ANNE R. TRAUM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SCREENING ORDER
ANNE R. TRAUM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Former state pretrial detainee Plaintiff Corey Booth has submitted a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). (ECF Nos. 1-1, 1). Booth contends that his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act were violated when staff at Washoe County Detention Facility ("WCDF") failed to house him in the medical unit and delayed scheduling his medical appointments. Booth moves the Court to expedite this action and transfer it to another venue. (ECF Nos. 3, 4).
Because Booth is not in custody, the Court screens his civil-rights complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having done so, the Court finds that Booth states colorable claims about indifference to his medical needs and unsafe jail conditions, and discrimination based on a disability, so those claims will proceed. The Court denies Booth's motions to expedite this action and transfer it to another venue. Finally, based on the financial information provided, the Court grants Booth's IFP application and permits him to proceed in this action without prepayment of fees or costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Booth is not subject to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), (b) because he is no longer a "prisoner" under the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h).
I. MOTIONS TO EXPEDITE AND TRANSFER VENUE
Booth moves the Court to expedite this action, arguing that he's an American citizen whose due-process rights have been violated. (ECF No. 3). Booth also moves the Court to transfer this action to another venue, arguing that it's "prejudicial" or a "conflict of interest" for his claims to be heard in the same jurisdiction where they happened. (ECF No. 4). And Booth states that there are more parties who need to be added to this action, he's "been receiving threats and other malicious comments," and believes the court is violating his due-process rights by not addressing his motions "within the time frame." (Id. at 1).
The Court has a heavy docket. Booth's case is just one of hundreds before the Court. The Court has reviewed the filings here and determined that this action does not merit expedited treatment. Moreover, Booth's vague claims of prejudice, threat, and conflicts of interests are insufficient to override 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)'s instruction that a plaintiff may bring an action in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
The Court finds that the District of Nevada, and specifically the unofficial northern division, is the appropriate venue for this action because the events of the Complaint allegedly happened while Booth was detained at WCDF, and at least two defendants reside in Nevada. Booth's motions to expedite this action and transfer it to another venue are therefore denied.
II. SCREENING STANDARD
"[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). This provision applies to all actions filed in forma pauperis, regardless of whether the plaintiff is incarcerated. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001).
Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks that language. Thus, when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court applies the same standard as is applied under Rule 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Review under 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000).
When reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations, construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiffs favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Allegations in pro se complaints are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
But a complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," the factual allegations must be sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "The pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright 8& A. Miller, Federal Practice 8b Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). At a minimum, a plaintiff should state "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Finally, "[a] pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up).
III. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
A. Booth's factual allegations
Booth injured his left foot on or around October 20, 2022. (ECF No. 1-1 at 60). He was diagnosed with a "navicular fracture" at the emergency room, and placed in a boot and directed to be "nonweightbearing" with the assistance of crutches. (Id.) On or around November 18, 2022, Booth had "major surgery" to correct the break, which included placement of temporary metal pins, screws, and a bridge. (Id. at 13, 55, 59). Booth was "placed into a soft cast pending" a post-operative appointment to remove the stitches and place him in a hard cast. (Id. at 13). The surgeon instructed Booth not to put weight on his left foot and to keep it dry. (Id. at 13, 16).
Booth was arrested and booked into WCDF on November 25, 2022. (Id. at 13). Booth informed the booking deputies about his recent surgery, follow-up appointment with Reno Orthopedic, and instructions for care in the meantime. (Id.) Booth asked to be housed in a medical unit. (Id. at 15). Deputies said that Booth's medical needs would be addressed, and to tell medical staff about them. (Id. at 13-14).
After booking, Booth was taken to the infirmary where his soft cast was removed to inspect for drugs and other contraband. (Id. at 15). The nurse told Booth that his wound was infected and prescribed him antibiotics. (Id.)
On November 25, 2022, Booth's foot was "very swollen" and painful from the infection and recent surgery. (Id. at 18). Booth experienced fever, vomiting, cold sweats, and extreme fatigue. (Id.) Booth asked deputies for something like an extra blanket to elevate his left foot and ice to reduce the swelling. (Id.) Deputies refused Booth's requests. (Id.)
Booth alleges this happened on "November 25, 2016." (ECF No. 1-1 at 18). The year appears to be a typo based on the remainder of Booth's allegations, so the Court assumes he meant November 25, 2022.
Booth then asked Deputy Cotham to summon medical, but he refused. (Id.) Booth decided to take a shower in the hope of feeling better, and asked Cotham to provide him an ADA shower or summon a nurse to help. (Id. at 19). Cotham refused those requests. (Id.) Booth then asked for a plastic bag to protect his cast, which Cotham granted. (Id. at 19, 20). When Booth saw that the shower did not have a shower seat or grab bars, and the drain contained what appeared to be feces, he told deputies that it was not acceptable and again asked to be housed in a medical unit. (Id. at 20). Booth's request was denied. (Id.)
Angry and in pain, Booth "wheeled" himself to the deputy station, "got out of [his] wheelchair and [lied down] on the ground and said to the deputies, "what do I have to do to get medical attention[,] fake a cardiac arrest." (Id. at 20-21). Deputies arrived and escorted Booth to the medical unit where he was merely screened to determine if he was a suicide risk and placed in administrative segregation. (Id. at 21).
The door to Booth's cell in administrative segregation was too narrow to accommodate his wheelchair. (Id.) To enter and exit the cell, Booth had to get out of his wheelchair, put weight on his injured foot, close the wheelchair, maneuver the wheelchair through the door, and reopen it. (Id.) This caused Booth "[enormous] amounts of pain." (Id.) The cell lacked grab bars and handrails to help Booth get on and off the toilet. (Id.)
While in administrative segregation, Booth was forced to use a non-ADA compliant shower. (Id. at 22). To accomplish this, Booth had to balance on one foot while pushing the button for water every 10-15 seconds. (Id.) Booth lost his balance "many times" and used his broken foot to catch his fall, which resulted in more pain and suffering. (Id.)
Booth was removed from administrative segregation in December 2022 and placed in the general population, but not a medical unit. (Id. at 16). Booth "made several attempts at requesting to be housed" in a medical unit. (Id.) Deputies told Booth to request a shower at the infirmary between 11 and 12 because it had an ADA-compliant stall, and that's when inmates housed in the medical unit had tier time. (Id.) Booth was denied a shower "on several occasions[.]" (Id.)
Booth repeatedly asked deputies and medical staff to schedule a follow-up appointment with the surgeon to remove his stitches and place him in a hard cast. (Id. at 23). The stitches were supposed to have been removed two-weeks after surgery. (Id.) Booth submitted his first request via "Smart Communication" on December 11, 2022, and did not receive a response until January 1, 2023.
Booth alleges this happened on "January 1, 2025." (ECF No. 1-1 at 23). The year appears to be a typo based on the remainder of Booth's allegations, so the Court assumes he meant January 1, 2023.
Skin eventually grew over Booth's stitches and caused him "severe amounts of pain." (Id.) Booth was eventually seen by Naphcare physician Rex. (Id. at 24). Rex repeatedly tried to remove the stitches, even soaking Booth's foot in salt water to loosen the skin, but was not able to do so. (Id.)
Booth had a follow-up appointment with his surgeon on December 20, 2022. (Id. at 37, 57). The nurse and surgeon were very concerned that Booth's appointment had been delayed. (Id. at 37). Booth was placed into a hard cast and was supposed to be scheduled for a follow-up appointment four weeks out, around January 17, 2023, to remove the hard cast and schedule surgery to remove the hardware and physical therapy. (Id. at 37, 57). Although Booth communicated to jail medical staff that the delay removing his hard cast was causing him "enormous amounts of pain[,]" he was told merely "you are scheduled for off-site appointment." (Id. at 38). Booth did not have his follow up appointment until February 28, 2023. (Id. at 37, 55). Booth was released from custody on or around that date. (Id. at 25).
When Booth asked to speak to a supervisor about why he was not in ADA-compliant housing, Sergeant Johnson said he should complain to the county commissioners for "underfunding" WCDF. (Id. at 29). Booth witnessed effects of underfunding, like days-long lock downs, overcrowding, and fights among the inmates. (Id. at 31). The facility was "under a state of constant crisis[.]" (Id.) The environment in the facility is "chaotic and perilous[.]" (Id. at 32).
B. Booth's claims
Based on these allegations, Booth sues Washoe County Sheriffs Office Detention Facility Justice Complex; Washoe County Commissioners ("County Commissioners"); Naphcare Medical, Inc. ("Naphcare"); Darin Balaam; and City of Reno Municipality City Commissioners ("City Commissioners"). (Id. at 1-2). He brings six claims and seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief (Id. at 25-49). The Court liberally construes the Complaint as bringing claims based on several different theories of liability: (1) Fourteenth Amendment indifference to serious medical needs; (2) Fourteenth Amendment indifference to unsafe jail conditions; (3) supervisory liability for Fourteenth Amendment claims; (4) municipal liability for Fourteenth Amendment claims; and (5) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"). The Court addresses each theory and any issues below.
42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213.
29 U.S.C. § 701-797(b).
C. Analysis of claims and parties
1. Booth names a defendant that cannot be sued. Washoe County Sheriffs Office Detention Facility Justice Complex ("Complex") is a building, not a person or entity that can sue or be sued. The Court dismisses the Complex from this action with prejudice because amendment would be futile. The Court does not dismiss the Washoe County Commissioners, but it notes that Booth might have intend to sue the Board of County Commissioners for Washoe County. The Court also does not dismiss the City of Reno Municipality City Commissioners, but it notes that Booth might have intended to sue the Reno City Council.
2. Booth arguably states Fourteenth Amendment claims.
Pretrial detainees may raise claims about inadequate medical care and unsafe jail conditions under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018). Courts evaluate these claims under an objective deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 1125. The elements of a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment claim are:
"A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that punishment may not be 'cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment." Vazquez v. Cnty. of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979)). It appears from the allegations that Booth was a pretrial detainee, not a convicted prisoner serving a custodial sentence, during the events of the Complaint. The Court thus construes his medical-needs and unsafe-conditions claims as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.
(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved-making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiffs injuries.
Id. The third element requires the defendant's conduct to be "objectively unreasonable," a test that turns on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Id. A plaintiff must "prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent-omething akin to reckless disregard."
Id.
a. Medical needs
Booth arguably states a colorable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment about inadequate medical care. Based on the allegations, deputies and medical staff all knew when Booth was arrested and booked into WCDF that he recently had "major" surgery to repair a broken foot, had temporary hardware installed in his foot, sutures that needed to be removed, and a soft cast that needed to be replaced with a hard one and, later, a boot. They also knew that Booth's surgical wound was infected. But Naphcare's employees decided not to treat Booth's infection symptoms beyond providing antibiotics and not to provide him ice and a blanket or other means to elevate his foot. Medical staff declined to reassess Booth's medical needs after his infection symptoms worsened. And medical staff decided not to prioritize Booth's need to have his sutures removed and timely attend follow-up appointments with his off-site doctor.
Booth alleges that Naphcare provides medical care to inmates at WCDF under a contract with Washoe County. He also alleges that either the City of Reno, Washoe County, or both municipalities are responsible for funding WCDF. Booth contends that the moving force behind his constitutional injuries is Reno's or Washoe's policy or established custom of underfunding WCDF. He further contends that the violations happened because Naphcare has a policy or established practice of refusing to schedule off-site appointments due to cost.
A municipality may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the violation at issue. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). To state a claim for municipal or county liability, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a constitutional deprivation that was the product of a policy or custom of the local government unit. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. "Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,61 (2011). Municipalities are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees' actions. Id. at 60.
A policy has been defined as "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690); see also Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). The weight of authority has established that a "policy can be one of action or inaction" within the meaning of Monell. Waggy, 594 F.3d at 713 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). "Both types of claims require that the plaintiff prove a constitutional violation." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
There are no factual allegations to support Booth's conclusion that any policy or established practice of Naphcare caused his injuries. Booth, however, alleges facts to support his theory that the City Commissioners, County Commissioners, or both have knowingly underfunded WCDF, and thus caused his inadequate medical care. For instance, Booth alleges that he witnessed overcrowding and staff shortages during the three months he was detained at WCDF. He describes the jail as being "under a state of constant crisis." Understaffing meant that inmates were locked down in their cells for two or more days in a row. Because of these conditions, Booth witnessed more than five fights between inmates. Finally, a supervising deputy told Booth that that the issues existed because the County Commissioners were underfunding the facility, and deputies had filed a lawsuit because of the conditions at the facility. The Fourteenth Amendment claim about indifference to medical needs can therefore proceed against only the County Commissioners and the City Commissioners under the theory of municipal liability.
b. Unsafe jail conditions
Booth arguably states a colorable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment about unsafe jail conditions. Booth alleges that jail staff denied his requests to be housed in a medical unit. Booth was provided a wheelchair for his injury, but it was too big to fit through his cell's door. Booth was forced to get out of the wheelchair and close it to maneuver it through the doorway. To do this, Booth had to put weight on his left foot, causing him great pain. Deputies told Booth that he could shower in the medical unit, which had an ADA shower, but he was denied access to that shower on "several" occasions. When Booth showered in a stall that did not have a seat or handrails, he frequently lost his balance and had to put weight on his left foot, causing him great pain. And the toilet in Booth's cell lacked handrails.
Booth contends that the moving force behind the deputies' decision to house him in unsafe conditions is the City Commissioners' or County Commissioners' policy or established practice of underfunding the jail, which led to overcrowding, inadequate staff, and a lack of accessible housing units. Booth pleads sufficient facts to support this theory. Booth also alleges that these conditions happened because Sheriff Darin Balaam mismanaged the jail through bad policies or decisions or inadequately hired, trained, or supervised his staff. But there are no factual allegations supporting this theory. The Fourteenth Amendment claim about unsafe jail conditions can therefore proceed against only the County Commissioners and the City Commissioners under the theory of municipal liability.
3. Booth arguably states ADA and RA claims.
Both the ADA and the RA apply in the prison context. Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010). The ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The RA similarly provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The ADA applies only to public entities," like any State, local government, or their entities, "whereas the RA proscribes discrimination in all federally funded programs." Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up); accord 42 U.S.C. §12131(1) (defining "public entity").
Courts apply the same analysis to claims brought under the ADA and RA. Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999). Disability for the ADA's and RA's purposes means (1) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;" (2) "a record of such an impairment; or" (3) "being regarded as having an impairment[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). "Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." Id. at § 12102(2). Generally, a prisoner states a colorable claim under both the ADA and RA if he alleges that he was "improperly excluded from participation in, and denied the benefits of, a prison service, program, or activity on the basis of his physical handicap." Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997).
Although the ADA does not expressly provide for reasonable accommodations, the implementing regulations provide that "[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner may state an ADA claim based on the "alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [a prisoner's] disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs." United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006).
But a plaintiff cannot proceed against a jail official in his or her individual capacity on a claim based on the official's "alleged violation of Title [I or] II of the ADA and section 504 of the [RA]." Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002); Walsh v. Nev. Dept. of Human Resources, 471 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that individual defendants cannot be held personally liable for violations of Title I of the ADA). Thus, the proper defendant in an action under the ADA or RA is a jail official in his or her official capacity or the public entity responsible for the alleged discrimination. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153-54 (2006).
"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself." WUL v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1980).
Booth arguably states colorable claims under the ADA and RA about disability discrimination. Booth alleges that while he was detained at WCDF, the cell door was too narrow for his wheelchair to fit through without folding it, the toilet in his cell did not have handrails, and he was repeatedly denied access to a shower with a seat and handrails. Booth asked to be housed in the medical unit, which had accommodations that he needed, but his requests were denied. Liberally construed, these allegations arguably state that Booth was denied the benefit of the jail's hygiene, sanitation, and housing services because of his disability. The claim under the ADA and RA about disability discrimination can therefore proceed against the County Commissioners, the City Commissioners, and Darin Balaam only in their official capacities.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ordered that Booth's motions to expedite the case and transfer venue (ECF Nos. 3, 4) are denied.
It is further ordered that Booth's application to proceed in district court without prepaying fees or costs (ECF No. 1) is granted. Booth is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of any additional fees or costs or the giving of security for them.
It is further ordered that the Fourteenth Amendment claim about indifference to medical needs can proceed against the Washoe County Commissioners and the City of Reno Municipality City Commissioners under the theory of municipal liability.
It is further ordered that the Fourteenth Amendment claim about indifference to unsafe jail conditions can proceed against the Washoe County Commissioners and the City of Reno Municipality City Commissioners under the theory of municipal liability.
It is further ordered that the claim under the ADA and RA about disability discrimination can proceed against the Washoe County Commissioners, the City of Reno Municipality City Commissioners, and Darin Balaam only in their official capacities.
It is further ordered that Defendant Washoe County Sheriffs Office Detention Facility Justice Complex is dismissed with prejudice from this action.
It is further ordered that service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 must be perfected within 90 days of this order.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court will issue summonses for Defendants Washoe County Commissioners, the City of Reno Municipality City Commissioners, and Darin Balaam and deliver the same to the U.S. Marshal for service. The Clerk also will send sufficient copies of the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and this order to the U.S. Marshal for service on Defendants.
It is further ordered that the Clerk will send to Plaintiff Booth three USM-285 forms. Booth will have 30 days within which to furnish to the U.S. Marshal the required USM-285 forms with relevant information as to each Defendant on each form.
It is further ordered that within 20 days after receiving from the U.S. Marshal a copy of the USM-285 forms showing whether service has been accomplished, Booth must file a notice with the Court identifying which Defendants were served and which were not served, if any. If Booth wishes to have service again attempted on an unserved Defendant(s), then he must file a motion with the Court identifying the unserved Defendant(s) and specifying a more detailed name and/or address for said Defendant(s), or whether some other manner of service should be attempted.
It is further ordered that Booth will serve upon Defendant(s) or, if an appearance has been entered by counsel, upon their attorney(s), a copy of every pleading, motion or other document submitted for consideration by the Court. If Booth electronically files a document with the Court's electronic-filing system, no certificate of service is required. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(d)(1)(B); Nev. Loc. R. IC 4-l(b); Nev. Loc. R. 5-1. But if Booth mails the document to the Court, he will include with it a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of the document was mailed to the defendants or their attorneys. If counsel has entered a notice of appearance, Booth will direct service to the individual attorney named in the notice of appearance, at the physical or electronic address stated therein. The Court may disregard any document received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk, and any document received by a district judge, magistrate judge, or the Clerk that fails to include a certificate showing proper service when required.