BOGGS, J.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas No. 18JG-054246
On brief: Park Street Law Group, LLC, Jeffrey J. Madison, and Andrew D. Bowers. Argued: Donald P. Beck.
On brief: David W. Scalf, pro se. Argued: David W. Scalf.
DECISION
BOGGS, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, David W. Scalf, appeals a decision and entry denying his motion to vacate judgment filed July 6, 2022 in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons herein, we affirm the common pleas court's judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} In November 2018, plaintiff-appellee, the Ohio Department of Taxation, filed a praecipe of a tax assessment against Scalf for unpaid school district taxes owed to the state. A judgment lien was filed in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on November 23, 2018 for $1,523.71. On May 13, 2022, the common pleas court entered an Order and Notice of Garnishment of Personal Earnings and on the same day sent a notice of the garnishment to Scalf.
{¶ 3} On July 6, 2022, Scalf filed a pro-se Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations "to pursue legal action to collect a debt of any kind in the State of Ohio" had run, that the debt allegedly owed from tax years 2000 and 2003 was in fact paid in full, and that the Ohio Department of Taxation had provided proof to Scalf of that assertion. The Ohio Department of Taxation provided a memo in opposition that argued that Scalf s motion was untimely under Civ.R. 60(B) and that Scalf only submitted unsubstantiated evidence and denials to support his purported entitlement to relief from judgment.
{¶ 4} On July 22, 2022, the common pleas court denied Scalf s motion. The common pleas court looked to Hakim v. Kosydar, 49 Ohio St.2d 161 (1977), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio held that R.C. 5703.38 prohibits a common pleas court from entering an order which has the effect of suspending or staying an order, determination, or direction of the department of taxation. After noting that there are different avenues for appeals of final determinations of the Tax Commissioner, the court found that it would be improper to set aside the judgment at issue.
{¶ 5} The court also noted that even if it did have the authority to set aside the judgment, Scalf s motion would have to be denied on its merits since it was filed too long after the praecipe indicating that the assessment for unpaid taxes had become final. Under Civ.R. 60(B), a motion for relief from judgment must be made within a reasonable time and specifically for motions made under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (3) the motion must be made "not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken." GTE Automatic Elec, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976). The common pleas court noted that Scalf filed his motion to vacate judgment "over three years after the praecipe indicating that an assessment * * * had become final" and found that Scalf did not demonstrate that he filed his motion within a reasonable time. (July 22, 2022 Decision & Entry at 3.)
{¶ 6} On November 14, 2022, Scalf filed an appeal to this court asserting as his sole assignment of error that "[t]he lower court failed to acknowledge that the statute of limitations had expired and should have not permitted the filing of judgment to collect a debt. The rules of section of the Ohio Revised Code do not permit the filing of judgment to collect a debt." We now consider Scalf s appeal to this court.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 7} Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5).
{¶ 8} To prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, a party must demonstrate that: (1) it has a meritorious claim or defense to present if the court grants it relief; (2) it is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) it filed the motion within a reasonable time and, when relying on a ground for relief set forth in Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3), it filed the motion not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. GTE Automatic Elec, Inc. at paragraph two of the syllabus. If the moving party fails to demonstrate any of these three requirements, the trial court should overrule the motion. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1988). A trial court exercises its discretion when ruling on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, and, thus, an appellate court will not disturb such a ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (1987).
{¶ 9} Here we find no abuse of discretion by the common pleas court. "For a court of appeals to reach an abuse-of-discretion determination, the trial court's judgment must be so profoundly and wholly violative of fact and reason that' "it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias." '" State v. Weaver, __Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164 (1984), quoting Spalding v. Spalding, 355 Mich. 382, 384 (1959).
{¶ 10} While we are not unsympathetic to Scalf s current situation, the time for relief under a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate judgment has lapsed. The praecipe of a tax assessment for unpaid school district taxes owed to the state was filed in November 2018 pursuant to R.C. 5747.13(C). Scalf did not file his motion until July 6, 2022, which is well beyond the one-year limit under Civ. R. 60(B)(1) through (3), and to the extent Scalf s motion could be construed as seeking relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(4) or (5), the common pleas court could reasonably conclude that it was not filed within a reasonable time. Ultimately, we do not find the common pleas court's denial of Scalf s untimely motion rises to the level of abuse of discretion.
{¶ 11} We similarly find no error in the common pleas court's determination that Scalf s requested relief was barred by R.C. 5703.38. R.C. 5703.38 states:
No injunction shall issue suspending or staying any order, determination, or direction of the department of taxation, or any action of the treasurer of state, or attorney general required by law to be taken in pursuance of any such order, determination, or direction. This section does not affect any right or defense in any action to collect any tax or penalty.
{¶ 12} In Hakim, 49 Ohio St.2d 161, the Supreme Court held that R.C. 5703.38 prohibits common pleas courts from issuing any order-injunction or otherwise-that would have the effect of staying or suspending an order or action of the department of taxation. The relief sought in Hakim was not permanent injunctive relief from a tax assessment but a vacation of the judgment of the tax assessment that had become final. The court nevertheless concluded that R.C. 5703.38 barred the requested relief because "if a court were to vacate such a judgment, the Attorney General could not maintain an action to collect upon the judgment or to enforce the judicial lien." State v. Senu-Oke, 2d. Dist. No. 29045, 2021-Ohio-2699, ¶ 26, citing Hakim at 164-65.
{¶ 13} In other words, R.C. 5703.38 bars the common pleas court from granting any relief that would suspend or stay any order, determination, or decision of the commissioner of the department of taxation. See Torbet v. Kilgore, 6 Ohio St.2d 42 (1966). While Scalf does not expressly ask for an injunction, his requested relief to vacate the tax assessment and judgment would have the same effect as staying or suspending an order of the department of taxation, in violation of R.C. 5703.38.
{¶ 14} We now turn to the specifics of Scalf s assignment of error which asserts that the common pleas court erred in not considering that the statute of limitations had expired and that it should have not permitted the filing of judgment to collect a debt. We do not agree and overrule both points of Scalf s assignment of error. Regarding Scalf s statute of limitations argument, assuming arguendo that the statute of limitations had expired, that does not deprive the common pleas court of jurisdiction and thus would not render the judgment void. See State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75-76 (1998). A party seeking relief from a judgment that is not void, as Scalf does here, must still comply with Civ.R. 60(B) which Scalf has not done as discussed above. Further, as to Scalf s argument that the assessment never should have been filed, we also disagree. Upon the filing of a final assessment by the department of taxation in the common pleas court, "the clerk * * * must enter a judgment for the state against the assessee, in the amount shown on the entry, immediately upon its filing." Hakim at 163. Here, the common pleas court was therefore bound to enter the judgment after receiving the final assessment and did not err when it did so, contrary to Scalf s assertion.
We note that in Hakim, the statute at issue was related to unpaid sales tax. Here, Scalf is challenging a final assessment related to school and income taxes, however, the statute relating to income tax, R.C. 5747.13(C), requires the same process at the common pleas court.
{¶ 15} It is important to note that while R.C. 5703.38 bars the common pleas court from vacating the tax assessment and judgment against Scalf, that does not mean he has been or will be without avenues to pursue relief. In Hakim, the Supreme Court noted that R.C 5703.38 does "not result in an absolute denial to courts of the right to determine the legality of a tax." Hakim at 165. For instance, taxpayers may challenge final determinations of a tax commissioner through an administrative appeal process with the board of tax appeals and then the Supreme Court of Ohio. Id. Furthermore, a taxpayer may pay the assessment, seek a certificate of abatement, and then raise any due process arguments. Id. After collection proceedings have begun, taxpayers may also raise claims of insufficient service of the assessment. Id.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 16} Having overruled Scalf s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
JAMISON and LELAND, JJ., concur.