Order
161760-78 & (133)(138) Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch, Justices COA: 345708
Wayne CC: 17-000536-CC COA: 346105
Wayne CC: 17-000530-CC COA: 346106
Wayne CC: 17-000531-CC COA: 346107
Wayne CC: 17-000533-CC COA: 346108
Wayne CC: 17-000534-CC COA: 346109
Wayne CC: 17-000537-CC COA: 346110
Wayne CC: 17-000538-CC COA: 346111
Wayne CC: 17-000539-CC COA: 346112
Wayne CC: 17-000540-CC COA: 346113
Wayne CC: 17-000541-CC COA: 346114
Wayne CC: 17-000542-CC COA: 346115
Wayne CC: 17-000544-CC COA: 346116
Wayne CC: 17-000545-CC COA: 346117
Wayne CC: 17-000546-CC COA: 346118
Wayne CC: 17-000547-CC COA: 346119 Wayne CC: 17-000548-CC COA: 346120
Wayne CC: 17-006977-CC COA: 346121
Wayne CC: 17-006979-CC COA: 346122
Wayne CC: 17-006980-CC
On order of the Court, the motion to strike response in opposition to amicus curiae brief and the motion for leave to file a reply brief in support of motion to strike are GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the June 18, 2020 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
VIVIANO, J. (dissenting).
This case raises serious questions about the activities of the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) in relation to the Gordie Howe International Bridge. The Legislature has never authorized the bridge and, in fact, has since 2011 placed limitations on MDOT's authority to approve the bridge or use state funds for it. The meaning and effect of those limitations, and the constitutionality of MDOT's actions, are at the heart of this case. The Court of Appeals concluded that MDOT's actions complied with all the statutory restrictions and were otherwise constitutional.
Defendants raise strong arguments that the Court of Appeals erred. For example, when the state of Michigan, "by and through" MDOT, among other entities, entered into an agreement with Canada to construct a new bridge crossing between Detroit and Windsor, Ontario (the Crossing Agreement), there was an appropriations statute in effect that prohibited MDOT from "expend[ing] any state transportation revenue for the construction of the" bridge and from "commit[ting] the state to any new contract related to the construction planning or construction of the" bridge. 2011 PA 63, Art XVII, Part 2, § 384(1). Since the Crossing Agreement was entered, the Legislature has continued to prohibit MDOT from expending state funds except for "staff resources used in connection with project activities . . . ." 2013 PA 59, § 384(1). Under the Crossing Agreement, although Canada is required to reimburse MDOT for various expenditures including the land condemnations at issue here, MDOT must expend funds on the front end. It is at least a close question whether a prohibition on spending funds still allows hundreds of millions of dollars to be spent as long as the expenditures are later reimbursed. In addition to this interpretive issue, it is also questionable whether MDOT's actions pass muster under constitutional and statutory requirements that limit state agencies like MDOT to spending funds that are specifically appropriated by the Legislature. Const 1963, art 9, § 17; MCL 18.1366. It appears that no appropriations have been made for the funds spent by MDOT that are subject to reimbursement by Canada. These are difficult legal issues that merit this Court's attention.
This is yet another missed opportunity to address a contention that executive agencies and officials have acted outside the bounds of their prescribed authority. See Davis v Secretary of State, ___ Mich ___; 951 NW2d 911 (2020) (VIVIANO, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of leave to appeal in a challenge to the Secretary of State's mass mailing of absentee ballot applications); Davis v Secretary of State, ___ Mich ___; 951 NW2d 329 (2020) (dismissing appeal by stipulation of the parties in a case challenging the Secretary of State's last-minute directive banning the open carrying of firearms at polling places on Election Day). This is no small matter. See Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), p 29 ("It was precisely to bar prerogative or administrative evasions of law that seventeenth-century Englishmen developed ideas of constitutional law."). As I explained when this issue arose recently, "In general, '[t]he extent of the authority of the people's public agents is measured by the statute from which they derive their authority, not by their own acts and assumption of authority.' " Davis, ___ Mich at ___; 951 NW2d at 911, quoting Mich Ed Ass'n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194, 225-226 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The present case puts this issue in even starker relief, as the question is not simply whether MDOT was authorized to undertake its actions in regard to the bridge, but whether MDOT was affirmatively prohibited by the Legislature from taking these actions.
I would grant leave to appeal so that we could examine these important and far-reaching issues.
CLEMENT, J., did not participate due to her prior involvement as chief legal counsel for former Governor Rick Snyder.
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
April 2, 2021
/s/_________
Clerk