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Kimberly L. Eads, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Robert J. Eads, Jr., Appellee-Respondent

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jonathan R. Deenik
Deenik Law, LLC
Greenwood, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Janice Mandla Mattingly
Janice Mandla Mattingly, P.C.
Carmel, Indiana Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court The Honorable Peter D. Nugent, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 41D02-1110-DR-779 Vaidik, Chief Judge.



Case Summary

[1] In October 2011, Kimberly L. Eads ("Wife") filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Robert J. Eads ("Husband"). Nearly six years later, in July 2017, the trial court issued a decree dissolving the parties' marriage. In the decree, the court used a coverture fraction to determine that 77.2% of Husband's firefighters' pension was earned during the marriage. The court then ordered Husband, once he retires, to forward half of 77.2%, or 38.6%, of his monthly pension payment to Wife each month and then issue her a Form 1099-R (an IRS form for distributions from pensions and retirement plans) so that Wife pays the taxes on her share of his pension. In addition, the court found that Wife, who receives social-security disability payments for injuries she sustained in a car accident, is entitled to rehabilitative maintenance and ordered Husband to pay her $1000/month for twenty-four months. Finally, the court ordered each party to pay their own attorney's fees. [2] Both Husband and Wife now appeal. We conclude that the trial court erred in calculating the coverture fraction because it included pension rights that Husband earned after Wife filed for divorce. We therefore remand this case with instructions for the court to apply one of two methods—the date-of-retirement approach or the date-of-divorce approach—to determine the portion of Husband's pension that was earned during the marriage. We also conclude that the trial court erred in ordering Husband to issue Wife a Form 1099-R each year and therefore order the court to consider different options of making Wife responsible for the taxes on her share of Husband's pension. Although we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in ordering each party to pay their own attorney's fees, we find that the record does not support an award of rehabilitative maintenance. On remand, the court must determine whether Wife is entitled to incapacity maintenance instead of rehabilitative maintenance. We therefore affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Although the dissolution decree covers many topics, this appeal concerns only a few of them. Accordingly, we set forth the facts that are relevant to the issues the parties raise on appeal. [4] Husband began working as a firefighter on February 7, 1994. As a firefighter, Husband is a member of the 1977 Police Officers' and Firefighters' Pension and Disability Fund ("1977 Fund"), which is administered by the Indiana Public Retirement System (INPRS). Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23 (Finding 37); see also Thatcher v. City of Kokomo, 962 N.E.2d 1224, 1225 n.1 (Ind. 2012) ("The '1977 Fund' is a disability and pension fund for police officers and firefighters established by Indiana Code section 36-8-8-4 that is managed by [INPRS]."). Members of the 1977 Fund become vested with twenty years of service and are eligible for an unreduced retirement benefit when they have twenty years of service, are at least fifty-two years old, and have separated from service. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23 (Finding 37); see also Ex. 1. Unlike other pensions, the 1977 Fund pension is not subject to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). order the other party to pay their attorney's fees. Tr. Vol. II p. 111; Tr. Vol. III p. 49. [8] On July 5, 2017, the trial court issued a decree of dissolution of marriage, which it amended in December following the parties' motions to correct error. The amended decree addresses Husband's 1977 Fund pension as follows:

46. The Court finds that the period of time from the date of [Husband's] employment (February 7, 1994) until the Date of the Decree (July 5, 2017) to be a total period of 281 months. However, the parties were not married for the first 40 months of [Husband's] employment, and there was [a] 24-month period of time in 2002-3 in which [Husband] was not working and contributing to his pension. Therefore, the pension vesting period was 217 months. (281 months - 64 months). Thus, the percentage of the pension earned during the marriage is 77.2% (217 divided by 281). [Wife] is entitled to half of that amount, or 38.6%.
* * * * *

48. [Wife] presented evidence in the form of a valuation report prepared by Dan Andrew[s] for [Husband's] 1977 Police and Firefighter pension. (Exhibit 2A). The Court accepts . . . Andrew[s'] valuation and places a value of $1,278,133.26 on said pension. However, only 77.2% of that amount was earned during the marriage, or $986,718.83.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. The court then divided the $986,718.83 equally, awarding Husband and Wife each $493,359.42. Id. at 27 (Finding 59). As to how Wife would receive her share of Husband's pension, the court explained:
62. Because the parties do not have sufficient assets to divide the value of [Husband's] pension, the Court elects to divide the monthly benefit instead.
63. [Husband's] pension benefit at age 52 is calculated to be $3,254.86 per month . . . . [Husband] could apply for a reduced pension benefit January 1, 2017 in the amount of $2,894.22. (Exhibits 1, 2A, 2B, 2C).
64. Upon his retirement, [Husband] shall forward 38.6% . . . of his monthly pension each month to [Wife], as a [QDRO] is not possible with the Firefighter Pension. Because [Husband] . . . cannot determine his income tax liability before his earnings are calculated, [Husband] shall forward the pension amount directly to [Wife] and, each year, issue her a Form 1099 for her share of the pension.
65. The Court chooses this method of distributing [Husband's] pension due to the parties lacking sufficient resources to otherwise allocate sufficient assets and the inability of the pension to be divided by [QDRO].



Id
. at 28. [9] As for Wife's request for spousal maintenance, the court found:
74. The Court finds that [Wife] is disabled and in need of maintenance. [Wife] has been determined to be disabled by the Social Security Administration and receives Social Security Disability payments. [Wife] has been unable to work for several years.
* * * * *

82. The Court GRANTS [Wife's] request for spousal maintenance. The Court has reviewed I.C. 31-15-7-2 and the trial exhibits and agrees that [Wife] is in need of spousal maintenance. While [Wife] does currently receive disability income, it is not sufficient to sustain her needs. Pursuant to I.C. 31-15-7-2(3), the Court finds that [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] the sum of $1,000.00 or 16.2% of his monthly income as rehabilitative maintenance for a period of twenty-four (24) months.

Id
. at 29-30. Finally, the trial court ordered Husband and Wife to pay their own attorney's fees:
86. Each party will receive sufficient funds from the sale of the marital residence out of which to pay his or her attorney fees. Accordingly, each party shall be responsible for his or her attorney fees and costs.

Id
. at 30. [10] Wife now appeals, and Husband cross-appeals.

According to INPRS,

The fund is not required by federal law to honor [QDROs]. The 1977 Fund is not authorized by law to split payments between payees. . . . The Fund will not make any payments directly to a Fund Member's alternate payee under a QDRO. . . . The Fund will also not make any payments prior to the time that distributions would otherwise begin to the member by law. This means that the member must have actually retired or separated from employment from a 1977 Fund covered position in order for the Fund to begin making payments to the member.

Ex. 2C.


According to INPRS, on October 25, 2011, Husband "was not vested in a pension benefit"; however, if Husband separated from employment on October 25, 2011, "he could have withdrawn his member contribution account balance," which at that time was approximately $67,853.45. Ex. 2C; see also Tr. Vol. II pp. 216-17. After becoming vested, however, Husband cannot withdraw his member contributions "because [they] are used to fund the 1977 pension benefit." Ex. 2C.

According to Exhibit 2A, Andrews calculated the length of marriage as 13.94 years, that is, from November 15, 1997 (date of marriage) to October 25, 2011 (date Wife filed for divorce). Andrews calculated the term of Husband's employment as 22.66 years, that is, from February 7, 1994 (date of hire) to October 4, 2016 (date Husband's pension was valued).

This method of distributing Husband's retirement benefits is referred to as the deferred-distribution method. Under this method, the court makes no immediate division of the retirement benefits but determines the future benefits to which the non-owning spouse is entitled. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 44 N.E.3d 721, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Traditionally, the benefits have been stated as a share of the owning spouse's future benefit, and payment can be ordered to come directly from the owning spouse. Id. Under the other method, the immediate-offset method, the court determines the present value of the retirement benefits and awards the non-owning spouse his or her share of the benefits in an immediate lump-sum award of cash or property equal to the value of his or her interest. Id.

Discussion and Decision
I. Husband's Firefighters' Pension

[11] It is well settled that in a dissolution action, all marital property, whether owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts, goes into the marital pot for division. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a); Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). "Final separation" generally means the date that the petition for dissolution of marriage is filed. Ind. Code § 31-9-2-46. "Property" is defined in part as all the assets of either party or both parties, including:

(1) a present right to withdraw pension or retirement benefits;
(2) the right to receive pension or retirement benefits that are not forfeited upon termination of employment or that are vested (as defined in Section 411 of the Internal Revenue Code) but that are payable after the dissolution of marriage; and
(3) the right to receive disposable retired or retainer pay (as defined in 10 U.S.C. 1408(a)) acquired during the marriage that is or may be payable after the dissolution of marriage.


Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98(b). "The requirement that all marital assets be placed in the marital pot is meant to insure that the trial court first determines that value before endeavoring to divide property." Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). "Indiana's 'one pot' theory prohibits the exclusion of any asset in which a party has a vested interest from the scope of the trial [15] Husband challenges the trial court's division of his 1977 Fund pension. Specifically, he argues that the trial court improperly calculated the percentage of his pension that was earned during the marriage as 77.2%. He claims that the percentage should be lower, because the court improperly included pension rights that he earned after Wife filed for divorce. Husband is correct. [16] The court calculated 77.2% using a coverture fraction. Specifically, the court found:
46. The Court finds that the period of time from the date of [Husband's] employment (February 7, 1994) until the Date of the Decree (July 5, 2017) to be a total period of 281 months. However, the parties were not married for the first 40 months of [Husband's] employment, and there was [a] 24-month period of time in 2002-3 in which [Husband] was not working and contributing to his pension. Therefore, the pension vesting period was 217 months. (281 months - 64 months). Thus, the percentage of the pension earned during the marriage is 77.2% (217 divided by 281). [Wife] is entitled to half of that amount, or 38.6%.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24 (emphasis added). The court then ordered Husband to forward 38.6% "of his monthly pension each month" to Wife. Id. at 28 (Finding 64). [17] Determining the portion of a pension that was earned during a marriage "is one of the most difficult tasks in all of equitable distribution." 2 Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property 3d, Defined Benefit Plans: The Coverture Fraction § 6.25 (Nov. 2017 update). Because neither the employer nor the withholding and then multiply the coverture fraction by Husband's net monthly pension payment.

At the time of Adams, this statute was located at Indiana Code section 31-1-11.5-11 (repealed in 1997).

According to Turner, "marital share fraction" is more accurate terminology than "coverture fraction." Turner, supra, § 6.25 at n.0.50.

The earliest starting date is the date of marriage. However, the date of marriage is not always the starting date because the employee could have started working after the date of marriage. In such a case, the date would be the date the employee started earning pension rights.

Although Husband testified, and the trial court found, that Husband did not accrue pension rights for twenty-four months while he was "medically retired," INPRS and Andrews said he did. See Exs. 1 & 2C; see also Ind. Code § 36-8-8-12(e) ("Time spent receiving disability benefits, not to exceed twenty (20) years, is considered active service for the purpose of determining retirement benefits."); Tr. Vol. II p. 218 (Andrews testifying that "time off on disability in the 77 Plan counts as time served"). Therefore, the twenty-four months should be included.

If Husband's pension could have been valued on the date Wife filed for divorce, that date presumably would have been used. However, Husband's pension was not vested when Wife filed for divorce and therefore had no value (other than Husband's member contributions). Neither party objected to using October 4, 2016.

This is almost the same number that Andrews calculated—61.52%. See Tr. Vol. II p. 202; see also Ex. 2A.

As explained earlier, Husband's 1977 Fund pension is not subject to a QDRO. However, when a deferred-distribution award is implemented through a QDRO, the plan administrator gives a separate benefit check to each spouse, and each spouse is responsible for his or her own tax consequences. 2 Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property 3d, Defined Benefit Plans: Deferred Distribution Method § 6.32 (Nov. 2017 update).

According to INPRS, it must "withhold federal taxes on monthly payments. You may choose not to have taxes withheld. Make sure to complete the tax withholding forms when you apply for benefits." INPRS, [1977 Fund] Member Handbook: Taxation of Retirement Benefits, https://www.in.gov/inprs/77fundmbrhandbooktaxationofrtmtbenefits.htm. If the trial court is worried that Husband will withhold too many taxes, thus decreasing the amount that Wife receives each month, the court can order Husband to withhold a specific amount.

II. Maintenance Award

[25] Wife contends that the trial court erred in awarding her "rehabilitative" maintenance instead of "incapacity" maintenance. Spousal-maintenance awards in Indiana are "restricted to three, quite limited options": incapacity, caregiver, and rehabilitative. In re Marriage of Gertiser, 45 N.E.3d 363, 367 (Ind. 2015) (quotation omitted). Indiana Code section 31-15-7-2 sets forth the requirements of each:

A court may make the following findings concerning maintenance:
(1) If the court finds a spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that the ability of the incapacitated spouse to support himself or herself is materially affected, the court may find that maintenance for the spouse is necessary during the period of incapacity, subject to further order of the court.
(2) If the court finds that:


(A) a spouse lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for the spouse's needs; and
(B) the spouse is the custodian of a child whose physical or mental incapacity requires the custodian to forgo employment;



the court may find that maintenance is necessary for the spouse in an amount and for a period of time that the court considers appropriate.
(3) After considering:



(A) the educational level of each spouse at the time of marriage and at the time the action is commenced;
(B) whether an interruption in the education, training, or employment of a spouse who is seeking maintenance occurred during the marriage as a result of homemaking or child care responsibilities, or both;
(C) the earning capacity of each spouse, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, and length of presence in or absence from the job market; and
(D) the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the spouse who is seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;





a court may find that rehabilitative maintenance for the spouse seeking maintenance is necessary in an amount and for a period


of time that the court considers appropriate, but not to exceed three (3) years from the date of the final decree.

[26] In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the trial court's authority in ordering maintenance is limited to these three statutory options. Cannon v. Cannon, 758 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ind. 2001) ("Where none of these circumstances exist, a court may not order maintenance without the agreement of the parties."). This is because the policy regarding spousal maintenance reflects a clear legislative intent to retain fairly strict limits on the power of courts to order maintenance without the consent of the parties. Id. [27] In its findings, the trial court quoted only Section 31-15-7-2(1), which addresses incapacity maintenance, but then found that Wife was "disabled" and entitled to "rehabilitative maintenance" under Section 31-15-7-2(3) for twenty-four months (unlike incapacity maintenance, which lasts for the duration of the incapacity until further order of the court, rehabilitative maintenance may not exceed three years from the date of the final decree). However, the trial court's findings do not address the requirements for rehabilitative maintenance. And Wife concedes that "[t]here is no evidence of record which would support a finding of 'Rehabilitative Maintenance.'" Appellant's Br. p. 12. Further adding to the confusion is the fact that the trial court found that Husband "does not have the financial means to meet all the obligations this Court has now burdened him with and pay the spousal maintenance award." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30 (Finding 84) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to determine whether Wife is entitled to incapacity maintenance, taking into consideration Husband's ability to pay. Barton, 47 N.E.3d at 375-77. If the court awards Wife incapacity maintenance, it should last for the "period of incapacity, subject to further order of the court."

Wife posits that the trial court awarded her rehabilitative maintenance for twenty-four months so that it ended "at approximately the time she will begin receiving her share of [Husband's] monthly pension benefit." Appellant's Br. p. 13. --------

III. Attorney's Fees

[28] Both Husband and Wife asked the trial court to order the other party to pay their attorney's fees, but the court ordered Husband and Wife to pay their own fees. The court reasoned that they will each "receive sufficient funds from the sale of the marital residence." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30 (Finding 86). Wife contends that the trial court erred in not ordering Husband to pay her attorney's fees. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1, a trial court may order a party in a dissolution proceeding to pay a reasonable amount of the other party's attorney's fees. Barton, 47 N.E.3d at 377. The court has broad discretion in deciding whether to award attorney's fees. Id. [29] In determining whether to award attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding, trial courts should consider the parties' resources, their economic condition, their ability to engage in gainful employment and earn income, and other factors bearing on the reasonableness of the award. Id. A party's misconduct that directly results in additional litigation expenses may also be considered. Id. 22 Consideration of these factors promotes the legislative purpose behind the award of attorney's fees, which is to ensure that a party who would not otherwise be able to afford an attorney is able to retain representation. Hartley v. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274, 286-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). When one party is in a superior position to pay fees over the other party, an award is proper. Id. [30] Wife argues that the court should have ordered Husband to pay her attorney's fees of $22,000 due to her disability as well as Husband's superior earning capacity and conduct during the divorce proceedings, such as his failure to appear at some of the hearings and his failure to fully comply with discovery. The trial court made several findings regarding the parties' financial situation. That is, the court found that the parties were living "well above their means while married," that a "balloon payment" on the mortgage became due during the dissolution proceedings, and that "[Husband] and [Husband] alone has been responsible for the obligations relating to the marital residence during the almost 6-year pendency of this case." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30 (Findings 83 & 84). Although the trial court did not make any findings regarding Husband's conduct, the trial court was well aware that the divorce had been pending for nearly six years. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering each party to pay their own attorney's fees. However, because this case is being remanded, the court can revisit the topic of attorney's fees if it chooses. 23 [31] Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.

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Eads v. Eads
(Nov 16, 2018)