Lewis R. Carluzzo Chief Special Trial Judge.
ORDER AND DECISION
Lewis R. Carluzzo Chief Special Trial Judge.
This section 6330(d) case is before the Court on respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 28, 2023 (motion). Petitioner's objections to respondent's motion are embodied in his response, filed February 2, 2024. A hearing was conducted on the motion in Chicago, Illinois, on February 28, 2024. Counsel for the parties appeared and were heard.
Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
The material facts relied upon by respondent in support of the motion are not in dispute and easily summarized below. For the following reasons, we find that respondent is entitled to decision as a matter of law. That being so, resolving this matter upon summary judgment is appropriate. See Rule 121.
In a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Actions Under Sections 6320 or 6330 dated March 24, 2023 (notice), respondent determined that a levy is an appropriate collection action with respect to petitioner's outstanding 1999 federal income tax liability (underlying liability). The underlying liability consists primarily of an assessed deficiency and penalty, plus interest, flowing from petitioner's participation in a tax shelter transaction described in New Millennium Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-9. When respondent notified petitioner of his intent to collect the underlying liability by levy, he calculated that the amount then due exceeded $127 million.
Upon requesting an administrative hearing concerning the proposed collection action, petitioner did not dispute the amount of the underlying liability. Instead, as an alternative to collection by levy, he submitted an offer-in-compromise (OIC) in which he proposed to settle the underlying liability for $1.5 million on the ground of doubt as to collectibility. After thoroughly reviewing the OIC, respondent rejected it on public policy grounds and sustained the proposed levy. The notice outlined numerous factors that respondent considered in making his determination, among them his conclusions that (1) in view of petitioner's history of noncompliance, including his untimely filing of a number of federal income tax returns, accepting the OIC would negatively impact compliance by the general public, and (2) petitioner's reasonable collection potential (RCP) of nearly $6 million dwarfed the amount of his offer. In determining petitioner's RCP, respondent valued petitioner's available assets at more than $5 million; the balance represented respondent's estimate of petitioner's available future income.
Petitioner does not dispute that his filing of the returns in question was untimely. He claims instead, apparently misunderstanding the findings set forth in the notice, that respondent erroneously found that he did not file the returns at all.
If the taxpayer's underlying tax liability is not in dispute, as is the case here, we review respondent's determination to proceed with collection for abuse of discretion. Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-82 (2000). An abuse of discretion occurs if the determination is made "arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound basis in fact or law." Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999).
Accepting or rejecting an OIC is within the Commissioner's discretion. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1. A discretionary decision concerning an OIC proposed by a taxpayer will not be upset unless it is demonstrated that the decision was arbitrary in one way or another and could not be supported in law or in fact; whether we agree with the decision is unimportant. See Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 320 (2005), aff'd, 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006). Respondent's policy is that "offers may be rejected on the basis of public policy if acceptance might in any way be detrimental to the interests of fair tax administration," particularly because information concerning accepted offers is publicly available and may diminish voluntary compliance by other taxpayers. See Internal Revenue Manual 5.8.7.7.2(1) and (2) (June 23, 2022). Additionally, if a taxpayer's OIC is, as in this case, premised on doubt as to collectability, then a reasonable conclusion that that the taxpayer's RCP substantially exceeds the amount offered will generally suffice to establish that rejecting the OIC is a permissible exercise of discretion. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 475, 491-92 (2011), aff'd per curiam, 502 Fed.Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
On the record before us, it cannot be said that the rejection of the OIC and respondent's determination to proceed with collection as determined in the notice is not supported in law or in fact. The source and magnitude of the underlying liability involved in this case, coupled with petitioner's history of filing delinquent returns, amply supports respondent's determination to reject the OIC on public policy grounds. See O'Donnell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-134, at *2-3, 12-13.
Moreover, far from identifying any material error in respondent's RCP determination, petitioner concedes that he could have paid more of the underlying liability than the $1.5 million proposed in his OIC. Respondent's valuation of petitioner's assets, which petitioner does not challenge except to dispute the ownership of an account that respondent valued at less than $1,000, is alone sufficient to establish that petitioner's RCP substantially exceeded the amount of his offer. That being so, we need not consider the merits of petitioner's contentions that respondent overestimated his available future income in determining his RCP. Additionally, considering petitioner's concession that his OIC did not reflect the most he could afford to pay, we are not persuaded that the information in the record concerning petitioner's medical condition and substantial non-tax debts compelled respondent to conclude that the amount offered adequately reflected petitioner's RCP.
Petitioner did not propose any other collection alternative during the administrative hearing. In all other respects respondent's motion shows that he has complied with the requirements of section 6330, and we will therefore sustain respondent's determination in the notice. Petitioner is, of course, free to propose a new OIC or other collection alternative to respondent for consideration at any time. See, e.g., O'Donnell, T.C. Memo. 2021-134, at *14. It is accordingly
ORDERED that respondent's motion is granted. It is further
ORDERED AND DECIDED that respondent may proceed with collection as determined in the notice.