IT IS HEREBY ORDERED PURSUANT TO N.D.C.C. § 12.1- 31.2-02 that the above named Defendant . . . shall refrain from any direct or indirect contact with [K.M.].
You violate this Order if, in addition to the prohibitions set forth above, you:
1. Threaten, molest, injure, or harass the victim;
2. Call, write or visit the victim regardless of where this takes place, or have messages delivered to the victim;
3. Enter or come within 100 yards of the victim, or the victim's residence, or the victim's place of employment; or
4. Take or damage any of the victim's property. The Defendant is notified 1) willful violation of this order is a separate criminal offense, a class A misdemeanor, with a maximum penalty of 360 days' imprisonment and/or a $3,000 fine, 2) this order is enforceable in any jurisdiction, and, 3) if a law enforcement officer determines there is probable cause to believe this order has been violated, then the officer shall make a warrantless arrest, whether or not the violation is committed in the officer's presence. Consent of the victim does not invalidate this order.
[¶15] Relying in part on State v. Boyle, 2009 ND 156, 771 N.W.2d 604, Maher argues that courts must consider whether an order infringes upon the
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defendant's constitutional rights or conflicts with established parenting time rights. In Boyle, this Court recognized that parents have a constitutional right to parent their children. Id. ¶ 11. We stated that where there is potential for a restraining order to conflict with a child custody and visitation order, courts must ensure the orders do not conflict. Id. In Boyle, the original order that prohibited all contact with the other party was clarified after remand so the order did not interfere with the father's right to have contact with the child. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. While courts should consider the constitutional right to parent a child, we also recognize that the constitutional right to parent is not without limits and courts may impose sentences that may conflict with a parenting order when imposing such sentence serves other penological interests. See State v. Ehli, 2004 ND 125, ¶¶ 9, 11, 13, 17, 681 N.W.2d 808 (affirming condition of probation prohibiting contact with minor children after defendant pled guilty to continuous sexual abuse of child in father-daughter like relationship and did not acknowledge seriousness of crime).
[¶16] Here, the district court provided no reason why there should be no contact with the child, even acknowledging that such contact was not prohibited. The court further refused to provide a method to contact the child's mother in any way, effectively precluding Maher from exercising his constitutional right to parent his child. Contra Douglas v. State, 747 A.2d 752, 756-57 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (affirming condition of supervised probation prohibiting contact in person, by telephone, or by mail with mother of defendant's children because defendant was allowed contact through an intermediary to effect visitation with children). The court's rationale contradicted itself in that the court said it did not prohibit Maher from seeing his child but allowed no avenue to contact the child's mother, who had residential responsibility, and allowed no alternative means to arrange contact with the child. This was not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned decision. Here, under the facts of this case where there was no penological reason given to bar Maher from contacting his child and no means to do so without violating the terms of his probation and the order prohibiting contact, the court abused its discretion.
[¶17] Because the district court sentenced Maher within legal limits and did not rely on any impermissible factor, we conclude Maher's sentence is not illegal.
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However, we conclude the district court abused its discretion by not including a means for Maher to have contact with his child or explaining its rationale for not allowing a method to contact the child. We reverse and remand for resentencing and modification of the order extending the order prohibiting contact for the court to consider alternatives to the total prohibition of contact with K.M. for the purpose of Maher exercising his parental rights.
III
[¶18] Maher's remaining arguments are either unnecessary to our opinion or are without merit. We reverse the criminal judgment and order extending the order prohibiting contact and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. [¶19] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Jerod E. Tufte
Jon J. Jensen
Douglas A. Bahr