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Case Summary: Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran, No. 19-16849 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2020)

Factual and Procedural Background

Innova Solutions, Inc. (Innova), a technology company, sought to hire Dilip Dodda, a citizen of India who holds a bachelor's degree, as a computer programmer for three years. Innova petitioned for an H-1B "specialty occupation" visa on Dodda's behalf. Under the governing statutory and regulatory framework, a petitioner may establish eligibility under one pathway by showing that "a baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position."

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) relied exclusively on the Department of Labor's Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) and concluded that the OOH did not show that at least a bachelor's degree (or its equivalent in a specific specialty) is normally the minimum requirement for the computer programmer occupation. USCIS noted the OOH stated that "most computer programmers have a bachelor's degree" but also mentioned that "some employers hire workers with an associate's degree," and relied on that language in denying the petition.

Innova challenged USCIS's denial in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing the denial was arbitrary and capricious. The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS, concluding the OOH did not describe the normal minimum educational requirements for the occupation in a categorical fashion because some computer programmer positions may be performed by someone with an associate's degree. Innova appealed. The Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for USCIS and remanded, concluding USCIS's denial was arbitrary and capricious.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether USCIS's denial of Innova's H-1B petition was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.
  2. Whether the Department of Labor's Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) establishes that a bachelor's degree is "normally" the minimum educational requirement for the computer programmer occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1).
  3. Whether USCIS mischaracterized or failed to consider key OOH language (specifically, the OOH's statement that a bachelor's degree is the "typical level of education that most workers need to enter" the occupation) in making its decision.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Innova) Arguments

  • The OOH indicates that "most computer programmers have a bachelor's degree" and lists a bachelor's degree as the "typical level of education that most workers need to enter this occupation," which satisfies the regulatory phrase that a bachelor's degree is "normally the minimum requirement" for entry into the position.
  • USCIS's denial was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to give a rational explanation connecting the OOH evidence to its decision and because it mischaracterized and ignored central OOH language.

Appellee's (USCIS) Arguments

  • USCIS argued the OOH does not state that at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty is "normally" the minimum required for the computer programmer occupation; because the OOH notes that "some employers hire workers with an associate's degree," USCIS treated the OOH as not dispositive.
  • USCIS contended that the OOH alone cannot establish whether an occupation qualifies "per se" as a specialty occupation and that where the OOH recognizes that some positions within an occupation do not require a bachelor's degree the OOH is an insufficient source of information to satisfy the regulatory criterion.
  • USCIS (and the district court) effectively required petitioners to show that the particular position offered is among the subset of positions that normally require a bachelor's degree, rather than relying on the occupational-group-level statement in the OOH.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2011) Standard: review de novo of district court's ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court cited this case as authority for conducting de novo review of the district court's summary judgment ruling.
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Locke, 776 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2014) Standard: de novo review of district court's evaluations of an agency's actions. Supported the court's statement that it reviews agency actions de novo.
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) Definition of "arbitrary and capricious": agency may be arbitrary if it fails to consider important aspects, offers explanations contrary to evidence, or is implausible. The court invoked this standard to assess whether USCIS's action was arbitrary and capricious.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) Principle on arbitrary and capricious review (quoted within Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders). Used as foundational authority for the APA arbitrary-and-capricious standard applied to USCIS's decision.
Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) Agency must articulate a "satisfactory explanation" and a rational connection between facts found and choice made. Cited to emphasize the requirement that an agency's decision be supported by a rational connection to the evidence.
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) Court cannot supply a reasoned basis for an agency action that the agency itself has not given. Used to explain that the court may not make up for deficiencies in USCIS's explanation.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) Example demonstrating use of "normally" and "typically" interchangeably in Supreme Court usage. Illustrated the court's point that "typically" and "normally" are synonyms and are used interchangeably by the Supreme Court.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) Another example showing interchangeable use of "typically" and "normally." Supported the court's linguistic point on synonymy of the terms.
United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) Example of the Ninth Circuit's use of "typically" in contrastive contexts (illustrative). Used as an example to support the court's assertion about the meaning and interchangeability of "typically" and "normally."
United States v. Flores-Blanco, 623 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2010) Illustrative use of "typically" by the Ninth Circuit. Supported the court's linguistic point regarding "typically" and "normally."
Boyle v. United States (Brief for the United States) Example from Solicitor General brief using "typically" and "normally" interchangeably. Used as an example that other federal actors use the words interchangeably, supporting the court's linguistic conclusion.
Next Generation Tech., Inc. v. Johnson, 328 F. Supp. 3d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) Observation that a court was "at a loss to see a 'rational connection'" in a similar USCIS context. Cited to show parallel judicial skepticism about USCIS's reasoning in the same context.
Taylor Made Software, Inc. v. Cuccinelli, 453 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2020) Principle that USCIS cannot simply rely on the OOH's recognition of contrary cases; that is not rational treatment of the OOH language. Used to support the court's conclusion that USCIS cannot dismiss the OOH's occupational-group statement by pointing to some contrary instances.
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) Limitation on deference to agency interpretations (Auer/Kisor): deference applies only to genuinely ambiguous regulations after traditional tools of interpretation are exhausted. Applied to conclude that deference to USCIS's interpretation was unwarranted because the regulation was not ambiguous and USCIS's interpretation was implausible.
Mejia v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002) Agency does not have discretion to misapply the law. Invoked to support the court's statement that USCIS cannot misapply clear regulatory language.
Salehpour v. INS, 761 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1985) Where objective criteria of a regulation are clearly met, an agency cannot interpret the regulation so as to add another requirement. Used to support the proposition that USCIS could not add requirements when the regulatory criterion was met by the OOH evidence.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) Principle that a court may only affirm an agency on the basis provided by the agency. Cited to explain that the Ninth Circuit may only affirm USCIS on the grounds the agency itself provided, and because USCIS had not disavowed its view, the mischaracterization was fatal.
Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007) Deference is warranted only if an agency's decision is "fully informed and well-considered." Used to explain that the court will defer only to fully informed agency decisions—USCIS's decision was not.
Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987) Agency decisions must accurately reflect the evidentiary record; distortion or disregard of important aspects is abuse of discretion. Invoked to support reversal where USCIS mischaracterized and failed to consider central OOH language.
United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) Distinguishing "normally" from "always." Used to support the point that "normally" does not mean "always" and that USCIS improperly equated the two.
Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1992) Also distinguishing "normally" from "always." Supported the court's linguistic and interpretive conclusion about "normally."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the applicable standards: it reviews the district court's summary judgment ruling and evaluations of agency action de novo and must set aside agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The court emphasized that an agency's decision must contain a satisfactory explanation and a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, and the court may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given.

The court explained that USCIS relied solely on the OOH to determine whether the computer programmer occupation "normally" requires a bachelor's degree. The OOH stated that "most computer programmers have a bachelor's degree" and identified a bachelor's degree as the "typical level of education that most workers need to enter this occupation."

The court found multiple defects in USCIS's decision:

  • USCIS concluded that the OOH "does not state that at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty is normally the minimum required," despite the OOH's statements that a bachelor's degree is common and typically needed. The court held there is no meaningful difference between "typically" (as used in the OOH) and "normally" (as used in the regulation), calling the agency's suggestion of a meaningful gap implausible and not the product of agency expertise.
  • USCIS misrepresented the OOH by stating that the OOH showed most computer programmers obtain either a bachelor's or an associate's degree, whereas the OOH in fact states that most have a bachelor's degree and that some employers hire those with an associate's degree. Because the factual characterization of the only source USCIS relied on was central to USCIS's determination, the mischaracterization was arbitrary and capricious.
  • USCIS failed to consider key OOH language stating that a bachelor's degree is the "typical level of education that most workers need to enter this occupation." That language directly addressed the regulatory inquiry and was not discussed in USCIS's decision. The court concluded that failure to consider such central evidence constituted an independent basis for finding the decision arbitrary and capricious.
  • USCIS's attempt to require additional proof whenever some positions within an occupation accept less than a bachelor's degree effectively equated "normally" with "always," contrary to the regulation and established interpretations distinguishing "normally" from "always." The court observed that the regulation applies to the "particular position" but noted USCIS had determined that the "particular position" was the occupational group "computer programmer" and that, by USCIS's own practice, showing that the corresponding OOH occupational group normally requires a bachelor's degree satisfies the regulatory criterion.
  • The court also explained that deference to an agency interpretation is unwarranted where a regulation is not genuinely ambiguous and where the agency's interpretation is implausible—invoking Kisor and related authority to reject deference in this instance.

Based on these points—lack of a rational connection between the OOH and USCIS's conclusion, a material mischaracterization of the OOH, and failure to consider central OOH language—the court concluded USCIS's denial was arbitrary and capricious.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Ninth Circuit panel REVERSED AND REMANDED the district court's grant of summary judgment for USCIS, concluding that USCIS's denial of Innova's H-1B petition was arbitrary and capricious.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that USCIS's denial of Innova's H-1B petition was vacated and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.
  • The court based its reversal on the absence of a rational connection between USCIS's reasoning and the evidence it cited (the OOH), USCIS's mischaracterization of that evidence, and USCIS's failure to consider key OOH language. The opinion does not purport to announce or declare a broader rule beyond its application to the administrative record and analysis in this case; it reverses and remands on the grounds stated.

INNOVA SOLUTIONS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KATHY A. BARAN, Director of California Ser

Opinion by Judge Owens

FOR PUBLICATION

D.C. No. 5:17-cv-03674-VKD OPINION Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
Virginia K. DeMarchi, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 20, 2020 Pasadena, California Before: Richard A. Paez and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges, and Morrison C. England, Jr., Senior District Judge. Opinion by Judge Owens SUMMARY

The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Immigration

The panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and remanded, concluding that USCIS's denial of an H-1B temporary worker visa was arbitrary and capricious.

Innova Solutions, Inc. (Innova) wanted to hire a citizen of India with a bachelor's degree as a computer programmer and petitioned for an H-1B "specialty occupation" visa on his behalf. Under the relevant regulation, Innova had to establish that a "baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position." Although the Department of Labor's Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) provides that "[m]ost computer programmers have a bachelor's degree," and that a bachelor's degree is the "[t]ypical level of education that most" computer programmers need, USCIS concluded that "the OOH does not state that at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty is normally the minimum required."

The panel concluded that USCIS's denial of the H-1B visa petition was arbitrary and capricious. First, the panel explained that there is no daylight between typically needed, per the OOH, and normally required, per the regulation, and that USCIS's suggestion that there is "space" between these words is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. The panel also explained that the regulation is not ambiguous and deference to such an implausible interpretation is unwarranted.

Next, the panel concluded that USCIS's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it misrepresented the OOH by stating that it provides that most computer programmers have a bachelor's or associate's degree when, in fact, the OOH provides that most have a bachelor's degree.

Finally, the panel concluded that USCIS's decision was arbitrary and capricious because USCIS failed to consider key evidence, namely, the OOH language providing that a "bachelor's degree" is the "[t]ypical level of education that most workers need to enter this occupation."

COUNSEL

David A. Wulkan (argued), Jonathan R. Sturman, and David M. Sturman, Law Office of David M. Sturman A.P.C., Encino, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Elizabeth D. Kurlan (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; Sara Winslow, Chief, Civil Division; David L. Anderson, United States Attorney; United States Attorney's Office, San Francisco, California; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; William C. Peachey, Director; Glenn M. Girdharry, Assistant Director; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendant-Appellee. Mary Kenney (argued), Washington, D.C.; Leslie K. Dellon, Washington, D.C.; as and for Amicus Curiae American Immigration Council.

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Innova Solutions, Inc. (Innova), a technology company that provides services including cloud storage and data analytics, appeals from the district court's denial of its challenge to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) refusal to issue an H-1B temporary worker visa. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Like many leading American technology companies, Innova needs computer programmers. Innova wanted to hire Dilip Dodda, a citizen of India with a bachelor's degree, to work as one for a three-year period.

Innova petitioned for an H-1B "specialty occupation" visa so Dodda could reside and work in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). Under the relevant statutory and regulatory regime, Innova had to establish that the position required "theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge" and that "[a] baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position." See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1).

In October 2020, the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS promulgated an interim final rule that amends the regulatory criteria for qualifying as a specialty occupation. See Strengthening the H-1B Nonimmigrant Visa Classification Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,918 (Oct. 8, 2020). The new rule does not apply to pending or previously resolved visa petitions. Id. at 63,918, 63,924. The parties agree the amended language does not apply in this case.

The implementing regulation provides three other independently sufficient pathways for demonstrating that a position is in a "specialty occupation." See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2)-(4). For example, a position also qualifies as a "specialty occupation" if the employer normally requires a degree for the position. See id. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3). Only the first criterion is at issue on appeal.

USCIS relied on the Department of Labor's Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) as an "authoritative source" to determine whether Dodda's position "normally" requires a bachelor's degree. According to the OOH, "[m]ost computer programmers have a bachelor's degree in computer science or a related subject; however, some employers hire workers with an associate's degree." The OOH "Quick Facts" table for computer programmers similarly provided that a bachelor's degree is the "[t]ypical level of education that most workers need to enter this occupation."

The OOH provides hundreds of occupational profiles describing "the typical duties performed by the occupation" and "the typical education and training needed to enter the occupation," among other information. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Information Included in the OOH (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/ooh/about/occupational-information-included-in-the-ooh.htm. We refer throughout this opinion to the 2016-2017 version of the OOH that USCIS cited in its decision.

Despite the OOH's clear statements that "most" computer programmers have a bachelor's degree and that a bachelor's degree is the "typical" level of education "need[ed]" for the position, USCIS concluded that Innova had failed to show that a computer programmer qualified as a specialty position:

While the OOH indicates that most computer programmers obtain a degree (either a bachelor's or an associate's degree) in computer science or a related field, the OOH does not state that at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty is normally the minimum required for entry into the occupation. Further, the OOH also indicates that employers value computer programmers who have experience, which can be obtained through internships.

From 2000 to 2017, USCIS followed agency guidance (referred to as the Way Memo) that "we will generally consider the position of programmer to qualify as a specialty occupation" under the first regulatory criterion. In 2017, USCIS issued guidance rescinding the Way Memo. USCIS did not explicitly rely on the rescission memo in the instant case but followed its logic.

Innova challenged USCIS's denial of the visa in district court under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, contending that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. The district court rejected that argument and granted summary judgment for USCIS, concluding that "the OOH description for the Computer Programmer occupation does not describe the normal minimum educational requirements of the occupation in a categorical fashion" because "at least some Computer Programmer positions may be performed by someone with an associate's degree." Innova then appealed.

II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). "This court also reviews de novo the district court's evaluations of an agency's actions." San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, 776 F.3d 971, 991 (9th Cir. 2014).

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we must set aside agency action "found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). An action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). To survive a challenge, the agency must articulate "a satisfactory explanation" for its action, "including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (citation omitted). We may not attempt to make up for deficiencies in the decision by "supply[ing] a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given." Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016) (citation omitted).

B. USCIS's Denial of the H-1B Visa Petition Was Arbitrary and Capricious

The OOH is the only source upon which USCIS relied to conclude that a bachelor's degree is not "normally" required for computer programming positions like Innova's. The OOH stated that "[m]ost computer programmers have a bachelor's degree in computer science or a related subject." The OOH also listed a bachelor's degree as the "[t]ypical level of education that most workers need to enter" the computer programmer occupation.

USCIS's decision in light of that evidence was arbitrary and capricious. Mirroring the regulatory language, the decision explains: "the OOH does not state that at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty is normally the minimum required for entry into the occupation." Although the OOH, a career education resource published by a different agency, did not use the precise language of the H-1B regulation, it made clear that a bachelor's degree is not only common but typically needed. There is no daylight between typically needed, per the OOH, and normally required, per the regulatory criteria. "Typically" and "normally" are synonyms. Normally, Merriam-Webster Thesaurus, https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/normally. The Supreme Court uses these words interchangeably in the same sentence. So do we. So does the United States Solicitor General. And so does the federal government.

See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 744 (2006) ("In contrast to the pollutants normally covered by the permitting requirement of § 1342(a), 'dredged or fill material,' which is typically deposited for the sole purpose of staying put, does not normally wash downstream." (citation omitted) (emphases added)); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 469 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("These generalizations pervade the opinion of Justice Stevens, which constantly relates and relies on what 'typically,' or 'normally,' or 'probably' happens 'often.'" (emphases added)).

See, e.g., United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[M]ere nondisclosure of evidence is typically not enough to constitute fraud on the court, and perjury by a party or witness, by itself, is not normally fraud on the court." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphases added)); United States v. Flores-Blanco, 623 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 2010).

See Brief for the United States at 3, Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009) (No. 07-1309) ("After scouting for banks likely to have vulnerable and cash-rich night-deposit boxes, typically located in retail areas, like shopping malls, the group would normally execute robberies in the early morning hours." (internal citations omitted) (emphases added)).

See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 580.30; 33 C.F.R. § 203.71; 40 C.F.R. § 98.128; 45 C.F.R. § 1801.4.

USCIS's contrary reasoning is beyond saving. There is no "rational connection" between the only source USCIS cited, which indicated most computer programmers have a bachelor's degree and that a bachelor's degree is typically needed, and USCIS's decision that a bachelor's degree is not normally required. See Dep't of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2569 (citation omitted); Next Generation Tech., Inc. v. Johnson, 328 F. Supp. 3d 252, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (noting that the court "is at a loss to see a 'rational connection'" in the same context). USCIS's suggestion that there is "space" (which we understand to connote a difference in meaning) between these words is "so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. at 658 (citation omitted). While it is theoretically possible that there is "space" between normally, most, and typically, that space is at best molecular, and nowhere near big enough for the doublespeak freight train that USCIS tries to drive through it.

In response, USCIS points to OOH language stating that "some employers hire workers with an associate's degree." But the fact that some computer programmers are hired without a bachelor's degree is entirely consistent with a bachelor's degree "normally [being] the minimum requirement for entry." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1) (emphasis added); see also Taylor Made Software, Inc. v. Cuccinelli, 453 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 (D.D.C. 2020) ("[USCIS] cannot simply rely on the OOH's recognition that an unspecified number of contrary cases exist. That is not a rational treatment of the language in the OOH.") Normally does not mean always. See Normally, Cambridge Dictionary (2019), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/normally (defining "normally" as "usually or regularly" and "usually, or in most cases" (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1180 (9th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing "normally" from "always"); Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); 5 C.F.R. § 551.202(h) (same). While agencies are entitled to deference in interpreting their own ambiguous regulations, this regulation is not ambiguous and deference to such an implausible interpretation is unwarranted. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 (2019) (limiting Auer deference to regulations that are "genuinely ambiguous, even after a court has resorted to all the standard tools of interpretation"); Mejia v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that an agency "does not have the discretion to misapply the law."). USCIS's unreasonable reading of the regulatory language here is therefore arbitrary and capricious. See Salehpour v. INS, 761 F.2d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Where the objective criteria of a regulation are clearly met, there is no room for an agency to interpret a regulation so as to add another requirement.").

That USCIS recently issued an interim final rule amending this regulation to delete the word "normally" from the first criterion so that that a bachelor's degree is "always the requirement" for the occupation confirms this common sense reading of the prior regulatory language. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 63,926. As discussed above, this amendment does not impact the instant appeal. --------

On appeal, USCIS tries to distance itself from the "authoritative source" upon which it chose to rely exclusively in its decision. USCIS contends that the OOH alone cannot establish "whether an occupation qualifies per se as a specialty occupation" because "[i]n some instances, as with the Computer Programmer occupation here, it is not a sufficient source of information." In other words, where the OOH states that some positions do not require a bachelor's degree, USCIS does not consider the OOH a "sufficient source of information." That argument is related to the basis for the district court's decision: because some computer programmers are hired with associate's degrees, Innova "had the burden to show that the particular position offered to Mr. Dodda was among the Computer Programmer positions for which a bachelor's degree was normally required."

These arguments are flawed. First, by demanding additional proof anytime some positions within an occupation require less than a bachelor's degree, USCIS again improperly equates "normally" with "always." These contentions also misconstrue the regulation and flout USCIS's own approach to applying it. While it is true that the regulation refers to the requirement of a bachelor's degree "for entry into the particular position," 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1) (emphasis added), USCIS determined that Dodda's "particular position" is indeed computer programmer, and not a sub-group within that classification. As USCIS told the district court, this is the first of two steps in USCIS's analysis of the first regulatory criterion.

Second, "the agency categorically determines whether the educational requirements of that occupation group in the OOH normally requires for entry at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty." Therefore, by USCIS's own admission, showing that the matching occupational group in the OOH normally requires a bachelor's degree satisfies the regulation. No additional proof about whether the position falls within some sub-group is required. By requiring Innova to show its "particular position . . . was among the Computer Programmer positions for which a bachelor's degree was normally required," the district court's ruling functionally requires visa petitioners to demonstrate that their particular position actually requires a bachelor's degree. That approach is plainly inconsistent with the language of the first regulatory criterion and USCIS practice. Moreover, it conflates the first criterion, which only asks whether the position normally requires a bachelor's degree, and the third criterion, which asks whether the employer normally requires a bachelor's degree for the position. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1), with id. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3). And as both parties acknowledge, the four criteria are independent—a petitioner need only satisfy any one criterion to establish that a position is in a "specialty occupation." Id. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

USCIS's decision was also arbitrary and capricious because in misrepresenting the OOH, it "offered an explanation for its decision that [ran] counter to the evidence before [it]." Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. at 658 (citation omitted). We have required agency decisions to accurately reflect the evidentiary record. See Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419, 1422 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[W]hen important aspects of the individual claim are distorted or disregarded, the BIA has abused its discretion." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

According to the USCIS decision, the OOH stated that "the [computer programmer] occupation allows for a wide range of educational credentials, including an associate's degree to qualify." But rather than suggesting a "wide range," the OOH stated: "Most computer programmers have a bachelor's degree in computer science or a related subject; however, some employers hire workers with an associate's degree." The USCIS decision continues: "the OOH indicates that most computer programmers obtain a degree (either a bachelor's or an associate's degree) in computer science or a related field." But as the district court acknowledged, that "mischaracterizes the OOH." The OOH did not state that most computer programmers have either a bachelor's or an associate's degree, but rather that most "have a bachelor's degree in computer science or a related subject."

While a factual error is not necessarily fatal to an agency decision, whether most programmers have a bachelor's (as opposed to either a bachelor's or associate's) degree is the core question upon which USCIS's determination here hinged. Because we may only affirm on the basis provided by the agency, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947), and in any case, the agency has not disavowed this view, this serious misconstruction of the only source considered was arbitrary and capricious.

Finally, USCIS failed to consider key evidence. A decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem." Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. at 658 (citation omitted). "We will defer to an agency's decision only if it is 'fully informed and well-considered.'" Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The OOH listed "bachelor's degree" as the "[t]ypical level of education that most workers need to enter this occupation." That language speaks directly to the question whether a bachelor's degree is normally required for computer programmers. Indeed, it preempts USCIS's core argument on appeal: that "there is a difference between workers in a particular occupation 'having' a degree and what the industry (including other employers) normally 'requires,'" and that the OOH only establishes the former. Despite appearing at the top of the OOH's landing page for computer programmers, this OOH language was not mentioned anywhere in USCIS's decision. USCIS's failure to consider evidence so central to the inquiry is yet another (and independent) reason why its decision was arbitrary and capricious, and why we must reverse.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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