Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Advocates
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Advocates
Judges

Sebastian Durstock, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

Tavitas, Judge.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath
Madison, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Appeal from the Dearborn Circuit Court The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 15C01-1705-F2-7 Tavitas, Judge.



Case Summary

[1] Sebastian Durstock appeals his conviction for dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony. This case involves the analysis of the Fourth Amendment and exceptions to the warrant requirement. We affirm.

Oral argument was held in this matter on November 13, 2018, at Ivy Tech Community College - Columbus. We thank counsel for their presentations and Ivy Tech Community College - Columbus for its hospitality.

Issues

[2] Durstock raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence found during a pat down search of Durstock.
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Durstock's conviction for dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony.
III. Whether Durstock's sentence is inappropriate.



Facts

[3] On the morning of January 13, 2017, Officer David Schwarz of the Lawrenceburg Police Department was dispatched to an apartment in Lawrenceburg regarding an unconscious female, later identified as Chyanne Thompson. Emergency medical services arrived at the same time as Officer Schwarz. They discovered Candy Gaylord giving Thompson chest Durstock to seventeen and one-half years with two and one-half years suspended to probation. Durstock now appeals.

At the jury trial, Durstock presented an "oral motion to suppress," and the trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress outside the presence of the jury. Tr. Vol. II pp. 48-49. The trial court denied the motion.

Analysis I. Admission of Evidence

[9] Durstock argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. However, because Durstock appeals from a completed jury trial, the issue is more appropriately framed as whether the trial court properly admitted the evidence at trial. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). "The general admission of evidence at trial is a matter we leave to the discretion of the trial court." Id. at 259-60. "We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights." Id. at 260. [10] Durstock argues that the pat down search was improper because the officers had no reasonable suspicion that Durstock was armed and dangerous. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures by prohibiting them without a warrant supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings." Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). This protection has been "extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). "As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this rule is generally not admissible in a prosecution against the victim of the unlawful search or seizure absent evidence of a recognized exception." Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 260. "When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search." Bradley, 54 N.E.3d at 999. [11] In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States Supreme Court permitted a:

reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

Terry
, 392 U.S. at 27
, 88 S. Ct. at 1883 (internal citations and footnote omitted); see also Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. 2001). State, 766 N.E.2d 1223, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the officer's seizure of rock cocaine was justified under the plain feel doctrine). [16] Because the removal of the item from Durstock's pocket was permissible, the officers properly arrested Durstock for possession of a syringe. The possession of a hypodermic syringe is a Level 6 felony. See Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18. One exception to the warrant requirement is the search incident to arrest, which permits "a search of the arrestee's person and the area within his or her control." Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 261 n.10. Accordingly, once a person is arrested, officers are not required to obtain a warrant before conducting a further search of the arrestee's person. This search incident to Durstock's arrest resulted in the officers finding the fentanyl and cash in Durstock's pocket. We conclude that the officers' discovery of the fentanyl and cash in Durstock's pocket did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court properly admitted the evidence. [17] In sum, the pat down search, the removal of the syringe under the plain feel doctrine, and the search incident to arrest, are exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The evidence obtained was properly admitted.

Durstock makes no argument under the Indiana Constitution.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[18] Durstock challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his conviction for dealing in a narcotic, a Level 2 felony. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(2), (e)(2). One enhancing circumstance occurs when the "person committed the offense while in possession of a firearm." I.C. § 35-48-1-16.5(2). [20] Durstock challenges only whether the State proved an intent to deliver. Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-1(b) provides:

A person may be convicted of an offense under subsection (a)(2) only if:
(1) there is evidence in addition to the weight of the drug that the person intended to manufacture, finance the manufacture of, deliver, or finance the delivery of the drug; or
(2) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams.


The fentanyl here weighed slightly over six grams. Consequently, the State was required to show "evidence in addition to the weight of the drug that [Durstock] intended to . . . deliver . . . the drug." I.C. § 35-48-4-1(b). "Intent, being a mental state, can only be established by considering the behavior of the relevant actor, the surrounding circumstances, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom." Richardson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Circumstantial evidence showing possession with intent to deliver may support a conviction. Id. [21] Durstock argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he intended to deliver the fentanyl. We conclude that Durstock's argument is merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The State presented evidence that Durstock admitted in a recorded jail call that he was "hustling," which a detective testified was slang for dealing. Ex. 45. The evidence of the recorded call along with evidence that Durstock was in possession of digital scales, a handgun, and $331 in cash are sufficient to demonstrate that Durstock intended to deliver the fentanyl. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Durstock's conviction for dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony.

Amended by Pub. L. No. 252-2017, § 21 (eff. July 1, 2017). --------

III. Inappropriate Sentence

[22] Next, Durstock argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence "is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." McCain v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1066, 1067 (Ind. 2018). The defendant bears the burden to persuade this court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1198 (Ind. 2018). Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment "should receive considerable deference." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to "leaven the outliers." Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on "our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case." Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. [23] In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we look to the statutory ranges established for the classification of the relevant offense. Durstock was convicted of a Level 2 felony. The sentence for a Level 2 felony ranges from ten years to thirty years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Here, the trial court imposed an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years with two and one-half years suspended to probation. [24] Durstock argues that his criminal history was minimal, he struggled with addiction, and he had the support of his family. Durstock also contends that his involvement "in the criminal enterprise was extremely minimal" and claimed that the fentanyl belonged to Thompson. Appellant's Br. p. 18. [25] The nature of the offense is that Durstock was in Gaylord's apartment when Thompson overdosed and required police and emergency medical services to respond. Durstock's backpack was found in the bathroom of the apartment, and the backpack contained a loaded handgun wrapped in a wet bandana and digital scales. When officers performed a pat down search of Durstock, they found a syringe in his pocket and arrested him. In a search incident to the arrest, the officers also located several additional items in Durstock's pockets, believed that Durstock "actually delivered the fentanyl to Ms. Thompson, which resulted in her overdose." Id. [29] Given the significant amount of fentanyl that Durstock possessed, his possession of the handgun, his substance abuse, and the trial court's statements on Durstock's dishonesty and lack of remorse, we cannot say that the advisory sentence, which the trial court imposed here, was inappropriate.

Conclusion

[30] The trial court properly admitted evidence of the fentanyl found in Durstock's pocket. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Durstock's conviction, and his sentence is not inappropriate. We affirm. [31] Affirmed. Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

Durstock v. State
(Dec 4, 2018)