SKLAR, JUDGE
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Nos. CR2012009311001DT, CR2012146745001DT, and CR2019148578001DT The Honorable Jo Lynn Gentry, Judge
Fred Devine, Eloy In Propria Persona
Judge Sklar authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SKLAR, JUDGE
¶1 Fred Devine seeks review of the trial court's ruling summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rules 32 and 33, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Martinez, 226 Ariz. 464, ¶ 6 (App. 2011). Devine has not met his burden of establishing such abuse here.
Throughout his pleadings, Devine has cited Rule 32. That rule governs post-conviction relief for defendants convicted after a trial or a contested probation hearing. By contrast, Rule 33 provides relief for defendants who pled guilty.
¶2 Pursuant to plea agreements in CR2012009311 and CR2012146745, Devine was convicted of two counts of burglary in the third degree. The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Devine on concurrent, four-year terms of probation. Several years later, pursuant to a plea agreement in CR2019148578, Devine was also convicted of burglary in the third degree. The court sentenced him to six years' imprisonment with 144 days' presentence credit. Based on his conviction in CR2019148578, the court found Devine had violated the conditions of his probation in CR2012009311 and CR2012146745. For CR2012009311, the court sentenced Devine to 2.5 years' imprisonment with 347 days' presentence credit. And for CR2012146745, the court sentenced him to 2.5 years' imprisonment with 398 days' presentence credit. The court ordered all three prison sentences to run concurrently.
¶3 In November 2022, under all three cause numbers, Devine filed a petition for post-conviction relief, requesting his "immediate release from custody." He argued that the total presentence credit awarded by the trial court-889 days-meant that he was entitled to early release from prison as of June 19, 2022. In its response, the state argued that Devine's calculations were "incorrect" and that he was "not entitled to add up all of his presentence credits and then reduce the length of his longest sentence by their sum total." The state explained that, while Devine's "two shorter sentences have expired, his longest sentence has not" and that he was not eligible for release until September 23, 2024, at the earliest.
¶4 In January 2023, the trial court summarily dismissed Devine's petition. Shortly thereafter, Devine filed his reply to the state's response. He asserted that "[t]he nature of concurrent sentence[s] and legislative intent absorbs prison terms into one (1) single term of imprisonment." He therefore reasoned that his prison term for CR201914578 should "be reduced by the total number of days of jail credits and not just 144 days." Because the court had previously dismissed the petition, it treated the reply as a motion for rehearing, determined Devine had failed "to provide a sufficient factual or legal basis to support rehearing," and denied relief. This petition for review followed.
¶5 On review, Devine repeats his claim that his presentence incarceration credit has been "improperly calculated." He maintains that his concurrent sentences constitute a "single term of imprisonment" and that the periods of presentence incarceration credit must therefore be combined.
¶6 "All time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense shall be credited against the term of imprisonment otherwise provided for by this chapter." A.R.S. § 13-712(B). The rationale for this statute is that a "defendant, as a matter of equal protection, must be credited with presentence jail time when such time, if added to the maximum sentence imposed, will exceed the maximum statutory sentence." State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 245 (App. 1987) (quoting State v. Warde, 116 Ariz. 598, 600-01 (1977)). In other words, "[d]efendants financially unable to make bail should not serve longer in custody through presentence incarceration than similarly sentenced defendants able to post bail." Id.
Section 13-712 was previously numbered A.R.S. § 13-709. See 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 301, § 27.
¶7 Here, the trial court ordered that Devine's three prison sentences run concurrently. It awarded presentence credit specific to each conviction, according to how much time Devine had spent incarcerated relative to that offense. This is consistent with § 13-712(B), which allows credit for time spent in custody "pursuant to an offense." Devine in essence seeks triple credit for his presentence incarceration. He is not so entitled. See State v. Chavez, 172 Ariz. 102, 104 (App. 1992) (purpose of § 13-712 "was to assure a single, not a double, credit for pre-imprisonment incarceration"). Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing this claim. See State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, ¶ 8 (App. 2000) (court may summarily dismiss petition for post-conviction relief if no material issue of fact or law would entitle petitioner to relief).
For CR2012009311, Devine was awarded 202 days from October 24, 2012 through May 13, 2013 and 145 days from October 17, 2019 through March 9, 2020. For CR2012146745, Devine was awarded 253 days from September 3, 2012 through May 13, 2013 and 145 days from October 17, 2019 through March 9, 2020. And for CR2019148578, Devine was awarded 145 days from October 17, 2019 through March 9, 2020.
¶8 Devine also contends that his due process rights were violated because the trial court "prematurely denied his petition." Specifically, he complains that the court issued its ruling before he had filed his reply.
¶9 Devine is correct that the rules of post-conviction relief allow petitioners to file a reply to the state's response. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(b), 33.9(b). In this case, the trial court issued its ruling before the time had lapsed for Devine to do so. However, the court received Devine's reply and nonetheless considered it, concluding that it would not have changed the outcome of the proceeding. And, as explained above, the court did not err in dismissing his petition without a hearing. Devine was not denied due process of law. See State v. Stocks, 227 Ariz. 390, ¶ 7 (App. 2011) (due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard at meaningful time and in meaningful manner).
¶10 Accordingly, we grant review but deny relief.