Jackson v. State

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

Court of Appeals No. A-13178

Advocates

Appearances: Hatton G. Greer, Assistant Public Defender, and Beth Goldstein, Acting Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Mackenzie C. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Judges

Judge WOLLENBERG.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2016, eighteen-year-old Tony Jackson, along with his brothers Brandon Nelson (seventeen) and Frank Jackson Jr. (nineteen), participated in a robbery that resulted in the death of Joshua Sours III. Tony Jackson pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to first-degree robbery and first-degree vehicle theft, receiving a composite sentence of 17 years with 8 years suspended, resulting in 9 years to serve. The plea agreement left probation conditions to the sentencing court's discretion. The sentencing court imposed a probation condition prohibiting contact between Jackson and his brothers without prior court permission, over Jackson's objection.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the probation condition prohibiting contact between Tony Jackson and his brothers impermissibly infringes on his constitutional right to familial association.
Whether the sentencing court applied the required "special scrutiny" by ensuring the condition was narrowly tailored and by considering less restrictive alternatives before imposing the contact restriction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The probation condition infringes on Jackson's constitutional right to familial association.
The sentencing court failed to ensure the condition was narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary interference.
The court did not consider less restrictive alternatives, such as supervised or monitored contact.

Appellee's Arguments

The State argued that Jackson did not propose less restrictive alternatives at sentencing, and thus his challenge should be reviewed only for plain error.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Dawson v. State, 894 P.2d 672, 680 (Alaska App. 1995)	Recognizes that probation conditions restricting marital or familial association implicate constitutional rights of privacy, liberty, and freedom of association, requiring special scrutiny.	Used to establish that restrictions on familial contact must be narrowly tailored and justified by case-specific necessity.
Simants v. State, 329 P.3d 1033, 1038 (Alaska App. 2014)	Probation conditions restricting familial associations are subject to special scrutiny.	Supported the principle that such probation conditions demand careful judicial consideration.
Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166, 1174-75 (Alaska App. 2008)	Same as above: probation restrictions on familial association require special scrutiny.	Reinforced the need for narrowly tailored conditions with consideration of less restrictive alternatives.
Glasgow v. State, 355 P.3d 597, 600 (Alaska App. 2015)	To survive special scrutiny, a probation condition must be narrowly tailored and the court must consider less restrictive alternatives.	Guided the court's analysis on the required procedural and substantive standards for probation conditions.
Johnson v. State, 421 P.3d 134, 140 (Alaska App. 2018)	Vacated probation condition restricting contact between father and son co-defendants absent case-specific necessity.	Supported the decision to vacate the contact restriction due to lack of demonstrated necessity.
Powell v. State, 2018 WL 3660226 (Alaska App. Aug. 1, 2018) (unpublished)	Trial court directed to reconsider probation condition limiting contact with family when less restrictive alternatives are apparent, even absent objection.	Referenced to affirm that Jackson preserved his challenge and that less restrictive alternatives should be considered.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recognized that probation conditions restricting familial contact implicate significant constitutional rights—privacy, liberty, and freedom of association—and therefore require special scrutiny. This scrutiny mandates that such conditions be narrowly tailored and that the sentencing court must consider and provide good reasons for rejecting less restrictive alternatives. The court found that the sentencing court did not explain why a total prohibition on contact between Jackson and his brothers was necessary, nor did it consider less restrictive options like supervised contact. Instead, the court imposed a presumption against contact, requiring Jackson to demonstrate a compelling need for any contact later. The court also rejected the State's argument that Jackson failed to preserve the issue, noting that Jackson did argue the condition was overly restrictive. Given these findings, the court vacated the probation condition and remanded for reconsideration under the proper standard of special scrutiny.

Holding and Implications

The court VACATED the probation condition prohibiting contact between Tony Jackson and his brothers and REMANDED the case to the sentencing court for reconsideration applying special scrutiny.

This decision directly affects the parties by removing the existing contact restriction condition and requiring the sentencing court to reassess the condition with proper constitutional safeguards. The opinion does not establish new precedent, as it is a memorandum decision not binding as legal authority, but it reinforces the established requirement that probation conditions restricting familial association must be narrowly tailored and justified by case-specific necessity.

Show full summary ...

TONY JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.

Judge WOLLENBERG.

NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See McCoy v . State , 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002). Trial Court No. 2KB-16-00063 CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from the Superior Court, Second Judicial District, Kotzebue, Romano D. DiBenedetto, Judge. Appearances: Hatton G. Greer, Assistant Public Defender, and Beth Goldstein, Acting Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Mackenzie C. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges. Judge WOLLENBERG.

In 2016, eighteen-year-old Tony Jackson, along with his brothers, seventeen-year-old Brandon Nelson and nineteen-year-old Frank Jackson Jr., participated in a robbery that resulted in the death of Joshua Sours III. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Tony Jackson pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and first-degree vehicle theft for his role in the events leading to Sours's death, in exchange for a composite sentence of 17 years' imprisonment with 8 years suspended (9 years to serve). The agreement left Jackson's probation conditions open to the discretion of the sentencing court. One of the conditions the court ultimately imposed, over Jackson's objection, prohibits contact between Jackson and his brothers without prior permission from the court.

AS 11.41.500(a)(1) and AS 11.46.360(a)(2)(A), respectively.

On appeal, Jackson argues that this probation condition impermissibly infringes on his constitutional right to familial association. He contends that the trial court imposed the condition without ensuring that it was narrowly tailored and without considering less restrictive alternatives.

Probation conditions restricting contact between family members implicate the constitutional rights of privacy, liberty, and freedom of association, and are thus subject to special scrutiny. To survive special scrutiny, a condition must be "narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary interference with the constitutional right at issue, and the [sentencing] court must affirmatively consider, and have good reason for rejecting, any less restrictive alternatives."

Dawson v. State, 894 P.2d 672, 680 (Alaska App. 1995) (recognizing that a probation condition restricting marital association "plainly implicates the constitutional rights of privacy, liberty and freedom of association"); see also Simants v. State, 329 P.3d 1033, 1038 (Alaska App. 2014) (recognizing that a probation condition that restricts a defendant's familial associations is subject to special scrutiny); Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166, 1174-75 (Alaska App. 2008) (same).

Glasgow v. State, 355 P.3d 597, 600 (Alaska App. 2015).

Although "discouraging a probationer from associating with former partners in crime is obviously related to the goal of rehabilitation," prohibiting contact between family members "is just as obviously an extreme restriction of liberty." While we have recognized the inherent tension in these competing sentencing considerations, we have consistently vacated conditions restricting contact between family members in the absence of "case-specific circumstances demonstrating actual necessity."

Dawson, 894 P.2d at 680.

Id.; see also, e.g., Johnson v. State, 421 P.3d 134, 140 (Alaska App. 2018) (vacating and remanding a probation condition restricting contact between father and son co-defendants: "their status as co-defendants (or felons) alone did not override the importance of their familial relationship").

Here, the sentencing court did not explain why a total prohibition on contact between the brothers was necessary, or why readily apparent less restrictive alternatives, such as supervised or monitored contact, would not satisfy the goals of probation while still preserving the brothers' constitutionally protected relationship. To the contrary, the court appeared to start with the presumption that contact should not be permitted, and then allowed contact only if Jackson could later demonstrate to the court a compelling need.

The State argues that the brothers did not propose any less restrictive alternatives to the sentencing court, and thus Jackson's claim should be reviewed only for plain error. But Jackson did argue that the condition was overly restrictive because it would prohibit him from visiting his brothers even in a supervised setting. We conclude that Jackson preserved his challenge to the probation condition. Cf. Powell v. State, 2018 WL 3660226, at *2-3 (Alaska App. Aug. 1, 2018) (unpublished) (directing the trial court to reconsider a probation condition that limited the defendant's contact with his mother and brother, even in the absence of any objection, when it was readily apparent that reasonable, lesser restrictions were available). --------

We therefore VACATE the probation condition prohibiting contact between Jackson and his brothers and REMAND this case to the sentencing court for application of special scrutiny to the challenged probation condition.