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ATLANTIC CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JOHN P. GREYTAK; TANGLEWOOD INVESTORS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendants and Appellants, and GTL, INC. Defendant.

Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Certified Question, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Hon. Paul J. Watford, Hon. Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, Presiding Judges COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Quentin M. Rhoades, Nicole Siefert, Rhoades & Siefert, P.L.L.C., Missoula, Montana For Appellee: Matthew K. Hutchison, Valori E. Vidulich, Kaufman Vidal Hileman & Ellingson, P.C., Kalispell, Montana For Amici Curiae: Justin Stalpes, Beck & Amsden, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana (for Montana Trial Lawyers Association) John Alke, Northwestern Energy, Helena, Montana (for Northwestern Energy and Clark Fork & Blackfoot, LLC) John M. Morrison, Linda M. Deola, Morrison Sherwood Wilson & Deola, PLLP (for the Estate of Judith Gleason) Randall J. Colbert, Scott W. Farago, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP (for Central United Life Insurance Company) Joseph Seifert, Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Johnson & Gillespie, P.C., Helena, Montana Laura A. Foggan, Willey Rein LLP, Washington, DC (for Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association)

/s/_________


Clerk Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 This matter comes to the Court pursuant to M. R. App. P. 15 on a question of Montana law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

Whether, in a case involving a claim of damages by a third party, an insurer who does not receive timely notice according to the terms of an insurance policy must demonstrate prejudice from the lack of notice to avoid defense and indemnification of the insured.

This Court accepted the certified question by Order of July 8, 2014, and the parties and several amici curiae have filed briefs. ¶2 We answer the question: yes.

BACKGROUND

¶3 According to facts supplied by the Court of Appeals, this case originally arose from a civil action filed in the Montana Third Judicial District Court. In March 2010 GTL filed suit against Greytak and Tanglewood (hereafter, Greytak) for non-payment of an obligation arising from a construction project. GTL was insured by Atlantic Casualty under a commercial general liability policy. In March 2010 Greytak sent a letter to GTL asserting that it had grounds for various counterclaims involving construction defects, and in November 2010 Greytak filed counterclaims against GTL in the state court action. ¶4 In April 2011 GTL and Greytak entered a settlement agreement that required GTL to notify Atlantic of Greytak's counterclaims. GTL and Greytak also agreed that if Atlantic did not appear to defend the case and did not file a declaratory action on the coverage issue, GTL would allow judgment to be entered against it and in favor of Greytak for $624,685.14 plus costs. If Atlantic did appear to defend, Greytak could GTL's failure to provide timely notice of Greytak's counterclaims. Greytak appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

DISCUSSION

¶7 In the declaratory judgment action, the United States District Court concluded that Atlantic had no duty to defend or indemnify GTL on Greytak's claims because GTL's notice of the claim to Atlantic was untimely. The District Court found that Atlantic's Commercial General Liability policy was clear in its requirement that GTL provide timely ("as soon as practicable") notice of the Greytak counterclaims. The District Court, relying on Steadele v. Colony Insurance, 2011 MT 208, 361 Mont. 459, 260 P.3d 145, concluded that compliance with the notice requirement in the insurance contract was a condition precedent to coverage, barring recovery under the policy unless the requirement is met or waived. Reviewing the facts, the District Court concluded that Greytak's April 30, 2010 demand letter to GTL triggered the notice requirement in the Atlantic policy, and that GTL's notice to Atlantic almost a year later was not timely. The District Court, again relying upon Steadele, held that Montana law did not require Atlantic to show that it was prejudiced by GTL's untimely notice, only that the notice was untimely. ¶8 The issue presented by the certified question is whether Montana law applies the "notice-prejudice" rule to the insurance policy that Atlantic issued to GTL; specifically, whether the policy provision requiring GTL to notify the insurer of a covered event "as ¶16 The Court of Appeals certified the question:

Whether, in a case involving a claim of damages by a third party, an insurer who does not receive timely notice according to the terms of an insurance policy must demonstrate prejudice from the lack of notice to avoid defense and indemnification of the insured.

Our answer is: Yes, an insurer who does not receive timely notice according to the terms of an insurance policy must demonstrate prejudice from the lack of notice to avoid defense and indemnification of the insured.

It is clear from the policy language that it does not impose a specific time within which the insured must provide notice to the insurer.

/S/ MIKE McGRATH We Concur: /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
Justice Jim Rice, specially concurring. ¶17 I concur in the Court's decision, as far as it goes. However, I believe that the facts set forth in the Certification Order also clearly establish that Atlantic has been prejudiced as a matter of law and that, under application of the principle we have adopted as the notice-prejudice rule, Greytak is entitled to no relief under the policy, as we held under similar circumstances in Steadele. The parties' briefs contain arguments regarding prejudice. In response to the Certified Question, I would address the prejudice issue, reformulating the question if necessary. ¶18 The Certification Order explains that the directive to give notice to the insurer in the Atlantic policy is "identical" to the one at issue in Steadele. Certification Order, p. 6. About that provision, we concluded, as I have modified the language to reflect the current parties:



The Certification Order actually states that notice was to be given to the "insured," which is an error. The provision cited from the policy at issue in Steadele, like the one here, required that notice be given to the "insurer."

This notice is in plain English; it is simple, clear, unambiguous and easy to understand. It sets forth [GTL's] duty to notify [Atlantic] 'as soon as practicable' of an occurrence, an offense which may result in a claim, or if suit is brought against [GTL]. This notice provision was intended to provide [Atlantic] the opportunity to defend its interests and to prevent or mitigate adverse judgments.

Steadele
, ¶ 21. We also reasoned in Steadele that "this is not a case where the insured failed to notify its carrier by a few days or where the failure to notify was de minimis. Rather, here, MCHC failed to notify Colony for months after having been served with the Steadeles' summons and complaint." Steadele, ¶ 29. Despite the same simple, clear, easy to understand, "in plain English" notice provision that was at issue in Steadele, GTL failed to notify Atlantic of the claim—for a period of time longer than the delay involved in Steadele. Even giving the benefit of the doubt to the "notice" provided by GTL in its letter of May 23, 2011, GTL's failure to notify Atlantic of the claims stretched over a year, which, as in Steadele, is clearly not a de minimis delay. ¶19 Further, and critically, the extensive delay was not merely "dead time" in which nothing was happening. Like the Steadeles, GTL and the Greytak parties proceeded to litigate without the involvement or knowledge of Atlantic, to its detriment. A year into Opinion, ¶ 14. As the Court explains, the purpose of the notice-prejudice rule is to protect the insured from loss of insurance coverage over a technical violation of the policy when that violation is of no prejudicial consequence to the insurer. Opinion, ¶ 14. The rule is not intended to provide claimants and insureds a litigation Petri dish in which to grow stipulated judgments in the dark while the insured is relieved of its contractual obligations to involve the insurer. The rule does not abrogate the insured's duty to notify. It merely excuses failure of that duty when a "technical" violation does not prejudice the insurer. Opinion, ¶ 14. Here, GTL's violation was not "technical." It was contrived in order to prejudice Atlantic, which it clearly did. ¶22 I would further hold that Greytak does not receive the benefit of the rule.

/S/ JIM RICE Justice Laurie McKinnon, specially concurring. ¶23 As I set forth in my concurrence and dissent in Estate of Gleason v. Central United Life Insurance, 2015 MT 140, ¶¶ 104-17, ___ Mont. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting) I agree generally with our adoption of the notice-prejudice rule. I have stated my reasons for doing so in Gleason and incorporate them here. Both contract and equitable principles support adoption of an alternative to the strict, traditional interpretation of notice provisions applied in our past decisions. If it were not for these principles, I would leave adoption of the notice-prejudice rule to the legislature. pending lawsuit against him until after settlement of their claim, I would hold that prejudice exists as a matter of law.

As I state in Gleason, ¶ 114 (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting), I would impose a requirement that the insured, for the period of delay beyond the limits of timeliness, show that he or she was acting in good faith and that the delay was not purposeful. Equity dictates that a bad-faith delay in notifying an insurer, even though no material prejudice results, should be considered when deciding whether the policy should be enforced. Here, it is unlikely that Greytak could withstand such a factual inquiry. Moreover, such an inquiry would be unnecessary if this Court were to adopt an exception to the notice-prejudice rule where a judgment has been entered.
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/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

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Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Greytak
(May 29, 2015)