A BRAHAM CLARK FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 46-47 (EDWARD W. TUTTLE REV., 5TH ED. 1925). This limitation on issues reflects our recognition that, though a defendant has a constitutional right to appeal his judgment of conviction, he has waived by plea most of the appellate claims he could otherwise
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make in favor of reversing that judgment. See Robinson v. State,
373 So. 2d 898, 902-03 (Fla. 1979) (construing section 924.06, Florida Statutes, to be constitutional and holding that a defendant who has pleaded guilty is limited in his appeal "to a class of issues which occur contemporaneously with the entry of the plea"); Leonard v. State, 760 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 2000) ("As with defendants who went to trial, defendants who plead guilty have a constitutional right to appeal, although the issues that they can raise on appeal are limited.").
If an order denying a plea-withdrawal motion is not an appealable non-final order, the only way it separately would be reviewable is in the first type of appeal—from "final judgments or orders of trial courts." The order on the plea-withdrawal motion is not that type of order.
In the criminal context, the two original final orders a criminal defendant can appeal are the judgment of conviction and a sentence, and he can seek appellate review of either or both. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h) (providing that multiple final orders may be reviewed upon the filing of one timely notice of appeal); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(A), (F) (distinguishing a criminal defendant's ability to
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appeal "a final judgment" and "a sentence"); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3) (directing a criminal defendant to file the notice of appeal "any time between rendition of a final judgment and 30 days following rendition of a written order imposing sentence"); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.670 (distinguishing "a final judgment of conviction" from the imposition of a sentence); cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a), (c) (distinguishing a collateral attack on a "judgment" and on a
"sentence"). The order denying Saffold's motion directed to his plea is neither type of original final order. Cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.650 (defining "judgment" as "the adjudication by the court that the defendant is guilty or not guilty"); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.700(a) (defining
"sentence" to be "the pronouncement by the court of the penalty imposed on a defendant for the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty").
The district court's judicial power—affirm, reverse, set aside— ultimately operates against the final order on review, that final order being the trial court's exercise of judicial power. As part of that review, the district court considers whether that final order is the product of some harmful error that the trial court committed in the proceeding leading to that final order. Cf. Fla. R. App. P.
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9.110(h), (k). A procedural error underlying an interim order might be violative of a substantive right that calls into question the validity of the final order (i.e., undermining the fairness of the trial). Cf. Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 774 (Fla. 1971) (explaining that "the violation of a rule of procedure prescribed by this Court does not call for a reversal of a conviction unless the record discloses that non-compliance with the rule resulted in prejudice or harm to the defendant"). If there is such a prejudicial error, then the district court would reverse or vacate that final order (not the offending interim order or ruling) and reopen the proceeding. If there is no prejudicial error, the district court would affirm the final order (not the order or ruling that had been challenged). The only order under review by the Fourth District in Saffold II was the new sentencing order—not the order on Saffold's plea- withdrawal request. And the only relief available to Saffold would have been directed to the sentencing order, provided he could demonstrate some error in the sentencing process leading to the order (or in the order itself) that infringed a substantive right. Cf. Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 572-74 (Fla. 2008) (distinguishing between "errors in sentence-related orders" that result from the
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"sentencing process," on the one hand; and an "error in the sentencing process" itself, on the other). Saffold's initial brief in the Fourth District nevertheless failed to explain how denial of his change-of-plea motion in any way related to the new sentencing or how the denial infringed a right related to the sentencing process. Nor could he. The motion obviously was directed to the judgment of conviction in the trial court proceeding, yet that judgment was not (and could not be) on appeal. The motion simply had nothing to do with the only final order on review—the new sentence. The Fourth District could have just summarily affirmed the sentence. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a) (allowing the appellate court to "summarily affirm the order to be reviewed if the court finds that no preliminary basis for reversal has been demonstrated").12
II
Notwithstanding any jurisdictional questions, we are obliged to state with clarity that rule 3.170(l) does not authorize a trial court
12. I put off for another day whether our certified-conflict jurisdiction can be rooted in a district court's analysis explaining its purported affirmance of a non-appealable (and non-appealed) order.
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to consider a change-of-plea motion on a remand for a new sentencing. I join the majority's decision to do this and the policy rationale behind it—to ensure finality in the judgment. Saffold's no-contest plea indeed had relevant legal significance.
"Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence."
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). The plea "is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). By his no-contest plea, Saffold "consent[ed] to the judgment of conviction." Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267, 270-71 (Fla.
1975).
When Saffold did not appeal that judgment originally, it became final and absolute, and the trial court lost procedural jurisdiction to modify or vacate it. See Einstein v. Davidson, 17 So. 563, 564-65 (Fla. 1895) (noting how a trial court "loses control of its judgment[]" after an authorized time period passes so that it cannot modify or vacate that judgment outside that period, except by appellate mandate or authorized motion); Davidson v. Stringer, 147 So. 228, 229 (Fla. 1933) (noting that once a trial court renders a
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final judgment and the time has passed for the court to reconsider it, the trial court's jurisdiction is "exhausted" except either to enforce it, or when authorized, to correct or vacate it); Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1970) (explaining that one of our goals "is that litigation be finally terminated as quickly as due process and necessary reflection allows . . . [so u]nless a proper motion or petition [directed at correcting error in a final judgment] is filed within the allotted time [as set out by rule], the judgment or order of the trial court becomes absolute" and "the trial court has no authority to alter, modify or vacate [it]"); see also F REEMAN, supra, at 392, 399-400; cf. Baskin v. Klemm, 160 So. 509, 509 (Fla. 1935) (explaining that once an appellate court's review of a trial court's judgment becomes final, the trial court is "without jurisdiction to change that judgment without first having permission . . . to so change or modify its judgment"); State ex rel. Budd v. Williams, 11 So. 2d 341, 341 (Fla. 1943) ("After affirmance of the decree by this court the circuit court was without jurisdiction to alter or change the decree as so affirmed without first having authority from this court to so act."); cf. Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 149 (1907) ("The general principle
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is that judgments cannot be disturbed after the term at which they are rendered, and can only be corrected, if at all, by writ of error, or appeal, or relieved against in equity in certain cases."); In re Metro. Tr. Co. of City of New York, 218 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1910) (holding that a trial court loses the authority to vacate a final decree "[a]fter the term had expired, and after the complainant had exercised his right of appeal to procure a review of the errors of which he desired to complain").
By rule, we authorize trial courts to open their already rendered (and otherwise final) judgments in at least two different ways. One is to establish a time period, after rendition but before appeal, during which the trial court retains jurisdiction over the judgment; the other is to authorize consideration of a collateral attack on the judgment, even after the judgment has been affirmed on appeal and the trial court has lost jurisdiction over its judgment. Cf. F REEMAN, supra, at 377 (distinguishing between trial court's control over its own judgment "during the term" and its power to modify or vacate the judgment after the term); id. at 272, 278, 381-
384.
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Rules authorizing rehearing motions in civil and family-law proceedings fall into the first category. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a) (requiring that a motion for rehearing be used to preserve certain errors in the judgment and authorizing the trial court to "open the judgment" to "take additional testimony" and "enter a new judgment"); Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.530(a) (same).
And subdivisions (f) and (l) of rule 3.170 operate the same way.13Subdivision (f) authorizes the trial court to retain control over the "judgment of conviction" and "set [it] aside," either "in its discretion" or "on good cause," up until pronouncement of sentence. Subdivision (l) then authorizes the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the judgment for thirty days following rendition of the sentencing order, but to consider only a narrow set of challenges to that plea judgment.14
These provisions stand in stark contrast to those rules that fall into the second category of authorization for a trial court to
13. Rule 3.800's subdivisions (b) and (c) give similar retention authorization to trial courts regarding their sentencing orders.
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open its judgment—to consider the collateral attack post-appeal (i.e., once the time has passed for taking an appeal or a mandate of affirmance has issued; in either event, the trial court then losing control over the judgment). Cf. F REEMAN, supra, at 381-84. Under the civil and family-law rules, we do this by authorizing trial courts to consider motions for relief from judgment. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540; Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540. And in the criminal context, we give this authorization in rule 3.850, in which we allow the trial court to consider enumerated "grounds [] for relief from judgment or release from custody." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a); see also id. (b) (setting a limitation period running from when "the judgment and sentence become final"); id. (c) (noting that the "rule does not authorize relief based on grounds that could have or should have been raised . . . if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence"); cf. Morgan v. State, 350 So. 3d 712, 716 (Fla. 2022) (highlighting the structural and operational difference between rule 3.800(a) and rule 3.850; the former authorizing sentence correction as "an extended part of the sentencing process,"
the latter authorizing vacatur of the sentence and starting anew as
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truly collateral relief).15Indeed, to say that rule 3.170(f) authorized the trial court to consider a collateral attack on Saffold's then- absolutely final judgment would be for us to render certain provisions of rule 3.850 superfluous.
Another telltale of our intent that rule 3.170 operate only pre- appeal and not as collateral authorization: Both provisions appear in the "Arraignments and Pleas" section of the rules, rather than in the "Postconviction Relief" section. Cf. Morgan, 350 So. 3d at 716 (observing that "rule 3.800 proceedings" are an "extended part of the sentencing process in the underlying criminal case," and are not
"postconviction proceedings," based in part on the rule's appearance in the "Sentence" portion of the rules rather than the
"Postconviction Relief" portion).
15. Rule 3.800(a) in a way is a hybrid because it continues to authorize the trial court to correct its order "at any time," even after completion of an appeal, to address an illegal sentence; yet typically, a rule 3.800(a) proceeding would not commence until after the appellate process became final. Cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b) (allowing a motion to correct sentence, "including an illegal sentence," to be filed before or during an appeal of the sentencing order); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) ("A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time.").
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Finally, as I already have mentioned, an order on a motion filed under rule 3.170 is not a separately appealable, final order. Instead, denial of the motion is a preserved issue that then may be raised on direct appellate review of the judgment of conviction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)c.; cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)(I) (tolling rendition for a motion filed under rule 3.170(l)). An order on a motion under rule 3.850, by contrast, is a final order—just as an order on a relief-from-judgment motion under rule
1.540 is. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b); cf. Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (describing a
"final post decretal order" as one that is "dispositive of any question," constituting a "final and distinct adjudication of rights which have not been adjudicated in the original final judgment"); Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(5) (treating an order "entered on an authorized and timely motion for relief from judgment" as a
"specified final order"). Orders on motions under rules like these are treated as final and separately appealable because of their unique, historical function. Rules like 1.540, 3.850, and 12.540 serve as procedural substitutes for various ancient writs and equity claims that served
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the same purpose. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540 (abolishing "writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review" and directing that "relief from a judgment or decree shall be by motion . . . or by independent action"); Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1239 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that rule 3.850 was intended as a procedural substitute for raising "collateral postconviction challenges to the legality of criminal judgments that were traditionally cognizable in petitions for writs of habeas corpus"). The same cannot be said for a rule like 3.170, the function of which has been described above.
* * *
Saffold basically asks that we pronounce rule 3.170(f) to be the procedural equivalent of rule 3.850. That approach, as a policy matter, makes no sense. Rule 3.170(f) is structurally and operationally different—it has a different purpose—when compared
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Saffold's only pathway for seeking relief from the judgment of conviction at that point was rule 3.850. The Fourth District, then, technically was correct in its conclusion that Saffold was not entitled to submit his plea-withdrawal motion on a remand strictly for resentencing (albeit because the trial court did not have the authority to consider it under rule 3.170(f) in the first place). I concur in the majority's approval of that conclusion and in its disapproval of the Second District's conclusion to the contrary. Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D2022-2399
(Broward County)
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Timothy Wang, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm Beach, Florida, and Melynda L. Melear, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Respondent