PER CURIAM:
Patrick Reed, a famous professional golfer and public figure, filed two separate, thirty-six count defamation lawsuits, each against multiple media companies and their employees based on several allegedly defamatory publications, including television broadcasts, podcasts, print and online articles, social media posts, and a book.1Specifically, Reed brought claims for defamation, def- amation per se, defamation by implication, and tortious interfer- ence of contract. Reed now appeals the district court's dismissal of both lawsuits.2
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10058 We write only for the parties, and therefore we recite only those facts that are necessary for the parties to understand our opin- ion. Reed left the Professional Golfers' Association Tour ("PGA Tour") and signed with LIV Golf—a newer professional golf tour financially backed by the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia. Reed generally alleges that, in retaliation for his decision to sign with LIV, Defendants conspired with other major tour groups, in- cluding the PGA Tour, to maliciously defame him and tortiously interfere with his LIV contract. Reed's allegations rely on one of two allegedly defamatory narratives—(1) as a member of LIV Golf he has aligned himself with the "tyrannical, murderous" leader of Saudi Arabia for a higher paycheck paid in "blood money," which is destroying the sport, or (2) he has a history of being accused of cheating and unethical behavior during tournaments. Reed alleges that, because of these allegedly false narratives, he suffered social harm to his goodwill and reputation, as well as financial harm to his business and sponsorship deals.
The complaints that Reed filed in each case were dismissed without prejudice as "shotgun pleadings," and the district court di- rected Reed to refile and incorporate only relevant factual allega- tions into each count. Reed amended both complaints, and all De- fendants in both lawsuits moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)—seven motions in total. The district court held a nearly three-hour omnibus hearing on the motions. dismissal of these claims and Defendants is affirmed as well. The remainder of this opinion applies to the remaining Defendants in both Reed I and Reed II.
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24-10058 Opinion of the Court 5 The district court then issued a joint seventy-eight-page opinion that dismissed both cases with prejudice, holding, inter alia, that none of Reed's defamation claims were actionable because he failed to plead any Defendant acted with actual malice in making any of the statements. Reed timely appealed the district court's dismissal of both complaints.
After carefully reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the district court's decision.3
We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), ac- cepting all the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1037 (11th Cir. 2008). To sur- vive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must in- clude "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10058 is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defend- ant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must allege "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Under Florida law, for claims against a public figure for def- amation, defamation per se, or defamation by implication, a plaintiff must plausibly allege, among other things, that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106-08, 1111-12 (Fla. 2008); accord Mid-Fla. Television Corp. v. Boyles, 467 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 1985).4Allegations of actual malice in a defamation context must satisfy the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard; thus, the facts a plaintiff alleges must support a reasona- ble inference that the speaker or publisher made the false statement knowing it was false or with reckless disregard as to its falsity. Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1273 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Michel,
816 F.3d at 702); see also Jews for Jesus, 997 So. 2d at 1106. This sub- jective test focuses on whether the defendant had serious concerns about the accuracy of the published statement or was highly cog- nizant that the statement was likely false. Turner, 879 F.3d at 1273 (citing Michel, 816 F.3d at 702-03).
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24-10058 Opinion of the Court 7 To start, Reed's complaints include a litany of conclusory al- legations that are merely formulaic recitations of the "actual mal- ice" element which, alone, are insufficient. Id.; cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. For example, he alleges that Defendants "acted with actual malice," the statements were "made with actual malice,"
and that "[they] knew or had reason to know that the publications were false and misleading, and/or at a minimum acted with a reck- less disregard for the truth." Beyond these conclusory allegations, Reed further argues that his numerous allegations about Defend- ants' hostility and animosity towards him and repeated attacks against him are also sufficient to plead Defendants acted with ac- tual malice. However, "ill-will, improper motive or personal ani- mosity plays no role in determining whether a defendant acted with actual malice." Project Veritas v. Cable News Network, Inc., 121 F.4th 1267, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024) (alteration adopted) (quoting Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 193 F.3d 1185, 1198 n.17 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) ("Actual malice [in the context of defamation against a public figure] should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will."). Reed also points to his allegations that the Defendants failed to fully investigate their statements by intentionally choosing not to speak with any witnesses who could have refuted the allegedly defamatory statements as further support that he satisfied the ele- ments for claiming actual malice. However, a defendant's "failure to investigate, standing on its own, does not indicate the presence of actual malice." Michel, 816 F.3d at 703. Instead, a plaintiff must
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10058 show the defendant deliberately avoided investigating the veracity of the statement in order to evade learning the truth. Id. Reed's amended complaints fail to allege such facts. Additionally, Reed contends that, because some Defendants republished or relied on the alleged defamatory statements, they necessarily engaged in actual malice. Yet, Reed never alleged a key component of actual malice, which is that the Defendants had seri- ous concerns about the accuracy of the published statements or were highly cognizant that the statements were likely false. See Turner, 879 F.3d at 1273 (citing Michel, 816 F.3d at 702-03). As we already have held, publishers are permitted to rely on other pub- lished reports from "reputable sources." Berisha v. Lawson, 973 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Further, the required awareness of likely falsehood is absent when the publisher's claims are reasonably supported by numerous prior reports, as is the case here. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir.
1978).5
In sum, Reed simply failed to plead facts that addressed the element of "actual malice" in the context of defamation against a public figure, i.e., that any Defendant knew the statements they made were false or that they made them with reckless disregard as to their falsity. Turner, 879 F.3d at 1273. Thus, all his defamation
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24-10058 Opinion of the Court 9 claims fail, and the district court's dismissal of each defamation claim against every remaining Defendant is affirmed. While Reed seeks leave to replead his claims, a district court may dismiss a case with prejudice when amendment would be fu- tile. See Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). Reed has had two opportunities to plausibly allege claims for defamation in his lengthy complaints but has failed both times to sufficiently allege any Defendant acted with actual malice. He does not present any argument on appeal that convinces us a third opportunity would lead to viable claims. Any further amendment would, therefore, be futile. Accordingly, the district court's dismis- sal of both complaints in their entirety with prejudice is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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