STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant LUIS BUSTAMANTE, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 12, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 26, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between February 12, 2015, and March 26, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes eighty-eight pages of paper discovery and fifty CDs containing audio and video recordings. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time consult with his client, review the discovery produced in this case, investigate the case, and discuss potential resolution of this matter with the United States.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 12, 2015 to March 26, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to
18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.