremely high' asbestos exposures occur from tearing out asbestos insulation and these are 'very, very heavy concentrated, dense exposures to asbestos.'" Lorbiecki's expert witness admitted that "there is no testimony and no evidence to prove that" anyone other than the independent contractor disturbed the asbestos which caused Lorbiecki's injuries, and it was Lorbiecki's asbestos exposure resulting from
"working as a steamfitter at the Pabst plant [that] constituted a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma and, therefore, in causing his death."
Indisputably, asbestos existed at Pabst's brewery before Lorbiecki arrived, but it was not airborne. Lorbiecki's own argument and supporting evidence demonstrates that the steamfitters performed unsafe work for the independent contractor, their employer, which caused the undisturbed asbestos to become airborne. This, however, is not the legal standard to impart liability to Pabst. The majority indeed recognizes that undisturbed asbestos is not dangerous, and it must recognize that no evidence supports that airborne asbestos existed when Lorbiecki came to the premises. Curiously though, it relies on distinguishable cases wherein a plaintiff came into premises where there was airborne asbestos. See majority op., ¶¶4, 9,
27. Since the evidence demonstrated that the asbestos was undisturbed until the steamfitting work occurred and the parties stipulated that undisturbed asbestos is safe, as a matter of law, Pabst did not turn over unsafe premises to the independent contractor and cannot be held liable. Given the state of the record, even after trial, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict motion (which was essentially the summary judgment motion renewed) should have been granted as Lorbiecki did not demonstrate the preexisting "unsafe condition" exception applied.
¶96 As a matter of law, when an owner relinquishes control to an independent contractor of a safe place, and,
if thereafter in the performance of the work under the contract the premises are changed by the contractor and as a result a hazardous condition is created, the owner does not become liable to the contractor's employee injured as a consequence of such hazardous condition while acting in the scope of his employment.
Potter, 268 Wis. at 372; see also Stefanovich, 86 Wis. 2d at 169 (describing accidents caused by negligent "acts of operation" or "activity conducted on the premises" rather than an unsafe condition of the premises fall outside of the scope of the safe-place statute). Like the plaintiffs in Barth and Potter, Lorbiecki's injuries result from the work of the independent contractor,
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work he was hired to do for his employer. His injuries do not stem from existing "unsafe conditions," airborne asbestos, on an owner's premises. They result from his work for his employer, the independent contractor. See also Deaton, 265 Wis. at 352-53; L. G. Arnold, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 267 Wis. 521, 525-26, 66 N.W.2d 176 (1954); Gross v. Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 47,
212 N.W.2d 2 (1973); Korenak v. Curative Workshop Adult Rehab. Ctr., 71 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 237 N.W.2d 43 (1976); Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 779-80. To conclude otherwise requires building owners "to superintend the activities of the employee of a subcontractor" despite the fact that the safe-place statute imposes no such duty. See Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 780. As a matter of law, no evidence, even after trial, supports "unsafe condition."
¶97 At a minimum, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which essentially renewed the motion for summary judgment, should have been granted as the entire record also demonstrates that it was the independent contractor's work that caused the asbestos to become airborne. Nothing in the record and no findings by the circuit court support the conclusion that Pabst provided the independent contractor with a building that was in an "unsafe condition."
IV. CONCLUSION
¶98 The law is the law. The record at the time of summary judgment established that summary judgment should have been granted to Pabst. Delving into the record, this case never should have proceeded to trial. At trial, the same problem was perpetuated as neither exception was demonstrated by Lorbiecki to establish Pabst's liability. After trial, the legal errors continued as the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was essentially the motion for summary judgment renewed, should have been granted. The parties' stipulations, the arguments made, and the facts adduced at trial do not support what is required by law to find Pabst liable. While summary judgment should have been granted, at a minimum the post-verdict motion should have been granted for Pabst, because Pabst neither (1) controlled the details of Lorbiecki's work nor (2) turned over a building that was in an unsafe condition.
¶99 Lorbiecki never alleged nor proved that Pabst controlled the work of the independent contractor. The circuit court never made any such findings. As a matter of law, the jury verdict is flawed; the jury was never even given an instruction on the proper legal standard concerning a building owner's duty to the employee of an independent contractor. Wisconsin Supreme Court case law establishes that more is required than
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an owner's right to inspect an area where work is being done or receive notice that certain activities are ongoing to amount to "control" in safe- place parlance. Potter, 268 Wis. at 376. Even if the independent contractor had to notify Pabst about welds or cuts, it was nonetheless the independent contractor who chose where the welds and cuts would be and how to make the welds and cuts. And that does not amount to control. Nothing in the record establishes that Pabst controlled the details of Lorbiecki's work. As in Barth, Pabst enlisted the expertise of an independent contractor to complete work that Pabst itself did not have the expertise to do. As established in the record, Pabst in no way retained or exercised control over the details of the work. Barth, 71 Wis. 2d at 780-81.
¶100 At every stage in this case Lorbiecki failed to demonstrate that airborne asbestos existed on the brewery's premises before he arrived onsite. Lorbiecki never argued this was the case and the circuit court did not identify any facts that would support its legal conclusion. Unlike the employees in Viola, Anderson, and Calewarts, Lorbiecki did not unknowingly come to premises where dangerous airborne asbestos already existed. His employer was hired for its expertise. The asbestos was undisturbed until his employer began working. His presence at the brewery and exposure to the airborne asbestos occurred because of the work required by his employment. See Anderson, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (concluding that the activity of working with asbestos is "inherently dangerous" yet not
"extrahazardous"). The summary judgment motion should have been granted, and its denial deserves a de novo review of the evidence at the time of summary judgment.
¶101 Today's majority overhauls appellate review of denials of summary judgment. The majority opinion creates strict liability for premises' owners who hire independent contractors to remove or safely work with asbestos, even if the asbestos is undisturbed prior to that work. Apparently, the majority accepts the circuit court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, if a building contains undisturbed asbestos, it is "unsafe"
under the safe-place statute. But the circuit never identified any facts which might support this holding, nor could it. The record is absent of any such evidence, and the majority does nothing to rectify the circuit court's incorrect assumptions which formed the basis for the denial of summary judgment. Notably, at trial the parties stipulated that undisturbed asbestos is not unsafe. Testimony established that it was Lorbiecki's job that required him to first disturb the asbestos.
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¶102 I indeed feel very sorry for Mr. Lorbiecki, his wife, and loved ones. No one should so suffer. But under the law, he was an employee of an independent contractor, was injured in the scope of his employment, which required him to "hammer and chisel away at asbestos-containing insulation." Prior to that work, nothing indicates that the building was in an unsafe condition. The mere presence of asbestos on the property, particularly in an undisturbed state, does not qualify as an "unsafe condition" on this record. Our precedent confirms as much. ¶103 The impact of today's opinion leaves civil practitioners wondering what, if anything, is left of appellate review of a denied summary judgment motion. It essentially leaves building owners strictly liable for the mere presence of asbestos on their property, even if undisturbed. Our court should be reviewing the denial of summary judgment based upon the record as it existed when the circuit court made its ruling under the correct legal standards. In doing so, Lorbiecki's own arguments demonstrate that he failed to establish "control" or an "unsafe condition." And, even after trial, nothing established the building owner's liability under either theory. At a minimum, Pabst's post-verdict motion should have been granted.
¶104 For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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