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Jacob ROSE, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Similarly Situated; Derrick Boyd, Roberto Castaneda, Germayne Edmond, Steven Edmond Jr., Keland Gipson, Reginald Hogg, Jimmy Kuhn, Sione Latu, Justin Lewis, Hector Salazar, Vehikite Taulaki, Hafoka Olie, Godfrey Williams, Teddy Woods, Plaintiffs,v.GRAPPLER PRESSURE PUMPING, LLC, Defendant.

DAVID COUNTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Curt Hesse, Melissa Moore, Moore & Associates, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs. H. Brandon Jones, Bonds Ellis Eppich Schafer Jones LLP, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVID COUNTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This case raises two questions. First, has a bankruptcy court's ruling precluded Plaintiff Jacob Rose and other similarly situated ("Plaintiffs") from asserting the same claims here that they alleged before that bankruptcy court? Second, should this Court extend liability for Plaintiffs' statutory claims through a federal common law doctrine even though no court in this circuit has done so? Those questions are easy to ask but more difficult to answer.

BACKGROUND

Legend Energy Services, LLC ("LES") is an oilfield services company, who, allegedly without warning, fired Plaintiffs on May 15, 2021. Plaintiffs allege that firing violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN Act"), which requires certain employers to provide affected employees with 60-days' notice before a mass layoff. Plaintiffs first sued LES for WARN Act violations in July 2021, but in October 2021, and before Plaintiffs' claims could be adjudicated, LES filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 relief under the Bankruptcy Code.

Once in bankruptcy court, Plaintiffs filed a complaint ("Bankruptcy Complaint") that asserted the same WARN Act claims against LES and added Defendant Grappler Pressure Pumping, LLC to those claims as LES's "successor." Grappler then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims, which the bankruptcy court ultimately granted. Now, Plaintiffs reassert the same WARN Act claims against Grappler here, alleging it should be liable for LES's alleged violations as LES's successor.

Grappler, of course, disagrees, asking the Court to dismiss this case for either of two reasons. First, Grappler contends that the bankruptcy court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims means such claims are barred here by the doctrine of res judicata. Second, if Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by res judicata, Grappler believes those claims should still be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the successor doctrine does not apply to claims arising under the WARN Act.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a "court accepts 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" "To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations,' but must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief— including factual allegations that when assumed to be true 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" In other words, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

A claim has facial plausibility "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." "The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." A court ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion may rely on the complaint, its proper attachments, "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." A court may also consider documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss "if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim." But because the court reviews only the well-pleaded facts in the complaint, it may not consider new factual allegations made outside the complaint. "[A] motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) 'is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.'"

Id.

Id.

Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004).

Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 338.

Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)).

DISCUSSION I. Are Plaintiffs' claims barred by res judicata?

In plain English, the doctrine of res judicata means a party is barred from litigating "claims that either have been litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit." Courts use four elements when analyzing whether a party should be precluded from litigating certain claims under this doctrine:

Test Masters Educ. Services, Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 2004)).

(1) the parties are identical or in privity;
(2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and
(4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both actions.

Id.

Plaintiffs argue that, because res judicata is an affirmative defense, Grappler improperly raises it as a means for dismissal. Grappler counters that the elements of res judicata are apparent on the face of the pleadings, thus dismissal in a 12(b)(6) motion based on res judicata is still proper. The Court need not tangle with those arguments, however, because the answer is much simpler: "[a] dismissal without prejudice is not an adjudication on the merits and thus does not have a res judicata effect." Here, the LES bankruptcy court dismissed Plaintiffs' Bankruptcy Complaint, that much is true. But in doing so, the court took painstaking steps to emphasize Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without prejudice. Take this paragraph from the bankruptcy court's conclusion:

Doc. 8 at 4.

Doc. 6 at 8.

Rolls-Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 765, 776 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 2003)); see also Santana v. City of Tulsa, 359 F.3d 1241, 1246 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Generally, a dismissal without prejudice is a dismissal that does not operate as an adjudication upon the merits, and thus does not have res judicata effect." (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)); In re Hallahan, 936 F.2d 1496, 1499 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The case was dismissed without prejudice, and such a dismissal has no res judicta effect."); Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[A] dismissal without prejudice permits a new action (assuming the statute of limitations has not run) without regard to res judicata principles[.]").

"Finally, this Order should not be construed to disturb or prejudice claims which may exist directly between Plaintiffs and Grappler, if any, over which this Court may lack jurisdiction. The Court neither makes a finding as to whether any such claims exist, nor over whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear such claims."

In re Legend Energy Services, LLC, No. 22-06003 (Doc. 40 at 3) (emphasis added).

This Court finds it nearly impossible to distort that paragraph into a bankruptcy court ruling on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, although Grappler gives it a go. Likewise, the bankruptcy court's order ends with bolded letters, stating the motion to dismiss "is GRANTED without prejudice as to any claims which may exist directly between any of the Plaintiffs, Jacob Rose, et. al, ... and the Defendant, Grappler Pressure Pumping over which this Court may lack jurisdiction." And like the Supreme Court has reasoned, a dismissal without prejudice is the opposite of an adjudication on the merits. So, in short, the bankruptcy court did not rule on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims—or even conclude whether they existed—thus dismissing those claims without prejudice, which does not have a res judicata effect.

No. 22-06003 (Doc. 40 at 4); see also In re Legend Energy Services, LLC, No. 21-60451, 2023 WL 3055613, *4 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2023) ("The Court finds Plaintiffs' claim of Grappler's potential successor liability for Debtor's alleged violations of the WARN Act plausible, but makes no finding on whether Grappler actually has successor liability.").

See Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505, 121 S.Ct. 1021, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001) (reasoning that Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "makes clear that an 'adjudication upon the merits' is the opposite of a 'dismissal without prejudice'"); see also Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (holding that in a res judicata context "[d]ismissals for want of jurisdiction are not decisions on the merits.").

In other words, Grappler cannot show that "the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits." Test Masters Educ. Services, Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005).

II. Should Plaintiffs' claims be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)?

Even though Plaintiffs' WARN Act claims are not barred by res judicata, they must still survive Grappler's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The WARN Act requires certain employers to provide affected employees with 60-days' notice before a plant closure or mass layoff. If an employer fails to comply, affected, employees may sue the employer for backpay, benefits, and attorney fees. "'To prove a WARN Act claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant was "an employer"; (2) the defendant ordered a "plant closing" or "mass layoff'"; (3) the defendant failed to give to the plaintiff sixty days['] notice of the closing or layoff; and (4) the plaintiff is an "aggrieved" or "affected" employee."

29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).

Id. § 2104(a).

Easom v. US Well Services, Inc., 37 F.4th 238 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. U.S. Well Services, Inc. v. Easom, ___ U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 427, 214 L. Ed. 2d 235 (2022) (quoting In re TWL Corp., 712 F.3d 886, 897 (5th Cir. 2013)).

The main argument advanced in Grappler's 12(b)(6) motion is that Plaintiffs have not alleged, and cannot allege, that

Grappler was Plaintiffs' "employer." Of course, LES, not Grappler, employed Plaintiffs. Thus, Grappler was not Plaintiffs' employer in a traditional sense. Plaintiffs, though, contend Grappler can still be held liable for LES's alleged violations under what's known as the "successor doctrine." Grappler, on the other hand, argues that the successor doctrine does not apply to claims under the WARN Act. So whether the successor doctrine applies is the threshold question.

A. Does the successor doctrine apply?

According to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Grappler received some of LES's assets and is now running substantially the same business. There is a well-settled, general rule in corporate law that "[w]hen a company is sold in an asset sale, the buyer ordinarily acquires the company's assets but not its liabilities." The successor doctrine, which is "derived from labor law principles enunciated in four Supreme Court cases," is a federal common law exception to that general rule. In short, the successor doctrine's purpose "is to ensure that an employee's statutory rights are not vitiated by the mere fact of a sudden change in the employer's business."

Doc. 1 at 13.

Valdez v. Celerity Logistics, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L. C., 711 F.3d 763, 764 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1996); see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964); NLRB v. Burns International Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 92 S.Ct. 1571, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 (1972); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 94 S.Ct. 2236, 41 L.Ed.2d 46 (1974); Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987).

87 F.3d at 750 (internal quotations omitted)

Although this doctrine originated in the labor relations context, other courts have extended its application to federal employment law claims. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Rojas v. TK Communications reasoned that the doctrine applied to a plaintiff's claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Likewise, district courts in this circuit have allowed successor liability for claims arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Yet no court has applied the successor doctrine to WARN Act claims.

Id.

See, e.g., Valdez v. Celerity Logistics, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 936, 941 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (FLSA); McKee v. Am. Transfer & Storage, 946 F. Supp. 485, 487 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (ADA); Murphree v. Communications Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 702 (E.D. La. 2006) (USERRA); Schutze v. Fin. Computer Software, No. 3:04-CV-0276-H, 2006 WL 2842008 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2006) (ERISA).

So with no clear guidance, the Court looks to the Parties' arguments, starting with those found in Grappler's motion.

i. Grappler's arguments.

Grappler raises two main arguments, with the first being that the WARN Act diverges from other "traditional areas of labor like the National Labor Relations Act, Title VII, Section 1981, or Fair Labor Standards Act." Thus, in Grappler's thinking, "[t]he WARN Act was not intended to be viewed in the same context." Yet that argument would land better if the Fifth Circuit had not already held over 30 years ago that claims for back pay under Title VII and § 1983 are merely equitable claims—just like claims for back pay under the WARN Act as is the case here. So claiming the WARN Act should not even be viewed in the same context as other federal employment law statutes appears to be too broad an argument.

Doc. 6 at 13.

Id.

Fleming v. Bayou Steel BD Holdings II L.L.C., 83 F.4th 278, 292 n.11 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Wilson v. Belmont Homes, Inc., 970 F.2d 53, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1992) (Title VII claim for back pay is equitable); Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 323-24 (5th Cir. 1970) (§ 1983 claim for back pay is equitable)).

Grappler's second argument is that "[t]he Fifth Circuit has directly held that only WARN Act text and Department of Labor (DOL) regulations determine liability under the WARN Act," citing the Fifth Circuit's recent holding in Fleming v. Bayou Steel BD Holdings II L.L.C . But that assertion misses two points. First, there are key differences between this case and Fleming. For example, the plaintiffs in Fleming had sued (1) the holding company that indirectly owned their now-bankrupted employer and (2) the private equity firm that advised the fund who owned the holding company. In contrast, there's no allegation here that Grappler is (or was at some point) "related" to LES in a corporate structure sense. So unlike in this case, the plaintiffs in Fleming were seeking "WARN Act damages from other corporations that are legally distinct from but related to the defunct employer."

Id. at 284.

Id. (emphasis added).

That's an important distinction; the Department of Labor regulations at issue in Fleming provide five factors for deciding whether "subsidiaries which are wholly or partially owned by a parent company" are "so intertwined with the employer that the two may be considered a single employer, such that the related entity may be liable for the actual employer's WARN Act violation." So when the Fleming court states "[s]uch companies may be found liable only if they acted as a "single employer" with the plaintiffs' employer," such companies refers to legally distinct entities that are related to the defunct employer. That's not the case here.

Id. at 295 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2)); § 639.3(a)(2).

Second, imposing liability here would not be done through a textual interpretation exercise like in Fleming—the successor doctrine is a federal common law exception when a statute is mute on ownership changes. Indeed, "successor liability is at bottom an equitable doctrine designed to fill gaps in statutes that do not address ownership transfers." Which likely explains why even the Fifth Circuit in Rojas did not conduct any "textual analysis" when extending the doctrine to Title VII claims, focusing instead on the doctrine's equitable policy. In fact, the Court has not seen any district court in this circuit undertake a statutory interpretation to apply the doctrine to other federal employment law statutes. ii. Plaintiffs' arguments.

Valdez v. Celerity Logistics, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 936, 944 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1995); Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Rest. Emp. & Bartenders Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, 417 U.S. 249, 256, 94 S.Ct. 2236, 41 L.Ed.2d 46 (1974)).

Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1996).

This is likely due to the Rojas court's holding that the primary consideration in determining successor liability is not the statute's text but whether there was (1) notice to the successor, (2) ability of the predecessor to provide relief, and (3) continuity of business operations. Id. at 750 (citing Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 750 (7th Cir. 1985)).

Although Plaintiffs' response counters with several arguments, their arguments are even more unconvincing. For example, even though Plaintiffs claim that Fifth Circuit already applied the successor doctrine to WARN Act claims in Hollowell v. Orleans Regional Hospital can easily be refuted —which the LES bankruptcy court did—Plaintiffs appear undeterred, throwing that argument in once again. So once more, the Court reiterates that Hollowell affirmed the jury instruction and verdict on successor liability "under Louisiana law" and thus does not stand for what Plaintiffs claim it does.

See In re Legend Energy Services, LLC, No. 21-60451, 2023 WL 3055613, *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2023) ("Grappler correctly states, however, that Hollowell does not clearly support Plaintiffs' use of the Successorship Doctrine because it does not apply a federal law or Texas law successorship theory.") (internal citations removed).

Hollowell v. Orleans Reg'l Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).

Likewise, Plaintiffs add a citation and parenthetical for a case out of the Southern District of Texas, which Plaintiffs posit "explain[s] that even though Hollowell applied Louisiana law, the Court was 'inclined to apply federal common law' ..." But that quote has been misleadingly shortened; in a case asking whether a company's manager could individually be liable under the WARN Act, and the only way to do so was through veil piercing, that court was indeed "inclined to apply federal common law veil piercing rules to the claims." So that case also does nothing for Plaintiffs arguments.

Aaron v. Leday, 2013 WL 5936623 at *8 (S.D.Tex. Nov. 5, 2013) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs' second argument is that this Court should deny Grappler's 12(b)(6) motion because "[t]he bankruptcy court exhaustively addressed whether the successorship doctrine applies to WARN Act claims and held that it does." That argument, however, rings hollow given Plaintiffs' assertion three pages earlier that "under well-settled law a bankruptcy court does not have the authority to determine whether GPP is liable to Rose and the other plaintiffs as LES's successor." And like with the res judicata issues above, the bankruptcy court took great pains to avoid deciding whether successor liability should apply.

Doc. 8 at 9.

Id. at 6.

See In re Legend Energy Services, 2023 WL 3055613 at *4 ("The Court finds Plaintiffs' claim of Grappler's potential successor liability for Debtor's alleged violations of the WARN Act plausible, but makes no finding on whether Grappler actually has successor liability.").

B. After conducting its own analysis, the Court believes successor liability should not apply in this case.

Finding the Parties' arguments less-than conclusive, the Court undertakes its own analysis, starting with the Supreme Court's warning that courts must proceed "cautiously, in the traditional case-by-case approach of the common law" when determining whether the successor doctrine should be applied. Indeed, in one of their initial four cases on successor liability theory, the Supreme Court admonished that "[p]articularly in light of the difficulty of the successorship question, the myriad factual circumstances and legal contexts in which it can arise, and the absence of congressional guidance as to its resolution,

Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Rest. Emp. & Bartenders Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, 417 U.S. 249, 256, 94 S.Ct. 2236, 41 L.Ed.2d 46 (1974).

emphasis on the facts of each case as it arises is especially appropriate." And based on that cautionary warning, this Court believes that successor liability should not apply for three reasons.

Id.

This is not to say successor liability could never be imposed for WARN Act claims. Like Judge Posner once noted, "there is an interest in legal predictability that is served by applying the same standard of successor liability either to all federal statutes that protect employees or to none." Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Sols., L.L.C., 711 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2013). And "none" appears to have been disregarded as an option in this circuit many years ago.

First, the "legal context" here is not seen in the other cases in this circuit imposing liability through the successor doctrine —a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. And although this fact goes entirely unmentioned by the Parties, there are serious issues if a defunct company's employees could pursue federal employment law claims against any non-related company simply because that company purchased some of the defunct company's assets after it filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 liquidation.

For example, if the Court were to apply the successor doctrine in cases like this one, it could upend the priorities of competing creditors under the bankruptcy law created by Congress. Indeed, a unanimous Third Circuit panel, which included now-Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito, noted this exact problem in In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. There, the court was reviewing the district court's decision that Trans World Airlines' ("TWA") assets were sold through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy "free and clear" of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") 29 pending claims for employment discrimination under various statutes like Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA.

322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003).

Id. at 285, 287.

The Trans World Airlines court affirmed the lower court's holding that the discrimination claims constituted an interest in property under Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus TWA's assets should be sold "free and clear" of the EEOC's claims. But even if that were not the case, the court reasoned that, "in the context of a bankruptcy," federal employment law claims "are, by their nature, general unsecured claims and, as such, are accorded low priority. To allow the claimants to assert successor liability claims against [an acquiring company] while limiting other creditors' recourse to the proceeds of the asset sale would be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme."

Id. at 290-91.

Id. at 292.

What's more, applying the successor doctrine in this context also has economic ramifications. Indeed, in Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, Judge Richard Posner recognized a potential economic problem (although an esoteric one) if the successor doctrine was applied when assets were purchased out of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding:

"Once a firm is in Chapter 7 bankruptcy... it is 'owned' by the trustee (or receiver), whose sole concern is with maximizing the net value of the debtor's estate to creditors (and maybe to other claimants—including shareholders, if the estate is flush enough to enable all the creditors' claims to be satisfied in full). With immaterial exceptions, the trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy (or, we assume, a receiver) must sell the debtor's assets for the highest price he can get. [The trustee] may not cut the price so that some junior creditor can enforce a claim not against the debtor's assets but against a third party, the successor ... The trustee would be required to sell the assets piecemeal if that would yield more money for the creditors as a whole (to be allocated among them according to their priorities) than sale as a going concern would, even if some creditors would be harmed because successor liability would have been extinguished, and even if economic value would have been destroyed."

711 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2013).

So put simply, in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy scenario, the threat of imposing successor liability depresses the going-concern value of the predecessor by such an extent, the insolvent company would be better off selling its assets piecemeal because a pile of dismembered assets would have more economic value than a going-concern under the threat of successor liability. In Judge Posner's mind, this would be "an example of a good reason not mentioned in conventional formulations of the federal standard for not imposing successor liability."

See Id. at 768-69.

Id. at 768.

Second, the factual allegations about LES's assets provides more questions than answers. Take Plaintiffs' allegation that "LES's assets were transferred to other entities, including GPP." Presumably, these assets include the pieces of equipment with LES's logo still on them allegedly owned by Grappler and pictured in the Complaint. But that raises various concerns.

Doc. 1 at 13.

For instance, what percentage of LES's assets now belong to Grappler? 10%? 90%? If Grappler only bought the limited pieces of equipment pictured in the Complaint, is that enough to impose successor liability? It makes little sense to impose successor liability if only a few assets were transferred.

Likewise, what about those "other entities" who also were transferred some of LES's assets, could they too be held liable under a successor theory because they bought "some" assets from a company going through Chapter 7 liquidation? When the general rule is that a buyer in an asset sale "acquires the company's assets but not its liabilities," those unanswered questions create doubt that applying the successor doctrine would be equitable given the factual circumstances.

Valdez v. Celerity Logistics, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L. C., 711 F.3d 763, 764 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Lastly, a holding against imposing successor liability here would not upset "the purpose of the doctrine"—ensuring that an employee's statutory rights are not "vitiated by the mere fact of a sudden change in the employer's business." Admittedly, that might seem strange to say here; the successor doctrine will not apply and thus Plaintiffs no longer have any claims. So Plaintiffs' statutory right would be impaired. Yet even without claims against Grappler, Plaintiffs still could have some sort of claim against LES in the bankruptcy court. Indeed, Plaintiffs could potentially still be in line as creditors against LES's estate in the bankruptcy court.

Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1996).

But they are not—Plaintiffs failed to timely file proofs of claim and initiate an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court as required by the Bankruptcy Code. "The deadline to file a proof of

In re Legend Energy Services, LLC, No. 21-60451, 2023 WL 3055613, *5 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2023).

claim in the underlying bankruptcy case was February 22, 2022." Plaintiffs' attorney filed notice of appearance on January 5, 2022. Yet Plaintiffs chose to not file their complaint against LES and Grappler until March 9, 2022, missing the deadline by more than two weeks. Because of that timeliness failure, the bankruptcy court dismissed Plaintiffs' direct claims against LES with prejudice. So although this Court's decision might be the final blow to Plaintiffs' claims, it is not what "vitiated" Plaintiffs' statutory rights.

Id.

No. 21-60451 (Doc. 33).

Id. (Doc. 55). When Plaintiffs filed their Bankruptcy Complaint, it opened an adversary proceeding under a different case number in the bankruptcy court. That number is No. 22-06003.

In re Legend Energy Services, LLC, No. 22-06003 (Doc. 40).

See Rojas, 87 F.3d at 750.

In short, liability through a successor theory should not be imposed against Grappler here because the legal context and factual circumstances advise against extending the doctrine for Plaintiffs' WARN Act claims.

III. Plaintiffs should not be given leave to amend their Complaint.

In their response, Plaintiffs request that they be granted leave to amend their Complaint should the Court grant dismissal. When a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim, the court should generally give the plaintiff at least one chance to amend under Rule 15(a) before dismissing the action with prejudice. The trial court acts within its discretion in denying leave to amend where the proposed amendment would be futile because it could not survive a motion to dismiss.

Doc. 8 at 10-11.

Dawes v. Imperial Sugar Co., 975 F. Supp. 2d 666, 685-86 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

Rio Grande Royalty Co. v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 620 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2010).

Here, granting Plaintiffs leave to amend would be futile because the sole theory of liability found in their Complaint is asserted through the successor doctrine, which the Court holds should not be applied in this case. Likewise, Plaintiffs have proposed no amendments to the Complaint that would give it a chance of surviving another motion to dismiss. Thus, leave to amend should not be granted.

CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. (Doc. 6).

It is so ORDERED.

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Rose v. Grappler Pressure Pumping, LLC
(Mar 1, 2024)