THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2024-0519, State of New Hampshire v. Donald Thompson, the court on September 12, 2025, issued the following order:
The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The defendant, Donald Thompson, appeals his conviction, following a bench trial in the Circuit Court (Swegart, J.), on charges of disobeying a police officer and resisting arrest. See RSA 265:4 (2024) (amended 2024); RSA 642:2 (2016). The defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) determining that the State was not required to prove that he acted with a purpose to evade a pursuit by a law enforcement officer in order to convict him of disobeying a police officer; (2) allegedly determining that the State was not required to prove that he had specific intent to resist arrest in order to convict him of resisting arrest; and (3) finding sufficient evidence to convict him of both crimes. We affirm.
We first address the defendant's arguments that the trial court erred by determining that the State did not have to prove that he acted with a purpose to evade a pursuit by a law enforcement officer to convict him of disobeying a police officer, and by finding sufficient evidence to convict him of that crime. The interpretation of a statute raises a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Jordan, 176 N.H. 34, 38 (2023). We look first to the statutory language itself and, if possible, construe it according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret the statute as written, and do not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that it did not see fit to include. Id.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence likewise raises a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Seibel, 174 N.H. 440, 445 (2021). When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we objectively review the entire record, construing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from it, in the light most favorable to the State, and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We examine each item of evidence in the context of the entire case, not in isolation. Id. The trier of fact is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts proved as well as from facts found as the result of other inferences so long as they can reasonably be drawn therefrom. See id.
1
2
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt. State v. Saintil-Brown, 172 N.H. 110, 117 (2019). When the evidence as to one or more of the elements is solely circumstantial, the defendant must establish that the evidence does not exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt. Id. The proper analysis is not whether every possible conclusion consistent with innocence has been excluded, but whether all such reasonable conclusions based on the evidence have been excluded. Id. When solely circumstantial evidence is at issue, "the critical question is whether, even assuming all credibility resolutions in favor of the State, the inferential chain of circumstances is of sufficient strength that guilt is the sole rational conclusion." Seibel, 174 N.H. at 445 (quotation omitted).
RSA 265:4, I provides:
No person, while driving or in charge of a vehicle, shall:
. . .
(c) Purposely neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any law enforcement officer who is in uniform or who displays his badge conspicuously on the outside of his outer coat or garment, or who signals such person to stop by means of any authorized audible or visual emergency warning signals; or otherwise willfully attempt to elude pursuit by a law enforcement officer by increasing speed, extinguishing headlamps while still in motion or abandoning a vehicle while being pursued
RSA 265:4, I(c). "A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when his conscious object is to cause the result or engage in the conduct that comprises the element." RSA 626:2, II(a) (2016). In this case, the defendant was charged by a complaint alleging that he
"[p]urposely[,] while driving a motor vehicle, . . . neglected to stop when signaled to stop by . . . a law enforcement officer . . . by means of authorized visual emergency blue light warning signals . . . and further neglected to stop after being signaled by means of authorized audible siren and emergency blue lights." At trial, the defendant argued that the State was required to prove that he willfully attempted to elude the officer's pursuit of him when he purposely neglected to stop, and that there was no evidence that he was attempting to elude a pursuit. In convicting the defendant, the trial court rejected this argument, ruling that "the State [did not] need to prove a purpose to elude."
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in so ruling, asserting that under the statute, the State was required to prove the following elements: "(1) Operating a motor vehicle; (2) A law enforcement officer signaling the person to stop; and (3) A wilful [sic] attempt to elude pursuit, by
3
purposefully neglecting to stop or by increasing speed, extinguishing headlamps while still in motion or abandoning a vehicle while being pursued."
We disagree.
In State v. Hall, we interpreted RSA 265:4, I(c) as follows: "Under RSA 265:4, I(c), the elements of disobeying an officer are: (1) driving a motor vehicle, and (2) purposely neglecting to stop when signaled by a law enforcement officer or willfully attempting to elude pursuit by a law enforcement officer." State v. Hall, 133 N.H. 446, 450 (1990) (emphasis added). Consistent with Hall, the trial court correctly construed the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in RSA 265:4, I(c) as containing two independent variants of the crime, one requiring proof that the defendant purposely neglected to stop when signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer, and a second, not charged in this case, requiring proof that the defendant willfully attempted to elude pursuit by a law enforcement officer. See Hall, 133 N.H. at 450. The defendant's argument not only contradicts Hall, but reads into the first clause of RSA 265:4, I(c) language not used by the legislature, namely, that the State must prove a willful attempt to elude a pursuit by purposely neglecting to stop. To the extent the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for disobeying a police officer, his argument largely turns upon his erroneous interpretation of RSA 265:4, I(c), asserting that the evidence did not establish a willful attempt to elude a law enforcement pursuit. To the extent he is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he purposely neglected to stop when signaled to do so by a law enforcement officer, we disagree. The evidence at trial, including video footage from the officer's body-worn and dashboard-mounted cameras, demonstrates that the defendant (1) drove for seven-tenths of a mile and for more than a minute after the officer had activated his emergency blue lights and begun to pursue him;
(2) continued to drive, and briefly accelerated by ten miles per hour, even after the officer had activated his emergency siren directly behind him; (3) signaled to the officer with his hand at least four times, acknowledging the officer's presence behind him; (4) passed several locations where he could have safely stopped prior to where he eventually stopped; and (5) told the officer, after stopping, that "you don't have to stop until you're in a public place." Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant purposely neglected to stop when signaled to do so by a law enforcement officer. See Seibel, 174 N.H. at 445.
We next address whether the trial court erred by allegedly determining that the State was not required to prove that the defendant had specific intent to resist arrest in order to convict him of resisting arrest. RSA 642:2 provides,
"A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when the person knowingly or purposely
4
physically interferes with a person recognized to be a law enforcement official
. . . seeking to effect an arrest or detention of the person . . . regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the arrest. . . . Verbal protestations alone shall not constitute resisting arrest or detention." To convict the defendant of resisting arrest, the State was required to prove that he "(1) knowingly or purposely; (2) physically interfered; (3) with a person recognized to be a law enforcement official; (4) while that person was seeking to effect an arrest or detention of the defendant." State v. Rogers, 177 N.H. 47, 51-52 (2024), 2024 N.H. 57, ¶13. "The Criminal Code generally uses the terms 'purposely' and 'knowingly' in place of specific intent and general intent, respectively." State v. Goodwin, 140 N.H. 672, 674 (1996).
In its narrative order, the trial court stated:
As to the Resisting Arrest, [the defendant] was told clearly that he was being put under arrest and was ordered to put his hands behind his back. He moved his arms away and twisted his body away such that it physically interfered with law enforcement's ability to place him under arrest. The State established this element, along with the other required elements, beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(Emphasis added.) We interpret trial court orders de novo. See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H. 698, 702 (2008). We ordinarily assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decision. See State v. Palermo, 168 N.H. 387, 394 (2015). Here, in light of the trial court's express determination that the State established, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the defendant physically interfered with the officer's efforts to arrest him, but
"the other required elements" of resisting arrest, we conclude that it determined that, as charged, he purposely interfered with the officer's efforts to effect his arrest.
Finally, we reject the defendant's argument that the evidence did not support the trial court's finding that he purposely interfered physically with a person he recognized to be a law enforcement officer while the officer was seeking to effect his arrest. The video footage which was submitted at trial establishes that the officer was in uniform, was driving a marked cruiser with its emergency blue lights and siren activated, told the defendant that he was under arrest, directed the defendant to place his hands behind his back multiple times, and attempted to place handcuffs on him while the defendant physically pulled his arms away from the officer and twisted his body away from him multiple times, all the while arguing with the officer. On this evidence, a rational fact finder
5
could have found the elements of resisting arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. See Seibel, 174 N.H. at 445.
Affirmed.
MacDonald, C.J., and Donovan and Countway, JJ., concurred.
Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk