JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
Decision Under Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 14-D-86; the Hon. Steven L. Nordquist, Judge, presiding. Judgment Affirmed. Counsel on Appeal Andrew T. Smith and Paul R. Cicero, of Cicero, France & Alexander, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant. Tyler B. Slack and Carol N. Bailey, of WilliamsMcCarthy, LLP, of Rockford, for appellee. Panel JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices McLaren and Hutchinson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Respondent, William E. Wynkoop, appeals from the judgment dissolving his marriage to petitioner, Patricia A. James. He contends that the trial court erred in classifying as marital property the real estate on which his nonmarital business is located. Because the trial court's ruling that respondent failed to show that he acquired the property by a method listed in section 503(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2016)) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 The parties were married in September 1990. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on February 4, 2014, and an amended petition for dissolution on February 14, 2014. A trial was held over the course of two days, on October 17, 2016, and December 5, 2016. ¶ 4 At trial, respondent testified as follows. In March 1984, before his marriage to petitioner, he purchased a fully operating auto body shop located on 35th Street in Rockford (35th Street property) for $205,000. The sale included the land, building, tools, and equipment. He made a down payment of $40,000 and obtained a mortgage in his individual name for the $165,000 balance. He titled the land in his individual name. That same year, he incorporated Auto Rehabilitation Center, Inc. (ARC), and although the business has since moved to a new location on Colosseum Drive in Rockford (the Colosseum property), he has continued to operate ARC as the sole owner and shareholder. ¶ 5 During their marriage, the parties each received regular paychecks from their jobs, which they deposited into a joint checking account. Respondent maintained separate bank accounts for ARC, including a savings and a checking account. These accounts were always separate from the parties' marital accounts. Petitioner never contributed any money to ARC. ¶ 6 Sometime in 1997 or 1998, respondent decided that he wanted to build from "the ground up" his own body shop that would be tailored to ARC's business. ARC saved "about close to $300,000" in its separate savings account, and respondent purchased the Colosseum property with funds from that account. Respondent testified that he secured a bank loan from Northwest Bank to purchase the Colosseum property and that the loan was in place when the closing took place, on May 27, 1999. He titled it in his individual name, rather than in the name of his business, for tax purposes. The Colosseum property was never sold, conveyed, or transferred to any other person or entity. At the time of the trial, the Colosseum property remained titled in respondent's name. ¶ 7 Sometime in late 1999, respondent created a business proposal to develop the Colosseum property, and he presented it to Bill Redig, who was then a commercial loan officer at Northwest Bank. The bank issued two loan-commitment letters on November 4, 1999, both of which were admitted into evidence. The first loan-commitment letter was for $1.6 million to finance the construction of a new auto body shop on the Colosseum property. It identified respondent individually as the borrower and listed as collateral the first mortgage on the Colosseum property and the assignment of an insurance policy on respondent's life. The second loan-commitment letter was for $500,000 to finance equipment and furnishings for the new body shop. It listed ARC as the borrower and required as collateral a blanket security agreement on ARC's assets and respondent's unlimited personal guaranty. Respondent first major customers after he started working at the bank. Petitioner was not involved with either transaction, and she did not provide any collateral for the loans. ¶ 14 Northwest Bank would have required a minimum of 20% down on the total cost of the construction project. The 35th Street property was sold in 2000, and all of the sale proceeds were rolled into the construction project—they were not used to purchase the Colosseum property itself. Typically, sale proceeds must be spent on a project's construction expenses before the bank will advance any funds on a construction loan, and that is what he expected respondent to do with the proceeds from the sale of the 35th Street property. He could not recall specifically when they closed on respondent's construction loan. ¶ 15 Redig testified that he was not involved in the transaction in which respondent paid cash for the Colosseum property. When respondent came to him, respondent already owned the land and was looking for a construction loan to build "the building itself." ¶ 16 Petitioner testified as follows. She was a full-time registered nurse when she married respondent. She retired from nursing in 1999 and began working full-time for ARC until the parties separated. She was not paid for her work at ARC. She and respondent combined their finances in joint savings and checking accounts. After the new body shop opened on the Colosseum property, each month respondent would bring home two salary checks totaling $5000 and a rent check for $20,000. Petitioner would deposit the rent check into the parties' joint checking account and then write a check to Northwest Bank for the mortgage payment on the Colosseum property. The mortgage was about $9000 or $10,000 per month, and the remainder of the rent proceeds was used to cover the parties' monthly living expenses. Respondent eventually ceased bringing home the two monthly salary checks and instead brought home a rent check for $25,000. This arrangement continued until she filed for divorce, and she presumed that respondent then began to make the mortgage payment on the Colosseum property himself. The parties stipulated that, if recalled, petitioner would testify that Johnson and respondent were longtime personal friends, that they had been roommates, and that their friendship predated the parties' marriage. The parties also stipulated that petitioner's work for ARC did not constitute a substantial contribution to the appreciation of ARC's value. ¶ 17 The trial court issued a memorandum of decision on January 27, 2017. It classified ARC as respondent's nonmarital property, noting that he incorporated it prior to his marriage to petitioner and had operated it out of the 35th Street location. The trial court also found that, sometime in 1999 or 2000, ARC moved to the Colosseum property and that respondent purchased the real estate in his individual name and never transferred title to the business. The trial court therefore classified it as marital property "because it was acquired after the date of the marriage and the [respondent] *** did not satisfy his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of [section 503] for his request that it is non-marital property." ¶ 18 On March 7, 2017, the trial court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage fully incorporating its memorandum of decision. Respondent sought reconsideration thereof, and the trial court denied it after a hearing on July 20, 2017. Respondent timely appealed.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 The disposition of property in a dissolution-of-marriage proceeding is governed by section 503 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2016)). All property owned by the parties in a ¶ 24 We agree with petitioner that the "estate or tax planning purposes" language of section 503(b)(1) is inapplicable to this case and that, therefore, the trial court committed no error in not applying it. In construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. MidAmerica Bank, FSB v. Charter One Bank, FSB, 232 Ill. 2d 560, 565 (2009). "The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning." Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). A statute must be read as a whole and not as isolated provisions. In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 32. ¶ 25 Here, a complete recitation of section 503(b)(1) of the Act is necessary. It provides:
"For purposes of distribution of property, all property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage is presumed marital property. This presumption includes non-marital property transferred into some form of co-ownership between the spouses, regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, or community property. The presumption of marital property is overcome by showing through clear and convincing evidence that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of this Section or was done for estate or tax planning purposes or for other reasons that establish that a transfer between spouses was not intended to be a gift."
750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2016).
¶ 26 Under a plain reading of section 503(b)(1), the marital-property presumption applies to (1) all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage and (2) all nonmarital property that is transferred into some form of co-ownership between the spouses. The last sentence of section 503(b)(1) establishes the means by which the presumption of marital property may be overcome—depending on how the presumption arose. When section 503(b)(1) is read as a whole, it becomes clear that the phrase "estate or tax planning purposes" modifies the previous sentence regarding the transfer of nonmarital property into some form of co-ownership between the spouses.
Thus, in order to trigger the "estate or tax planning" language under section 503(b)(1), one must first show through clear and convincing evidence that the property at issue was originally nonmarital under section 503(a). See
id. ¶ 27 Respondent's argument that the Colosseum property is his nonmarital property under section 503(b)(1), because he titled it in his individual name "for tax purposes," relies on a flawed reading of an isolated portion of the statute and puts the proverbial cart before the horse. Simply put, his argument presupposes that the Colosseum property was his nonmarital property in the first instance—without a showing though clear and convincing evidence that it was acquired by a method listed in section 503(a). ¶ 28 It is undisputed that respondent acquired the Colosseum property in his individual name nearly 10 years into the marriage. It is therefore presumed to be marital property. See
id.;
Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 45. The presumption is overcome by a showing through clear and convincing evidence that the property was acquired by a method listed in section 503(a).
In re Marriage of Brill, 2017 IL App (2d) 160604, ¶ 52;
In re Marriage of Asta, 2016 IL App (2d) 150160, ¶ 16. Section 503(a) contains an exclusive and specific list of nonmarital
marital-property presumption (see
Henke, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 174 (finding wife's testimony sufficient to trace marital-estate contributions to husband's nonmarital property)), we can see no reason why the trial court here should have deemed respondent's testimony alone to be clear and convincing, in light of its various shortcomings. As noted above, we view respondent's testimony concerning the source of the funds used to purchase the Colosseum property, as well as the exact dollar amount, to be vague and inconsistent. These shortcomings were repeated, rather than clarified, in respondent's briefs. ¶ 33 It is also of no import that petitioner offered no evidence that marital property was used to purchase the Colosseum property. As noted, respondent bore the burden to rebut the marital-property presumption with clear and convincing evidence that the property was acquired by a method listed in section 503(a) of the Act.
750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2016). In drafting the Act, "the legislature strongly favored the presumption of marital property, setting a high evidentiary hurdle for litigants attempting to overcome the presumption."
In re Marriage of Didier, 318 Ill. App. 3d 253, 262 (2000). Simply put, petitioner had no obligation to contradict respondent's evidence or present her own evidence that the property was marital. See
Stuhr, 2016 IL App (1st) 152370, ¶ 57. ¶ 34 As respondent failed to establish, as a threshold issue, that the Colosseum property was acquired by a method listed in section 503(a) of the Act, the trial court could "stop there" without considering evidence of "estate or tax planning" under section 503(b)(1). ¶ 35 In light of all of the above, we cannot say that the trial court's finding that the Colosseum property was marital property was against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 36 Respondent next contends that the trial court's ruling was error because it failed to consider the 2016 addition of section 503(a)(6.5) to the Act, which created a new category of nonmarital property: "[a]ll property acquired by a spouse by the sole use of non-marital property as collateral for a loan that then is used to acquire property during the marriage; to the extent that the marital estate repays any portion of the loan, it shall be considered a contribution from the marital estate to the non-marital estate subject to reimbursement."
750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6.5) (West 2016). ¶ 37 We find that respondent has forfeited this issue on appeal. Respondent's "argument" on this point in his opening brief consists nearly entirely of a copy-and-paste version of his "tax planning" argument, save for the statutory language and citation. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) requires that an appellant's brief contain "[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. *** Points not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing." Respondent's argument falls woefully short of what is required under this rule, which our supreme court has stated is not a mere suggestion, but has the force of law.
Rodriguez v.
Sheriff's Merit Comm'n, 218 Ill. 2d 342, 353 (2006). "A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument presented."
Thrall Car Manufacturing Co.
v.
Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986). The appellate court is not a depository into which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.
In re Marriage of Petrik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38. Failure to follow Rule 341 may result in forfeiture of an issue on appeal.
Kic v.
Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23. Such is the case here.
We observe that, tellingly, respondent omitted this sentence when quoting section 503(b)(1) in his briefs. --------
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County. ¶ 40 Affirmed.