Supreme Court of Texas ══════════
No. 24-0273
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Abigail Dalila Cerna, as Next Friend of R.W., Petitioner,
v.
Pearland Urban Air, LLC,
Respondent
═══════════════════════════════════════ On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas ═══════════════════════════════════════
Argued March 19, 2025
JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court. Before compelling arbitration, a court must conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes arising out of their relationship. If so, the court next determines whether the parties' present claims fall within the scope of their agreement to arbitrate. Parties sometimes further agree, however, to require that an arbitrator decide the scope question. In such cases, a court must compel arbitration upon finding that (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) the agreement
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unmistakably delegates to the arbitrator the question of whether the parties' present claims fall within the agreement's scope. In this case, a mother signed a release agreement for herself and her child upon their entry into a trampoline park. The agreement includes a provision that sends disputes arising out of activity at the park to arbitration, including disputes over the scope, validity, and arbitrability of the provision. About three months after signing the agreement, the mother and her child returned to the park, entering it without signing another release. The mother later sued the park, alleging that her child was injured during their second visit to the park. The trial court denied the park's motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeals reversed, holding that whether the arbitration agreement extended to a second visit to the park is a challenge related to the scope of the signed release, not its existence. Because the parties had agreed to delegate such issues to an arbitrator, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in declining to compel arbitration. We agree with the court of appeals. Given the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, the question of the agreement's duration is one asking whether the claims asserted fall within the agreement's scope. In this case, the parties agree that the arbitration agreement is valid but disagree as to whether it governs beyond the first visit to the park. Because the parties delegated this dispute to an arbitrator to decide, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment.
I
Abigail Cerna and her child visited Urban Air Trampoline and Adventure Park in Pearland on August 30, 2020. Upon entering the
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park, Cerna signed a "Customer Release, Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, and Indemnification Agreement" (the August Agreement). In the agreement, Cerna released all claims against Urban Air and its related entities in exchange for entrance to the Pearland location "or any other premises owned or operated by Urban Air wherever located."
The August Agreement contains a broadly worded arbitration clause. Among other provisions, the clause requires disputes relating to
"the scope, arbitrability, or validity" of the agreement to be "settled by binding arbitration before a single arbitrator":
Any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, breach thereof, the Premises, Activities, property damage (real or personal), personal injury
(including death), or the scope, arbitrability, or validity of this arbitration agreement (Dispute) shall be brought by the parties in their individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or
representative capacity, and settled by binding arbitration before a single arbitrator administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) per its Commercial Industry Arbitration Rules in effect at the time the demand for arbitration is filed.
Neither the arbitration clause nor any other clause of the agreement contains express language as to the duration of the agreement. Cerna and her child returned to Pearland Urban Air on November 21, 2020, and did not sign another agreement. At this visit, Cerna alleges that her child was seriously injured when he cut his foot while jumping on a trampoline.
After Cerna filed suit against Urban Air, it moved to compel arbitration. Urban Air contended that the August Agreement requires Cerna to arbitrate her claims because they arise out of activity on Urban
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Air's premises. Pertinent to the issue before our Court, Cerna responded that the August Agreement cannot apply to the November visit, and thus no agreement to arbitrate exists for the November visit. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Urban Air's motion. On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals reversed.1The court first held that the August Agreement was a valid contract binding Cerna and her child.2With an agreement established, the court then held that Cerna's argument—that the August Agreement did not apply to the November visit—is a challenge to its scope.3Finally, the court held it could not decide this question of scope because the August Agreement expressly delegates this question to an arbitrator.4
II
A party seeking to compel arbitration must establish that
"(1) there is a valid arbitration clause, and (2) the claims in dispute fall within that agreement's scope."5Courts decide the first inquiry—
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whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.6A court must not compel arbitration absent a valid agreement to arbitrate.7 The second inquiry accepts the existence of an agreement and turns to examine the agreement's breadth. Like other contractual provisions, parties can agree to delegate this question to an arbitrator to decide rather than a court.8Courts enforce these "delegation provision[s]," however, only if they "clearly and unmistakably" delegate matters of scope to an arbitrator.9
In this case, Cerna contends that the relevant question is whether an arbitration agreement exists for her and her child's November visit to Urban Air. In Cerna's view, the trial court properly denied Urban Air's motion to compel arbitration because Urban Air produced no release applicable to the November visit, and the August Agreement does not state the length of its duration or that it governs beyond the August visit. Under the court of appeals' analysis, Cerna argues,
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disputes will be delegated to arbitration in perpetuity and without judicial inquiry as long as the parties once agreed to do so. Instead, courts should examine whether an agreement exists that governs the particular dispute—in this case, the November visit. Urban Air responds that neither party disputes the existence of an agreement to arbitrate—the August Agreement. Cerna simply challenges whether the November visit falls within the agreement's scope. Because the August Agreement contains a clear and unmistakable delegation provision, however, Urban Air argues an arbitrator must decide this challenge in the first instance.
A
Courts decide challenges "to the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate."10If a party challenges whether an agreement to arbitrate formed, a court applies ordinary contract law principles to ensure an enforceable agreement exists.11So too when an arbitration agreement signatory attempts to compel a non-signatory to arbitrate, which raises the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists between those parties.12Finally, if the parties to an arbitration agreement subsequently enter into another agreement, that also may give rise to
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an existence challenge, because it raises a question whether the first agreement compelling arbitration "still exists at all."13 Once a court determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists, the particulars of the agreement control the court's next steps. Ordinarily, a court decides whether the parties' claims fall within the agreement's scope.14But because arbitration agreements are contracts, the parties can agree that an arbitrator must decide whether the parties' claims fall within the agreement—or "are arbitrable."15When an agreement unmistakably delegates questions of the applicability of the agreement to the parties' claims, a court must compel arbitration on the matters the parties delegated.16Such matters can include questions
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about the scope or validity of the arbitration clause in a given context.17 A delegation provision removes the court's power to decide such challenges.18
In this Court, Cerna does not dispute that the August Agreement is valid and binds her to arbitrate claims arising from the August visit. But because the August Agreement lacks durational language, she claims that her challenge to its application to the November visit is one going to the existence of a contract for that visit. Cerna's challenge, however, is to the scope of the August Agreement, not its existence. Cerna does not dispute its formation or whether it applies to her; nor does she invoke a superseding agreement for the November visit that could challenge the present existence of the August Agreement.19Rather, Cerna questions the extent of the agreement's applicability—that is, whether it "exists as to the claims [she] has asserted in this suit."20Cerna argues that the August Agreement does not apply to the present dispute because the agreement
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does not apply to her November visit. Such applicability arguments are recognized as ones of scope.21
Like Cerna, other parties seeking to avoid arbitration have attempted to reframe a scope challenge into one that asks whether an
"arbitration agreement exists as to the claims it has asserted in this suit."22We rejected such an attempt in TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, holding that this framing "collapses two separate inquiries" of existence and scope.23We observed that the two inquiries must remain separate in recognition of the principle that only courts can decide existence but scope can be delegated.24 An argument about an agreement's "existence," when confined to a particular claim, crosses the threshold from existence to scope. Such a dispute concerns not if an agreement to arbitrate exists, but which claims are arbitrable under that valid agreement.25We have declined to recognize such challenges as going to existence when a party otherwise concedes that an agreement has formed. In TotalEnergies, the party seeking to avoid arbitration contended that its claims did not arise out
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of the parties' arbitration agreement.26But its challenge contested the arbitrability of the particular dispute under that admittedly existing agreement, and thus we held that the issue was one of scope properly delegated to an arbitrator.27Similarly, in RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, we held that a party who "concedes the existence of the agreement" is subject to a delegation clause requiring an arbitrator to decide the scope of the agreement.28
B
To permit judicial inquiry into the present dispute would subsume scope questions into existence questions, eroding enforcement of the parties' delegation provision. The arbitration provision within the August Agreement states that Cerna and Urban Air will arbitrate any dispute regarding the "scope, arbitrability, or validity of this arbitration agreement." We have recognized similar language as sufficiently clear and unmistakable to enforce it, and we do so in this case.29The parties have agreed that an arbitrator, not the courts, decides whether the August Agreement applies to subsequent visits, and we must respect
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this agreement.30We thus express no opinion on whether the August Agreement governs the November visit.31
Finally, we observe that existing law provides protection against rubberstamping the delegation of disputes to an arbitrator. The "clear and unmistakable" standard prevents parties from unwittingly implying an agreement to delegate arbitrability questions.32A subsequent agreement may also require a court to decide whether the prior agreement containing a delegation provision remains in existence, but Cerna does not contend that there was such an agreement here.33If, as Cerna suggests, a party seeks to compel arbitration of a dispute wholly outside an existing agreement, it is the arbitrator who decides the question, including whether compelling arbitration in such circumstances was frivolous.34This approach carries out the "two-step
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process" of existence and scope necessary when a valid delegation provision exists.35Courts decide whether an agreement exists in the first step but lack the authority to engage in the second upon confirming the validity of a delegation provision.
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Upon deciding that the parties agreed to arbitrate, courts must respect the agreement's terms—including terms delegating to an arbitrator disputes over whether particular claims fall within the parties' agreement. In challenging the August Agreement's applicability to her November visit, Cerna asks a court to decide that the claims she brings are excluded from that agreement. The court of appeals properly held that this decision is one reserved to the arbitrator under the terms of the parties' agreement. Accordingly, we affirm its judgment and remand the case to the trial court to issue an order compelling arbitration.
Jane N. Bland
Justice
arbitrability. When the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must respect the parties' decision as embodied in the contract." 586 U.S. at 71.
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OPINION DELIVERED: May 23, 2025