Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DI 17-01C Honorable John C. Brown, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, James Reavis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Ryan W. Aikin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Martin D. Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Deborah Pratt, Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana Filed: /s/_________
Clerk Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 B.H. appeals from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order entered by the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, committing him to the Montana State Hospital. We affirm and consider the following issue:
Did the District Court commit plain error regarding the procedural safeguards in § 53-21-122(2)(a) ,
MCA,
necessitating appellate review?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 B.H. suffers from bipolar disorder. In late 2016 and early 2017, he suffered a severe manic episode during which he acted in ways his wife confirmed were uncharacteristic. She called police, who took B.H. to the emergency room and then to Hope House, a mental health facility in Bozeman. B.H. was uncooperative at Hope House, refusing treatment and stating he just needed a vacation. B.H. left Hope House against medical advice and was thereafter placed at Hays Morris House, a mental health facility in Butte, because Hope House had reached capacity. B.H. was likewise uncooperative at Hays Morris House, where he refused medication, threatened others, got into arguments, repeatedly removed his clothes, and tore baseboards from his room. ¶3 Adrian Utsch, a professional person employed by the Gallatin Mental Health Center, conducted a mental health evaluation of B.H. Based on her findings, Utsch sought initiation of a proceeding to involuntarily commit B.H. to the Montana State Hospital. The commitment petition, filed by the Gallatin County Attorney's Office, alleged that B.H. had threatened to kill his father and himself, he suffered from a mental disorder, he was substantially unable to provide for his own basic needs, and he was an imminent threat of injuring himself and others. The State's petition included a list of B.H.'s constitutional and statutory rights. ¶4 The District Court, pursuant to § 53-21-122, MCA, determined probable cause existed that B.H. suffered from a mental disorder requiring commitment, appointed counsel for B.H., and scheduled an initial hearing on the State's petition for January 9, 2017. B.H. attended his initial hearing via video from Hays Morris House in Butte. B.H.'s counsel was present in the courtroom, as was counsel for the state. At the outset of the hearing, B.H. acknowledged that he had seen the State's petition. After a discussion concerning whether B.H. needed an interpreter, because he kept answering the court in Spanish, B.H. asked whether the court could appoint Eduardo Garcia as his friend. The court agreed to do so, and at that point, B.H. interrupted, whereupon the following exchange occurred:
B.H.: I can have Amanda speak for me. She's right here.
The Court: Okay, well, Mr.—
B.H.: I will remove myself from the situation right now.
The Court: Okay.
B.H.: Will that speed things up?
The Court: Well, [B.H.], you don't have to because I, let me tell you what's going to happen.
B.H.: He's not listening. I'm going to go out (indecipherable).
The Court: All right. So, let the record show that [B.H.] has decided to step out of the hearing room. He has the right to do that . . . .
. . .
The Court: Showing that [B.H.] did appear for this hearing by video until he left the room; that I did not have a chance to advise him of his rights but Mr. Rutzke [counsel for B.H.], were you able to do that to a limited extent or?
Mr. Rutzke: I was not, Your Honor. I was not. I will make—
Female Voice: Do you want him to get a copy of his rights?
The Court: Yeah, he will—there's a copy of his rights attached to the Petition, ma'am, but also, I mean—
Female Voice: Okay.
The Court: —that really what—
Female Voice: Okay.
The Court: —his most important right is he has a right to remain silent and he has a right to the hearing and I'm granting him the hearing—
Female Voice: Um hum (yes).
The Court: —so the fact that his rights have not been affected in any way. I mean I'm protecting his rights basically.
Female Voice: Um hum (yes).
¶5 Later, B.H. re-entered the hearing room. The court informed B.H. that a mental health evaluation would be performed by a professional person prior to the commitment hearing, and asked whether B.H. would like a second opinion. The court then scheduled a contested hearing for two days later, on January 11. ¶6 At the January 11 hearing, the State presented three witnesses, including two certified professional persons and B.H.'s wife. When B.H. interjected during testimony, the court advised him, "before you say anything to me you need to clear it with . . . Mr. Rutzke[,]" because "Mr. Rutzke is here to protect you." B.H. then consulted with Mr.
Rutzke and took the stand to offer testimony. After all the evidence had been presented, the District Court noted for the record that "the Court finds and concludes that [B.H.], throughout this proceeding, has received the benefit of all applicable statutes and Constitutional rights to which he is entitled." ¶7 After testimony concluded, the District Court orally summarized its findings of fact and conclusions of law and committed B.H. to the Montana State Hospital for a period not to exceed 90 days. Neither Mr. Rutzke nor B.H. objected at any time during the proceedings that the court had failed to properly advise B.H. of his rights or that B.H.'s rights had been violated. ¶8 B.H. appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 We review a district court's civil commitment order "to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law are correct." In re M.K.S., 2015 MT 146, ¶ 10, 379 Mont. 293, 350 P.3d 27 (citation omitted). "Issues of due process in an involuntary commitment proceeding are subject to plenary review." In re M.K.S., ¶ 10 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶10 As an initial matter, we observe that B.H.'s appeal of his involuntary commitment is not moot despite the expiration of his 90-day commitment period, because the time period is too short to allow litigation of the appeal, and there is a reasonable possibility that he could be subject to the same action again. In re M.K.S., ¶ 11. Appeals from involuntary the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings," or "compromise[d] the integrity of the judicial process." In re M.K.S., ¶ 13 (internal quotations and citations omitted). There is little "risk" that B.H.'s liberty interest was in any way deprived by the manner in which this proceeding was conducted, and the error did not result in substantial prejudice. In re M.K.S., ¶ 18. Therefore, we decline to exercise plain error review. ¶24 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE We concur: /S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR Justice James Jeremiah Shea, dissenting. ¶25 I respectfully dissent from the Court's holding. The Court frames the issue as whether the District Court committed plain error regarding procedural safeguards. The procedural safeguards at issue are the mandatory advisement of constitutional rights, statutory rights, and the substantive effect of the petition, as well as an advisement of the process involving the professional person who would be making a recommendation to the Court as to the degree to which B.H.'s liberty would be restricted. There is no dispute that this advisement was not given by the Court, nor did B.H.'s counsel advise him of these rights. Based on the record before us, B.H. went into a process that ultimately resulted in his involuntary commitment to Montana State Hospital (MSH) blind as to what his rights in this process were. Irrespective of the District Court's efforts to ensure his rights were protected at the evidentiary hearing, I cannot conclude that the failure to advise B.H. of his rights at the inception of the process may not have resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice, left unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or compromised the integrity of the judicial process. Thus, I would exercise plain error review. ¶26 Section 53-21-122(2)(a), MCA, mandates:
The respondent must be advised of the respondent's constitutional rights, the respondent's rights under this part, and the substantive effect of the petition. The respondent must also be advised that the professional person appointed to conduct the examination under 53-21-123 will include in the professional person's report a recommendation about whether the respondent should be diverted from involuntary commitment to short-term inpatient treatment provided for in 53-21-1205 and 53-21-1206 or to a category D assisted living facility as provided in 50-5-224.
B.H. was not advised of his constitutional rights. He was not advised of his statutory rights.
He was not advised of the substantive effect of the petition. Although he was
the integrity of the judicial process.
See In re M.
K.
S., ¶ 13. I would therefore exercise plain error and I would reverse and vacate the commitment order. ¶29 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Pursuant to § 53-21-115, MCA, among the rights of which B.H. should have been advised, but was not are:
(1) the right to notice reasonably in advance of any hearing or other court proceeding concerning the person;
(2) the right to any hearing to be present, to offer evidence, and to present witnesses in any proceeding concerning the person;
(3) the right to know, before a hearing, the names and addresses of any witnesses who will testify in support of a petition;
(4) the right in any hearing to cross-examine witnesses;
(5) the right to be represented by counsel;
(6) the right to remain silent;
(7) the right in any hearing to be proceeded according to the rules of evidence applicable to civil matters generally;
(8) the right to view and copy all petitions on file with the court concerning the person;
(9) the right to be examined by a professional person of the person's choice when the professional person is willing and reasonably available;
(10) the right to be dressed in the person's own clothes at any hearing held pursuant to this part;
(11) the right to refuse any but lifesaving medication for up to 24 hours prior to any hearing held pursuant to this part; and
(12) the right to voluntarily take necessary medications prior to any hearing pursuant to this part.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA Justice Laurie McKinnon joins in the dissenting Opinion of Justice Shea.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON