Horne v. Dep't of Agric.

Any handler that violates the Secretary of Agriculture's marketing orders may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. §§608a(5), 608a(6), and 608c(14). One such order, the California Raisin Marketing Order (Marketing Order or Order), established a Raisin Administrative Committee (RAC), which recommends setting up annual reserve pools of raisins that are not to be sold on the open domestic market, and which recommends what portion of a particular year's production should be included in the pool. The Order also requires handlers to pay assessments to help cover the RAC's administrative costs.

Petitioners, California raisin growers, started a business that processed more than 3 million pounds of raisins from their farm and 60 other farms during the two crop years. When they refused Claims. It recognized that when a handler raises a takings defense, Court of Federal Claims Tucker Act jurisdiction gives way to the AMAA's comprehensive remedial scheme, see 7 U. S. C. §608c(15), but found that petitioners had brought the takings claim in their capacity as producers.

Held: The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide petitioners' takings claim. Pp. 523-529, 186 L. Ed. 2d, at 80-83.

(a) That court incorrectly determined that petitioners brought their takings claim as producers rather than handlers. Petitioners argued that they were producers--and thus not subject to the AMAA or the Marketing Order--but both the USDA and the District Court concluded that they were handlers. And the fines and civil penalties for failure to reserve raisins were levied on them in that capacity. Because the Marketing Order imposes duties on petitioners only in their capacity as handlers, their takings claim raised as a defense against those duties is necessarily raised in that same capacity. In finding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit confused petitioners' statutory argument that they were producers with court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a takings defense raised by a handler seeking review of a final agency order. Pp. 523-524, 186 L. Ed. 2d, at 80-81.

(b) The Government's claim that petitioners' takings-based defense was rightly dismissed on ripeness grounds is unpersuasive, and its reliance on Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, is misplaced. There, a plaintiff's claim that a zoning decision effected a taking without just compensation was not ripe. But the claim failed because the plaintiff could not show that it had been injured by the Government's action when there had been no final decision. Here, petitioners were subject to a final agency order imposing concrete fines and penalties. The takings claim in Williamson County was also not yet ripe because the plaintiff had not sought “compensation through the procedures [provided by] the State.” Id., at 19, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 1264. The Government argues that petitioners' takings claim is premature because the Tucker Act affords a remedy, but, in fact, the AMAA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over a handler's takings claim. As a result, there is no alternative remedy. Pp. 524-528, 186 L. Ed. 2d, at 81-83.

(c) A takings-based defense may be raised by a handler in the context of an enforcement proceeding initiated by the USDA under §608c(14). The provision's text does not bar handlers from raising constitutional defenses to the USDA's enforcement action. Allowing handlers to do so would not diminish the incentive to file direct challenges to marketing orders under §608c(15)(A), for a handler who refuses to comply with a marketing order and waits for an enforcement action will be liable for significant monetary penalties if the constitutional challenge fails. It would also make little sense to force a party to pay an assessed fine in one proceeding and then turn around and sue for recovery of that same money in another proceeding. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 520, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 141 L. Ed. 2d 451. Pp. 528-529, 186 L. Ed. 2d, at 83.

673 F.3d 1071, reversed and remanded.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) and the California Raisin Marketing Order (Marketing Tucker Act jurisdiction over takings claims brought by raisin handlers. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Ninth Circuit.

I

A

Congress enacted the AMAA during the Great Depression in an effort to insulate the Secretary, handlers, and producers the principal purposes of which are to raise the price of agricultural products and to establish an orderly system for marketing them”). The Secretary may delegate to industry committees the authority to administer marketing orders. §608c(7)(C).

The AMAA does not directly regulate the “producer[s]” who grow agricultural commodities, §608c(13)(B); it only regulates “handlers,” which the AMAA defines as “processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling” of covered agricultural commodities. §608c(1). Handlers who violate the Secretary’s marketing orders may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. §§608a(5), 608a(6), and 608c(14).

The Secretary promulgated a marketing order for California raisins in 1949. See 14 Fed. Reg. 5136 (codified, as amended, at 7 CFR pt. 989 (2013)). In particular, “[t]he Raisin Marketing Order, like other fruit and vegetable orders adopted under the AMAA, [sought] to stabilize producer returns by limiting the quantity of raisins sold by handlers in the domestic competitive market.” Lion Raisins, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.3d 1356, 1359 (CA Fed. 2005). The Marketing Order defines a raisin “handler” as “ (a) [a]ny processor or packer; (b) [a]ny person who places . . . raisins in the current of commerce from within [California] to any point outside thereof; (c) [a]ny person who delivers off-grade raisins . . . into any eligible non-normal outlet; or (d) [a]ny person who blends raisins [subject to certain exceptions].” 7 CFR §989.15.

The Marketing Order also established the Raisin Administrative determines that the recommendation would “effectuate the declared policy of the Act.” §989.55. The reserve-tonnage, calculated as a percentage of a producer’s crop, varies from year to year.

interest in the net proceeds of the RAC’s disposition of the reserve pool.

Handlers have other duties beyond managing the RAC’s reserve pool. The Marketing Order requires them to file certain reports with the RAC, such as reports concerning the quantity of raisins that they hold or acquire. §989.73. They are also required to allow the RAC access to their premises, raisins, and business records to verify the accuracy of the handlers’ reports, §989.77, to obtain inspections of raisins acquired, §989.58(d), and to pay certain assessments, §989.80, which help cover the RAC’s administrative costs. A handler who violates any provision of the Order or its implementing regulations is subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,100 per day. 7 U. S. C. §608c(14)(B); 7 CFR §3.91(b)(1)(vii). A handler who does not comply with the reserve requirement must “compensate the [RAC] for the amount of the loss resulting from his failure to . . . deliver” the requisite raisins. §989.166(c).

B

Petitioners Marvin and Laura Horne have been producing raisins in two California counties (Fresno and Madera) since 1969. The Hornes 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 crop years. During these two crop years, the Hornes produced 27.4% and 12.3% of the raisins they processed, respectively.

Although the USDA informed the Hornes in 2001 that their proposed operations made them “handlers” under the AMAA, the Hornes paid no assessments to the RAC during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 crop years. Nor did they set aside reserve-tonnage raisins from those produced and owned by the more than 60 other farmers who contracted with Lassen Vineyards for packing services. They also declined to arrange for RAC inspection of the raisins they received for processing, denied the RAC access to their records, and held none of their own raisins in reserve.

On April 1, 2004, the Administrator of the Agriculture Marketing Service initiated an enforcement action against the Hornes, Raisin Valley Petitioners also raised several affirmative defenses, including a claim that the Marketing Order violated the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against taking property without just compensation.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded in 2006 that petitioners were handlers of raisins and thus subject to the Marketing Order. The ALJ also concluded that petitioners violated the AMAA and the Marketing Order and rejected petitioners’ takings defense based on its view that “handlers no longer have a property right that permits them to market App. 39 (citing Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 244, 246-247 (1994)).

Petitioners appealed to a judicial officer who, like the ALJ, also found that petitioners were handlers and that they had violated the Marketing Order. The judicial officer imposed $202,600 in civil penalties under 7 U. S. C. §608c(14)(B); $8,783.39 in assessments for the two crop years under 7 CFR §989.80(a); and $483,843.53 for the value of the California raisins that petitioners failed to hold in reserve for the two crop years under §989.166(c). The judicial officer believed that he lacked “authority to judge the constitutionality of the various statutes administered by the [USDA],” App. 73, and declined to adjudicate petitioners’ takings claim.

Petitioners filed a complaint in Federal District Court seeking judicial review of the USDA’s decision. See 7 U. S. C. §608c(14)(B). The District Court granted summary judgment to the USDA. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that petitioners were “handlers” subject to the Marketing Order, and rejected petitioners’ argument that they were exempt from the Marketing Order due to their status as “producers” under §608c(13)(B). producer’s crop through the reserve requirement, the court held that the transfer of title to the RAC did not constitute a physical taking. See 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115464, [WL] at *26 (“‘[I]n essence, [petitioners] are paying an admissions fee or toll—admittedly a steep one—for marketing raisins. The government does not force plaintiffs to grow raisins or to market the raisins; rather, it directs that if they grow and market raisins, then passing title to their “reserve tonnage” raisins to the RAC is the admission ticket’” (quoting Evans v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554, 563-564 (2006))).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed that petitioners were “handlers” subject to the Marketing Order’s provisions, and rejected petitioners’ argument that they were producers and, thus, exempt from regulation. 673 F.3d 1071, 1078 (2012). The court did not resolve petitioners’ takings claim, however, because it concluded to a taking requiring compensation.” Ibid. This availability of a Federal Claims Court action thus rendered petitioners’ takings claim unripe for adjudication. Ibid.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to review petitioners’ takings claim. 568 U.S. 1021, 133 S. Ct. 638, 184 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2012).

II

A

The Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling flowed from its determination that petitioners brought their takings claim as producers rather than handlers. This determination is not correct. Although petitioners argued that they were producers—and thus not subject to the AMAA or Marketing Order at all—both the USDA and the District Court concluded that petitioners were “handlers.” Accordingly, the civil penalty, assessment, and reimbursement for failure to reserve raisins were all levied on petitioners in their capacity as “handlers.” If petitioners’ argument that they were producers had prevailed, they would not have been subject to any of the monetary sanctions imposed on them. See 7 U. S. C. §608c(13)(B) (“No order issued under this chapter shall be applicable to any producer in his capacity as a producer”).

It is undisputed that the Marketing Order imposes duties on petitioners only with the unconstitutional requirement. See Brief for Petitioners 54. Given that fines can only be levied on handlers, petitioners’ takings claim makes sense only as a defense to penalties imposed upon them in their capacity as handlers. The Ninth Circuit confused petitioners’ statutory argument ( i.e., “we are producers, not handlers”) with their constitutional argument ( i.e., “assuming we are handlers, fining us for refusing to turn over reserve-tonnage raisins violates the Fifth Amendment”).

agency order.

B

The Government argues that petitioners’ takings-based defense was rightly dismissed on ripeness grounds. Brief for Respondent 21-22. According to the Government, be-cause a takings claim can be pursued later in the Court of Federal Claims, the Ninth Circuit correctly refused to adjudicate petitioners’ takings defense. In support of its position, the Government relies largely on Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985). Brief for Respondent 21-22 (“Just compensation need not ‘be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a ‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation’ exist at the time of the taking’” (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S., at 194, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126)). In that case, the plaintiff filed suit against the regional planning commission, claiming that a zoning decision by the commission effected a taking of property without just compensation. Id., at 182, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126. We found that the plaintiff’s claim was not “ripe” for two reasons, neither of which supports the Government’s position.

First, we explained that the plaintiff’s takings claim in Williamson County failed agency order imposing concrete fines and penalties at the time they sought judicial review under §608c(14)(B). This was clearly sufficient “injury” for federal jurisdiction.

Second, the Williamson County plaintiff’s takings claim was not yet ripe because the plaintiff had not sought “compensation through the procedures the State ha[d] provided for doing so.” Id., at 194, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126. We explained that “[i]f the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process yields just compensation, then the property owner has no claim against the Government for a taking.” Id., at 194-195, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Stated differently, a Fifth Amendment claim is premature until it is clear that Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 729, and n. 10, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010).

Here, the Government argues that petitioners’ takings claim is premature because the Tucker Act affords “the requisite reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining just compensation that a property owner must pursue.” Brief for Respondent 22. In the Government’s view, “[p]etitioners should have complied with the order's requirements, and, after a portion of their raisins were placed in reserve to be disposed of as directed by the RAC, . . . sought compensation as producers in the Court of Federal Claims for the alleged taking.” Id., at 24-25. We disagree with the Government’s argument, however, because the AMAA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over a handler’s takings claim. As a result, there is no alternative “reasonable, certain, and adequate” remedial scheme through which petitioners (as handlers) must proceed before obtaining review of their claim under the AMAA.

The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department.” of the [statute], the entirety of its text, and the structure of review that it establishes.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444, 108 S. Ct. 668, 98 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1988).

Under the AMAA’s comprehensive remedial scheme, handlers may challenge the content, applicability, and enforcement of marketing orders. Pursuant to §§608c(15) (A)-(B), a handler may file with the Secretary a direct challenge to a marketing order and its applicability to him. We have held that “any handler” subject to a marketing order must raise any challenges to the order, including constitutional challenges, in administrative proceedings. See United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 294, 67 S. Ct. 207, 91 L. Ed. 290 (1946). Once the Secretary issues a ruling, the federal district court where the “handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business,” is “vested with jurisdiction . . . to review [the] ruling.” §608c(15)(B). These statutory provisions over petitioners’ takings claim. Petitioners (as handlers) have no alternative remedy, and their takings claim was not “premature” when presented to the Ninth Circuit.

C

Although petitioners’ claim was not “premature” for Tucker Act purposes, the question remains whether a takings-based defense may be raised by a handler in the context of an enforcement proceeding initiated by the USDA under §608c(14). We hold that it may. The AMAA provides that the handler may not be subjected to an adverse order until he has been given “notice and an opportunity for an agency hearing on the record.” §608c(14)(B). The text of §608c(14)(B) does not bar handlers from raising constitutional defenses to the USDA’s enforcement action. Allowing handlers to raise constitutional challenges in the course of enforcement proceedings would not diminish the incentive to file direct challenges to marketing orders under §608c(15)(A) because a handler who refuses to comply with a marketing order and waits for an enforcement action will be liable for significant monetary penalties if his constitutional challenge fails.

In the case of an administrative enforcement proceeding, when a party raises a constitutional defense to an assessed fine, it would make little sense to require the party to pay the fine in one proceeding and then turn around and sue for recovery of that same money in another proceeding. See Eastern Enters., supra, at 520, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 141 L. Ed. 2d 451. We see no indication that Congress intended this result for handlers subject to enforcement proceedings under the AMAA. Petitioners were therefore free to raise their takings-based defense before the USDA. And, because §608c(14)(B) satisfied that petitioners raised a cognizable takings defense and that the Ninth Circuit erred in declining to adjudicate it.

III

The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide whether the USDA’s imposition of fines and civil penalties on petitioners, in their capacity as handlers, violated the Fifth Amendment. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.