Coleman v. Bowker

SHIVA V. HODGES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SHIVA V. HODGES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

William Theoplas Coleman (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil action, alleging violations of his constitutional rights by Officer Bowker and Officer Maldanado (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends Defendants be summarily dismissed.

I. Factual Background

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was arrested in Irmo, South Carolina, and then advised there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for shoplifting from Rock Hill, South Carolina. [ECF No. 9 at 6]. He alleges Bowker sought the warrant without conducting an investigation. He further claims the warrant for shoplifting under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-13-110 is unlawful and violated S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10 because Bowker obtained an arrest warrant instead of issuing a uniform traffic ticket. Id. at 6-9. Plaintiff claims he was therefore illegally seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff further claims that pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-80, shoplifting may not be used to make a custodial arrest. Id.

Plaintiff provides a detailed procedural history regarding charges against him unrelated to Bowker and Maldanado. As to Defendants, the shoplifting charge ended in a mistrial and the judge held Plaintiff in contempt of court, at which time Defendants took Plaintiff into custody pursuant to the judge's contempt order. Id. at 10-13. Plaintiff seeks ten million dollars in damages. Id. at 14.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Analysis

All of Plaintiff's claims stem from his argument that his arrest warrant was unlawful because Bowker could only issue him a uniform traffic ticket for shoplifting. Plaintiff cites to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10 for the proposition that only a uniform traffic ticket may be used for a shoplifting charge. That section states in relevant part:

There will be a uniform traffic ticket used by all law enforcement officers in arrests for traffic offenses and for the following additional offenses: ...

(26) Shoplifting Section 16-13-110.

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10(A). Subsection (C) of the statute states “No other ticket may be used for these offenses.” S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10(A). However, South Carolina courts have specifically found that this statute “expands the general jurisdiction of the magistrate court by identifying certain offenses beyond the statutory limits of section 22-3-540.” Bayly v. State, 724 S.E.2d 182, 184 (S.C. 2012). Although the statute eliminates the need for an arrest warrant, it does not prohibit the use of a warrant. Id. (“[S]ection 56-7-10 eliminates the need for an arrest warrant and authorizes the use of a uniform traffic ticket to notify an accused and commence judicial proceedings in the magistrate court.”). Subsection (C) states that no other ticket may be used- presumably referring to a ticket other than the uniform traffic ticket-but it does not prohibit the use of a warrant.

The court finds without merit Plaintiff's arguments that his arrest for shoplifting was illegal based on S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10. Further, even if Plaintiff's arrest were procedurally inadequate under South Carolina law, that does not mean his arrest was unreasonable or without probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. See Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[A] public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant.”); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining when arresting official makes the arrest with a facially valid warrant, it is not false arrest).

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends Defendants be summarily dismissed. Because Plaintiff has had an opportunity to file an amended complaint, the undersigned recommends the dismissal be without prejudice, but without leave for further amendment.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”