United States v. Raia

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Docket Number

No. 20-1033

Advocates

Mark E. Coyne, Steven G. Sanders, Office of United States Attorney, 970 Broad Street, Room 700, Newark, NJ 07102, Counsel for Appellant Jenny Chung, Lee Vartan, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, One Boland Drive, West Orange, NJ 07052, David M. Dugan, Chiesa Shahinian Giantomasi, 11 Times Square, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10036, Alan L. Zegas, Law Offices of Alan L. Zegas, Third Floor West, 60 Morris Turnpike, Summit, NJ 07901, Counsel for Appellee

Judges

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Acts

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Francis Raia was convicted by a jury of conspiring to use the mails to promote unlawful activity related to bribery during a local election campaign in Hoboken, New Jersey. The District Court sentenced him to three months imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and a $50,000 fine. The government appealed the sentence, considering it too lenient, seeking a longer term of imprisonment. Raia began serving his sentence in March 2020 at a federal correctional institute in Fairton, New Jersey. Shortly after, he requested the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to file a compassionate release motion on his behalf due to risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, citing his age and medical conditions. Before BOP responded and before the statutorily required 30-day period elapsed, Raia filed his own compassionate release motion with the District Court. The District Court denied the motion, ruling it lacked jurisdiction due to the pending government appeal but noted it would have granted release based on COVID-19 risks and Raia’s non-violent offense and community contributions. Raia then petitioned this Court to decide the compassionate release motion or alternatively dismiss the government’s appeal to allow the District Court to act.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether this Court can decide a defendant’s compassionate release motion in the first instance when the defendant has not exhausted administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Whether this Court may dismiss the government’s pending appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(2) to return jurisdiction to the District Court for consideration of the compassionate release motion.
Whether remanding the case to the District Court under Rule 12.1 is appropriate to allow initial consideration of the compassionate release motion despite the defendant’s failure to comply with the statutory exhaustion requirement.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2020)	Requirement that compassionate release motions must be addressed first to the sentencing court under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).	Supported the conclusion that this Court cannot decide the compassionate release motion in the first instance.
United States v. Smith, 896 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2018)	Same as above, confirming the procedural requirement under § 3582.	Reinforced the statutory exhaustion and jurisdictional requirements for compassionate release motions.
Horner Equip. Int'l, Inc. v. Seaside Pool Ctr., Inc., 884 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1989)	Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(2) dismissal is a sanction for failure to comply with procedural rules.	Used to reject Raia’s request to dismiss the government’s appeal since there was no procedural failure by the government.
Lehman Bros. Holdings v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., L.P., 785 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2015)	Same as above, clarifying the scope of Rule 3(a)(2) dismissal.	Further supported the conclusion that dismissal of the appeal was inappropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by interpreting the statutory framework of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which allows a court to modify a sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” only after the defendant has exhausted administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) or after 30 days have elapsed since the BOP received the defendant’s request. The Court emphasized that the statute requires such motions to be initially addressed to the sentencing court, not directly to the appellate court.

Raia failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement because he filed his compassionate release motion with the District Court before BOP had 30 days to respond to his request. The Court noted that this exhaustion requirement is critical, especially given the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the BOP’s active measures to mitigate risk within prisons.

Raia alternatively requested dismissal of the government’s appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(2), which allows dismissal for failure to take procedural steps. The Court found no procedural failure on the government’s part and thus rejected this request.

The Court considered remanding the case to the District Court under Rule 12.1 to allow initial consideration of the motion, but deemed such remand futile given Raia’s failure to meet the exhaustion requirement.

Ultimately, the Court denied Raia’s motion, underscoring the importance of strict compliance with statutory procedural prerequisites despite the serious risks posed by COVID-19 in prison settings.

Holding and Implications

The Court DENIED Raia’s motion to decide his compassionate release request in the first instance or to dismiss the government’s appeal.

The direct consequence of this decision is that Raia’s compassionate release motion cannot proceed until he complies with the statutory exhaustion requirement by allowing the BOP 30 days to consider his request. The government’s appeal remains pending, and the District Court retains jurisdiction to consider the motion only after exhaustion is satisfied. The Court did not establish new precedent but reaffirmed the mandatory procedural framework governing compassionate release motions, emphasizing the critical role of administrative exhaustion even amid a public health crisis.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant v. FRANCIS RAIA

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Mark E. Coyne, Steven G. Sanders, Office of United States Attorney, 970 Broad Street, Room 700, Newark, NJ 07102, Counsel for Appellant

Jenny Chung, Lee Vartan, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, One Boland Drive, West Orange, NJ 07052, David M. Dugan, Chiesa Shahinian Giantomasi, 11 Times Square, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10036, Alan L. Zegas, Law Offices of Alan L. Zegas, Third Floor West, 60 Morris Turnpike, Summit, NJ 07901, Counsel for Appellee

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, AMBRO and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Chief Judge.

The First Step Act empowers criminal defendants to request compassionate release for "extraordinary and compelling reasons." 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). But before they make such requests, defendants must at least ask the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to do so on their behalf and give BOP thirty days to respond. See § 3582(c)(1)(A). And even then, defendants must first submit their motion to "the [sentencing] court"; we can only consider these motions on appeal. § 3582.

The relevant portion of § 3582 provides:

(c) Modification of an Imposed Term of Imprisonment .–The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—

(1) in any case–

(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction

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Nevertheless, Francis Raia asks us to decide his compassionate-release motion in the first instance. Alternatively, he asks us to dismiss the government's pending appeal so the District Court can decide the motion. But although he asked BOP to move for compassionate release on his behalf, he did not give it thirty days to respond. So we will deny Raia's motion.

While running for local office in Hoboken, New Jersey, Raia directed campaign volunteers to bribe voters with $50 payments to vote for him by absentee ballot and support a measure he favored. A jury convicted Raia of conspiring to use the mails to promote unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(i)(2) (defining "unlawful activity" to include bribery). The District Court sentenced Raia to three months imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and a $50,000 fine. But the government thought the sentence was too lenient, having originally sought twenty-seven months imprisonment. It appealed to this Court under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).

On March 3, 2020, with the government's appeal pending, Raia reported to the federal correctional institute in Fairton, New Jersey to begin his sentence. Shortly thereafter, he asked BOP to move for compassionate release on his behalf. But before BOP responded, and before thirty days passed, Raia filed his own motion with the District Court for compassionate release given the present pandemic caused by COVID-19, a highly contagious respiratory virus which has already infected over 25,000 people in New Jersey and poses unique risks in population-dense prison facilities. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, COVID-19 Action Plan (Mar. 13, 2020, 3:09 PM), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20200313_covid-19.jsp; New Jersey, COVID-19 Information Hub , https://covid19.nj.gov/ (last updated Apr. 2, 2020, 1:00 PM). In particular, Raia claimed he faces heightened risk of serious illness or death from the virus since he is sixty-eight-years old and suffers from Parkinson's Disease, diabetes, and heart issues.

Two days later, the District Court denied the motion, concluding that the pending appeal divested it of jurisdiction. In a footnote, however, the District Court offered that it would have granted the motion and released Raia to home confinement "[d]ue to the increased risk posed by a custodial term" in light of COVID-19, and because Raia's offense "was non-violent and [Raia] has otherwise been a highly productive, charitable member of his community." Order n.1, Mar. 26, 2020 (ECF No. 86).

Raia has not appealed that order. Instead, he filed a motion asking this Court to decide his compassionate-release motion. Alternatively, he asks us to return jurisdiction to the District Court by dismissing the government's appeal without prejudice. He claims we have power to do so under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(2), which notes: "An appellant's failure to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for the court of appeals to act as it considers appropriate, including dismissing the appeal."

We cannot decide Raia's compassionate-release motion in the first instance. Section 3582's text requires those motions to be addressed to the sentencing court, a point several Circuits have noted and Raia himself acknowledges. See, e.g. , United States v. Richardson , 948 F.3d 733, 749 (6th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Smith , 896 F.3d 466, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ; Mot. 3.

Nor can we dismiss the government's appeal under Rule 3(a)(2). Rule 3(a)(2) dismissal is a sanction for "fail[ing] to comply with procedural rules." Horner Equip. Int'l, Inc. v. Seaside Pool Ctr., Inc. , 884 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 1989) ; see also Lehman Bros. Holdings v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., L.P. , 785 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 2015). Here, there is nothing the government has failed to do.

We could, however, remand the case to the District Court while retaining jurisdiction over the government's appeal under Rule 12.1. That would allow the District Court to consider Raia's compassionate-release request in the first instance.

But any remand would be futile. As noted, Raia failed to comply with § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement: BOP has not had thirty days to consider Raia's request to move for compassionate release on his behalf, and there has been no adverse decision by BOP for Raia to administratively exhaust within that time period (as such, we need not address administrative appeals here). Although the District Court's indicative ruling did not mention the exhaustion requirement, it presents a glaring roadblock foreclosing compassionate release at this point.

Accordingly, since Rule 3(a)(2) is inapt and since remanding the matter under Rule 12.1 would be futile, we will deny Raia's motion outright.

* * *

We do not mean to minimize the risks that COVID-19 poses in the federal prison system, particularly for inmates like Raia. But the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release, especially considering BOP's statutory role, and its extensive and professional efforts to curtail the virus's spread. See generally Federal Bureau of Prisons, COVID-19 Action Plan (Mar. 13, 2020, 3:09 PM), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20200313_covid19.jsp. Given BOP's shared desire for a safe and healthy prison environment, we conclude that strict compliance with § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement takes on added—and critical—importance. And given the Attorney General's directive that BOP "prioritize the use of [its] various statutory authorities to grant home confinement for inmates seeking transfer in connection with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic," we anticipate that the statutory requirement will be speedily dispatched in cases like this one. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. to Dir., Bureau of Prisons 1 (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1262731/download. So we will deny Raia's motion.