ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________ * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
May 19, 2025
Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court
Appellate Case: 24-1158 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2025 Page: 1
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Before MATHESON, EBEL, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
For over 10 years, Elizabeth Covington and John Humphries have litigated a Colorado state court domestic relations case regarding their marriage dissolution and parenting of their children—G.E.H. and J.M.H. In March 2023, Ms. Covington and J.M.H. filed a suit in federal district court against Mr. Humphries; Jill Betz, a social worker at the San Miguel County Department of Human Services ("DHS"); Carol Friedrich, DHS Director; and James Plumhoff, the Child Legal Representative in the domestic relations proceedings. Ms. Covington and J.M.H. alleged damages claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.1
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2It further said that, to the extent state court proceedings were ongoing, the Younger abstention doctrine barred review.3Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand because the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines do not apply.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. State Court Proceedings
We first include a summary of the state court proceedings.
Domestic Relations Case
During the domestic relations case, ongoing since 2010, Ms. Covington has accused Mr. Humphries of abusing the children.
a. July 2022 order
In a July 2022 order, the Colorado district court found that Ms. Covington had
"failed to comply with the parenting time schedule and violated the court's orders,"
App. at 131, including alienating the children from Mr. Humphries ("July 2022 order"). As a remedy, the court shifted decision-making for G.E.H. from Ms. Covington to Mr. Humphries. The court also found "there [was] an absence of credible evidence or information that [Mr. Humphries] has been abusive, neglectful, or seriously deficient in his parenting." Id. at 116; see also id. at 121-22, 126-27.
b. August 2024 appellate decision
Ms. Covington appealed the July 2022 order. In August 2024, the Colorado Court of Appeals held the district court lacked statutory authority to reallocate decision-making for G.E.H. to Mr. Humphries. In re Marriage of Humphries & Covington, 559 P.3d 271, 275-78 (Colo. App. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24SC616, 2025 WL 764619, at *1 (Colo. Mar. 10, 2025). The court reversed this portion of the July 2022 order and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 277-78. It affirmed the district court's rulings "conclud[ing] that there was insufficient credible evidence of father's alleged abuse," finding the abuse
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allegations were "unsupported by the record," and rejecting Ms. Covington's child abuse expert opinions. Id. at 279.
November 2022 Case
In November 2022, Ms. Covington, on behalf of her children, sued Mr. Humphries in state court based on his purported child abuse from 2013 to 2020. The complaint alleged (1) negligence, (2) false imprisonment, and (3) extreme and outrageous conduct. In June 2024, the district court granted a stipulated motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. Covington v. Humphries, 2022 CV 30026 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 17, 2024). B. Federal Court Proceedings
Complaint
In March 2023, Ms. Covington filed the suit at issue here. She amended her complaint in July 2023. The amended complaint alleged that Mr. Humphries physically abused both children. It alleged that Ms. Betz and Ms. Friedrich worked with Mr. Humphries to "concoct[] narratives and blatantly disregard[] the safety of the minor children when they were with [Mr.] Humphries," App. at 27, "conduct[ed] sham investigations as to child abuse, destroy[ed] evidence from files," and misrepresented the extent of their child abuse investigation, id. at 42. Ms. Betz's and Ms. Friedrich's alleged conduct included "maliciously falsifying evidence," "presenting fabricated evidence and perjured testimony to the court," and "maliciously refusing to provide the full body of reports and evidence when requested by a court." Id. at 43. Mr. Plumhoff allegedly failed to convey information about the child abuse to the state court, created a parenting time schedule without consulting Ms. Covington, and "arranged for a forced exchange"
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of the children to Mr. Humphries. Id. at 30. All Defendants allegedly "conspir[ed] to use trickery, fabrication and/or false testimony or evidence, and failed to recognize compelling evidence in preparing and presenting reports and court documents to the court." Id. at 44; see id. at 45-47.
The amended complaint listed four claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983:
(1) Ms. Betz and Ms. Friedrich violated Ms. Covington's Fourteenth Amendment right to parent and to familial association; (2) all Defendants conspired to violate Ms. Covington's rights; (3) Ms. Betz and Ms. Friedrich violated J.M.H.'s due process and equal protection rights, "including the right to liberty, familial association and the right to due process of law"; and (4) all Defendants conspired to violate J.M.H.'s rights. App. at 42, 44-46.
Dismissal and Appeal
The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, concluding the amended complaint launched a "direct attack" on the July 2022 order in the state domestic relations case. Id. at 262. The court also held, to the extent state proceedings remained ongoing, it must abstain under Younger from considering the federal claims.
Ms. Covington timely appealed, but only as to Ms. Betz and Ms. Friedrich. Id. at 266; Aplt. Doc. 29.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court's application of the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines. Miller v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. (In re Miller),
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666 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman); Brown ex rel. Brown v. Day,
555 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 2009) (Younger). Rooker-Feldman does not apply because the state proceedings were not final when Ms. Covington filed the federal complaint in March 2023. Younger abstention does not apply to the state domestic relations proceedings here. We reverse and remand. A. Rooker-Feldman
Legal Standard
"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a losing party in state court who complains of injury caused by the state-court judgment from bringing a case seeking review and rejection of that judgment in federal court." In re Miller, 666 F.3d at 1261. It applies "only to suits filed after state proceedings are final." Guttman v. Khalsa,
446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006). In Guttman, the plaintiff filed his federal lawsuit while his petition for certiorari to the New Mexico Supreme Court was still pending. Id. We deemed the plaintiff's state lawsuit not final and held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar his federal lawsuit. Id. Thus, a state proceeding is not final if an appeal to a state appellate court or a petition for writ of certiorari to the state supreme court is pending. Id.; D.A. Osguthorpe Fam. P'ship v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2013); see Bear v. Patton, 451 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing "the relevant inquiry" for Rooker-Feldman "is whether, at the time the federal action was filed, the [state court] judgment . . . was final and appealable under [state] law and, if so, whether [plaintiff's] time for taking an appeal had run").
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Analysis
The district court erred because "Rooker-Feldman applies only to suits filed after state proceedings are final." Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1032. When Ms. Covington filed the complaint in March 2023, the July 2022 order was pending on appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals.4The state proceedings were therefore not final and Rooker-Feldman did not apply.
The Colorado Court of Appeals' August 2024 decision does not affect this conclusion because it was handed down after the March 2023 federal suit filing date. See id. at 1030-32 (holding Rooker-Feldman did not apply because the state proceeding was not final when the federal complaint was filed, even though the state proceedings became final as the federal case was pending).
B. Younger Abstention
Ms. Covington argues that Younger abstention does not apply to this case. Aplt. Br. at 27 n.8; Aplt. Reply Br. at 8-9. Appellees Betz and Friedrich argue we should agree with the district court's dismissal under Younger as an alternative ground to affirm. Aplee. Br. at 16-17. We agree with Ms. Covington.5
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Legal Standard—Younger abstention and the Sprint categories
The Younger abstention doctrine generally requires federal courts to abstain from interfering with ongoing state legal proceedings. Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Pro. Licensing of Dep't of Com., 240 F.3d 871, 874-75 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). It applies when "(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state interests." Id. at 875 (quotations omitted).
In addition to the foregoing elements, the Supreme Court has further limited Younger to three categories. In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989), the Court, drawing from its previous Younger decisions, said the doctrine applies when the state proceedings are (1) "criminal prosecutions," id. at 368; (2) certain "civil enforcement proceedings," id. (citing Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979)); or (3) "civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions," id. (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.12 (1977); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987)). In Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs,
571 U.S. 69 (2013), the Court said Younger applies only to these three "exceptional"
(10th Cir. 2023) (quoting D.L. ex rel. J.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004)).
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categories of state proceedings. Id. at 78; see Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 924 (8th ed. 2021) ("In Sprint . . . the Court was explicit that Younger abstention is not to be extended beyond the three categories . . . .").
As this court recently noted, "If and only if the state court proceeding falls within one of the[se] enumerated 'exceptional' types of cases" from Sprint "may courts analyze the propriety of abstention" under Younger. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., 98 F.4th 1307, 1317 (10th Cir. 2024). Because the underlying state proceeding here is a civil case, we provide the following additional background on the second and third Sprint categories.
The second Sprint category includes certain civil enforcement proceedings that are
"'akin to a criminal prosecution' in 'important respects.'" Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78-79 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604). "In cases of this genre, a state actor is routinely a party to the state proceeding and often initiates the action," and the "enforcement actions are characteristically initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff, i.e., the party challenging the state action, for some wrongful act." Id. at 79 (citing Moore, 442 U.S. at 419-20); see also Hunter v. Hirsig, 660 F. App'x 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (applying this category to state proceedings that "originated with the state's proactive enforcement of its laws" (quotations omitted)).6In Moore, for example, the Texas Department of Human Resources sued two parents for child abuse and to take temporary
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custody of their children. 442 U.S. at 419-21. The Supreme Court held that Younger abstention applied because the state was a party to the proceeding and "the temporary removal of a child in a child-abuse context is . . . 'in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes.'" Id. at 423 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604).
The third Sprint category covers state proceedings "involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions,"
Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78, which includes orders and processes that "lie[] at the core of the administration of a State's judicial system" and through which the state "vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system," Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335. In Juidice, the Supreme Court held Younger abstention applied to a state court contempt proceeding in a suit between private parties because contempt enforcement "stands in aid of the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory." Id. at 336 n.12. In Pennzoil, the Court held Younger applied when the federal suit
"challenge[d] . . . the processes by which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its courts." 481 U.S. at 13-14.7
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District Court Order
In a footnote, the district court identified Younger abstention as an alternative ground to dismiss the complaint. It reasoned that "[t]o the extent that [the July 2022 order] is not final and there is ongoing litigation" in the state domestic relations proceedings "then this would preclude this Court from hearing the case under the Younger abstention doctrine." App. at 262 n.6. The court said the November 2022 state case "arguably . . . would also preclude this Court from hearing the case" under Younger. Id. It cited the three Younger elements without first assessing whether the state proceedings fall into one of the Sprint categories. It also relied on Morkel v. Davis,
513 F. App'x 724 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), in which we abstained under Younger based on an ongoing state divorce and child custody case.
Analysis
a. Ongoing proceedings
"Younger requires federal courts to refrain from ruling when it could interfere with ongoing state proceedings." Columbian Fin. Corp. v. Stork, 811 F.3d 390, 393 (10th Cir.
2016).
The November 2022 state case was ongoing when Ms. Covington filed her federal complaint in March 2023 and when the federal district court dismissed the case without prejudice in March 2024. But it is not ongoing now because the parties dismissed the November 2022 case with prejudice in June 2024. Under "these circumstances, we [would] vacate [the Younger] dismissal" and "remand the[] claims to the [federal] district
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court so that it can reconsider them without the need to abstain now that the state proceedings have ended." Id. at 395.
That leaves only the domestic relations case to determine whether the Sprint categories apply because it is still ongoing following remand from the state appellate court in August 2024. See In re Marriage of Humphries, 559 P.3d at 282.8 b. Sprint categories and the domestic relations case The state domestic relations proceedings here do not fit the Sprint categories, so Younger is inapplicable. See Travelers, 98 F.4th at 1317. The first category does not apply because the state case is not a criminal prosecution. Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72.
The second category does not apply because the domestic relations proceedings are not civil enforcement proceedings brought by state actors against private parties. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 423; Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604; Hunter, 660 F. App'x at 716; Malhan v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of State, 938 F.3d 453, 463 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding this category inapplicable because the "wife, not the State, began the family court case"). And they are not "state proceeding[s] which in important respects [are] more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases." Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604; see Sprint,
571 U.S. at 79; Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018).
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The third category does not apply because the domestic relations proceedings do not concern "certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78. The July 2022 order addressed a parenting time dispute and evidentiary issues about Mr. Humphries's alleged child abuse. It does not "lie[] at the core of the administration of [the] State's judicial system."
Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335. Nor does it implicate the state's contempt process, id., or other
"processes by which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its courts,"
Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13-14. Nor does it "ensure that [state] courts can perform their functions"—it is "merely the output of those functions." Malhan, 938 F.3d at 463. And it does not concern the state court's "ability to enforce compliance with judgments already made." Cook, 879 F.3d at 1041.
In sum, the third category does not apply because the circumstances of these state domestic relations proceedings do not "implicate [the] State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts." Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72-73.9To hold otherwise would extend Younger beyond the "exceptional circumstances" that "justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in deference to the States." Id. at 78 (quotations omitted);
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see also McGoffney v. Rahaman, No. 23-1060, 2023 WL 6890917, at *4 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2023) (unpublished) (holding the third Sprint category "does not encompass run-of-the-mill probate proceedings").10
Because the state domestic relations proceedings here fall outside the Sprint categories, Younger abstention does not apply.
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III. CONCLUSION
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge