Fujisaki, J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 51603927)
Defendant Danny Richard Dowdy was convicted by plea of procuring and offering a false or forged instrument in violation of Penal Code section 115, subdivision (a). This conviction concerned a deed of trust and assignment of rents that encumbered real property belonging to an elderly victim (hereafter, the subject deed). The subject deed listed Jeffrey S. Blumin, "trustee of the Jeffrey Steven Blumin UTD dated 9/25/14," as the lender. (Capitalization omitted.) After obtaining the conviction, the People sought an order declaring the subject deed void pursuant to section 115, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the motion in a written decision that declared the subject deed void ab initio. The court also issued a separate order again declaring the subject deed void ab initio.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Blumin appeals from the order. He contends that the order was procedurally defective and that its defects cannot be corrected because the People presented no evidence the subject deed was false. Blumin further argues that a determination regarding the validity of the subject deed should have been made in his civil declaratory relief action. We will affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dowdy and co-defendants Rosa Nina Flores and James Michael Anderson were charged by information with crimes arising from the financial abuse of victim Donna B. As relevant here, Dowdy was charged with violating section 115, subdivision (a), by "unlawfully and knowingly procur[ing] and offer[ing] a false and forged instrument to be filed, registered, and recorded in a public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, and recorded under a law of this state or the United States."
To provide context, we briefly set out the facts underlying the criminal charges as supported by the record, which includes portions of the preliminary hearing transcript.
Donna B. was a septuagenarian with dementia and/or mental health issues when Dowdy and Flores began staying at her home. Dowdy started living with the victim around mid-2012 and, at that time, the home was in fair condition. Although the victim owned her home, she owed back taxes on the property.
While living with the victim, Dowdy held himself out as her son and "helped" the victim refinance her home. Anderson brokered a hard money loan in the amount of $140,000 from Blumin, and Anderson was present when the victim signed the loan application documents in May 2015. The loan application documents contained intentional inaccuracies (e.g., concerning the victim's income and assets, and where she lived) in order to qualify the victim for the loan. The victim also signed a deed of trust (the subject deed) securing the loan with her home. The subject deed was recorded with the Contra Costa County Recorder's Office in May 2015.
Subsequent to the loan application, the three co-defendants accompanied the victim to the bank on various occasions to make withdrawals. Dowdy took, or tried to take, money from the victim. Police executed a search warrant at the victim's home in December 2015. They found the home in shambles and paper evidence of someone practicing the victim's signature inside. Local officials later deemed the victim's home uninhabitable.
Contemporaneous with the filing of the information in this case, which occurred in March 2016, the People recorded a notice of pendency of action (lis pendens) with the Contra Costa County Recorder's Office pursuant to section 115, subdivision (f). A copy of the subject deed was attached to the notice. The People also provided Blumin notice of the action via a letter dated June 2, 2016.
Dowdy ultimately pled no contest to a violation of section 115, subdivision (a) and admitted five prior prison term commitments (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Dowdy was sentenced to prison for seven years.
As for Dowdy's co-defendants, Flores pled no contest to felony grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), and Anderson pled to a misdemeanor charge of being an accessory (§ 32). Both were placed on probation.
In January 2018, the People filed a motion pursuant to section 115, subdivision (e), to dissolve the subject deed. Blumin opposed the motion.
In mid-May 2018, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a written "decision" granting the People's motion and declaring the subject deed void ab initio. The court found that the victim "lacked the mental capacity to understand the documents she signed at the direction of the defendants" and that her incompetency was apparent in her videotaped police interview introduced at the evidentiary hearing. Although the interview took place about five months after she signed the loan documents, the court determined, based on that interview and the severity of the victim's cognitive impairment, that the impairment must have existed when she executed the subject deed. The court also observed that Dowdy pled guilty to violating section 115, subdivision (a), in the criminal proceeding. Based on the evidence, the court concluded the subject deed was a false instrument.
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor argued the loan documents were false, not forged.
Shortly after issuing its written decision, the trial court issued a separate written "order" again declaring the subject deed void ab initio. In the order, the court stated that the subject deed was both false and forged, and that Dowdy was convicted of "knowingly offer[ing] the [subject deed] to be filed, registered, or recorded within the County Recorder's Office, knowing that the document was both false and forged." Blumin appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
Section 115, subdivision (a), makes it a felony for any person to knowingly procure or offer any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public state office where the instrument, if genuine, could be filed, registered, or recorded under any federal or state law.
Section 115, subdivision (e)(1), provides in relevant part: "After a person is convicted of a violation of this section, . . . upon written motion of the prosecuting agency, the court, after a hearing described in subdivision (f), shall issue a written order that the false or forged instrument be adjudged void ab initio if the court determines that an order is appropriate under applicable law. The order shall state whether the instrument is false or forged, or both false and forged, and describe the nature of the falsity or forgery." (Italics added.)
Subdivision (f) sets out various procedures concerning motions filed under subdivision (e). Among other things, the court must hold a hearing with notice to all interested parties, and interested parties have the right to be heard and present information to the court. (§ 115, subd. (f)(7)-(8).) After such a hearing, "if the court determines that the interests of justice or the need to protect the property rights of any person or party so requires, including, but not limited to, a finding that the matter may be more appropriately determined in a civil proceeding, the court may decline to make a determination under subdivision (e)." (Id., subd. (f)(9)(A).)
The "core purpose" of section 115 is "to protect the integrity and reliability of public records." (People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1061.)
B. Analysis
Blumin makes three main arguments in this appeal. First, he contends the order declaring the subject deed void ab initio suffers from two procedural defects: (a) the order failed to describe the nature of the instrument's falsity and/or forgery as required by section 115, subdivision (e)(1); and (b) the order conflicts with the trial court's written decision, insofar as the order states the subject deed is both false and forged while the written decision states the subject deed is false. Second, Blumin argues the court cannot cure the alleged defective order because the People presented no evidence establishing that the subject deed was false. Third, Blumin contends the court should have allowed the validity of the subject deed to be resolved in Blumin's civil declaratory relief action. We address these claims below.
1. Procedural Defects with the Order
Initially, we reject Blumin's claims that the order declaring the subject deed void is procedurally defective. "No judgment shall be set aside . . . in any cause . . . for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Furthermore, "[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived." (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie).) Here, Blumin fails to set out a developed argument as to how or why the alleged procedural defects amount to reversible error. Notably, however, the court's written "decision"—which separately declared the subject deed void ab initio—states the subject instrument is false and describes the nature of its falsity. Thus, the written decision appears to comply with the requirements of section 115, subdivision (e)(1).
2. The Determination that the Subject Deed is False
Next, we reject Blumin's various contentions that the People did not present evidence of the subject deed's falsity.
Focusing on the trial court's conclusion that the victim lacked the mental capacity to understand the documents she signed at the defendants' behest, Blumin contends that the trial court lacked "jurisdiction" to determine the victim's competency and that the People presented no evidence that any court previously determined the victim was incompetent to contract on the day she signed the loan agreement. These arguments, however, are unsupported by citations to authority. (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.) In arguing the court acted without jurisdiction, Blumin's sole citation is to the "plain language" of section 115. But nothing in the statute restricts a court from determining that an instrument is "false" based on the victim's lack of competency, and Blumin identifies no authority supporting his contrary position. Likewise, Blumin fails to offer any developed argument delineating what constitute a "false" instrument within the meaning of section 115. We are not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor will we make arguments for parties. (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.)
In his reply brief, Blumin asserts the People failed to cite authority supporting a document signed by an incompetent person can be false under section 115, but the burden of demonstrating error is on Blumin as the appellant. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
Blumin also attacks the substance of the trial court's determination that the victim lacked the mental capacity to contract on the day of the loan transaction. Blumin claims the People "relied exclusively on the videotaped police interview of [the victim] during which she exhibited delusion[al] behavior" to show the victim's lack of competency to contract, but in his view the interview does not support such a finding. This is so, Blumin contends, because the interview may not have depicted the victim's typical mental functioning; the interview took place about five months after the loan transaction; and the victim's delusional behavior might not have affected her ability to understand the loan transaction. We are unpersuaded.
When a finding of fact is attacked on substantial evidence grounds, " 'the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.' [Citations.] [¶] 'It is well established that a reviewing court starts with the presumption that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.' " (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) If a party contends " 'some particular issue of fact is not sustained, they are required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed to be waived.' " (Ibid., italics added and omitted.) A necessary corollary to the presumption of correctness on appeal is that an appellant must provide an adequate record to the court establishing error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) Failure to do so requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant. (Ibid.)
Here, Blumin's claim is forfeited because he failed to supply the victim's recorded interview as part of the appellate record. Relatedly, Blumin fails to articulate the standard of review on appeal and tailor his argument to it, which is another basis for deeming the argument forfeited. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948; People v. Foss (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 113, 126.)
Moreover, contrary to what Blumin suggests, the interview was not actually the People's "exclusive" evidence of the victim's competency. The People presented other evidence—Dowdy's section 115 conviction; the testimony of two witnesses; and other documentary evidence concerning the victim's loan—that arguably is also relevant, either directly or circumstantially, to the issue of the victim's capacity on the day she signed the loan application documents and subject deed. For instance, one witness, an investigator with the prosecutor's office, testified that he both spoke to the victim and watched her recorded interview. The investigator also observed the victim's delusional thinking during the recorded interview, and indicated his belief that the victim lacked mental capacity at the time of her loan application. The other witness, an expert forensic accountant, testified about egregiously false statements in the victim's loan application documents. For example, the loan application stated that the victim received over $5,000 in monthly rental income, when in fact her bank statements showed she received $750 per month from her Social Security benefits. The loan application also stated the victim had tens of thousands in cash reserves, when in actuality her bank records showed she only had $1,000 in liquid assets. That the victim submitted an application containing such patently false statements was probative of her inability to comprehend what she was signing.
Blumin next argues that a finding of the victim's incompetency would render the loan merely voidable not void. The only authority Blumin cites, however, is Civil Code section 39, while the controlling statute in this case is clearly section 115, which Blumin does not address at all in making this argument. As stated above, section 115 mandates that, after a section 115 conviction and upon the prosecuting agency's written motion, a court "shall issue a written order that the false or forged instrument be adjudged void ab initio if the court determines that an order is appropriate under applicable law." (§ 115, subd. (e)(1).) Here, the trial court had evidence of Dowdy's section 115 conviction, and both its order and written decision found the subject deed false. Given the clear application of section 115, and the lack of argument establishing its supposed inapplicability or discussion about how it should be interpreted given other laws, we reject the argument that the subject deed was merely voidable under Civil Code section 39.
Last, Blumin contends the misrepresentations in the victim's loan application documents (see ante, fn. 6) do not render the subject deed false. Elsewhere in his opening brief, Blumin seems to argue the subject deed is not false because it truthfully references a "real loan to a real person" and because the loan "saved [the victim's] [p]roperty and she undeniably received and spent Loan proceeds." Again, these arguments need not be addressed because they are undeveloped and unsupported by citations to the record or to authority. (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.)
Blumin cites to Perlas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 429 for the proposition that he "had no obligation to vet any of the representations in the Loan application, much less determine [the victim's] ability to pay back the Loan." But this does not further his claim that the misrepresentations in the loan application (see ante, fn. 6) do not render the subject deed false within the meaning of section 115.
Blumin also cites to Schiavon v. Arnaudo Bros. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 374 to argue that if misrepresentations induced him to make the loan, then the loan is merely voidable. But this is not a case about mere misrepresentations; and Schiavon itself says: "A deed is void . . . if the grantor is unaware of the nature of what he or she is signing. [Citation.] A voidable deed, on the other hand, is one where the grantor is aware of what he or she is executing, but has been induced to do so through fraudulent misrepresentations." (Schiavon, at p. 378, italics added.)
3. Resolution Through the Declaratory Relief Action
Finally, we reject Blumin's contention that the trial court should have allowed the validity of the subject deed to be resolved in his declaratory relief action. In sum, Blumin argues that because the People did not record their notice of pendency of action or give him notice of the criminal action within the time limits set out in section 115, subdivision (f)(4), a statutory presumption arose that the matter should be more appropriately determined in a civil proceeding. Blumin goes on to say that he "augmented this presumption" by arguing at the hearing that (1) section 115 does not give a court jurisdiction to adjudicate competency, and (2) he filed a declaratory relief action on the validity of the Note and subject deed and obtained a default against the victim. Blumin claims the court ignored the foregoing presumption.
Section 115, subdivision (f)(1) and (2), provide that within 10 days of the filing of a complaint or indictment, the prosecuting agency shall provide written notice to all parties who have an interest in the property affected by the false or forged instrument, and record a notice of pendency of action in the county where the real property is located.
Subdivision (f)(4) provides that the failure to provide notice or record a pendency of action "shall not prevent the prosecuting agency from later making a motion under subdivision (e), but the court shall take the failure to provide notice or record a pendency of action as required under paragraphs (1) and (2) as reason to provide any interested parties additional time to respond to the motion." Furthermore, "[f]ailure of the prosecuting agency to so notify interested parties under this subdivision or record a pendency of action as required under paragraphs (1) and (2) within 10 calendar days shall create a presumption that a finding as described in paragraph (9) [("a finding that the matter may be more appropriately determined in a civil proceeding")] is necessary to protect the property rights of the interested party or parties." (§ 115, subd. (f)(4), (9).)
Here, the People filed the complaint in December 2015 and did not record the notice of pendency of action until they filed the information in March 2016. They provided notice to Blumin of pendency of the action via letter dated June 2, 2016.
Again, however, the argument is unsupported by record citations or citations to authority. (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.) Additionally, Blumin fails to both articulate the standard of review on appeal and tailor his argument to it. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 948; People v. Foss, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 126.) The argument is therefore waived.
Before leaving this discussion, we note that Blumin, for the first time in his reply brief, also seems to contend that the default judgment he obtained against the victim in his declaratory relief action is "res judicata as to all issues pleaded in the complaint." Not only is the argument waived because it is raised for the first time in the reply brief (Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Board (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830), but Blumin also fails to present a developed argument accompanied by citations to the record and authority concerning how the default judgment in his declaratory relief action impacted the trial court's ability to declare the subject deed void under section 115.
Notably, section 115 states the outcome of a "quiet title action"—which Blumin did not file but arguably presents an analogous situation—is not dispositive as to whether an instrument should be declared void. (§ 115, subd. (f)(9)(B) ["If, prior to the hearing on the motion, any person or party files a quiet title action that seeks a judicial determination of the validity of the same false or forged instrument that is the subject of the motion, or the status of an interested party as a bona fide purchaser of, or bona fide holder of an encumbrance on, the property affected by the false or forged instrument, the court may consider that as an additional but not dispositive factor in making its determination under subdivision (e); provided, however, that a final judgment previously entered in that quiet title action shall be followed to the extent otherwise required by law"], italics added.)
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court declaring the subject deed void ab initio is affirmed. Blumin shall bear the costs of this appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).)
/s/_________
Fujisaki, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Siggins, P. J. /s/_________
Jackson, J.