Roger H. Williams for appellant.
Clinton S. Cole, District Attorney (
Milburn D. Smith of counsel), for respondent.
Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General (
Wendell P. Brown and
John C. Crary, Jr., of counsel), for Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of New York, amicus curiæ, in support of respondent's position.
subject to State regulation. The police power of the State cannot draw within its jurisdiction objects which lie beyond it. (
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100,
supra.) The goods were intact in their original packages and had not become commingled with the common mass of property of the State at the Utica terminal and were
in transitu to Fort Plain, New York. There was a single freight charge, one waybill, the contract of carriage was not made in New York and the contract was for the transportation of these goods from the point in Maryland to a definite point in New York, to wit, Fort Plain, New York. No part of the tariff can be definitely allocated to the Utica-Fort Plain transfer. The charge was indivisible. (
People v. Horton Motor Lines, 281 N.Y. 196,
supra;
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100,
supra;
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461;
Bowman v. Chicago Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 507.) The tractor and trailer were subject to Federal regulation being engaged in interstate commerce. The Attorney-General cites
South Carolina Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. (303 U. S. 177) and
Matter of Ajax Trucking Co. v. Browne (272 App. Div. 1087, affd.
298 N.Y. 736, appeal dismissed 337 U. S. 951) as to the authority of the States over their streets and highways and as to their power of taxation. These cases do not touch the point involved here. The point is, that the defendant under the reciprocity and exemption clauses of section 51 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was protected as he was not engaged in intrastate commerce as contemplated by said section. I am clearly of the opinion that the goods in question were interstate commerce and were being delivered as such as part of the original contract of transportation, and that the intrastate commerce of the State was in no way invaded. In view of the above conclusion, the other questions raised by the appellant are not considered. The conviction of defendant appealed from should be and hereby is reversed, the information dismissed, the defendant discharged and the fine remitted. An order may be submitted accordingly.