Carlota M. Böhm United States Bankruptcy Judge
Chapter 11
Related to Doc. Nos. 573, 580, 593
Related to Doc. No. 12
MEMORANDUM ORDER
The matters pending before the Court involve disputes between Buena Vista Oceanside, LLC ("Buena Vista") and the Town of Lauderdale-By-The-Sea, Florida ("LBTS"). Buena Vista commenced an adversary proceeding against LBTS by filing an Adversary Complaint for Equitable Relief ("Complaint"). In response, LBTS filed The Town of Lauderdale-By-The-Sea, Florida's Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss") asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Also pending, and related to the foregoing, is LBTS's Amended Motion for Entry of Order, Nunc Pro Tunc, As to Exception to Automatic Stay Pursuant to Police Power ("Stay Motion") filed on the docket of the bankruptcy case. While the Complaint asserts the applicability of the automatic stay, the Stay Motion asserts that an exception to the stay applies.
Lauderdale-By-The-Sea, Florida's Emergency Motion for Entry of Order as to Exception to Automatic Stay Pursuant to Police Power (Doc. No. 565) was withdrawn. See Order dated March 31, 2015.
In addition, while these matters were proceeding, Buena Vista filed a Motion for Sanctions Resulting from Movant's Tampering with Evidence and Obstruction of Justice ("Sanctions Motion") and an Emergency Motion for Protective Order ("Motion for Protective Order"). Both the Sanctions Motion and Motion for Protective Order have been held in abeyance pending the outcome of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and Stay Motion.
On April 8, 2015, this Court held hearings on the Motion to Dismiss and Stay Motion. At that time, the parties were directed to present their arguments and any evidence with respect to these matters. Upon consideration of the Complaint, Motion to Dismiss, the Stay Motion, the responses filed by Buena Vista, the briefs filed, a review of the dockets, the record of prior hearings, the arguments presented at the hearings held on April 8, 2015, and for the reasons stated on the record, this Court finds as follows:
1. Buena Vista commenced the above-captioned bankruptcy case by filing a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 20, 2011. Shortly thereafter, on August 9, 2011, the case was converted to a case under Chapter 11.
2. On May 29, 2013, nearly two years ago, the Debtor's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization was confirmed, and a Post-Confirmation Order and Notice of Deadlines was entered.
3. The Post-Confirmation Order provides as follows:
[E]xcept as provided in the Plan or in the Order Confirming Plan, confirmation of the Plan (see 11 U.S.C. §1141), discharges the debtor, vests property of the estate in the debtor free and clear of claims and interests of creditors and other entities . . . ."
See Doc. No. 422. With respect to discharge, the Plan states:
"Upon completion of the payments provided for in the Plan, a full and unconditional release, settlement, discharge and satisfaction of all claims
existing against the Debtor of any nature whatsoever up to and through the date of confirmation will occur."
See Doc. No. 378, at VIII.a.
4. On November 20, 2013, Buena Vista filed Debtor's Motion for Final Decree in Accordance with 11 U.S.C. §1106(a)(7) and Report of Debtor ("Motion for Final Decree"). In the Motion for Final Decree, Buena Vista represented as follows: "Because Debtor has already made the payments required by the Plan, and no deposit is required, 'consummation' as defined in Paragraph 7 of the Post-Confirmation Order and Notice of Deadlines has occurred." See Doc. No. 431 (emphasis added). The Post-Confirmation Order defines "consummation" (when no deposit is required by the Plan) as "the payment of the first distribution required by the Plan."
5. In its Complaint, Buena Vista seeks relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362, specifically pursuant to §362(a)(3) and (4), and 11 U.S.C. §105. The underlying facts of the dispute relate to a building permit allegedly issued by LBTS on February 3, 2014, for additional parking spaces at one of Buena Vista's properties; a subsequent stop work order issued on May 8, 2014; and a citation issued on October 22, 2014. In Count I, Buena Vista asserts that, by issuing a citation, LBTS "seeks to take property of the estate . . . and also seeks to impose a lien against Buena Vista's property" in contravention of §362(a)(3) and
(4). In Count II, Buena Vista requests that this Court "exercise its broad powers under Section 105 of the Code" and grant injunctive relief.
6. In the Stay Motion, LBTS sought a "comfort order" providing that its actions to abate code violations were not subject to the automatic stay pursuant to the police power exception in §362(b)(4). The alleged violations include a fire safety violation and the code violations referenced in the Complaint.
7. The matters before the Court require resolution of the applicability of the automatic stay. In its response to the Motion to Dismiss, Buena Vista cites in a footnote to §362(c)(2)(A) and (B) stating that "[i]t should be noted that the automatic stay remains in place in this case because the case is neither closed nor dismissed." See Doc. No. 31, at 4, n.2. Buena Vista fails to cite to the full text of the statutory provision and further fails to address the status of this case in relation thereto. Section 362(c)(1) and (2) provide as follows:
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), (f), and (h) of this section--
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate;
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until the earliest of--
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied[.]
8. In its Complaint, Buena Vista relies on §362(a)(3) and (4) as a basis for relief under Count I. Notably, both provisions stay acts against property of the estate. Pursuant to §362(c)(1), the automatic stay with respect to these provisions ceases when the property is no longer property of the estate. As noted, supra in Paragraph 3, unless provided otherwise in the Plan or Confirmation Order, confirmation of the Plan vests property of the estate in the debtor. Buena Vista has not directed this Court's attention to any such exception.
9. The Court further notes that, should Buena Vista seek to otherwise assert the applicability of the stay, the stay ceases when the case is closed, dismissed, or when discharge is granted. With respect to "the stay of any other act under subsection (a)" of §362 as reference is made in §362(c)(2), it is unclear how any such provision would be applicable to the facts set forth by Buena Vista. The subject matter of the disputes between the parties is not only post-petition but post-confirmation.
10. In the Stay Motion, LBTS seeks an order finding the police power exception applicable to its conduct such that no violation of the stay occurred; however, based upon the foregoing, the automatic stay as to property of the estate terminated prior to the applicable conduct for which LBTS seeks such an order. Accordingly, no violation of the stay occurred on that basis. In LBTS's brief, it acknowledges that "there is no stay in effect in this post-confirmation Chapter 11 case" rendering its Stay Motion moot. See Doc. No. 606, at 6-7. In addition to the foregoing, this Court notes that enforcement of fire codes and building codes are the types of police and regulatory powers that would typically fall within the exception to the automatic stay set forth in §362(b)(4). The enforcement actions taken by LBTS, as described in the Complaint and Stay Motion, do not appear to be for the purpose of a pecuniary interest but rather in furtherance of public policy and/or public safety. Therefore, such actions would nonetheless constitute exceptions to the automatic stay.
11. As expressed at prior hearings, the post-confirmation jurisdiction of this Court is not
readily apparent. As this Court finds the relief sought in Count I pursuant to §362 to be inapplicable, the only remaining issue is Count II of the Complaint seeking relief under §105 of the Bankruptcy Code. With respect to this Court's jurisdiction, the burden of establishing jurisdiction is on the party asserting its existence. See Nuveen Mun. Trust v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, Buena Vista must establish that the adversary proceeding is "related to" its bankruptcy case. See Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 372 F.3d 154, 163 (3d. Cir.2004). This Court recently recited the standard in another adversary proceeding commenced by Buena Vista:
The general test for whether an action is "related to" a bankruptcy proceeding was set forth in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, which held that a matter is "related to" a bankruptcy case if "'the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.'" Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 294 (citations omitted). However, the applicability of the Pacor test is complicated if the relevant action has been brought post-confirmation of a bankruptcy plan. See Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 294.
See Buena Vista Oceanside, LLC v. Holistix 24, Inc. (In re Buena Vista Oceanside, LLC), Inc., No. 14-02078-CMB, 2014 WL 4230891, at *2, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 3632, at *3-4
(Bankr.W.D.Pa. Aug. 25, 2014). Nevertheless, although a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction decreases after confirmation of a plan, it is not entirely eliminated:
[R]etention of jurisdiction by a bankruptcy court is appropriate "where there is a close nexus to the bankruptcy plan or proceeding, as when a matter affects the interpretation, implementation, consummation, execution, or administration of a confirmed plan or incorporated litigation trust agreement . . . ."
See Holistix, 2014 WL 4230891, at *2, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 3632, at *4-5 (quoting Resorts Int'l, Inc., 372 F.3d at 168-69).
12. Significantly, the conduct at issue occurred after confirmation. In addition, although Buena Vista asserts that the parking spaces are fundamental to its plan for reorganization, it has not directed this Court to any particular provision within the Plan to establish this assertion and, by its own admission, consummation has already occurred. Accordingly, Buena Vista failed to establish that there is a close nexus to the bankruptcy case, and this Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. These types of regulatory proceedings are better addressed by the local court familiar with the enforcement of the applicable ordinances.
The Court notes that the Motion for Final Decree was withdrawn on the record at the hearing on September 16, 2014.
The Post-Confirmation Order dated May 29, 2013, provides, "Any other adversary proceeding, contested matter, motion or application shall be filed within forty-five (45) days after the date of this Order." The instant Complaint was filed on December 15, 2014, well over one year after the forty-five day deadline expired. Significantly, the Post-Confirmation Order further provides "Nothing in this Order shall preclude any proceeding in another Court with jurisdiction within time limits which might otherwise be applicable."
Section 362(b)(4) provides, in pertinent part, that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not operate as a stay of the following:
under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit . . . to enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police and regulatory power, including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police or regulatory power[.]
The Court notes that the Complaint asserts violations of both §362(a)(3) and (4); however, §362(a)(4) is not set forth within the §362(b)(4) exception. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this does not affect the Court's decision as the Court does not find §362(b)(4) to be determinative of this matter.
Section 362(a)(3) and (4) provide that the stay applies to "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate" and "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate[.]"
Section 362(a) sets forth the following to which the automatic stay applies:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning a tax liability of a debtor that is a corporation for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under this
title.
This is the second time Buena Vista commenced a post-confirmation adversary proceeding relating to post-petition causes of action. See Buena Vista Oceanside, LLC v. Holistix 24, Inc. (In re Buena Vista Oceanside, LLC), No. 14-02078-CMB, 2014 WL 4230891, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 3632 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. Aug. 25, 2014). That proceeding was dismissed due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The analysis set forth therein is applicable to the instant proceeding, and this Court referred the parties to that decision at a prior hearing.
Buena Vista offered little to convince this Court of its authority to grant relief solely through its equitable powers pursuant to §105 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 105(a) provides that "[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." In analyzing §105, the Supreme Court noted, "We have long held that 'whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of' the Bankruptcy Code." See Law v. Siegel, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194 (U.S. 2014)(quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)).
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Therefore, based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1. The Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
2. The Stay Motion is DENIED AS MOOT because the automatic stay is not in effect with respect to these disputes.
3. The Motion for Sanctions and Motion for Protective Order are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as this Court lacks jurisdiction over the disputes between the parties. Any
discovery issues and requests for protective orders related thereto should be resolved in the appropriate forum.
Dated: April 9, 2015
/s/ Carlota M. Böhm
Carlota M. Böhm
United States Bankruptcy Judge
MAIL TO:
Office of the United States Trustee Jeffrey A. Hulton, Esq. Brett A. Solomon, Esq.
See 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1)-(8)(emphasis added).