A.T. v. State (In re C.T.)

HAGEN, Judge

Opinion Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Julie V. Lund
No. 1137406 Sheleigh A. Harding, Attorney for Appellant Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee Jeannine Timothy, Guardian ad Litem JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred. HAGEN, Judge: ¶1 A.T. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to C.T. (Child), arguing that termination was not in Child's best interest. Mother relies on this court's recent decision in In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, contending that termination was not strictly necessary because the juvenile court could have allowed Mother's parents (Grandparents) to have guardianship of Child. In B.T.B, we concluded that a court may not find that termination of parental rights is strictly necessary until it has considered or explored "less-permanent arrangements," such as custody or guardianship with a family member. Id. ¶ 55. Because the juvenile court correctly applied our holding in B.T.B. by exploring guardianship and custody with Grandparents before terminating Mother's parental rights, we affirm.

¶2 Mother is a minor who lives with Grandparents and her five younger siblings. Mother has been a caretaker of her younger siblings since she was eleven. When Mother was thirteen, she was allegedly sex-trafficked by her older sister, and became pregnant and contracted HIV as a result of rape by an unknown man. At that time, the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) took custody of Mother. ¶3 Mother gave birth to Child at the age of fourteen and was returned to Grandparents' custody. Shortly after the birth, DCFS received a report that Mother had threatened to kill herself and Child. DCFS found Mother and Child living in a park and placed both in DCFS custody. Mother denied that she intended to harm Child but threatened to harm herself if forced to return to Grandparents' home at that time. DCFS filed abuse, neglect, and dependency petitions as to Mother and Child. At a shelter hearing in Child's case, the juvenile court made findings that Mother had been adjudicated incompetent to stand trial in a with her foster parents and they expressed a desire to adopt. Child's foster parents also expressed a desire that Child continue to have a relationship with her biological family and remain connected to her heritage, "as long as it doesn't cause her anxiety, or angst, or confusion in any way that is harmful to her growth and development." ¶9 A few months after Child's primary permanency goal was changed to adoption, the juvenile court held a trial on the termination of Mother's parental rights. Upon hearing testimony from a psychologist, Mother, DCFS, Child's grandmother, and Child's foster mother, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and an order terminating Mother's parental rights. As grounds for termination, the court found that Mother had neglected Child and was an unfit or incompetent parent. The court also found that guardianship with Grandparents was "untenable" because Mother, "as a child herself, was the child in her home providing the [care-giving] to her younger siblings in the home, and would therefore also, of necessity, be providing the primary care to [Child]," despite Mother's continuing "emotional instability." Because of Mother's unfitness, and after finding that termination of her parental rights was strictly necessary, the court concluded that adoption was in Child's best interest. ¶10 Mother appeals.

¶11 Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights as to Child, contending that the juvenile court erred in concluding that termination was in Child's best interest. "The ultimate decision about whether to terminate a parent's rights presents a mixed question of law and fact." In re B.T.B, 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 8 (quotation simplified). "We afford great deference to the juvenile court's findings of fact and overturn the result only if the facts are against the clear weight of the evidence," but we review the court's "interpretation of the Termination of the Parental Rights Act for correctness." In re A.C.M., 2009 UT 30, ¶ 8, 221 P.3d 185.

¶12 Mother argues that "the juvenile court erred in terminating [her] parental rights without fully exploring whether [Child's] best interests would be better served by awarding permanent custody and guardianship of [Child] to [Grandparents]." "To terminate parental rights, [a] juvenile court must make two separate findings." In re T.E., 2011 UT 51, ¶ 17, 266 P.3d 739 (quotation simplified). First, a "court must find by clear and convincing evidence that there is at least one statutory ground for termination." Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012) (setting forth grounds for termination). Second, a court must "find that termination of the parent's rights is in the best interests of the child." In re A.C.M., 2009 UT 30, ¶ 23, 221 P.3d 185. Because "the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected," In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Utah 1982) (quotation simplified), a court may only terminate parental rights upon a finding that termination is "strictly necessary" to the best interests of the child, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1). ¶13 On appeal, Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that there are statutory grounds for termination. Instead, she challenges the court's finding that termination was in Child's best interest and, specifically, that "it was strictly necessary to terminate [her] parental rights given the existence of family members who could have raised [Child]." To support this argument, Mother relies on In re B.T.B, 2018 UT App 157. In that case, this court addressed "whether [a] juvenile court correctly younger siblings despite the fact that Mother's "emotional instability continued." With these circumstances in mind, the court changed the permanency goal to termination and adoption. It determined that Child "could not and should not return to" Mother and Grandparents' home because Mother was unfit to care for Child and Grandparents could not provide adequate supervision. Thus, not only did the juvenile court consider alternatives to termination, the court specifically explored permanent custody and guardianship with family members, but rejected those options for well-articulated reasons. ¶17 Contrary to Mother's argument, nothing in this court's decision in B.T.B requires courts to do anything more than "explore whether other feasible options exist" and "consider whether other less-permanent arrangements . . . might serve [Child's] needs just as well" as termination of parental rights. Id. Here, the juvenile court did more than consider and explore an alternative to termination; the court ordered custody and guardianship with Grandparents as a permanency goal. Only after exploring this placement and finding that this arrangement was not in Child's best interest did the court order termination and adoption as Child's permanency goal. Accordingly, because the court did consider and explore alternatives before finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was necessary, we affirm.

¶18 We reject Mother's argument that DCFS was required to provide additional services to Grandparents as guardians of Child before the juvenile court could find that termination of Mother's parental rights was strictly necessary, and we affirm the juvenile court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interest.