Golenbock Eiseman Assor Bell & Peskoe LLP, New York (Jacqueline G. Veit of counsel), for appellants.
Warner Partners, P.C., New York (Kenneth E. Warner of counsel), for respondents.
RENWICK, J.P., ANDRIAS, SAXE, MOSKOWITZ, JJ.
“Ambiguity is determined within the four corners of the document” (Brad H. v. City of New York, 17 N.Y.3d 180, 186, 928 N.Y.S.2d 221, 951 N.E.2d 743 [2011] ). Hence, in deciding whether section 3.3 of Preservation's LLC Agreement is ambiguous, we have not considered the extrinsic evidence that plaintiffs urge us to consider, such as the sixteenth amendment to SCA's partnership agreement, organizational charts and tax documents, and correspondence to SCA's limited partners.
“Ambiguity is present if language was written so imperfectly that it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation” (id. ). Section 3.3 is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation—the one that defendants advanced on the motion.
The first sentence of section 3.3 states, “At any time after the Funding Event (as hereinafter defined), the Managing Member may ... reallocate the Sharing Ratios of all Members in whatever amounts it deems ... to be appropriate (including ... assigning a Member a Sharing Ratio of zero).” The second sentence of section 3.3 defines “Funding Event” as “the distribution to Members, in accordance with their then current Sharing Ratios ..., of at least $10,000,000 in aggregate distributions pursuant to Section 4.2(iv).” Plaintiffs cannot dispute that Preservation has distributed at least $10 million to its members pursuant to section 4.2(iv). (It is true that plaintiff Harold Kuplesky's distributions were based on a Sharing Ratio of 3.49% rather than 11.63%. However, that particular reduction is not at issue on appeal.)
Plaintiffs rely on the last sentence of section 3.3, which says, “All Members acknowledge and agree that the Managing Member's reallocation power ... is intended to facilitate providing a new management incentive program after the full distribution from the proceeds of a substantial refinancing pursuant to Section 3.02 or 3.03 of SCA's partnership agreement.” However, this is merely a statement of intention; it does not actually require the full distribution of proceeds (see Sengillo v. Valeo Elec. Sys., Inc., 328 Fed.Appx. 39, 41–42, 2009 WL 1372423 [2d Cir.2009] ). We have modified the IAS court's declaration accordingly.