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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1999, defendant Windsor Burke borrowed $45,000 secured by a 30-year mortgage on Brooklyn property. Burke defaulted on March 3, 2002, by failing to make monthly payments thereafter. In June 2002, a foreclosure action (the 2002 action) was initiated against Burke by Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. (the Predecessor), but the note and mortgage were not assigned to the Predecessor until August 23, 2002. Burke did not respond to the 2002 action. A junior lienholder, the Condominium Board, was named but never served in the 2002 action. The Predecessor commenced another action in 2003 (the 2003 action) against the Condominium Board; Burke was not named in this action. The two actions were consolidated in November 2005.

Burke conveyed the property interest in 2006, ultimately to defendant 105 4th Units, LLC (Units LLC). In 2008, Units LLC’s counsel challenged the Predecessor’s standing due to the timing of the note and mortgage assignment. The Predecessor voluntarily discontinued the consolidated action in April 2009. The note and mortgage were assigned to the plaintiff in June 2009, who commenced the present foreclosure action in October 2009 against Burke and Units LLC. Burke defaulted by not appearing or answering; Units LLC moved to dismiss part of the complaint based on the statute of limitations, arguing acceleration of the loan had occurred in 2002 or 2003.

The Supreme Court denied Units LLC’s motion to dismiss claims based on payments due on or after October 5, 2003, but found claims for payments due before that date time-barred. Upon reargument, the court adhered to this ruling and denied Burke’s motion to vacate his default and dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Both Burke and Units LLC appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statute of limitations barred the foreclosure claims against Burke and Units LLC based on the timing and validity of acceleration of the mortgage debt.
  2. Whether the Supreme Court properly denied Burke’s motion to vacate his default and dismiss the complaint as time-barred.
  3. Whether Units LLC demonstrated that the option to accelerate the loan maturity was validly exercised prior to October 5, 2003, thus barring claims for payments due after that date.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant 105 4th Units, LLC's Arguments

  • Asserted that the Predecessor accelerated the loan in 2002 or 2003, triggering the six-year statute of limitations and barring the 2009 foreclosure action for payments due after October 5, 2003.
  • Contended that the commencement of the 2002 and 2003 foreclosure actions constituted valid exercises of the acceleration option.

Defendant Windsor Burke's Arguments

  • Moved to vacate his default and dismiss the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations.
  • Contended that the foreclosure claims against him were time-barred.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cohen, 80 A.D.3d 753 Separate causes of action accrue for each installment in a mortgage payable in installments; statute of limitations runs from each installment's due date. Confirmed that statute of limitations applies separately to each payment installment.
EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Patella, 279 A.D.2d 604 Once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the statute of limitations begins to run on the entire debt. Used to analyze whether acceleration occurred, affecting statute of limitations.
Esther M. Mertz Trust v. Fox Meadow Partners, 288 A.D.2d 338 Acceleration option must be affirmatively exercised by the holder; until then, acceleration provision has no effect. Applied to determine that no valid acceleration occurred prior to October 5, 2003.
EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Suarez, 49 A.D.3d 592 Service of complaint by a party without assignment of the note and mortgage is ineffective to accelerate the debt or confer standing to foreclose. Found the 2002 complaint ineffective to accelerate debt because Predecessor lacked assignment at service time.
Sarva v. Chakravorty, 34 A.D.3d 438 Borrower must receive clear and unequivocal notice of acceleration; commencement of foreclosure may suffice as notice. Units LLC failed to prove Burke was served with the 2003 complaint before October 5, 2003, so acceleration was not effective then.
Centennial El. Indus., Inc. v. Ninety–Five Madison Corp., 90 A.D.3d 689 Standards for vacating default and dismissing claims as time-barred. Supported denial of Burke’s motion to vacate default and dismiss complaint.
Brownfield v. Ferris, 49 A.D.3d 790 Same as above regarding default and statute of limitations. Reinforced the court's denial of Burke’s motion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statute of limitations for foreclosure actions, noting that for mortgages payable in installments, each unpaid installment triggers a separate cause of action with its own limitations period. However, if the mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire debt becomes due and the limitations period runs from acceleration.

The court analyzed whether the Predecessor validly exercised the option to accelerate the debt before October 5, 2003. It found the 2002 foreclosure action ineffective for acceleration because the Predecessor had not yet been assigned the note and mortgage at the time of service, thus lacking authority.

Regarding the 2003 action, the court found Units LLC failed to demonstrate Burke was served prior to October 5, 2003, so acceleration was not validly effected then. Even consolidation of the 2002 and 2003 actions in 2005 was within six years of the 2009 foreclosure action, thus not barring claims for payments due on or after October 5, 2003.

Consequently, the court upheld the denial of Units LLC’s motion to dismiss claims for payments due on or after October 5, 2003. As for Burke, the court found no basis to vacate his default or dismiss the complaint as time-barred, affirming the denial of his motion.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court's order dated December 16, 2010, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The court held that the defendants failed to show a valid acceleration of the mortgage debt prior to October 5, 2003, and thus the foreclosure claims for payments due on or after that date are not barred by the statute of limitations. Burke's motion to vacate default and dismiss the complaint was properly denied. This decision directly affects the parties by allowing the foreclosure action to proceed on timely claims but does not establish new legal precedent.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., etc., respondent, v. Windsor BURKE, et al., appellants, et al., defendants.

PETER B. SKELOS

Jeffrey M. Kramer, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant Windsor Burke, and Harry L. Klein, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant 105 4th Units, LLC (one brief filed). Houser & Allison, APC, New York, N.Y. (Sara L. Markert and Victor L. Matthews of counsel), and Peter T. Roach & Associates, Syosset, N.Y. (Scott A. Koltun of counsel), for respondent (one brief filed).

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Windsor Burke appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Silber, J.), dated December 16, 2010, as denied his motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate his default in appearing or answering and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as barred by the statute of limitations, and the defendant 105 4th Units, LLC, appeals from so much of the same order as, upon reargument, adhered to its original determination in an order dated February 1, 2010, denying that branch of its motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss so much of the complaint as, in effect, asserted causes of action against it based on payments due on or after October 5, 2003, as barred by the statute of limitations.

ORDERED that the order dated December 16, 2010, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In 1999, the defendant Windsor Burke borrowed $45,000 from nonparty Delta Funding Corporation (hereinafter Delta) which was secured by a 30–year mortgage on property owned by Burke located in Brooklyn. Burke defaulted on March 3, 2002, by failing to make the required monthly payment, and he conceded that he failed to make any of the monthly payments that came due after that date.

In June 2002, a foreclosure action (hereinafter the 2002 action) was commenced against Burke by the nonparty Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. (hereinafter the Predecessor). However, the note and mortgage were not assigned to the Predecessor until August 23, 2002. Burke did not appear or interpose an answer in the 2002 action.

A junior lienholder, the nonparty Board of Managers 105 4th Avenue Condominium (hereinafter the Condominium Board), was named as a defendant in the 2002 action, but was never served with process. Another action was commenced by the Predecessor in 2003 (hereinafter the 2003 action), which named the Condominium Board as the defendant. Burke was not named as a defendant in the 2003 action. The 2003 action was consolidated with the 2002 action on November 2005.

By deed dated June 29, 2006, Burke conveyed his interest in the property to the nonparty NB 105 4th Apts, LLC. That entity, in turn, conveyed the interest to the defendant 105 4th Units, LLC (hereinafter Units LLC), pursuant to a bargain and sale deed dated November 15, 2006.

Sometime in July 2008, counsel for Units LLC advised counsel for the Predecessor that since the Predecessor had not been assigned the note and mortgage prior to commencing the 2002 action, it lacked standing. The Predecessor agreed to voluntarily discontinue the consolidated action, and an order dated April 14, 2009, discontinued the consolidated action.

In June 2009, the note and mortgage were assigned to the plaintiff. On October 5, 2009, the present foreclosure action was commenced by the plaintiff against, among others, Burke and Units LLC. Burke did not appear or interpose an answer. Units LLC made a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. It argued that the Predecessor had accelerated the loan in 2002 or 2003, and that the 2009 action was therefore barred by the six-year statute of limitations.

The Supreme Court denied that branch of the motion of Units LLC which was to dismiss so much of the complaint as, in effect, asserted causes of action against it based on payments due on or after October 5, 2003. However, the court found that payments which had become due prior to October 5, 2003, were time-barred.

Units LLC moved for leave to reargue. At this point, Burke separately moved to vacate his default and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reargument, but, upon reargument, adhered to its prior determination denying that branch of the motion of Units LLC which was to dismiss so much of the complaint as, in effect, asserted causes of action against it based on payments due on or after October 5, 2003. The Supreme Court also denied Burke's motion to vacate his default and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Burke and Units LLC appeal.

As a general matter, an action to foreclose a mortgage may be brought to recover unpaid sums which were due within the six-year period immediately preceding the commencement of the action ( see CPLR 213[4] ). With respect to a mortgage payable in installments, separate causes of action accrued for each installment that is not paid, and the statute of limitations begins to run, on the date each installment becomes due ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cohen, 80 A.D.3d 753, 754, 915 N.Y.S.2d 569; Loiacono v. Goldberg, 240 A.D.2d 476, 477, 658 N.Y.S.2d 138; Pagano v. Smith, 201 A.D.2d 632, 633, 608 N.Y.S.2d 268). However, “even if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire debt” ( EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Patella, 279 A.D.2d 604, 605, 720 N.Y.S.2d 161; see Lavin v. Elmakiss, 302 A.D.2d 638, 639, 754 N.Y.S.2d 741; Zinker v. Makler, 298 A.D.2d 516, 517, 748 N.Y.S.2d 780).

Where the acceleration of the maturity of a mortgage debt on default is made optional with the holder of the note and mortgage, some affirmative action must be taken evidencing the holder's election to take advantage of the accelerating provision, and until such action has been taken the provision has no operation ( see Esther M. Mertz Trust v. Fox Meadow Partners, 288 A.D.2d 338, 340, 734 N.Y.S.2d 77; Ward v. Walkley, 143 A.D.2d 415, 417, 532 N.Y.S.2d 426; see also 1–5 Bergman on New York Mortgage Foreclosures § 5.11[2] [2011] ). “Sometimes ... whether maturity has arrived through acceleration can be a question of fact” (1–5 Bergman on New York Mortgage Foreclosures § 5.11[3] [2011]; cf. LPP Mtge. Ltd. v. Gold, 44 A.D.3d 718, 719, 842 N.Y.S.2d 739).

As with other contractual options, the holder of an option may be required to exercise an option to accelerate the maturity of a loan in accordance with the terms of the note and mortgage ( see Serapilio v. Staszak, 255 A.D.2d 824, 824, 680 N.Y.S.2d 296; Loiacono v. Goldberg, 240 A.D.2d at 477, 658 N.Y.S.2d 138; see generally Island Auto Seat Cover Co., Inc. v. Minunni, 69 A.D.3d 570, 571, 892 N.Y.S.2d 189). Furthermore, the borrower must be provided with notice of the holder's decision to exercise the option to accelerate the maturity of a loan ( see EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Smith, 18 A.D.3d 602, 603, 796 N.Y.S.2d 364; EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Patella, 279 A.D.2d at 605–606, 720 N.Y.S.2d 161; Arbisser v. Gelbelman, 286 A.D.2d 693, 694, 730 N.Y.S.2d 157), and such notice must be “clear and unequivocal” ( Sarva v. Chakravorty, 34 A.D.3d 438, 439, 826 N.Y.S.2d 74; see Arbisser v. Gelbelman, 286 A.D.2d at 694, 730 N.Y.S.2d 157; Colonie Block & Supply Co. v. Overmyer Co., 35 A.D.2d 897, 897, 315 N.Y.S.2d 713). Commencement of a foreclosure action may be sufficient to put the borrower on notice that the option to accelerate the debt has been exercised ( see EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Smith, 18 A.D.3d at 603, 796 N.Y.S.2d 364; Clayton Natl. v. Guldi, 307 A.D.2d 982, 982, 763 N.Y.S.2d 493; Arbisser v. Gelbelman, 286 A.D.2d at 694, 730 N.Y.S.2d 157).

Here, the Predecessor had not been assigned the note or the mortgage at the time the 2002 complaint was served upon Burke. Accordingly, service of the 2002 complaint was ineffective to constitute a valid exercise of the option to accelerate the debt since the Predecessor did not have the authority to accelerate the debt or to sue to foreclose at that time ( see EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Suarez, 49 A.D.3d 592, 593, 852 N.Y.S.2d 791). Furthermore, Units LLC failed to demonstrate that the commencement of the 2003 action was effective to constitute a valid exercise of the acceleration option since it failed to show that the Predecessor served Burke with the complaint in the 2003 action prior to October 5, 2003 ( see Sarva v. Chakravorty, 34 A.D.3d at 439, 826 N.Y.S.2d 74). Even if the consolidation of the 2002 and 2003 actions could be construed as a valid acceleration, it occurred in 2005, less than six years prior to the commencement of this action ( see CPLR 213 [4] ).

In sum, Units LLC failed to demonstrate that the option to accelerate the maturity of the loan was validly exercised in accordance with the terms of the note and mortgage, prior to October 5, 2003 ( see EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Suarez, 49 A.D.3d at 593, 852 N.Y.S.2d 791; Sarva v. Chakravorty, 34 A.D.3d at 439, 826 N.Y.S.2d 74; see also Esther M. Mertz Trust v. Fox Meadow Partners, 288 A.D.2d at 339, 734 N.Y.S.2d 77; Loiacono v. Goldberg, 240 A.D.2d at 477, 658 N.Y.S.2d 138; Pagano v. Smith, 201 A.D.2d at 633, 608 N.Y.S.2d 268; Ward v. Walkley, 143 A.D.2d at 417, 532 N.Y.S.2d 426). Accordingly, upon reargument, the Supreme Court properly adhered to its prior determination denying that branch of the motion of Units LLC which was to dismiss so much of the complaint as, in effect, asserted causes of action against it based on payments due on or after October 5, 2003.

Contrary to Burke's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied his motion to vacate his default in appearing or answering and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as barred by the statute of limitations ( see Centennial El. Indus., Inc. v. Ninety–Five Madison Corp., 90 A.D.3d 689, 690, 934 N.Y.S.2d 483 [2d Dept.2011]; Brownfield v. Ferris, 49 A.D.3d 790, 791, 855 N.Y.S.2d 565).

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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burke
(Apr 17, 2012)