Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Advocates
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Advocates
Judges

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID TRUJILLO AGUILAR, Defendant and Appellant.

MEEHAN, J.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County No. 1470777. Nancy A. Leo, Judge.

John Balazs for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Galen N. Farris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

MEEHAN, J. 1

INTRODUCTION

Defendant David Trujillo Aguilar stands convicted for his participation in a driveby shooting at a gas station in Modesto in the early hours of August 24, 2003. Defendant shot and killed one victim, and shot and injured two others. He was charged with one count of first degree premeditated murder of victim Lacy Ferguson (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count I), and two counts of premeditated attempted murder of John R. and Adrian V.C. (Adrian) (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts II &III). A firearm enhancement for personal use was alleged as to each count (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and a great bodily injury (GBI) enhancement was alleged as to each attempted murder count (§ 12022.7, subd. (a); counts II &III).

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

Defendant was also charged and convicted of three counts of shooting at an occupied building or vehicle with GBI enhancements (§§ 246, 12022.7, subd. (a); counts IV, V & VI). After trial, counts IV, V and VI were dismissed on defendant's unopposed motion as violative of the terms of defendant's extradition from Mexico.

Defendant was convicted by jury on all counts and the enhancement allegations were found true. Defendant was sentenced in July 2018 as follows: 25 years to life, plus 10 years for the personal-use firearm enhancement (§§ 190, 12022.5, subd. (a); count I); consecutive terms of life with the possibility of parole were imposed for counts II and III, plus consecutive 10-year terms for the firearm enhancement for each count, as well as consecutive three-year terms for the GBI enhancements (§§ 187, 190, 664, 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a)).

We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the convictions and to support a jury instruction on the kill zone theory of intent for the attempted murder of John R. (count II). However, for reasons explained below, the jury instruction on the kill zone theory was likely misleading and confusing, particularly in light of People v. Canizales 2 (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 607 (Canizales) and the trial record here, which caused prejudicial harm. As a result, we are constrained to reverse the conviction on count II, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant identifies the attempted murder of John R. as count III. The information and verdict forms identify this charge as count II.

We reject defendant's remaining evidentiary and prosecutorial misconduct arguments, finding no prejudicial error, either considered individually or cumulatively, and the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Lacy Ferguson was shot and killed outside a gas station and convenience store (Quik Stop) in Modesto at approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 24, 2003, in a gang-related driveby shooting. Two others near Ferguson, John R. and Adrian, were shot but survived their injuries. The investigation yielded no definitive leads until 2014, when an incarcerated witness who had been in the Quik Stop parking lot during the shooting identified the men involved and agreed to testify at trial in exchange for concessions by the prosecutor on various criminal charges and convictions the witness had incurred. Another incarcerated percipient witness also came forward with information in exchange for a reduction in his current sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The 18-day trial occurred in July and August 2017.

I. Prosecution Case

A. Witnesses in the Quik Stop Parking Lot

1. Karina S.

During the day leading up to the shooting, Karina S. left the San Fernando Valley with her cousin, Adrian, and a friend of Adrian's that Karina did not know-later identified by investigators as Moya. Adrian was young, perhaps 19 or 20 years old, and Karina thought he associated with a gang but was not really in a gang. The gang friends he hung out with wore the color blue, which Adrian also often wore and was wearing that day. The plan was to drive to Karina's brother's house in Sacramento for a visit. Karina sat in the backseat, Adrian drove, and Adrian's friend, Moya, occupied the front 3 passenger seat. While Karina never saw Adrian drinking that day, she was pretty sure he was intoxicated. She noticed Adrian had been driving erratically since their departure, and he was swerving the car from lane to lane. Adrian and Moya decided they were going to stop in Modesto for gas, and Adrian nearly crashed the car taking the exit. Karina never once spoke to Moya during the drive.

As soon as they exited from the freeway, Karina switched spots with Adrian and started driving the car. She was directed by either Adrian or Moya to drive to the Quik Stop at the corner of Carpenter and Paradise Roads in Modesto. Despite that they were supposed to be getting gas, Karina stopped the car in a parking stall directly in front of the Quik Stop next to a truck; she did not pull up to the gas tanks, which she could not explain. Neither Adrian nor Moya made or received any calls up to this point. Adrian got out and went into the store, but Moya remained in the front passenger seat. As Adrian went into the store, Karina noticed a couple of people in front of the store, including a White male and female who were standing right in front of where she was parked and a Black male who she believed came out of the white truck.

Adrian was wearing a blue bandana hanging down his right side. Karina S. associated that blue bandana with a gang. She knew Adrian hung out with gang members, but she did not think he was really in a gang. While Adrian was in the store, Moya made a very short, whispered phone call that Karina could not hear. When Adrian came back out of the store a few minutes later, he stood next to Karina's door to get some extra change from her. He was never yelling or making any gestures-she never saw any kind of confrontation or argument that night.

All of the sudden, she heard gunfire. The shots were fired from behind her and to her right. She ducked down in the car, and she thought Moya remained in the car, too. When she got out of the car after the shooting stopped, Adrian was hopping around and hiding behind the nearby truck, and then he dropped to the ground. She saw there was smoke coming from underneath the car she had been in, and she saw holes in the 4 windshield. She also saw the White woman who had been in front of Karina's car lying on the ground. Karina grabbed a shirt from her bag in the backseat of the car to wrap around Adrian's leg. The White woman never got off the ground, and the White male with her was hitting the wall with his arms and screaming. The White woman had an injury to her head.

An ambulance arrived, but the paramedics told Karina she could not ride with Adrian and gave her directions where they were taking him. Moya's sister came to pick them up because she lived just around the corner. The next day when Karina's brother came to pick her up, they looked at the car she had driven to Modesto. The car had several bullet holes, including in the windshield.

Karina was never interviewed by any officers at the Quik Stop, she was never shown any photo lineups, nor did she ever identify anyone. She did not remember any of the cars in the lot other than the truck they parked next to in front of the store. She remembered the officers looking at Moya's car when it was in the Quik Stop lot after the shooting. As they examined the car, Karina noticed that Moya walked into the crowd of onlookers and tried to just blend into the scene. She did not see any weapons in the car that night, and Karina never knew Adrian to carry weapons. Adrian died in a car accident about a year after the shooting-he was not associating with a gang at that point.

2. Antonio D.

Antonio D. was also in the parking lot during the shooting. He had driven his white Ford pickup truck, and he parked in front of the store near the front door. He remembered the store being fairly crowded, but no one stood out to him in particular. He did not remember a green car next to him. Antonio was backing out of his parking stall when he heard gunshots. He re-parked in the stall and then stayed in his truck. He saw people running around in front of him, but he did not recall seeing a Black male with a White woman. He also did not recall telling an officer that he saw a couple matching that description, but he may have flagged down a police officer who was driving on Carpenter 5 Road. Antonio did not recognize defendant nor had he seen him before. He did not remember telling any officer about a Black man and a lady in a silver vehicle, but if he said that, he probably was not making it up.

3. Katrina B.

Katrina B. was in a car parked in front of the store, perhaps the second or third stall west of the front door. Katrina stayed in the car while her mother and stepmother went into the store. She noticed a car next to her with women in the backseat-there was no one in the driver's seat; those women seemed to be with a man who was yelling at a car behind her. She turned to look at where the man was yelling. When she did, she saw a car driving around, heard yelling, and then heard gunshots. The car driving around seemed to be a Ford and was dark green or blue, and it drove right behind her. Katrina saw four figures in that car, and the passenger reminded her of her son's father-he was Hispanic, bald, and maybe 20 or 21 years old. She did not get a good look at the driver.

The passenger's window of the blue or green car was down and a gun was hanging out the window. The gun was held outside the car and pointed at the store. She saw the car come around the gas pumps behind her, and shots were fired seconds later. The gunshots seemed to come from the pumps behind her, but she could not remember how many shots she heard. To her, there seemed to be a break or a pause between the shots. The second series of shots was fired when the vehicle was at the far end of the parking lot, not when it was near her car.

Katrina did not remember seeing the car leave the parking lot. After the shooting, she saw a man in front of her car who appeared wounded; Katrina did not know whether he was struck with the first bullets she heard or the bullets she heard after the pause. Katrina also saw another man who was yelling and a woman was on the ground. She saw a car parked to her right with females in it who were talking to the person who had been yelling before the shooting. Katrina was shown photograph lineups after the shooting, but she could not identify anyone in the photographs as the shooter she saw that night. 6

She thought she had a good view of the shooter/passenger's face. He had a bald head with no cap or hood. She could not identify defendant as the passenger in the car that night.

4. Lorena G.

Lorena G. was in the parking lot during the shooting and called 911 the next day to report what she saw. She told dispatch she got a good look at the person who was shooting and there was only one person in the car, but Lorena testified at trial defendant is not that person. That is the most she could remember. Lorena testified she was drunk and high when she made the 911 call. When the call was played for the jury, she identified her voice on the recording, but testified she thought she sounded drunk. Lorena did not remember anything about that night except that she stopped at the gas station to use the bathroom, was told no, and then she left. She could not remember if the shooter's vehicle was moving, how many people were in the car, or how many people were shooting from the car. She also remembered nothing about the car itself-she saw the car's profile only. She could not remember which direction the car went. After the shooting, officers showed her many pictures, but she never identified anyone. She was high and drunk when the police came to talk to her, too.

5. Isaac W.

Isaac had stopped to get gas at the Quik Stop and was leaving the parking lot when the shooting started. At that time, Isaac lived in Stockton and drove a 2003 black Honda Civic. Earlier in the evening, he had gone with his father, F.W., and his brother, Anthony W., to a gambling shack. While they were there, his brother took his car without his permission. When Isaac discovered his car was gone, his father's girlfriend, Trisha G., drove to the shack and picked up Isaac and F.W.; they drove around looking for Anthony. When they found Anthony, he stopped the Civic and Isaac got into his 7 own car. F.W. and Trisha followed Isaac and Anthony. Anthony had a gun in the backseat, and they drove somewhere to drop it off. Then, with F.W. and Trisha still following them, they all pulled into the Quik Stop to get gas.

Isaac did not know Trisha's last name.

Isaac parked at the gas pumps facing the store while F.W. pulled in facing the opposite direction, toward Paradise Road. Isaac and Anthony went into the store together and Isaac purchased gas for his car and for Trisha's car. Isaac saw about four or five Sureno gang members in the store wearing blue, so he did not know if his brother was going to fight anyone in the store. Isaac was in the store for several minutes. He and Anthony left the store together and walked to the pumps. Isaac pumped the gas, and Anthony was telling him what he had done earlier.

When he finished pumping gas, Isaac got into the car with Anthony, and they made a right around the last pump and headed to the exit on Paradise Road. As Isaac was pulling through the lot toward Paradise, another car passed them coming from the direction of Paradise and turning right into the gas station so that the passenger side of both cars lined up closest to each other. Anthony had his window down and there was contact between Anthony and the passenger of that car-so Isaac stopped. Isaac could see the passenger in the other car, but he did not recognize him and had never seen him before. The contact between Anthony and the passenger seemed friendly. That car was facing the store while Isaac's car was facing Paradise. The car looked like a black Mazda with four doors and two people were inside. The passenger pulled out a black gun, raised it up over the roof of the car, and fired seven consecutive shots. Anthony yelled out the window, "'Pop 'em out.'" Later in his testimony Isaac described the passenger lifting himself out of his car window with the gun to shoot over the roof, that he pointed the gun forward, shooting in a northerly direction. The shooter fired about three consistent shots and then, after a slight pause, took about four or five more shots. The suspect vehicle was behind (north of) Isaac's at the time of the shooting, "like at the tail end of [his] car," and east of the gas pumps. Isaac testified all the shots were taken while the shooter's car 8 was at that location-he did not remember any shots fired when the vehicle was on Victoria Drive. The car then made a left onto Victoria and proceeded north with its lights on. Isaac saw people running toward the store from a gold-colored car parked in front of the store.

Isaac saw a woman lying on the ground 8 to 10 feet from the front door of the store; she was slumped over and her boyfriend was screaming. Isaac also saw a guy wearing blue who was hobbling. Isaac started to exit the lot, and Anthony said something about those people being worth money. Isaac drove with Anthony to F.W.'s house and told F.W. what had happened. F.W. and Trisha had already pulled out of the lot before the shooting, and Isaac remembered that F.W. and Trisha also turned left on Paradise Road when they drove out. When Isaac got to F.W.'s house, there was a White man there who said "some harsh, crazy remarks" about how gory it was and warned Isaac not to say anything and not to leave F.W.'s house yet. Anthony was with Isaac when this was said, but Isaac took the White man's statements as directed toward Isaac because he was the one with the car and was about to go back to his own house at that point. This intimidated Isaac. Anthony admitted to Isaac he was running with Norteno gang members.

Isaac saw the driver, but could not identify him since it had been so long. He appeared to be a heavier-set, light-skinned Hispanic man whom Isaac had never seen before. Isaac described the passenger as a short, Hispanic male, about 150 pounds, with a buzzed haircut, medium-colored skin, and a peach-fuzz mustache. Isaac did not remember anything being on the passenger's head like a hood or a cap, but he seemed to be wearing a white T-shirt. The passenger's head was not bald or totally shaved. Isaac did not stop his car because he did not want to be caught up as a witness or be labeled as a snitch. When police questioned him, Isaac told them he got a good look at the guy and could identify him. Isaac was shown a lot of photographs and identified the same person 9 twice as the shooter, but he had no idea if he had identified defendant in those photos. Isaac did not recognize defendant at the preliminary hearing.

6. Anthony W.

In 2003, Anthony lived on Donald Street, which is on the west side of Modesto. His father, F.W., lived on Robertson Road, around the corner from Donald Street. His brother, Isaac, was living in Stockton. Anthony was associating with gang members in his neighborhood. The West Side Boyz (WSB), a subset of the Norteno gang, was predominant in his west-side neighborhood.

Anthony knew Pete Garcia, who was a heavyset, light-skinned Hispanic man. He also knew defendant, who used to live next door to F.W. Anthony would get together with defendant to drink and get high. Defendant was also close to F.W., and F.W. knew defendant's brother.

On the night of the shooting, Isaac, Anthony and F.W. had gone to a gambling shack; Anthony did not stay because he had problems with people who were there. So, Anthony took his brother's car and was driving it around. He had a gun that belonged to someone he had given a ride-he did not want to be without protection. He was planning on going back to the shack, but then he met his father and brother while driving along a street. Isaac was angry, and when Isaac discovered the gun in the car, he wanted Anthony to drop it off, which they drove to do.

Isaac had to get back to Stockton, so they stopped to get gas. Isaac's car was a black Nissan with four doors. Anthony did not recall what type of car F.W. and his girlfriend, Trisha G. were in at the time. F.W. and Trisha followed Anthony and Isaac the whole time. They came to a gas station and entered from Paradise Road. Isaac and Anthony went to the middle pump, facing the store; F.W. and Trisha parked at another pump closer to Carpenter Road.

When they pulled into the station, Anthony noticed Hispanic "South Sider" gang members wearing blue bandanas that were hanging out. Two of them were sitting next to 10 a maroon-colored car parked in front of the store to Anthony's left-he thought there were also females associated with that car. It was unusual to see "South Siders" in that location. Anthony did not recall going into the store, but he did get out and walked over to phone kiosks on the Victoria Drive end of the lot. He did not know why he did that since he was not planning to make a call. When he came back from the telephone kiosks, he saw a silver car drive in with its lights off. The car came into the lot where the phone kiosks were and stopped right in front of Anthony and Isaac. The car then went around the pumps behind them and parked at an angle toward the Victoria side of the lot. Pete Garcia was driving, and defendant was in the passenger seat of this silver-colored car.

Anthony was already back in Isaac's car when the silver car first came into the parking lot. The car never made any kind of contact with the South Siders who were at the store; Anthony did not hear any confrontation. The people in the silver car saw Anthony, but there was no acknowledgement. Isaac was already in the car and they were still at the pumps. Isaac wanted to drive away, but Anthony told him to wait because he felt like something was going to happen. When the car had first pulled in, Anthony saw defendant putting up a hoodie and arranging it on his head. Defendant had a full head of hair, but Anthony did not know how short it was then. Defendant also had a moustache.

Isaac started to drive out of the parking lot, past the stopped silver car. The passenger sides of Isaac's car and the silver car were not aligned. Anthony saw the passenger lean his body against the car door, almost sitting on the window, and saw the passenger holding a black gun in his right hand. The passenger was reaching toward his left over the windshield. When the passenger fired the first shot, his hand jerked back and he was falling back into the car, but he was still shooting. He fired about three shots. Then, the driver, Pete Garcia, grabbed the gun from defendant and shot at the purple or maroon car. Anthony thought Garcia fired about six or seven shots. Isaac and Anthony were already at the stop sign to exit the lot when the shooting started. They saw F.W.'s car going across the light-controlled intersection at Carpenter Road toward Robertson 11 Road. Anthony was not sure which direction he and Isaac went on Paradise Road after leaving the gas station.

Isaac and Anthony went back to F.W.'s house where F.W. and Trisha were. No one else was at the house, and no one came to talk to Anthony about what he had seen. Anthony was unsure whether F.W. had left the gas station by the time the shooting happened. They talked about what they had seen, and Trisha was hysterical. Anthony did not tell his father he recognized people in the shooter's car. Anthony stayed at F.W.'s house for approximately 30 minutes and then left before Isaac.

The next day, Anthony asked to be dropped off at Pete Garcia's house because Anthony knew they had seen him, and he wanted to tell Garcia that he was not going to say anything. The guy Anthony was with, however, advised against that plan and Anthony ended up just going out. Anthony never tried to find defendant for the same reason. Anthony had gone to school with Pete, so that was why he thought he could seek Pete out to talk. Although he had seen defendant with Pete on prior occasions before the shooting, Anthony never saw Pete and defendant together after that night. Anthony explained he knew defendant from living in the same area and knowing the same people. He did not go to school with defendant.

Later, when he was in prison, Anthony told his mother what had happened at the Quik Stop. He told her that if something happened to him, she should tell Ferguson's family what had happened. He told his mother how they had gotten to the store that night and how defendant was trying to shoot the guy (with the blue bandana) and ended up shooting the girl instead. He also told her how Pete took the gun from defendant because Pete had a better angle for the shot. Anthony identified Pete and defendant to his mother. Shortly after he told his mother about what happened, Detective McEntire came to see him and Anthony told him what he had seen, but he did not tell McEntire he knew the men in the car. Anthony was scared to reveal that information while he was still in prison. 12

Anthony met with the district attorney's investigator, Kirk Bunch, in February 2014. Anthony indicated he had information about the shooting, and then told Bunch everything he knew about the incident. Anthony entered into an agreement in April 2014 to give testimony in this case in exchange for favorable terms on some of his prior convictions and pending criminal charges against him, including that he would serve local time and not go to prison. He was released on his own recognizance but despite agreeing not to commit any additional crimes, Anthony committed more offenses after his release, including violating restraining orders, second degree burglary, vandalism and offenses related to possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia.

On cross-examination, Anthony was impeached with his preliminary hearing statements that he did not know defendant to be associated with any gangs, that he had not seen Garcia and defendant together prior to 2003, and that he had not known defendant to be involved in any criminal activity. He also admitted that he told Bunch that he had seen defendant at a bar or a tent shortly before 2014, when Anthony was arrested again.

Anthony also admitted that when he was interviewed by Bunch in 2014, he identified the shooter as possibly being David Mo.1, David Mo.2, or David Mo.3. He was shown pictures of these men, but said they were not the shooter. Then, when he was shown a picture of defendant (David Aguilar), he was able to identify defendant as the shooter.

B. Residents Living Near the Quik Stop 1. Larry C.

Three people who lived near the Quik Stop also heard shots that night and heard and/or saw a car driving north on Victoria Drive. Larry C., who lived on Victoria about two houses from the store, was in his backyard when he heard the shooting, screaming and yelling. He went around to the front yard and saw a dark-colored car go by really fast with its lights off. He told police he had heard six or eight shots that were all fired 13 together rapidly-he did not remember a pause between volleys of shots. He had not seen that car before the shooting and never saw it again after it went down Victoria with its lights off. He remembered the car to be a larger Impala or a Buick, not a small car. He did not see any of the people in the car.

2. Ramona M. and Carol M.

Ramona M. lived about four lots behind the Quik Stop. She heard shots fired and then heard a car on Victoria Drive. Carol M. also lived on Victoria. Carol heard about six or eight gunshots fired consistently with no pause. Then Carol heard, but did not see, a car go northbound on Victoria really fast. Carol went to the Quik Stop and stayed long enough to talk to police. That area at the intersection of Victoria and Paradise Road is the Vernon Block, where those gang members hang out.

C. Clerks Working in the Store

R.K. and S.A. were working at the Quik Stop when the shooting occurred. R.K. heard a popping noise behind him, dropped down for cover, and called 911. He heard more than five gunshots in succession with no pause. He thought he saw a black Honda Civic-it had driven by and then he heard the gunshots and the Civic took off. He never saw anyone shooting from that car, though. During the 911 call, R.K. handed the phone to S.A. so that R.K. could check on victims outside the store. The 911 call was played for the jury. S.A. had been in the bathroom during the shooting and had not seen anything.

R.K. had seen Ferguson sitting on the curb out front and her boyfriend was standing next to her. R.K. had never seen the man with the blue bandana before, but R.K. had seen him come in to buy something just before the shooting. He frequently sees gangsters wearing colors in the store. Ferguson and her boyfriend had come in to buy sodas and went back outside. R.K. did not know how long they were outside before the shooting started. R.K. drove a green Mitsubishi, which he had parked just east of the center door of the store. 14

D. Law Enforcement Response and Investigation 1. Officer Jesse Gutierrez

Modesto Police Officer Jesse Gutierrez was on patrol in southwest Modesto at the time of the shooting. He was making a turn onto Carpenter Road near the Quik Stop when a Hispanic male flagged him down on foot. The man's name was Antonio D., and he said someone had been shot. Gutierrez pulled his car into the parking lot. Another person contacted him then and said Gutierrez had just missed what happened. When Gutierrez looked toward the store, he saw someone had been injured and had blood on his pants, and he was sitting on the sidewalk with his leg in the parking stall area near the door and the green Mitsubishi. A vehicle then approached Gutierrez-it was a silver car, and it was moving from the direction of Victoria Drive to Carpenter Road. A Black male was driving with a White female passenger, and they yelled through their car windows at Gutierrez that he had just missed a black Ford Focus that had been involved in the shooting. They said the car had four doors and had gone up Victoria Drive, which Gutierrez assumed meant north. Gutierrez indicated the people in the silver car were very cooperative.

Gutierrez's attention was then diverted by a heavyset White male with blood on his arm who was yelling and seemed emotionally upset. The man picked up a trash can lid and tossed it. Gutierrez also saw there was someone lying on the ground with her head saturated in blood. Gutierrez rendered first aid, and when paramedics took over, Gutierrez moved on to make contact again with Antonio D. and other witnesses.

Antonio D. told him he noticed a black car had circled the perimeter of the lot and that it went north on Victoria Drive. He said when he got in his truck and began backing out of the parking stall, he saw the silver car Gutierrez had seen earlier with the Black man and the White female who had been in the parking slot east of him. Gutierrez reasoned the silver car would have been parked between the white truck and the clerk's green Mitsubishi. Then, Antonio heard five or six shots fired. He did not say where the 15 shots came from or whether there was any kind of pause in the shooting. Antonio got out of his truck to gain cover.

2. Michael F.

Michael F., a video journalist, was filming a ride-along with the Modesto Police Department that night as part of a reporting assignment. The patrol detail Michael F. was with responded to the scene at 1:30 a.m. and was among the initial law enforcement personnel to arrive. Officer Evers asked Michael F. to document the scene on video. The video was taken into evidence and played for the jury at trial.

3. Deputy Jeffrey Hunt

Hunt was on patrol the night of the shooting, and he was sent to the hospital where he contacted victims John R. and Adrian. John R. had a gunshot wound to his left, upper arm, which was photographed. Adrian had a bullet wound to his right calf and one to his right buttock. Hunt noted Adrian had a tattoo of a female wearing a sombrero on his right shoulder. Hunt testified he had seen Sureno gang members with a similar tattoo.

4. Detective Mark Copeland

Sheriff's Deputy Mark Copeland was dispatched to the scene and arrived at about 3:45 a.m. Copeland assisted with the collection of evidence, got briefed by the detectives and a sergeant who were already there, and was assigned to obtain statements from the victims who were at the hospital by that time. At the hospital, Copeland contacted John R., a heavyset White man, who had already been discharged from the hospital by the time Copeland found him. He was shot in the upper left arm and was visibly emotional about the death of his girlfriend at the store. Copeland showed him a photo lineup, which defendant was not part of, but he did not pick anyone out.

Copeland also spoke with Adrian, who had been admitted to a room, and then Copeland went back to the scene. There were two cars in the parking lot that remained there all night-one was a Chevy Lumina associated with Adrian, Karina S. and another person named Moya; the other car was a green Mitsubishi that belonged to a clerk at the 16 store. There was a bullet hole in the windshield of the Lumina. The Lumina was towed to the sheriff's office because the owner, Moya, had taken off and they could not locate him. Ten fragments of bullets and bullet jackets were found in the area, and one nine-millimeter bullet casing was found in the parking lot. Copeland found it difficult to conclude how many bullets had been fired since one bullet could create numerous fragments. Copeland attended the autopsy of Ferguson on August 27, 2003, after which the medical examiner concluded her death was caused by a gunshot wound to the head.

Medical Examiner Jennifer Rulon also testified briefly about the autopsy and her conclusion Ferguson's death was caused by a gunshot wound to the head.

After about a month of investigation, the case was left to Detective McEntire alone. Copeland was reassigned the case in March 2005, and he worked on it until September or October 2005. Copeland spoke with Katrina B. on October 7, 2003, and again on May 2, 2005. She looked at photo lineups both times, but she never identified anyone. Defendant's photo was not in any of those lineups. Katrina B. told Copeland in October 2003 that she saw the suspect vehicle circle the lot, that the shooter was firing while the car was moving, and then it completed the circle and there was more firing from the car to the front of the store. She said she assumed the passenger was firing over the car and that the vehicle headed northbound on Victoria Drive after the shooting.

Pete Garcia, a documented Norteno gang member, was considered a suspect as the possible driver. During research, the name David Mo.3 came up as a potential suspect through Detective McEntire. Mo.3 was also a known Norteno gang member and an associate of Pete Garcia. Copeland did not interview Mo.3-Mo.3 was 27 years old at the time of the shooting and did not match the description Katrina B. had given them of the shooter.

Then, in March 2005, Copeland received a recording of a call between Anthony W.'s mother and a detective with the Modesto Police Department. Defendant's 17 name came up in that conversation. Once Copeland learned of defendant, he searched for records pertaining to him, but there was no information defendant was associated with Pete Garcia. Copeland did not speak to Anthony W.

5. Sarah F.

Sarah F. was a good friend of Ferguson, and Sarah dated Ferguson's brother, James, after the shooting. Sarah lived on Modesto's west side in 2003 and on September 27, 2003, while Sarah was getting gas with her daughter in the car, a man approached her. He had on tan pants, no shirt, and his head was shaved. He approached Sarah and asked her if she was James's friend. When she responded affirmatively, the man looked at her in a "boastful" and "mocking" manner and told Sarah to tell James that Diablo said "'"Hi."'"

About a half-hour later, the same man drove past Sarah's house while she was exiting her car and yelled out, "'So this is where you live.'" She called the police to tell them she had been threatened. Two officers came to talk with her at work, but no one ever showed her a photo of defendant. She remembered the man who approached her in 2003 had one eye a bit lower than the other, and she identified defendant in court as having one eye lower than the other. Sarah remembered speaking with Detective McEntire on September 30, 2003, about the incident, but she could not identify Diablo in any of the pictures McEntire showed her. Defendant's photo was not among any of the lineup photos she viewed. Sarah related incidents where Ferguson's mother's house was subject to tagging and a memorial to Ferguson was set on fire.

In 2016 when defendant was arrested, Sarah wanted to see a picture of who they had arrested. When she saw the photo of who had been arrested in March or April, she realized it was the same man who had approached her and followed her to her home in 2003. When she saw the picture, she texted Ferguson's mother, Boni, to tell her that the man arrested was the man who had approached her and referred to himself as Diablo. Sarah testified she looked the photo up herself on the internet, and that Boni had not 18 shown it to her. On cross-examination, however, she testified Boni had sent her the arrest photo.

Sarah indicated she suffered a head injury in March 2016 before she saw the arrest photo; the head injury had caused memory difficulties prior to a surgery in October 2016. In June 2017, Sarah spoke with the district attorney's investigator, Kirk Bunch. Sarah did not remember telling Bunch that when officers had visited her before with lineup photos, it was driving her mad that she could not identify someone. She remembered being frustrated because the man who had approached her and followed her to her house was not in the photo lineups she looked at. She did tell Bunch, however, that she had suffered a head trauma that had affected her memory.

Sarah testified she was certain defendant was the man who approached her at the gas station and followed her home and referred to himself as Diablo. She denied that she had heard anyone mention Diablo's name before the man approached her at the gas station, although McEntire testified Sarah told him two people had mentioned Diablo's name to her before the encounter Sarah described at the gas station.

6. A.J.

At the trial, A.J. testified he was formerly a northern gang member from the WSB subset, which covers the streets of Rouse Ct., Sutter Ave., Garden Ave., and Roselawn Ct. in Modesto. He has been in the gang from the time he was born, it is a generational matter in his family and goes back to the 1970's. In 2003, he was selling drugs, including cocaine and methamphetamine. This also included defending and protecting his gang territory, which usually led to violence. The South Siders were the primary rival gang of the WSB. The South Siders' gang color is blue, whereas the WSB fly red. The heart of the WSB neighborhood was the intersection of Colorado and Pelton Avenues in Modesto, and there was an MS Market on that corner where "most of everything went down."

A.J. explained that to "'post up'" included selling drugs and patrolling the neighborhood for the gang. He was actively involved in "posting up" around the MS 19 Market in July and August 2003. He knew Pete Garcia, who was still alive in 2003 and was in the WSB subset. Garcia did not live in the neighborhood, but he was there daily. Garcia had younger males around A.J.'s age with him whom he would endorse for status within the gang. He would have these younger men sell drugs, while he picked up the money and supplied the drugs. A.J. was never endorsed by Garcia because of his family history with the gang-he did not have to go through the same initiation most youth would have to go through, and the gang treated him a little better because of his family status.

A.J. knew defendant, too, because defendant would associate with Garcia and a man named Jose. Defendant was not a member of WSB, but he was an associate. On the night of the shooting, A.J. was hanging out and selling drugs at a trap house near Colorado and Pelton Avenues. A.J. was with another person named Lucky whom Garcia happened to endorse. They were standing out front and saw Garcia and defendant pull up in a small dark car which Garcia was driving. Garcia seemed to have been drinking-he jumped out of the vehicle and brandished a weapon. A.J. knew Garcia to get very aggressive when he was drunk, and Garcia was aggressive that night. He was uttering threats against Vernon Block Members, another Norteno subset gang on the west side of Modesto, and South Siders. Garcia was saying he was going to "put down" on some "scrap"-a derogatory term for South Siders.

A.J. described Garcia as stocky and sturdy, somewhere around 220 to 230 pounds and maybe 5 feet 7 or 9 inches tall. Garcia introduced him to defendant, but A.J. could not remember what defendant was wearing-it was a hot night. Garcia and defendant stayed only a matter of minutes. A.J. and the others encouraged Garcia to leave because he was bringing unwanted attention. After Garcia and defendant left, they joked that Garcia did not know how to act when he was drunk. A.J. had a police scanner with him that night to monitor police activity so they would know if law enforcement was approaching. About 5 or 10 minutes after Garcia and defendant left, they heard shots but 20 could not tell where they were coming from. A few minutes later, the police scanner transmissions indicated shots had been fired, and a few minutes after that, Garcia came "whipping" around the corner to the trap house, pulled over in the same car A.J. had seen him in earlier, and jumped out of the car. Defendant remained in the passenger seat, looking around nervously. Garcia began talking about how he just "let them have it." After being told to leave, Garcia drove away heading southbound. A.J. heard later that a woman had been shot at the Quik Stop.

The day after the shooting, A.J. and some others were at the yard of a home near the corner of Pelton and Colorado Avenues with Garcia and defendant. A.J. got called over to Garcia and they had a conversation about what had happened the night before at the Quik Stop. Garcia said it was their doing, he and defendant, and then said they were not even aiming for her, they were aiming at those "'fools.'" Defendant was shaking his head in disgust, as though it should not have happened. It was not clear to A.J. who had done the shooting. Garcia told A.J. not to tell anyone what had happened. Defendant was present for this conversation.

A few months later, A.J. ran into Garcia at the MS Market on the corner of Pelton and Colorado Avenues. According to A.J., Garcia was drunk and alluded to the night of the shooting and some South Siders. Garcia had been placed on "freeze" by the WSB gang that A.J. described as an investigation by the gang for an alleged incident that violates mandates, policies or guidelines of the gang. Killing civilians is against the rules and results in an automatic freeze of the involved gang member. The member on freeze will be kept out of any pertinent "household" information of the gang's day-to-day operations. A.J. indicated defendant was also placed on freeze as an associate. When A.J. saw Garcia at the market, he thought Garcia was inquiring as to the status of the gang's investigation of the Quik Stop murder. Garcia reiterated they had not been aiming at the female victim that night, they were aiming at South Siders, but he did not go into any further details of the shooting. 21

In 2011, A.J. was convicted of murder and attempted murder. He admitted he executed one man and attempted to kill another man based on a directive from A.J.'s gang-WSB. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. While he was in the county jail, he reached out to the prosecutor in this case to see if they could work out a deal in exchange for information he had on the Quik Stop shooting. He told the prosecutor what he knew, but held back the names of the individuals involved. He ultimately agreed to testify in this matter in exchange for a reduced sentence from life without the possibility of parole to a term of 23 years to life. When he signed the agreement in July 2017, just before this trial, he identified defendant and Garcia as the men involved.

7. David Mo.3

David Mo.3 testified that he was living on the west side of Modesto in 2003, he was running with some WSB gang members then, and he was living with Garcia. David Mo.3 spent a lot of time with Garcia, whom David knew to be WSB. David knew nothing of the shooting and had nothing to do with it. He found out about it later. David denied being currently affiliated with WSB. He did not know defendant, and David had never spoken to Garcia about the shooting. David knew that Garcia had since passed away, but he had not had any contact with Garcia since he was arrested with Garcia in 2003.

David Mo.3 never hung out with Garcia around Colorado and Pelton Avenues-he was not aware of who hung out over there. In 2003, David was considered a soldier in the gang; Garcia had other soldiers hanging around him. David was Garcia's protector on and off for about six months. David was arrested in August 2003 while riding in a car with Garcia; David was carrying a .45-caliber firearm at that time. Before the arrest, David had lived with Garcia for several months. Garcia was a private person, and he would keep things from David. In that time, David never saw defendant. According to 22 David, Garcia never drove a car-he had people drive for him instead. Some people who drove Garcia were not necessarily WSB gang members.

Garcia hated South Sider gang members, but never said anything about it. Southerners were the biggest rivals of WSB; some Vernon Block members were friends with WSB members, while others were enemies. David Mo.3 never saw defendant with WSB members.

II. Defense Case

A. Anthony's Parents

1. Sandra B.

Sandra B. visited her son, Anthony W., in prison in 2005. He wanted to talk with her about something, and he ended up discussing an incident he had witnessed. Anthony was scared that someone would kill him in prison because he knew the identity of the shooter from the 2003 Quik Stop shooting. He said he was with Isaac in Isaac's car that night, and they had stopped at the Quik Stop. Anthony said F.W. and Trisha were also in the parking lot during the shooting. Anthony indicated it was a Norteno shooting, he knew the guys in the car who did the shooting, and he identified defendant as the shooter and Pete Garcia as the driver.

A couple of months after this conversation with Anthony, Sandra was reading the newspaper, and it mentioned the Quik Stop shooting-she was upset about the information she had regarding that case. Although Anthony had told her not to tell the cops unless he died, she called Detective Banks on March 18, 2005, and told him what Anthony had told her. She said defendant and Garcia were responsible for the 2003 Quik Stop shooting, and she had information defendant lived on Victoria Drive or that it was a place where Garcia hung out. She told him Garcia was the shooter and defendant was the driver. She remembered Anthony said something about a small, dark-colored car. The call to Banks was recorded, and it was played for the jury. 23

Sandra B. testified she called the police station the day after talking to Banks; she was trying to reach Detective Banks to correct what she had told him. She left a message with the watch commander that she wanted to correct her statement to Banks and to tell him that Garcia was the driver and defendant was the shooter. She was told that the information would be passed to the proper investigator because it was not Detective Banks's department.

Sandra B. remembered Anthony saying something about a black car, and she remembered the word "Saturn," but nothing about a gold color. She testified she was a little shocked Banks asked her about the reward that was being offered for information about the case; she thought Banks was the first one to bring up the reward in their conversation. Sandra denied calling him because she wanted the reward-she never did get any reward money for what she revealed. When Banks mentioned the reward, Sandra said she would like to say she did not want it, but she had just buried her mother with no insurance money. Yet, she was also concerned about bringing Anthony's name into it.

2. F.W.

On the night of the shooting, F.W. was with Isaac and Anthony at a place where they "spen[t] some leisure time." Anthony took off with Isaac's car after they arrived, so F.W. called his girlfriend, Trisha G., to pick them up and they all went looking for Anthony. It took them about an hour to find him driving near the high school. Isaac got out of Trisha's silver car and into the driver's seat of his own car. Trisha and F.W. went to the Quik Stop with Isaac and Anthony driving behind them.

F.W. and Trisha pulled in from Carpenter Road. After they got gas, F.W. realized he had forgotten cigarettes, so they pulled up to the store and F.W. went inside to make the purchase. While pulling up, there was a small, dark car coming into the Quik Stop with two people in it looking for trouble-they had scowls on their faces and were "mean-mugging." F.W. said he got a good look at the passenger and the driver, but he did not know them. 24

F.W. saw people standing to the right of the store's front door. The shooting started just as F.W. was getting back to the car after going inside to purchase the cigarettes. Trisha had the car facing Carpenter Road. F.W. heard the shots all fired consecutively, and he looked for Isaac and Anthony who were getting ready to leave and had pulled away from the gas pumps. F.W. jumped in the car and they "burn[ed] rubber" out of the parking lot. They made a left onto Carpenter while exiting the lot, and went straight to F.W.'s house. He assumed the shooter's car went north on Victoria Drive, but he did not see that. F.W. did not remember talking to a police officer that night, but he thought Trisha called 911 on the way back to the house. That 911 call was played for the jury.

On the call, Trisha told dispatch she was reporting a shooting at the Quik Stop on Paradise Road. She indicated there were two injured, one possibly in the head. Although there was an officer there, Trisha told dispatch the officer wanted her to talk to 911. She identified the suspect vehicle as a black Ford Focus with two Hispanic males in it. A voice is heard saying on the call, "I told you to say nothing." Trisha continued that the men were light-skinned Hispanic males, and the car had headed north on Victoria Drive.

F.W. admitted he was present for that call, but denied that he told Trisha not to say anything to anyone. F.W., Trisha, Isaac and Anthony met back at F.W.'s house and they talked about the shooting. No one else was at the house that night. Anthony did not say who was in the car-Anthony told F.W. he did not know who was in the car, and he "for sure" did not say it was defendant.

F.W. and Trisha had lived at the house on Robertson Road for at least three months before the shooting; Anthony did not live there-he lived with his mother across town. F.W. and defendant knew each other, they socialized together and may have used methamphetamine together. F.W. also knew defendant's brother, Joe, from whom F.W. would buy roosters. F.W. never knew defendant or Joe to be affiliated with a gang. According to F.W., Anthony was associated with Bedrock Posse, which is a Bloods gang, 25 but he also associated with a few Norteno friends, including Garcia. While Anthony knew defendant, and had told F.W. he knew defendant, F.W. testified he never saw Anthony and defendant together.

B. Law Enforcement Investigation 1. Sebron Banks

Detective Banks confirmed he spoke with Sandra B., and the call was recorded. Sandra said she had information about a homicide that occurred and she was interested in providing that information to law enforcement. She said she got the information from her son, she identified defendant and Garcia as the men involved, and indicated Garcia was the shooter. She said Anthony thought defendant was in prison for another murder but that Garcia was not in prison. She said the shooting pertained to drug deals and retaliation. She also mentioned something about a gold Saturn and a small black car being involved. Banks brought up the issue of the reward, and Sandra indicated she was interested because she could use the money. Banks relayed the information to Mark Copeland, including a recording of the call.

2. Detective Michael McEntire

Detective Michael McEntire was called out to the Quik Stop in the early morning hours on August 24, 2003. He got the store's camera videos from the clerk and took them into evidence. They were not able to get the license plate number off any of the vehicles on the video. He was at the scene for hours collecting evidence.

On August 25, 2003, McEntire saw a vehicle he had noticed in the store videos of the shooting, so he pulled it over. F.W. and Trisha G. were in the car. They acknowledged to McEntire they had been in the parking lot of the store during the shooting. F.W. said he did not think he could give a better description of the car or the people in it-he did not say he did not see who was in the car. Trisha G. said she was in the car by the gas pumps and Anthony and Isaac were next to her in their car when she saw a newer model Ford Focus pull into the lot and angle toward Victoria Drive. When 26 the vehicle passed by her, she noticed the driver was a heavyset man with dark hair that was cut short in a buzz cut. She described the passenger as leaning out the car window, and described him as having a plaid shirt, lighter-colored hair, and a buzz cut. He looked to be 20 to 26 years old. She saw Adrian walking to the passenger side of the green vehicle. She then saw the passenger from the black Ford Focus shooting toward the green vehicle. She said Isaac and Anthony were pulling out of the lot when the shooting started. She and F.W. left, too. McEntire learned about Isaac's presence at the scene through F.W. and Trisha.

McEntire subsequently met with Trisha G. and F.W. and had photo lineups prepared. When McEntire met with Trisha in September 2003, she could not identify anyone in the lineups. He followed up with Trisha in July 2004 with another lineup. Trisha was not able to identify Garcia who was in the 2004 lineup, but she thought he looked similar to the person who had been the passenger in the car. She thought the driver looked like David Mo.3, and the passenger looked like Garcia. Trisha said she could identify the passenger in the shooter's car if she were shown a photograph. Defendant was not a suspect at the time McEntire was working the case.

September 30, 2003, McEntire talked with Sarah F. She said a man had approached her on September 27, 2003, and told Sarah to tell James, Ferguson's brother, that Diablo said hi. She saw that individual again at her friend's house that evening who told her again to remember to tell James that Diablo said hi, and that the person said something about knowing where Sarah lived. McEntire noted that Sarah also talked about two people who had approached her on a Thursday to tell her that Diablo was the person who did the shooting. McEntire interviewed Sarah on the Tuesday following September 27, 2003, which had been a Saturday. McEntire found only Sergio C. using the moniker Diablo. McEntire took four photographs to Sarah to identify, but she could not pick anyone out. 27

McEntire showed John R. a photo lineup too, but he could not identify anyone. That lineup did not contain Garcia or defendant. The investigation started focusing on Garcia around July 4, 2004, and McEntire showed his picture to 5-10 witnesses. In July 2004, McEntire saw Anthony in prison. McEntire told Anthony he had already spoken with F.W. and Trisha, who said Anthony and Isaac were at the Quik Stop that night. Anthony refused to cooperate or give any details.

In December 2004, McEntire interviewed Isaac. A photo lineup was also taken to Isaac, but he could not identify anyone. He saw one person in the lineup that he thought was the driver, but defendant was not in that lineup. Isaac described the driver as wearing a tan and red flannel jacket, could have been White or Hispanic with lighter skin color. Isaac described the passenger as a light-skinned Hispanic man, about 5 feet 7 inches tall and 140 pounds, with a little moustache and slicked hair, and wearing a gray, white, and black flannel shirt. Isaac never described the passenger as wearing a hoodie. Isaac told McEntire that when he pulled his car away from the gas pump that night, he noticed a black Toyota Corolla next to his car. The passenger in that vehicle had a gun, and Isaac thought the guy was going to shoot Anthony. Isaac said the passenger looked over at Anthony and raised the gun up over the roof of the car and started shooting about eight or nine times. Isaac did not see the driver shoot. Isaac said he ducked down and was trying to see where they were shooting. Isaac indicated there were other gang members in the store-he thought the guys in the car they were shooting at were wearing blue. He thought the shooter hit that car a couple of times. Isaac believed the men in the shooter's car were all Northern gang members, but he was not 100 percent sure who they were. He thought Anthony knew who they were, though, because they were all Northerners.

Multiple people McEntire interviewed said the shooter's car had its headlights off. Eventually McEntire started looking into Garcia as a suspect, but never noted any connection between defendant and Garcia. McEntire became aware that Garcia was 28 connected to Mo.3. Mo.3, however, had come down to the station and answered questions that eliminated him as a suspect. McEntire was reassigned in 2005 and the case was turned over to someone else.

3. Marcelina Nuno

In 2008, Deputy Nuno was working with the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Department homicide unit and was in charge of cold cases. When he was assigned this case, he started reviewing the details. Work had been done on the case between the time McEntire left the case and it was assigned to Nuno. Garcia was not a suspect, as far as he knew. Nuno had information from inmates who wanted to talk to him about this case, which was not uncommon. He interviewed many of these inmates, but none identified Garcia.

Nuno researched Garcia through a statewide database-there was information in relation to Garcia about gangs, but nothing about drugs. He recalled seeing defendant's name in the case file, but he did not recall finding defendant in any of the databases regarding drug dealing and gang activity. Nuno clarified on cross-examination he never ran any searches to see if defendant was in the databases.

Nuno did not recall any information that defendant had been in prison, but he did not check the prison system to determine whether defendant was there. Nuno contacted Trisha G. in April 2008. He showed her additional photo lineups that included Garcia, but while she pointed to a couple of people who looked familiar, including Garcia, she did not indicate whether she thought Garcia was a driver or a passenger that night. There was no photo of defendant in that lineup.

4. Kirk Bunch

Kirk Bunch worked as an investigator for the Stanislaus County District Attorney's Office. He spoke with Anthony about this case in February 2014 while Anthony was in custody. Bunch knew Anthony had already given information about the case to his mother, which was relayed through Detectives Banks and Copeland. Anthony 29 told him the suspect car at the Quik Stop in 2003 was a light-colored tan or metallic gold. Anthony never mentioned the suspect vehicle being black; he was not sure what the passenger in that car was wearing, but he thought it might have been a white T-shirt. At the preliminary hearing, though, Anthony said the passenger was wearing a black hoodie. Anthony ultimately identified defendant as the shooter, and said he had known defendant 20 plus years. Anthony said that he, Garcia, and defendant had all gone to school together, although there is a five-year difference in age between Anthony and defendant.

Anthony ended up signing an agreement with the district attorney's office on April 15, 2014, regarding his testimony in exchange for various concessions on his past convictions and pending criminal charges. After he was released, he did not abide by the agreement's requirement that he obey all laws-he was arrested subsequently and eventually pleaded guilty to burglary and other felonies.

Using Anthony's statement, Bunch obtained an extradition order for defendant, who had been deported to Mexico. Bunch contacted defendant's family and left his card, saying he wanted to speak with defendant. Defendant called Bunch and confirmed his location in Mexico. Defendant was detained in Mexico until he was transported back to Stanislaus County in 2016.

Bunch also spoke with A.J. in April 2016. A.J. told Bunch that he had seen defendant and Garcia on the day of the shooting, and that he had seen Garcia after the shooting. A.J. said he had seen Garcia in a tan vehicle, but he said he was uncertain about the color. He said Garcia was driving, and he was with defendant. About 10 or 15 minutes later, he heard gunshots. On a police scanner, A.J. heard about shooting victims at the Quik Stop where Garcia had told him he was going to put in some work. Garcia had also mentioned a possible conflict with Joe F. from the Vernon Block. A.J. would not give up Garcia's name initially, and he did not identify defendant until July 17, 2017-the same day A.J. was transported with defendant to the courthouse for trial in this matter. 30

Bunch asked who could corroborate A.J.'s story, but A.J. never gave him the name of such a person. A.J. said the passenger with Garcia that night was not someone from the "'hood, '" which Bunch took to mean a member of WSB. A.J. said he was going to hold back information about the passenger until his attorney talked to the district attorney, but he thought the passenger was fighting a murder charge.

When Bunch looked up defendant, he never found defendant to have been to prison at any time between 2003 and 2014 or that defendant had ever fought murder charges. He did find a conviction against defendant for illegally re-entering the United States after being deported. Bunch believed defendant had served 38 months in federal prison, but because he did not have defendant's rap sheet, he could not say exactly when defendant had been in federal custody.

Bunch tried to corroborate what Anthony, and then subsequently A.J., told him.

He looked at descriptions of the suspects from the witnesses and corroborated that against the specific information that Anthony and then A.J. provided. Bunch also corroborated Joe F.'s presence at the gas station through reports. Bunch was able to verify defendant had been a neighbor of F.W. Based on what Anthony and A.J. told him, including a review of defendant's arrest records and booking photos, Bunch opined that defendant was a gang member. Bunch conceded that he could not find any information in databases that defendant was a gang member. Defendant was wearing red in several of his arrest booking photos-which factored into Bunch's opinion-but Bunch also acknowledged defendant was wearing a blue jean jacket in one photo and a blue cap in another.

Bunch interviewed F.W. in 2014. He seemed to know more about gang members during their interview than he did in court. F.W. said he was 100 percent sure he had not seen defendant in the car. He said his kids had more information than he did. Bunch spoke to Trisha G., who had moved out-of-state, over the phone. She knew defendant, but she never said anything about him being involved. 31

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Evidence Challenges

A. Substantial Evidence Linking Defendant to the Shooting (All Counts)

Defendant argues the prosecution's entire case against him rested on the testimony of in-custody informants Anthony and A.J. There was no physical evidence linking defendant to the crime: Anthony and A.J. provided the sole evidence tying defendant to the shooting, and Anthony was the only witness who identified defendant as a shooter. Defendant maintains their testimony connecting him to the crime was entirely uncorroborated by other independent evidence and was otherwise too inconsistent and unreliable to constitute substantial evidence.

1. Standard of Review

"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense" (Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265, citing In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364), and the verdict must be supported by substantial evidence (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio)). On appeal, the relevant inquiry governing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence "'is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055.) "The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict-i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Zamudio, supra, at p. 357.)

"In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence." (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.) "'[I]t is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the 32 defendant's guilt ....'" (People v. Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1055-1056.) "A reversal for insufficient evidence 'is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support"' the jury's verdict." (Zamudio, supra, at p. 357.)

2. Analysis

Considering the record as a whole and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, substantial evidence supports the verdict. Three people were shot in the parking lot of the Quik Stop, one of whom was killed, after a car came through the lot firing six to eight shots from a semiautomatic weapon. Katrina B. and Isaac saw the passenger of a dark-colored vehicle shoot a firearm several times. Katrina, Isaac and Anthony described the passenger holding a gun out the window and shooting, and their description of the passenger was generally consistent with defendant's appearance. Isaac and F.W. placed Anthony at the scene during the shooting, and Anthony identified defendant as the passenger and Garcia as the driver of the vehicle from which shots were fired. Anthony testified he associated with WSB and Garcia was a WSB gang member, which was confirmed by law enforcement testimony, and Anthony identified defendant as an associate of Garcia. Isaac confirmed Anthony associated with Norteno gang members in the area, and that Anthony seemed to know the men in the suspect vehicle they saw that night. There was testimony that Adrian associated with a rival southern gang and that he was wearing blue rival gang colors that night, which would have been a basis for WSB members and associates to target him on sight. In 2005, Anthony told his mother that defendant and Garcia had done the shooting, which she passed along to law enforcement in a recorded phone call.

A.J. testified he was a longtime WSB gang member and he knew Garcia, who was also a WSB gang member. He recognized defendant as an associate of Garcia. On the night of the shooting, A.J. saw Garcia and defendant together in a dark-colored car that Garcia was driving while A.J. was at a house near the corner of Pelton and Colorado 33 Avenues-the heart of WSB territory. Garcia had a gun and was talking about finding rival gang members-either rival Vernon Block members or Sureno gang members. After they left, A.J. testified a police scanner indicated shots had been fired. Minutes later, Garcia and defendant reappeared in a dark-colored car. Garcia started talking about how he and defendant "'just got off on those fools.'" Defendant stayed in the car, looked around anxiously, and then he and Garcia left. The next day A.J. learned someone had been killed at the Quik Stop. A.J. saw Garcia later in the day near the corner of Pelton and Colorado. Garcia was talking about what happened at the Quik Stop the night before, and that he and defendant were responsible, but they had not been aiming at Ferguson.

Sarah F. testified a man she identified at trial as defendant had approached her a few weeks after the shooting and after Sarah had been on television relating to a vigil held for Ferguson. Defendant told Sarah to tell James (Ferguson's brother) that Diablo said hello, which Sarah took as a threat. Defendant followed her home and made a comment about knowing where Sarah lived, which Sarah also considered threatening. She described the intimidation Ferguson's family faced after the shooting. Given the timing of this encounter with defendant and the intimidation of Ferguson's family, ostensibly for continuing to pursue information about the shooter's identity, it was reasonable to infer this was an act of intimidation by defendant that related to the shooting and suggested his involvement.

Taken together, this was substantial evidence Garcia and defendant had targeted Adrian because of his Sureno gang affiliation, and defendant fired shots from the passenger seat of the car that night that struck Adrian and John R. and killed Ferguson.

Defendant points out that Anthony's and A.J.'s testimony was inconsistent in salient respects from other witnesses, which rendered their testimonies unreliable. We agree there were numerous inconsistencies and factual conflicts the jury had to resolve among all of the testimonial evidence, including the testimony offered by Anthony and 34 A.J. For example, Katrina B. thought she saw four people in the shooter's car, and in Lorena G.'s 911 call to police the next day, she said there was only the shooter in the car. Anthony, Isaac and F.W. all claimed to see two people in the car. Isaac saw a gold-colored car parked near the front door, but no one else mentioned that color of a car in the parking stalls. Anthony thought the suspect vehicle was gold- or metallic-colored, but everyone else thought it was dark-colored. Isaac thought F.W. and Trisha G. had already gone home by the time the shooting occurred, but other testimony, including F.W.'s, indicated they were in a silver car near the store's front door when the shooting occurred. Katrina heard an argument or yelling coming from Adrian and directed at the suspect vehicle, but Karina S. testified Adrian never did any type of yelling. Neither Isaac nor Anthony remembered any form of verbal confrontation from the men they saw wearing blue.

The witnesses remembered different numbers of shots fired, and the forensic evidence was inconclusive in that regard. Katrina B. and Isaac thought there might have been a pause in the shooting before it resumed again, but other witnesses said the shots were fired consecutively with no pause. Lorena G. reported in her 911 call that the shooter had a goatee, with medium-length hair on his head, but Isaac thought the passenger/shooter had a moustache and his hair was a short buzz cut. Only Anthony remembered the passenger wearing a hoodie, while the other witnesses described seeing the passenger's head and type of haircut clearly-although they varied somewhat in their descriptions. Anthony told Bunch in a 2014 interview that defendant was in a white T-shirt, but changed his story later and said defendant was wearing a dark hoodie.

F.W. told McEntire early on that he did not see who was in the car and McEntire, therefore, did not show him a photo lineup; but, at trial, F.W. said he saw the passenger clearly and knew it was not defendant. Anthony said the driver, Garcia, got the gun from the passenger (defendant) and fired additional rounds toward the men wearing blue. In 35 her 911 call, Lorena G. said she only saw one person in the car, so by inference she saw the driver shooting from the car. No one else reported the driver shooting the gun.

A.J. changed his story about the color of the suspect vehicle-he first told Bunch it was cream-colored or tan; but, then two weeks later, A.J. told Bunch it was darkcolored. A.J. initially told Bunch he had never seen Garcia's passenger before that night; but, at trial, A.J. said he knew defendant because defendant hung out with Jose, another associate of Garcia's. A.J. did not identify defendant as the passenger until after A.J. and defendant were incarcerated at the same time in the county jail. A.J. testified he thought defendant was in jail fighting a murder case in 2007 or 2008, but Bunch said there was no such record defendant had ever before fought a murder case. A.J. also said he was with someone who saw defendant with Garcia that night and could corroborate his testimony, but he never provided the name to Bunch.

However, none of these inconsistencies and evidentiary conflicts rendered Anthony's or A.J.'s testimony impossible or inherently improbable. (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296 ["The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable."].) "Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness that satisfies the [substantial evidence] standard is sufficient to uphold the finding." (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) It was for the jury to weigh the testimony and determine how to resolve conflicts in the evidence. (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)

Defendant maintains the inconsistencies in Anthony's and A.J.'s testimonies are more significant because of the testimonial agreements they had with the prosecution. But that issue of credibility was explored in depth at trial, and it was the sole province of the jury to weigh the testimony Anthony and A.J. provided in light of their agreements with the prosecution. It is not our role to second-guess the jury's credibility findings. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 590 [conflicts and even testimony that is subject 36 to justifiable suspicion do not justify reversal of judgment-it is the province of the jury to determine credibility of witnesses and truth or falsity of facts on which determination depends].)

Defendant argues this case is analogous to People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, where our high court concluded the evidence to sustain the defendant's murder conviction was insufficient because the only evidence that specifically implicated him in the crime was the uncorroborated testimony of two accomplices. (Id. at pp. 1126, 11281130.) Defendant maintains the entire case tying him to this shooting was built on the testimony of Anthony and A.J. Yet, their in-custody informant testimony lacked any corroborating evidence linking defendant to the Quik Stop shooting-no one else identified defendant, and there was no forensic evidence linking him to the shooting.

The distinction here, however, is that neither A.J. nor Anthony were "'in-custody informant[s]'" within the meaning of section 1127a or section 1111.5, subdivision (a). Section 1127a requires the jury in a criminal proceeding to be provided with a cautionary instruction whenever testimony is given by an in-custody informant. The statute defines an in-custody informant to be "a person, other than a codefendant, percipient witness, accomplice, or coconspirator whose testimony is based upon statements made by the defendant while both the defendant and the informant are held within a correctional institution." (§ 1127a, subd. (a).)

The cautionary instruction required by section 1127a is as follows: "'The testimony of an in-custody informant should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny. In evaluating such testimony, you should consider the extent to which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or expectation of, any benefits from the party calling that witness. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give it the weight to which you find it to be entitled in the light of all the evidence in the case.'" (§ 1127a, subd. (b).)

Section 1111.5 defines in-custody informant the same way, and requires that an incustody informant's testimony be corroborated by other evidence that connects the 37 defendant with the commission of the offense. (§ 1111.5, subds. (a) &(b).) The statute provides that this corroboration "is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the special circumstance or the circumstance in aggravation." (§ 1111.5, subd. (a).) Moreover, the corroboration of an in-custody informant may not be provided by the testimony of another in-custody informant unless the party calling the in-custody informant as a witness establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the in-custody informant has not communicated with another in-custody informant on the subject of the testimony. (Ibid.)

Section 1111.5, subdivision (b), provides that, "As used in this section, 'in-custody informant' means a person, other than a codefendant, percipient witness, accomplice, or coconspirator, whose testimony is based on statements allegedly made by the defendant while both the defendant and the informant were held within a city or county jail, state penal institution, or correctional institution. Nothing in this section limits or changes the requirements for corroboration of accomplice testimony pursuant to Section 1111."

Defendant argues in his reply brief that the corroboration requirement of section 1111.5 is applicable here because both Anthony and A.J. first gave information to law enforcement while they were both in custody and seeking leniency in exchange for their information.

But, the mere fact that Anthony and A.J. were incarcerated at overlapping intervals in the same county jail as defendant is not sufficient to transform their testimony into that of in-custody informants within the meaning of section 1127a and section 1111.5, subdivision (b). As explained by our high court, the legislative history of section 1127a reveals a deliberate difference between in-custody percipient witnesses and in-custody informant witnesses. "In-custody informant witnesses have no personal knowledge of the crime, but testify that a defendant made an inculpatory statement to them while in proximity in a county jail or state prison, often in exchange for favorable treatment by law enforcement. In-custody percipient witnesses, by contrast, like other 38 percipient witnesses, codefendants, accomplices, and coconspirators, testify on the basis of personal knowledge of the crime." (People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 121.)

Anthony and A.J. were percipient witnesses who were also incarcerated at the time they testified about events they personally witnessed. There was evidence they were held in custody at the Stanislaus County Jail at overlapping intervals and A.J. was transported with defendant on July 17, 2017, but there was no evidence that either A.J. or Anthony ever spoke with defendant. Most importantly, none of their testimony was based on statements defendant made to them while they were incarcerated with defendant. As such, they were not in-custody informants, and their testimony connecting defendant to the commission of the offense did not require independent corroboration. (§ 1111.5, subds. (a) &(b); People v. Bivert, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 120-121.) The jury was entitled to credit their testimony.

Based on circumstances known at the beginning of trial, the court identified A.J. And Anthony as in-custody informants and gave the in-custody informant admonition (CALCRIM No. 336) under section 1127a during the preliminary instructions. At the close of evidence, the court noted Anthony's and A.J.'s testimony was not technically that of in-custody informants, but observed the jury had already been provided the admonition. The court concluded there was no harm in having given the cautionary instruction because it admonished the jury to evaluate A.J.'s and Anthony's testimony with caution and close scrutiny, which the court found appropriate. As the People point out, although this instruction was not applicable, there was no detriment to defendant for the jury to be cautioned to be skeptical of the testimony of Anthony and A.J.

B. Concurrent Intent to Kill John R. (Count II)

Attempted murder requires "the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing." (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.) Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to instruct on the kill zone theory of intent to support the conviction for the attempted murder of John R. 39

Outside the kill zone theory, there was no evidence Garcia and/or defendant intended to kill John R. The prosecution's entire case was built around the theory this was a gang-related shooting targeting Adrian, and John R. and Ferguson were only tragic bystander victims who were fired upon based on their proximity to Adrian. Arguing there is no substantial evidence to support a kill zone instruction is fundamentally a substantial evidence challenge to the verdict on count II for the attempted murder of John R.

1. Kill Zone Theory of Intent

Defendant was charged with the premeditated first degree murder of Ferguson (count I), and the premeditated attempted murder of John R. (count II) and Adrian (count III). Consistent with the evidence, the prosecution's case was built around the theory this was a gang-related shooting targeting Adrian, and John R. and Ferguson were tragic bystander victims.

A killing with express malice formed willfully, deliberately and with premeditation is first degree murder. (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942.) Express malice requires an intent to kill unlawfully. (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) "'[M]alice is implied when a person willfully does an act, the natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the person knowingly acts with conscious disregard for the danger to life that the act poses.'" (People v. Beltran, supra, at pp. 941942.) To prove the premeditated first degree murder of Ferguson, evidence of express malice, not merely implied malice, was required. Under the doctrine of transferred intent, "'a defendant who shoots with the intent to kill a certain person and hits a bystander instead is subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had "'the fatal blow reached the person for whom intended.'" [Citation.] In such a factual setting, the defendant is deemed as culpable as if he had accomplished what he set out to do.'" (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 321 (Bland).) Although the evidence indicated Adrian was the only intended target of the shooting, the jury was instructed on the doctrine of transferred intent, which allowed them to conclude the intent to kill Adrian transferred to Ferguson, and her murder was thus the product of express malice. 40

Like first degree premeditated murder, attempted murder requires evidence of express malice-implied malice is insufficient. (People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 623.) But the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder. (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331.) "Someone who in truth does not intend to kill a person is not guilty of that person's attempted murder even if the crime would have been murder-due to transferred intent-if the person were killed. To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else." (Id. at p. 328.) Thus, unlike the murder of Ferguson, the doctrine of transferred intent could not be used to prove defendant intended to kill John R.

Yet, there remained another theory to prove shooting John R. was the product of an intent to kill: if the jury found that defendant primarily wanted to kill Adrian, the jury could conclude defendant had the concurrent intent to kill John R. if he intended to kill John R. as a means of killing Adrian. (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 330-331.) As explained in Bland, although the intent to kill a primary target does not transfer to a survivor, it does not preclude a finding the person concurrently intended to kill others within a kill zone when the nature and scope of the attack indicate the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in the victim's vicinity. (Id. at pp. 329, 331.) This formulation of a concurrent intent to kill has been described as a kill zone theory. (Id. at p. 331 ["the defendant may be convicted of the attempted murders of any within the kill zone, although on a concurrent, not transferred, intent theory"].)

In 2019, our high court explained the limited application of the kill zone theory in Canizales. Pursuant to Canizales, the kill zone theory is only applicable when "(1) the circumstances of the defendant's attack on a primary target, including the type and extent of force [he or she] used, are such that the only reasonable inference is that [he or she] intended to create a zone of fatal harm ... around the primary target and (2) the alleged 41 attempted murder victim who was not the primary target was located within that zone of [fatal] harm." (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607 .)

The court explained the circumstances of the attack include "the type of weapon used, the number of shots fired (where a firearm is used), the distance between the defendant and the alleged victims, and the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary target." (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) "Evidence that a defendant who intends to kill a primary target acted with only conscious disregard of the risk of serious injury or death for those around a primary target does not satisfy the kill zone theory." (Ibid.) "[T]he kill zone theory does not apply where 'the defendant merely subjected persons near the primary target to lethal risk. Rather, in a kill zone case, the defendant has a primary target and reasons [that] he cannot miss that intended target if he kills everyone in the area in which the target is located. In the absence of such evidence, the kill zone instruction should not be given.'" (Ibid., quoting People v. Medina (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 146, 156.)

The court cautioned, "[W]e anticipate there will be relatively few cases in which the theory will be applicable and an instruction appropriate. Trial courts should tread carefully when the prosecution proposes to rely on such a theory, and should provide an instruction to the jury only in those cases where the court concludes there is sufficient evidence to support a jury determination that the only reasonable inference from the circumstances of the offense is that a defendant intended to kill everyone in the zone of fatal harm. The use or attempted use of force that merely endangered everyone in the area is insufficient to support a kill zone instruction." (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608.)

Under the limitations articulated by Canizales, defendant claims there was no substantial evidence to instruct on a kill zone theory to support the conviction for the attempted murder of John R. 42

2. Standard of Review

A trial court's decision to instruct is governed by the familiar substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 550 [whether claim was insufficiency of evidence to support an instruction or insufficiency of evidence to support the jury's verdict, the standard applied is essentially the same].) "We 'review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.] In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we presume in support of the judgment '"the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence."'" (Ibid.)

3. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Instruction

Defendant focuses on the statement in Canizales directing that "in future cases trial courts should reserve the kill zone theory for instances in which there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to kill (not merely to endanger or harm) everyone in the zone of fatal harm." (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 597.) Defendant argues that under the circumstances here, one cannot say the only reasonable inference is that defendant intended to kill everyone in a zone of fatal harm.

The witnesses gave varying accounts of the progression of the shooting (how many shots were fired, whether the shots were fired in two separate sequences, whether the driver fired any shots, and how the shooter's car proceeded through the lot), where the victims and target were located, and their relative proximity to the shooter. Yet, "'[t]he choice of which inference to be drawn from the facts, where more than one reasonable inference is possible, is the function of the jury.'" (People v. Mumin (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 36, 50 (Mumin), 43 review granted Nov. 10, 2021, S271049, quoting People v. Sweeney (1960) 55 Cal.2d 27, 51.)

The Supreme Court granted review in Mumin and ordered briefing limited to whether the trial court erred by providing the kill zone instruction and whether the Court of Appeal applied the proper standard of review under Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 591.

As a reviewing court, our task under the substantial evidence standard of review is not to determine whether we would have drawn inferences different from the jury. We must assess whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could determine this was the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence. (Mumin, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 50, review granted [under the familiar principles of substantial evidence review, an appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if the court would have concluded otherwise].)

The high court's decision in Canizales did not alter this substantial evidence standard of review in the kill zone context. (Mumin, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 51, review granted [Canizales "did not require that the appellate court itself determine whether the inference supporting the instruction was the only reasonable inference"].) Although Canizales warned that trial courts should reserve the kill zone theory for instances in which there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to kill (not merely to endanger or harm) everyone in the zone of fatal harm, the court went on to repeat the standard formulation of the substantial evidence test and applied it in the traditional manner. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 608-611.)

As the court in Mumin persuasively pointed out, "if Canizales had intended to change the established standard of review, the Supreme Court likely would have engaged in a more extensive discussion of the standard and why it should be changed. The Supreme Court's use of the established standard in its own discussion confirms no change was intended." (Mumin, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 52, review granted.) 44

Despite the conflicts in the evidence here and the different ways the jury could have assessed and weighed it, the substantial evidence test requires us to draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in favor of the judgment. As discussed post, faithful adherence to this familiar standard of review militates a conclusion there was substantial evidence that Adrian was the primary target, defendant intended to create a kill zone around Adrian, and that John R. was inside that kill zone when he was shot.

Canizales clarified a kill zone theory instruction is only warranted if there is substantial evidence that (1) there is a primary target; (2) the defendant harbors the intent to kill everyone within the kill zone in order to make sure he or she kills the primary target; and (3) the alleged victim of the attempted murder was inside the kill zone. (See Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 597, 607.)

We begin with the primary target: the prosecution's theory was that Adrian was the primary target, which was supported by substantial evidence. Adrian was associated with a gang in the San Fernando Valley area whose members wore blue. Multiple witnesses testified Adrian was wearing a long blue bandana, or two bandanas tied together, that hung from his waistband and down his leg. A.J. and Anthony testified blue is associated with the Sureno gang, a rival of both Norteno subset gangs in the area- WSB and Vernon Block. They also both testified the Quik Stop was in the heart of the Vernon Block gang territory, and that a Sureno found in Norteno territory would be a target. Anthony and Katrina B. testified they thought the shooter was targeting the man with the blue bandanas (Adrian), and he was hit by two bullets.

There must also be substantial evidence to support a reasonable inference the defendant intentionally created a zone of fatal harm around the target. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 609-610.) In determining whether this was defendant's intent and the scope of any such zone, the circumstances of the offenses must be considered, including the type of weapon used, the number of shots fired, the distance between defendant and 45 the alleged victims, and the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary target. (Id. at p. 607.)

Based on Karina S.'s testimony that Adrian had just been standing near her window in the Lumina when the shooting started, there was evidence to infer Adrian was within a few feet of both John R. and Ferguson, who were reportedly on the sidewalk directly in front of the Lumina. Witnesses reported up to eight shots fired from a semiautomatic handgun. Four shots fired did indeed hit victims who were between the Lumina and the storefront on the sidewalk, two bullet-impact marks were found by the trash can in front of the Lumina, and another bullet-impact mark was found through the Lumina's windshield.

Although Anthony and Isaac described the shooter's vehicle to be at somewhat different places in the lot when the shooting occurred, their descriptions seemed to indicate the vehicle was stationary and just to the south and east of the Lumina during the shooting. From the pictures depicting the exit on Victoria Drive and the position of the Lumina, the jury could ascertain from Isaac's and Anthony's testimony that the shooter's car was fairly close to the Lumina during the shooting-perhaps 20 to 30 feet or less. The sidewalk space between the Lumina and the store was fairly enclosed, sandwiched between the Lumina and the wall of the store. There were very few options to get out of the line of fire in that space, especially bullets fired so quickly from a semiautomatic weapon. (People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163, 187 [substantial evidence for kill zone instruction where 21 shots fired by semiautomatic weapon into small space enclosed on three sides].) Moreover, all of the victims near the Lumina were hit with bullets.

Viewing the evidence in this light, it could be inferred the shooter intended to create a zone of fatal harm around Adrian in the few feet of space between the Lumina and the store, and fired many bullets into that area in an effort to kill Adrian and anyone else who happened to be within the scope of that zone. As there was testimony John R. 46 was near the butane cages, within feet of the Lumina on the sidewalk, and he was in fact hit with a bullet, a jury could infer John R. was within the kill zone. A jury could have reasonably concluded this was the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Substantial evidence supported the kill zone instruction.

II. It is Reasonably Likely Jury Was Prejudicially Misled by Kill Zone Instruction

To instruct on the kill zone theory, the trial court utilized the same version of CALCRIM No. 600 that was provided to the jury in Canizales. That instruction informed the jury as follows:

"A person may intend to kill a specific victim or victims, and at the same time intend to kill everyone in a particular zone of harm or 'kill zone.' [|¶ In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of John [R.] and Adrian . the People must prove the defendant not only intended to kill Adrian . but also either intended to kill John [R.] or kill everyone within the kill zone. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant intended to kill John [R.] or intended to kill Adrian . by killing everyone in the kill zone, you must find the defendant not guilty of the attempted murder of John [R.] and Adrian ...."

We asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the sufficiency of the pre-Canizales instruction given in this case. Defendant claims the kill zone instruction did not properly articulate the relevant factors under Canizales and effectively misstated the burden of proof by failing to explain the People had the burden to prove defendant's intent to create a kill zone was the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence.

We review instructional errors de novo. (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) "An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction accurately states the law." (Ibid.) "The challenged instruction is viewed 'in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an 47 impermissible manner.'" (Ibid., quoting People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229.)

In Canizales, the Supreme Court expressly declined to reach a due process challenge to the instruction on the kill zone theory under the version of CALCRIM No. 600 given here because it concluded the instruction should not have been given on the facts presented. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 618.) The high court explained that CALCRIM No. 600 "should be revised to better describe the contours and limits of the kill zone theory," but the court stopped short of finding CALCRIM No. 600 inaccurate or incomplete as a matter of law in describing the kill zone theory. (Canizales, supra, at p. 609.)

Our analysis of the kill zone instruction here is necessarily framed by the many difficult factual conflicts the jury had to resolve about how the shooting occurred. All of the factors Canizales identified as relevant to assessing the intent to create a kill zone and its scope were enmeshed in factual conflicts here. The jury's assessment of these conflicts was a critical step in determining what inferences could be drawn about the relevant factors. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) The adequacy of instructional charge on the kill zone theory must be considered within the context of the trial record presented.

For the reasons discussed below, the instruction did not provide the jury with any guidance about how the circumstances of the attack were relevant to determining defendant's intent to create a kill zone around the primary target, it did not define a "kill zone" and seemed to equate a kill zone with a particular zone of harm, and did not explain the People had the burden of proving the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence was that defendant intended to create a kill zone. Because of the extensive factual conflicts about how the shooting occurred in this particular case, the kill zone instructional ambiguities and omissions likely misled and confused the jury about the need to resolve critically relevant factual conflicts in the evidence, determine what 48 inferences reasonably could be drawn from the facts found, and how to apply those facts and inferences to determine whether defendant acted with a concurrent intent to kill John R. under the kill zone theory. The prosecutor's closing argument and the lack of other evidence defendant intended to kill John R. made the kill zone instructional issue especially acute and resulted in prejudice.

Positioning of Victims and Witnesses

The Quik Stop store, parking, and gas pump area where the shooting occurred is situated like a peninsula, bounded on three sides by three different roads with a vehicle ingress/egress to each of those roads. Carpenter Road runs north and south along the west side of the Quik Stop lot; Paradise Road runs east and west along the south side of the lot; and Victoria Drive runs north and south along the east side of the lot. The Quik Stop store has front doors that face south, one located near the west end of the store front and one located near the center of the store front. Along the store front is a sidewalk perpendicular to a row of approximately 11 parking stalls facing the building.

When cars pull into these parking stalls facing the building, they look directly at the building's south-facing wall and sidewalk with Carpenter Road to the west (left) and Victoria Drive to the east (right). Cars that pull in nose-first to these parking stalls (as opposed to backing into the stall) have their tail ends to the gas pumps and Paradise Road to the south. Behind (south of) the row of parking stalls facing the building lies open pavement and then three islands of gas pumps, angled slightly at a northwest/southeast slant. South of these islands of gas pumps, the lot ends at Paradise Road, and there is an ingress/egress to Paradise Road.

Based on video and photographs, there are two parking stalls west of the westernmost door, and at the westernmost door there is a space and walkway between the parking stalls. To the east of this walkway are three more parking stalls followed by space on the lot for a walkway between the stalls leading to the center door. East of this walkway and center door lie six more parking stalls. 49

The store clerk's Mitsubishi was parked in the second space east of the center door, and the Lumina was parked in the fifth parking space east of the store's center door, second to the last stall to the east-there were two parking stalls between the Lumina and the Mitsubishi. Conservatively estimating the width of each parking stall to be six feet, the center door was at least 24 to 30 feet west of the Lumina. On the sidewalk in front of the store west of the Lumina were two cages filled with butane tanks-they were centered in front of the white line drawn between the two parking stalls between the Lumina and the Mitsubishi. There was a trash can on the sidewalk in front of and just to the east of the Lumina.

During the shooting, Katrina B. was in the backseat of a car parked two or three stalls west of the store's center door (six to seven parking stalls west of the Lumina). Katrina testified Adrian, the man she described yelling at the suspect vehicle, was to her right, close to a trash can by the center door, and that he seemed to be with a car next to hers with females in the backseat; when Adrian was shot, Katrina said she saw him on the ground in front of her car. Anthony also testified Adrian seemed to be near a car with several women in it. Karina S. was sitting in the driver's seat of the Lumina. According to Karina, Adrian had just asked her for change at her driver's side window when the shooting started, and she saw him hopping around and then falling to the ground. The video filmed just after the shooting (People's exh. No. 1) shows Adrian lying on the sidewalk above the stall west of the Mitsubishi, right near the store's center door; photos of the crime scene show what appears to be a large blood stain and foot tracks just west of the Mitsubishi on the sidewalk.

Ferguson was seated on the sidewalk just in front of the Lumina, and her boyfriend, John R., was standing near her, closer to the butane tanks. Karina remembered Ferguson and John. R. standing right in front of the Lumina. R.K., the store clerk, thought John R. was standing next to the butane tank cages and Ferguson was 50 sitting on the curb of the sidewalk. Karina testified the shooter fired from behind her and to the right (southeast of where they were parked).

Progression of Shooting and Position of Shooter's Vehicle

Katrina B. described the suspect vehicle circling the lot and then shots were fired from behind and to her right (east). When she saw the gun pointed from the suspect car toward the store, the car was moving. She described a pause and then shots being fired when the vehicle was at the east end of the parking lot. She described the first series of shots as coming within seconds of seeing the suspect car come around the gas pumps behind her. The man yelling at the suspect car was then on the ground in front of her car and appeared to be shot. She saw another man yelling, and there was a lady on the ground. Katrina did not know if Adrian, the man who appeared shot in front of her car, was hit with the second series of shots fired when the vehicle was at the far end of the parking lot, or whether he was struck with the first set of bullets she heard being fired.

Isaac described the shooter coming out of the passenger window of the suspect car and shooting over the roof of the car toward the store. The shooter opened fire while the suspect vehicle was facing the store east of the gas pumps just after entering the lot from Paradise Road, but north of Isaac's car, which was exiting onto Paradise. He described the shooter's vehicle being stationary during the shooting. He first testified he heard seven shots fired consecutively with no pause between, but on cross-examination he described hearing three consistent shots, then a slight pause, and then four or five more shots.

Anthony testified the suspect car came into the lot by the telephone kiosks on Victoria Drive, and stopped right in front of Isaac's car at the pump; then it went around the pump behind Isaac's car and parked at an angle toward Victoria. Isaac then drove past the suspect vehicle on the way out of the lot toward the Paradise Road exit. Anthony described the passenger of the suspect vehicle (defendant) reaching over the windshield with the gun in his right hand, firing about three shots, and sliding back into the car; then 51 Garcia took the gun from the passenger inside the car and fired repetitive shots out his driver's side window toward the store because he had a better angle to shoot the South Sider (Adrian). Anthony remembered the "lady that died" was hit with one of the first few shots.

Physical Evidence at the Scene and Victims Shot

Based on Copeland's testimony, there were five bullet-impact marks found at the scene, and four bullets fired into people. Ferguson had a bullet entrance and exit wound in her head consistent with a nine-millimeter bullet. At 3:53 on the video, Ferguson is shown lying on the sidewalk right in front of the green Lumina, and police crime scene photos of that area of the sidewalk show it was saturated in what appeared to be blood. John R. had been hit with a bullet in his arm. Adrian was shot twice, in his leg and buttock. Two bullet-impact marks were found on the telephone kiosks facing Victoria Drive at the edge of the lot, two bullet-impact marks were found near the trash can by the butane cages just west of the Lumina, and there was a bullet hole through the windshield of the Lumina, but no matching bullet hole in the rear windshield. There were a total of 10 bullet cores and fragments found in the lot, some were spread roughly south of the Lumina and stretching east to Victoria Drive and onto Victoria, others were by the telephone kiosks and near the sidewalk by the Lumina. Copeland testified it was difficult to ascertain exactly how many bullets were fired given that fragments can go in different directions and one bullet can create multiple fragments. F.W. testified there were five or six shots fired all in a row. Neighborhood witnesses (Carol M. and Larry C.) testified they heard up to as many as six to eight shots-all consecutive.

The forensic evidence collected at the scene does not resolve these questions or readily suggest one version is much more likely than another, and no expert testified whether the location of the bullet casing and fragments supported a specific shooting progression or primary location of the suspect car during the shooting. None of the witnesses definitively indicated how close the shooter's car was to the Lumina when the 52 shooting occurred. Katrina B. testified the shooter's car drove right behind the car she was in, west of the center door to the store, and she told Copeland the car was moving while the shooting was happening. As Copeland noted, the bullet-impact marks to the telephone kiosks and the bullet fragments on Victoria Drive seem to suggest bullets were fired when the shooter's car was already on Victoria. In essence, the shots could have been fired while the car was moving and continued to be fired when the car had pulled onto Victoria, so the distance between the shooter and the target may have grown from the first shots to the final shots fired.

The evidence is not uniform about where Adrian was standing when the shooting started or if he was shot in the same series of bullets that hit Ferguson and John R.- assuming the jury concluded there were two separate series of shots. Karina S.'s and Katrina B.'s testimony about where Adrian was when the shooting started seem inconsistent. Katrina testified Adrian appeared to be with a car next to hers, near the front door that had women in the backseat; Anthony also thought Adrian was associated with a maroon car with several women in it. By the time Officer Gutierrez arrived, Adrian was on the sidewalk west of the Mitsubishi near the store's center door- consistent with Katrina's testimony. The video at 4:57 to 5:05 after the shooting shows Adrian lying near the center door, too. It may have been possible Adrian was right next to the Lumina when the first shots were fired (as Karina S. seemed to indicate), he ran west on the sidewalk to escape, and landed near the store's center door about 25 or 30 feet away from the Lumina after he was shot.

Or perhaps Adrian moved there after the shooting concluded-Karina S. testified he was hopping around and then dropped to the ground, and a crime scene photo showed what appeared to be bloody footprints east of an apparent pool of blood next to the Mitsubishi where Adrian was lying after the shooting. It was also possible, consistent with Katrina B.'s testimony-and to some degree Anthony's testimony that Adrian seemed associated with a car with several women in it-that Adrian was near the center 53 door west of the Mitsubishi and next to a car with several women inside (and, thus, significantly west of Ferguson and John R., who were by the Lumina) at the very start of the shooting.

Application of the Facts

These conflicts materially bore on the factors Canizales identified as critically relevant to assessing a defendant's intent to create a kill zone and the scope of that zone. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607 [jury should consider type of weapon used, number of shots fired, distance between the defendant and alleged victims, and proximity of alleged victims to primary target].) Yet, as in Canizales, the former version of CALCRIM No. 600 given here did not define the term "kill zone," and it did not direct jurors to consider the circumstances of the attack. (Canizales, supra, at p. 613.) While Canizales did not conclude this was erroneous as a matter of law, given the factual conflicts presented here, the omissions created a uniquely confusing instructional charge that very likely misled the jury and caused them to misapply the law.

First, the instruction did not tell the jury to consider the circumstances of the attack, identified none of the relevant factors to determine defendant's intent to create a kill zone or its scope, nor did it instruct the jury the People had the burden to prove the only reasonable conclusion from defendant's use of lethal force was that he intended to create a kill zone and that John R. was within that zone. In this case, the circumstances of the shooting and the relevant Canizales factors were uniquely enmeshed in factual conflicts. The different ways the jury could have resolved the factual conflicts would have led to different reasonable inferences about how the attack occurred and whether there was an intent to create a kill zone. For example, if the jury concluded Adrian was standing near the door of the store when the shooting started, and thus 25 to 30 feet away from Ferguson and John R., the jury could have concluded defendant only accidentally shot John R. due to poor aim or the fact the vehicle was moving while he was shooting. The jury could have determined defendant only fired a couple of shots that simply missed 54

Adrian, after which Garcia took additional shots that found the mark. From this, the jury could have concluded defendant had no intent to create a kill zone around Adrian or that defendant's intent to create a kill zone was just one reasonable conclusion, not the only reasonable conclusion. Because the jury was not instructed to consider the circumstances of the attack in determining the intent to create a kill zone, the jury had no way to know it was important to resolve the factual conflicts and apply those findings to determine defendant's intent. Different trial records might not present this issue, but here the lack of instructional guidance about how to assess defendant's intent to create a kill zone in light of the circumstances of the attack left the jury completely adrift in a sea of material factual issues it knew neither to resolve nor how they were relevant.

Second, and compounding the problem, the instruction failed to define "kill zone." Instead, it stated "[a] person may intend to kill a specific victim or victims, and at the same time intend to kill everyone in a particular zone of harm or 'kill zone.'" This left critical ambiguity about what a zone of harm might include and likely suggested to the jury that any area where anyone was put at any risk of harm during the shooting was a kill zone. The jury could have concluded that no matter where John R. and Ferguson were in the parking lot, they were in a zone of harm because they were actually shot. This was especially true because the jury had no reason to know the nontarget's proximity to the primary target was even a relevant consideration. This encouraged the jury to conflate implied malice-shooting with conscious disregard for the danger to the lives of others in the vicinity-with the concurrent intent to kill everyone around Adrian.

The prosecutor's truncated mention of the kill zone in closing argument only clouded the issue further. The prosecutor theorized that defendant shared Garcia's intent to kill because defendant ended up "shooting over the car recklessly, with indifference to all of the people at the Quik Stop in the kill zone." This suggested that everyone at the Quik Stop was in the kill zone. The prosecutor's only other mention of the kill zone was in relation to the area around the Lumina, but it was unclear whether this was predicated 55 on Adrian's purported location near the Lumina. Nothing the prosecutor argued helped the jury understand what the instruction meant by the term "kill zone."

Moreover, outside of the kill zone theory, there was no other evidence defendant intended to kill John R. Nothing indicated John R. was a gang member or that defendant or Garcia had any link to John R. in any manner. John R. was wearing a red shirt that night, so there was little chance he was mistakenly viewed by Garcia and defendant as associated with Adrian. In view of the omissions in the instruction combined with the trial record in this case, we find it likely the jury misunderstood and misapplied the kill zone instruction. (People v. O'Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 994.)

We need not determine whether this amounted to a federal due process error because even under the less stringent prejudicial error analysis articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson), it is reasonably probable the error adversely affected the verdict as to count II. (People v. Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 955 [incorrect and ambiguous instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated in Watson].) Whether defendant intended to create a kill zone around Adrian was a close, factual question and one that hinged entirely on how the jury resolved the factual conflicts about the circumstances of the shooting and the inferences they drew from those findings. Yet, the jury was unaware it needed to resolve those conflicts because the jury had no reason to know the circumstances of the attack were even relevant. Had the jury known what factors bore on defendant's intent to create a kill zone, been provided with a definition of a kill zone, and known that it was the People's burden to show the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence was that defendant intended to create a kill zone, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have resolved count II in defendant's favor. The conviction on count II as to the attempted murder of John R. is reversed. 56

III. Evidentiary Ruling Challenges

A. Evidence Regarding Anthony W.'s Reputation for Dishonesty

Defendant argues the trial court erred by excluding F.W.'s opinion about Anthony's reputation for dishonesty in the community, and further erred by precluding the defense from asking F.W. whether Anthony had lied to him in the past and had been truthful in his dealings with him. Defendant maintains the testimony was proper to attack Anthony's credibility as a witness.

The People concede the trial court should have permitted the defense to solicit testimony from F.W. about specific past instances when Anthony had been dishonest for purposes of impeachment, but they dispute there was evidence F.W. had any actual knowledge of Anthony's general reputation for honesty.

Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 718, 723-725.) The erroneous admission of evidence violates a defendant's federal due process rights if it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. (See Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 70; People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 ["[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair."]; People v. Covarrubias (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1, 20.) Otherwise, the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence violates only state law and is reviewed for prejudice under the standard established in Watson, requiring reversal only if it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the error not occurred. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

Assuming the trial court erred by precluding the defense from eliciting both opinion testimony about Anthony's reputation for dishonesty and specific instances testimony about Anthony's dishonesty, the error was harmless.

Anthony's credibility was subject to a thorough and robust challenge on multiple grounds. He had received significant concessions from the People regarding other 57 criminal convictions and charges against him, the extent of which was explored in detail during the trial. He had multiple prior convictions for crimes, generally undercutting his veracity as a witness, including auto theft and burglary. He had also committed offenses after his testimonial agreement was in place with the prosecution, despite a promise not to commit any further crimes. Anthony admitted to illegal drug use and association with gangs. That his father (F.W.) could have pointed out specific instances when Anthony had been dishonest or lied to him or had opined Anthony had a reputation for dishonesty would have been entirely unsurprising in light of Anthony's gang, crime, and drug history. On this record, we cannot conclude any error in excluding F.W.'s testimony about Anthony's reputation for dishonesty or specific instances of dishonesty rendered defendant's trial fundamentally unfair.

The jury knew Anthony had strong motive to help the prosecution, given his testimonial agreement and, thus, an incentive to lie. He also had a long and extensive criminal history that included drugs and gangs, all of which are strongly suggestive of routine dishonesty. While Anthony was one of the most important witnesses and the only one who identified defendant as the passenger who shot from the car that night, there is simply no probability the outcome would have been different if Anthony had been impeached with additional instances of past dishonesty or a reputation for dishonesty.

B. Bunch's Testimony About Joe F.

Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting hearsay through Bunch's testimony that Joe F., an active Vernon Block Norteno gang member, was present at the Quik Stop on the night of the shooting. The People respond Bunch was not asked to relate any specific statements made by Joe F., so his testimony did not constitute hearsay. The People also argue the testimony could have been admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of the effect it had on Bunch. 58

1. Background

Bunch was called as a defense witness. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Bunch about confirming what Anthony and A.J. had told him about Joe F.

"Q. Let me ask an open-ended. Do you recall whether or not anyone you talked to told you that a guy named Joe [F.] was at the Quik Stop on August 24 of 2003. [¶] _ [¶]

"[A.] I confirmed that by two different sources. [¶] _ [¶]

"Q. Who told you that? "

A. Anthony [W.]

"Q. Okay. Who else told you that?

"A. I- "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls for hearsay.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"[A.] When I read the report, when I first got this investigation, I read from cover to cover. I noticed Joe [F.] was interviewed, related to this case. [] While working the Federal Gang Task Force, I had contact with Joe [ F. ] And I knew Joe [ F. ] was a documented Norteno of that area. [¶] • [¶]

"Q. And he was Vernon Block; wasn't he?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Joe [F.] was at that gas station that night; wasn't he?

"A. Yes, Ma'am.

"Q. So there was a Vernon Block guy at the gas station, and Joe [F.] was his name. And he's a high-ranking status guy in Vernon Block; isn't he?

"A. Yes, ma'am." (Italics added.)

In another series of questions about what Anthony told Bunch during an interview, the prosecutor asked Bunch the following questions: 59

"Q. And when they rolled into that Quik Stop that day, Anthony [W.] told you he immediately knew something was going to happen?

"A. Yes, Ma'am.

"Q. He also noticed a second vehicle parked next to his vehicle, which he described as an active Norteno gang member; correct?

"A. Yes, Ma'am.

"Q. Did you ever corroborate there was an active Norteno gang member in the Quik Stop that night?

"A. Yes, Ma'am.

"Q. Who was that?

"A. Joe [F].

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. Hearsay. No foundation.

"THE COURT: Can you lay a foundation for that? [¶] _ [¶]

"Q. In the course of your investigation in this case, did you review other reports where Joe [F.] was interviewed as being present at the gas station? [|¶ ... [|¶

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. Calls for hearsay.

"THE COURT: Overruled. Yes or no.

"[A.] Yes, ma'am." (Italics added.)

2. Analysis

"Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered for the truth of the matter asserted and is generally inadmissible." (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1108, citing Evid. Code, § 1200; accord, People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674.) For purposes of the hearsay rule, a "'[s]tatement' is defined as an 'oral or written verbal expression' or 'nonverbal conduct of a person intended . as a substitute for oral or 60 written verbal expression.'" (People v. Smith (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 986, 1003, quoting Evid. Code, § 225.) Hearsay is not admissible unless it qualifies under some exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).) "[M]ultiple hearsay is admissible for its truth only if each hearsay layer separately meets the requirements of a hearsay exception." (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 149, citing Evid. Code, §§ 1200, 1201; accord, People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 403.)

Bunch testified that he confirmed Joe F. was at the store on the date of the shooting by reviewing reports, and he testified the reports contained information Joe F. was at the store on the night of the shooting. The wording in the report Bunch reviewed was itself an out-of-court statement (Evid. Code, § 225), and it was offered at trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted: that Joe F. was at the store on the night of the shooting. The contents of the report were hearsay. Moreover, unless the officer who wrote the original report actually saw Joe F. at the store that day, the report would have been based on the statements of others, like Joe F. Any statements by Joe F. or anyone else to an officer who then described those statements in a report would constitute a second layer of hearsay. Here, Bunch did not testify to expressly what Joe F. said to the reporting officer, but he did testify about what the officer recorded in the report. Bunch's testimony constituted at least one layer of hearsay, and based on the police report produced by defendant posttrial, two layers.

The People maintain Bunch's testimony about what Joe F. told law enforcement as recorded in the report could have been offered for its effect on Bunch's investigation, rather than for its truth-i.e., for a nonhearsay purpose. However, how Bunch conducted his investigation was not relevant to the issues at trial nor was it the reason the prosecutor elicited the testimony. The statements were offered for the truth of the matter that Joe F. was in fact at the store on that date.

While there was no discussion of exactly what kind of report Bunch had reviewed, defendant produced a sheriff's department report posttrial showing this information came 61 from McEntire's report about an interview with Joe F. in December 2003. This likely rendered the reports testimonial and Bunch's testimony violative of the confrontation clause. (See People v. Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 694 ["When the People offer statements about a completed crime, made to an investigating officer by a nontestifying witness, Crawford [v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36] teaches those hearsay statements are generally testimonial unless they are made in the context of an ongoing emergency .., or for some primary purpose other than preserving facts for use at trial."].)

Yet, even assuming Bunch relayed testimonial hearsay, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 698 [if improperly admitted hearsay is testimonial within the meaning of the high court's confrontation clause jurisprudence, the error is assessed under the federal constitutional standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, which requires any error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].)

Joe F.'s presence at the Quik Stop was a tangential issue and did nothing to corroborate or bolster either A.J.'s or Anthony's testimony. A.J. told Bunch that Garcia and defendant were going to "hit some South Siders, or a Vernon Block guy" and that there was somebody at the gas station who was a Vernon Block guy. He also told Bunch that Garcia may have had a possible conflict with Joe F. A.J. never mentioned Joe F. in his trial testimony, however. A.J. testified only that there were hard feelings between some Vernon Block and WSB gang members at that time. Joe F.'s presence at the Quik Stop or the possible rift between Joe F. and Garcia was not even important enough to elicit from A.J. at trial.

Bunch testified Anthony told him in an interview that Anthony saw an "active Norteno" parked in a car next to him that night at the Quik Stop. Yet, it was unclear from Bunch's testimony if Anthony was referring to someone other than Garcia, who was also an active Norteno, specifically of the WSB subset. Nonetheless, at trial Anthony denied that he saw Joe F. that night. Rather than bolstering Anthony's trial testimony, Bunch's 62 statement about Joe F. allowed the jury to infer Anthony was omitting, covering up, or just plain forgetting details of a story he had already told to Bunch. It did nothing to strengthen his credibility.

Moreover, nothing about Joe F.'s presence at the gas station helped the prosecution's case. The Quik Stop was in known Vernon Block territory, even according to one Quik Stop residential neighbor (Carol M.) who was not involved with gangs. Bunch confirming a Vernon Block member-even Joe F.-was at the Quik Stop that night was, by itself, entirely unremarkable. It did not corroborate any dispute between Garcia and Joe F., create any connection to defendant, or place defendant in the car with Garcia that night.

This was a tangential aspect of A.J.'s and Anthony's original interview statements. The prosecutor never mentioned this in closing argument, which is not surprising because it did nothing meaningful to support the prosecution's case. Beyond any reasonable doubt, Bunch's testimony about Joe F. did not affect the verdict.

IV. New Trial Motion A. Background

Following trial, defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on the same grounds he asserts now on appeal. The prosecutor opposed the motion. While conceding she made some misstatements in closing arguments, she argued those mistakes were not prejudicial. In denying the motion, the trial court commented the case did not appear to be a close case as defense counsel viewed it. The trial court acknowledged the prosecutor misspoke "a couple of times during closing argument," but given the instruction the jury was given not to consider the attorney's arguments to be evidence, those misstatements were not prejudicial individually or cumulatively. Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. 63

B. Standards

Statutory grounds to support a new trial are set forth in section 1181 and include instructional error and prosecutorial misconduct. (Id., subd. (5).) There are nonstatutory grounds as well. Specifically, "the trial court's constitutional duty to ensure that defendants are accorded due process of law provides the court with the authority to grant a new trial when the defendant did not receive a fair trial even though the cause of that unfairness is not expressly recognized as a ground for granting a new trial under section 1181." (People v. Alaniz (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1, 9, fn. 5 [citing cases].)

"'A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial, and there is a strong presumption that it properly exercised that discretion. "'The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.'" [Citation.]'" (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 730.) The denial of a motion for a new trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 213.)

C. False Testimony Grounds

"'Under well-established principles of due process, the prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity of which it is aware in the evidence it presents, even if the false evidence was not intentionally submitted.' [Citations.] Put another way, the prosecution has the duty to correct the testimony of its own witnesses that it knows, or should know, is false or misleading. [Citations.] This obligation applies to testimony whose false or misleading character would be evident in light of information known to the police involved in the criminal prosecution [citation], and applies even if the false or misleading testimony goes only to witness credibility [citations]. Due process also bars a prosecutor's knowing presentation of false or misleading argument." (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 716-717; see In re Masters (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1054, 1089 [the defendant's due process rights are violated if a 64 prosecutor knowingly presents false testimony or fails to correct such testimony after it has been elicited].)

1. Bunch's Testimony About Defendant's Incarceration History

Defendant claims the prosecutor knowingly presented or failed to correct Bunch's purportedly false testimony that defendant faced illegal re-entry charges in federal court in 2007, and defendant served 38 months in federal prison. Bunch also suggested on cross-examination by the prosecutor that defendant was incarcerated in Stanislaus County just before the federal illegal re-entry proceedings. Defendant argues this was used to prejudicially bolster A.J.'s credibility and his testimony that he thought defendant was fighting a murder charge in 2007.

A.J. testified that when he was interviewed by the prosecutor and Bunch, he was asked whether A.J. had heard anything more about Garcia's passenger since the shooting. A.J. testified he told them he had heard Garcia's passenger, whom he later identified as defendant, was fighting a murder charge in 2007. A.J. explained at trial that this was the "rumor," and it was not something he had personal knowledge about.

When the defense called Bunch to the stand, Bunch acknowledged defendant was not in prison on a murder charge in 2007 or 2008. Bunch was asked whether he found any conviction for defendant where he was in prison in 2007. Bunch responded that defendant had "re-entered the United States after being deported, and they detained him on a felony. He served, I believe, 38 months in a Federal Prison." The following exchange occurred between defense counsel and Bunch:

"Q. Okay. Now, when was it that [defendant] was in federal custody?

"A. I would have to look at his rap for the specific date.

"Q. Do you have that rap?

"A. I do not. 65

"Q. To the best of your knowledge, do you believe it was in 2007?

"A. I don't remember the date."

On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Bunch was asked whether defendant was arrested in Stanislaus County before his conviction in federal court. Bunch replied in the affirmative.

As an initial matter, defendant's claim of misconduct on this ground was forfeited for failing to object at the time of trial. Defendant was in the best position to know his own incarceration history, and Bunch was called as a defense witness. Defendant never attempted to correct Bunch's testimony or offer a rap sheet to refresh his recollection. (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 323.)

Even overlooking the forfeiture, we find no prejudicial error. Records produced by defendant show that he was not charged in federal court with illegal re-entry until 2010, and he was sentenced to time served on September 24, 2010. Although he had initially indicated 2007, Bunch specifically acknowledged he could not remember if defendant was in federal custody in 2007 on that matter; thus, although ultimately inaccurate, Bunch had acknowledged his uncertainty about the date. The fact defendant served 38 months in federal custody for this illegal re-entry was not accurate, but this was irrelevant to corroborate A.J.'s belief defendant was fighting a murder charge.

There was no showing of any falsity that defendant had been in custody in Stanislaus County just before his illegal re-entry. To the extent the prosecutor should not have subsequently referenced 2007 in asking Bunch whether defendant was in custody in Stanislaus County just prior to the federal case, an objection was interposed and sustained. The jury was instructed that when an objection to a question was 66 sustained, the jury was to ignore the question. On this record we cannot conclude the prosecutor misled the jury or violated defendant's due process rights when he failed to correct Bunch's testimony about defendant's federal case, and any error was harmless beyond doubt.

Review of the probation report submitted prior to sentencing in this matter indicates defendant had a March 5, 2010, conviction in Stanislaus Superior Court, and was sentenced to probation, 10 days' jail time, and a fine. He was charged in federal court with illegal re-entry in April 2010.

2. Bunch's Testimony That Joe F. Was Present During Shooting

Defendant argues that in addition to being hearsay, Bunch's statement that Joe F. was present at the Quik Stop that night was false.

We disagree. Bunch's testimony on this issue, regardless of its hearsay character, was not false. According to an investigative law enforcement report, Joe F. indicated to McEntire that he heard the shots at the Quik Stop that night, ran over to the store, and saw a car speeding away. He was indeed present at the Quik Stop that night, even if he did not witness the shooting.

Defendant argues that, even if the testimony was not technically false, it was misleading because it left the impression Joe F. was present at the Quik Stop during the shooting. Yet, even assuming the jury interpreted Bunch's testimony to mean Joe F. was present during the shooting, this did nothing to meaningfully bolster Anthony's or A.J.'s testimony, as discussed at length ante.

It was also unhelpful to the prosecution's case. At trial, Anthony denied he noticed Joe F. that night, and A.J. was never asked about Joe F. The Quik Stop was in known Vernon Block territory, even according to one Quik Stop residential neighbor (Carol M.) who was not involved with gangs. Bunch confirming a Vernon Block member was at the Quik Stop that night was, by itself, entirely unremarkable. It did not establish any link between defendant and the shooting or establish there actually was a feud between Garcia and Joe F.

Moreover, even if the jury believed Joe F. had been there during the shooting, witness testimony in combination with the fact Adrian was shot twice indicated Adrian was the ultimate target, not a Vernon Block gang member. This was a tangential aspect 67 of A.J.'s and Anthony's statements to Bunch, and it did nothing to bolster the credibility of A.J. or Anthony or confirm defendant was in the car with Garcia. The prosecutor never mentioned it in closing argument, which is not surprising because it did nothing meaningful to support the prosecution's case. Any misconduct in failing to correct this potentially misleading testimony was harmless beyond doubt.

3. Sandra B.'s Testimony About the Reward Money

Sandra B. testified on direct examination that she was shocked when Detective Banks asked her if she was interested in the reward that was being offered for information about the shooting-Sandra testified she did not call Banks because she wanted any reward.

Defendant argues this is demonstrably false because Sandra B. testified she called Banks after reading a newspaper article the day before indicating the case was still unsolved. Defendant maintains the story in the newspaper Sandra referenced was centered on the fact there was a reward being offered for the shooting. Defendant argues there is no way having read that story Sandra could truthfully claim she was shocked to hear about the reward from Banks.

Sandra B. never testified she did not know about the reward money until she talked to Banks. She testified Banks brought it up first in their phone conversation, that she was "a little bit shocked" that he asked her about it, and that her motivation to talk to him was not about the reward. Sandra being a little shocked at Banks's question about the reward could be interpreted to mean she was surprised he thought she was calling because of the reward money. It could also have meant she was surprised to discover there was a reward. This ambiguity did not render her testimony demonstrably false, and it does not establish she read and understood the newspaper's references to the reward money. Moreover, Sandra's purported knowledge about the reward from the article did not falsify her testimony that she called Banks because she realized the crime was still unsolved. At most, the newspaper article casts doubt on her motivation for calling 68 Banks, but it does not establish she gave false testimony. The prosecutor did not elicit, or fail to correct, false testimony by Sandra.

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument

Defendant claims a new trial should have been granted based on multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

"Under California law, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct if he or she makes use of 'deceptive or reprehensible methods' when attempting to persuade either the trial court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have resulted. [Citation.] Under the federal Constitution, conduct by a prosecutor that does not result in the denial of the defendant's specific constitutional rights-such as a comment upon the defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent-but is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is not a constitutional violation unless the challenged action '"so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."'" (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 298.)

A prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. The argument may be "'"'vigorous'"'" as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.) Nevertheless, mischaracterizing the evidence is misconduct. (Id. at p. 823.) So is referring to facts not in evidence. "'Statements of supposed facts not in evidence ... are a highly prejudicial form of misconduct, and a frequent basis for reversal.'" (Id. at p. 828.)

1. Forfeiture

To preserve a claim of misconduct for review on appeal, a defendant must make a timely objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor's improper remarks or conduct, unless an admonition would not have cured the harm. (People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 909; see People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1339 69 [failure to object to misconduct in opening and closing argument forfeited claim on appeal].)

Defendant made no objection to the prosecutor's statements he now claims constitute misconduct, and his claims are forfeited. The alleged misconduct in closing arguments was related to issues that were known to defense counsel at the time of argument. For example, defendant does not assert his counsel was unaware at trial of Anthony's pre-2003 felony conviction history. Raising claims of misconduct in the context of a motion for a new trial does not prevent forfeiture of the claims on appeal. (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 254 [rejecting argument raising prosecutorial misconduct claim in context of motion for a new trial preserved the issue for appeal].) Moreover, there is no basis to conclude an objection at trial would have been futile.

Defendant asserts the People cannot claim forfeiture on appeal when the prosecutor never raised that ground in opposition to the motion for a new trial. That is incorrect in two respects. The prosecutor's brief did raise defendant's lack of objection at trial as a basis to deny the motion. Moreover, neither of the cases defendant cites support his position. Even considering the merits of defendant's arguments, however, we find no prejudicial misconduct in the prosecutor's closing argument, as discussed below.

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300 involved a straightforward application of the forfeiture doctrine-the government did not object at sentencing when the trial court failed to impose a restitution fine. (Id. at p. 302.) The government's appellate argument that this constituted error was deemed forfeited on appeal. (Ibid.) People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318 involved no application of the forfeiture doctrine at all-the court noted the Attorney General had changed his substantive position on the constitutionality of a parole search, which the court addressed on the merits. (Id. at p. 331.)

2. Anthony's and A.J.'s Overlapping Incarceration Housing

Defendant highlights the prosecutor's closing argument that A.J.'s and Anthony's testimony corroborated each other because they were never in custody together where they could have discussed the shooting. Yet, records and testimony indicate they were 70 both in custody at the Stanislaus County Jail at overlapping intervals between 2008 and 2013 and in 2016, and A.J. testified he was in the county jail until 2013.

After trial, the prosecutor conceded this was a misstatement. We conclude any misconduct in this regard was harmless for several reasons. The jury heard A.J.'s testimony he was in county jail from 2008 to 2013, and he was returned to jail at some point before his April 2016 interview with the prosecution team and stayed there through the time of trial. From this testimony, the jury was aware the prosecutor's statement that A.J. went to prison in 2011 and stayed there was incorrect.

Moreover, Anthony testified he was facing prison for two offenses in 2014 when he talked to Bunch, and he was in local custody at the time-he was trying to avoid prison. Anthony indicated he had entered into a testimonial agreement where he would be released on his own recognizance. He testified he was then in custody again after violating a restraining order. Based on Anthony's and A.J.'s testimony, the jury had reason to infer they were both in county jail at overlapping times, regardless of the prosecutor's incorrect statement. The jury was instructed the prosecutor's argument was not evidence, and we presume they followed that instruction. (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436.) Moreover, as a legal matter, Anthony and A.J. were not in-custody informants as discussed above; thus, it was not error for the jury to consider the testimony of each to cross-corroborate the other regardless whether they had been incarcerated together. Any misconduct by the prosecutor did not render defendant's trial fundamentally unfair, nor was there a reasonable probability_of a more favorable verdict absent this statement.

3. A.J.'s Parole Chances

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued A.J. did not get that much of a deal because "chances are when you have life after 23 years, you are not going to be released on that first Parole Board hearing." Defendant maintains there was no evidence on the likelihood of an inmate's parole chances, and it was misconduct for the prosecutor 71 to give her own opinion without any evidentiary support in an effort to minimize the benefits of A.J.'s deal and bolster his credibility.

The People maintain the prosecutor's statement was not a matter outside the record, but was a comment on the value of the testimonial agreement A.J. entered into, which was within the wide latitude afforded prosecutors to argue their cases. The People point out that even A.J. acknowledged there was a possibility he would spend the rest of his life in prison if he did not prove to the parole board he had been rehabilitated.

To the extent this statement could be considered an improper comment on facts outside the record, it was harmless. (See People v. Rodriguez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 474, 482 [prosecutor's statement that suggests evidence not available to jury supports prosecutor's argument is improper].) The jury was instructed that the attorneys' arguments were not evidence, and we presume they followed that instruction. Moreover, the jury knew A.J.'s testimonial agreement permitted him a chance at parole, not a guarantee of when he would be granted parole, if ever. The prosecutor's limited statement about A.J.'s parole chances, and thus the value of A.J.'s testimonial agreement, was only one of many factors the jury weighed in considering A.J.'s believability. On this record, we do not believe the statement infected the trial with unfairness. To the extent it was misconduct under state law, we conclude it is not reasonably probable this isolated statement affected the jury's evaluation of the evidence or its verdict. (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 31.)

4. Anthony W.'s Felonies Prior to 2005

In closing argument, the prosecutor called the jury's attention to the factors articulated in the instructions for weighing Anthony W.'s and A.J.'s credibility, including whether the witness had been convicted of a felony. The prosecutor argued as follows:

"When you look at Anthony, you look at [A.J.], you get to decide that fact-their conviction for the felonies they suffered was so great in your mind, went so heavily that you can't believe everything else they talked about. You get to do that. [¶] I suspect 72 when you look at all of the other evidence in the case, you'll come to the same conclusion everybody else has, and that is that they were material witnesses, percipient witnesses who suffered convictions well after these events, well after 2003. [fl In 2003, they were just a material, percipient witness. They didn't become felons until 2008, 2009, 2014, and so on after the event."

Defendant argues this was misconduct because the prosecutor's statements were entirely false-Anthony had a 1995 felony conviction for robbery (§ 211), a 2000 felony for unauthorized possession of certain controlled substances (Health &Saf. Code, § 11377), and a 2001 felony conviction for false imprisonment (§ 236). In fact, defendant argues, the People alleged these felony offenses as prior strikes in a post-2003 criminal complaint against Anthony. The People argue defendant was not actually incarcerated until after 2003, so the prosecutor's statement was not technically false.

The prosecutor's assertion about Anthony's felony status prior to 2003 was incorrect. Since Anthony had suffered felony convictions prior to 2003, he was a convicted felon in 2003 regardless of his incarceration status in 2003. In context, it is difficult to know whether the prosecutor merely misspoke by trying to point out Anthony was not incarcerated in 2003 and did not go to prison until 2005-which was Anthony's testimony.

Nevertheless, this isolated misstatement about Anthony's felony record was not so extensive and egregious as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Moreover, there was no reasonable probability this statement affected the verdict. (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819 [prejudicial harm stemming from prosecutorial misconduct under California law occurs where there is a reasonable probability the error affected the jury's verdict].)

The misstatement was hardly an effective or meaningful argument regarding Anthony's credibility. Anthony admitted that at the time of the shooting he was associating with gangs, regularly did drugs and got high, had stolen his brother's car on 73 the night of the shooting and was in possession of a firearm, and described how he would discuss and plan the commission of crimes like robbery in that timeframe. Isaac confirmed much of this: he testified his brother, Anthony, associated with Norteno gang members, that Anthony stole his car on the night of the shooting, and that they had to drop off a gun Anthony had obtained. Whether Anthony had been formally convicted of a felony prior to 2003, the jury was well aware Anthony engaged in felonious behavior at the time of the shooting by virtue of his own admissions.

There is no reasonable probability that the prosecutor's inaccurate statement about Anthony's formal felony record prior to the shooting affected the jury's assessment of Anthony's credibility or the verdict.

5. Statement That A.J. Lived on Robertson Road

The prosecutor made the following argument about A.J.'s credibility:

"Then you can judge [A.J.'s] credibility ... and whether he was credible, and whether he stood before you and told you, 'This is who I am, and I'm in the know. Because that was my hood.'

"Okay. 'I knew the people in my hood.'

"He didn't live at Pelton and Colorado. He lived on Robertson Road, but he came by and frequented his hood with Pete Garcia. He's known Pete Garcia for a long time, and he knew [defendant] for a long time. So the people that identified [defendant] as your shooter that night by all accounts are not only corroborated by everybody and everything that we're about to go through one by one, one step at a time, but they corroborated each other and they said it from a place of being in the know." Defendant asserts this was misconduct because there was no evidence A.J. lived on Robertson Road or that he had known defendant for a long time. In the opposition to the motion for new trial on this ground, the prosecutor admitted she had misspoken when she said A.J. lived on Robertson Road-she had intended to state that Anthony had lived on Robertson Road. On appeal, the People acknowledge the prosecutor's concession, but argue it was harmless. 74

The jury heard testimony that Anthony's father lived on Robertson Road from Anthony and F.W. Anthony testified he had grown up on the west side and had known Garcia and defendant for years. Given the state of the evidence, the jury was well-positioned to understand the prosecutor had mistakenly confused limited details about Anthony with A.J. This isolated misstatement did not render the trial fundamentally unfair and there was no reasonable possibility the prosecutor's incorrect reference to A.J. affected the jury's verdict.

6. Isaac's Purported Statement to F.W.

Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued Isaac told his father immediately after the shooting that Anthony knew the people in the shooter's car. Defendant asserts this misstatement of fact was a false attempt to bolster Anthony's testimony he knew and recognized the shooter in the passenger seat.

The prosecutor conceded at argument on the motion for a new trial that her statement in this regard was incorrect. On appeal, the People maintain the misstatement was harmless. What Isaac, Anthony, F.W. and Trisha discussed immediately after the shooting was an issue addressed at some length with each of the witnesses. Isaac testified repeatedly that Anthony did not say anything to Isaac about knowing the men in the car, and Isaac testified he never asked Anthony who they were. F.W. testified Anthony never told him he knew who the shooter was or that defendant was involved-he never mentioned defendant in all the times he talked about the shooting. F.W. also specifically denied that Isaac said Anthony acknowledged the men in the shooter's car by giving them a head nod. In light of all the testimony the jury heard on this issue, the jury was positioned to know the prosecutor's statement was incorrect. The statement did not infect the trial with unfairness.

Moreover, even if the jury credited the prosecutor's statement-and we must presume they did not do so having been expressly instructed otherwise-there was no reasonable probability it affected the jury's credibility determination or the verdict. Isaac 75 expressly testified he believed Anthony recognized the men in the car that night and the bases for his belief, and Anthony identified the men to his mother two years later-which was corroborated by a recorded phone call to Banks-long before any testimonial agreement or trial. Regardless what Isaac told F.W. that night, it did not bolster Isaac's or Anthony's credibility in any fundamental way. And, the prosecutor's statement did not indicate or imply Isaac told F.W. who the shooter was-thus, the statement did not meaningfully detract from F.W.'s credibility.

7. Conclusion

In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. Although we have presumed instances of misconduct by the prosecutor, none were prejudicial. Even considered cumulatively, the errors did not render defendant's trial unfair.

V. Cumulative Error

Defendant claims the cumulative effect of the trial errors and the instances of misconduct, even if harmless individually, was prejudicial. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, the reviewing court must 'review each allegation and assess the cumulative effect of any errors to see if it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to [the] defendant in their absence.'" (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 646.) "The 'litmus test' for cumulative error 'is whether [the] defendant received due process and a fair trial.'" (People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795.)

There is an instructional error that requires the reversal of count II, but this error did not implicate the other counts, the admission of any evidence, or the progression of the trial. Other than that, we have presumed the trial court erred in excluding F.W.'s testimony about Anthony's reputation for dishonesty and testimony about specific instances of Anthony's dishonesty, and that the court erred in allowing Bunch to relay testimonial hearsay about Joe F. We have also presumed errors in statements the 76 prosecutor made during closing argument and for failing to correct a potentially misleading statement by a defense witness. None of the presumed errors were prejudicial in isolation, and they are not more prejudicial together.

While a series of errors may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error, this is not such a case. The errors here are not comparable to those in People v. Hill, where the "sheer number of the instances of prosecutorial misconduct, together with the other trial errors," "created a negative synergistic effect" that precluded a fair trial. (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 847.)

DISPOSITION

The conviction on count II, for the attempted murder of John R., is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: LEVY, Acting P. J., PENA, J. 77

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

People v. Aguilar
(Dec 9, 2021)