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STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CALVIN LYNDELL DIBRELL

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J.

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
No. 105374

Steven Wayne Sword
, Judge , concurring.

I agree with the majority that the defendant was searched without reasonable suspicion, that the evidence should have been suppressed by the trial court, and that the judgment of conviction must be vacated and the case dismissed.

A different trial judge conducted the hearing and denied the defendant's motion to suppress. --------

I also agree that the trial court erred by granting the State's Rule 609 request made after the defendant testified on direct examination. I write separately to express my opinion that this error was non-structural constitutional error, rather than non-constitutional error, and therefore the burden was on the State to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008). I agree with the majority that the error was not harmless, albeit because the State, rather than the defendant, failed to meet its burden of proof.

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609(a)(3) provides:

If the witness to be impeached is the accused in a criminal prosecution, the State must give the accused reasonable written notice of the impeaching conviction before trial, and the court upon request must determine that the conviction's probative value on credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues. The court may rule on the admissibility of such proof prior to the trial but in any event shall rule prior to the testimony of the accused. If the court makes a final determination that such proof is admissible for impeachment purposes, the accused need not actually testify at the trial to later challenge the propriety of the determination.

Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3) (emphasis added).

Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, a criminal defendant has a fundamental right not to testify. See State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 586 (Tenn. 2014). Likewise, "[i]t is now a well established principle in both state and federal law that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify at trial." Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tenn. 1999), on reh'g (Tenn. 2000).

How a trial court rules on a Rule 609 request has a direct and major impact on the accused's decision to testify or not to testify. Rule 609 appears to acknowledge the importance of that ruling on the accused's decision to testify or not testify by mandating that the ruling be made before the accused testifies.

A trial court upon request of the State or the accused must make a ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions. Because Rule 609(a)(3) mandates that the ruling in any event be made prior to the accused testifying, a trial court commits error if it grants the request to admit a defendant's prior convictions under Rule 609 after the accused has taken the witness stand to testify. In my opinion, that error is non-structural constitutional error, and the State's burden to demonstrate that the error is harmless is "quite stringent." Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d at 371.

For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority opinion.

/s/_________


ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

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State v. Dibrell
(Mar 26, 2018)