Ramos v. Swatzell

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Docket Number

No. 15-55397

Acts

The Public Health And Welfare — Civil Rights — Generally — Civil Action For Deprivation Of Rights

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Jossie Ramos and Melissa Ortiz brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Guillermo Garcia, former Warden of the California Institution for Women, was deliberately indifferent to their safety under the Eighth Amendment by failing in 2010 to take reasonable measures to protect them from sexual abuse by a correctional officer. [1]

The district court denied Garcia’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Garcia appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo. [2][1]

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. [3]
Whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ramos and Ortiz, Garcia violated a clearly established Eighth Amendment right by failing to protect them from a substantial risk of sexual abuse. [3][4][5][6]

Arguments of the Parties

Parties’ Jurisdictional Dispute

The parties disputed whether the court had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. [3]

Garcia’s Argument

Garcia argued that the law governing his supervisory duty was not clearly established because it did not alert him that the actions he took in response to the complaints were insufficient. [6]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893	Review of an order denying summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds is de novo.	The court applied de novo review to Garcia’s appeal. [1]
George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829	Interlocutory review of a qualified-immunity denial is limited to questions of law; genuine factual disputes are categorically unreviewable.	The court used this rule to define the scope of its jurisdiction. [3]
Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062	Quoted for the limitation on interlocutory review of factual disputes.	The court cited it through George in explaining appellate jurisdiction. [3]
Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169	When facts are disputed, the court may assume the nonmoving party’s version of the material facts is correct.	The court evaluated qualified immunity using plaintiffs’ version of the facts. [3]
Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895	Supports assuming the nonmoving party’s version of disputed facts and applying that approach to qualified-immunity review.	The court rejected Garcia’s argument because it depended on his version of the facts. [3][6]
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012	Whether governing law was clearly established and whether specific facts constitute a violation of established law are appealable legal questions.	The court concluded it had jurisdiction to decide Garcia’s entitlement to qualified immunity. [3]
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223	Qualified immunity requires examining whether the conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established.	The court applied both qualified-immunity inquiries. [4]
Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041	Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer violates the Eighth Amendment.	The court relied on this principle in finding a factual dispute concerning Garcia’s failure to respond to the risk of sexual abuse. [5]
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825	Deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm violates the Eighth Amendment when an official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.	The court applied this standard to plaintiffs’ allegations concerning Garcia’s response to the risk. [5]
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187	The Eighth Amendment right of prisoners to be free from sexual abuse was clearly established.	The court held that this right was clearly established in 2010. [6]
Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554	Discusses supervisor liability.	The court cited it in addressing the clearly established law governing Garcia’s supervisory role. [6]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first held that it could review the qualified-immunity denial because the appeal presented legal questions. Although factual determinations concerning genuine disputes of material fact are generally unreviewable on interlocutory appeal, the court could assume that plaintiffs’ version of the disputed material facts was correct and determine whether those facts established a constitutional violation of clearly established law. [3]

The court applied the two-part qualified-immunity inquiry: whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established when the conduct occurred. [4]

Taking the facts in plaintiffs’ favor, the court concluded that a genuine dispute existed as to whether Garcia violated their Eighth Amendment rights by failing to take reasonable measures in response to a substantial risk of sexual abuse. Deliberate indifference to a known and excessive risk to inmate safety violates the Eighth Amendment. [5]

The court further determined that, by 2010, the constitutional prohibition against failing to protect inmates from sexual abuse was clearly established. Garcia’s contrary argument required the court to accept his version of disputed facts, which was impermissible at this stage of review. [6]

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly denied Garcia qualified immunity. [7][8]

Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. [9] Because the disposition was designated not for publication and was stated not to be precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, it set no new precedent. [10]

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JOSSIE RAMOS and MELISSA ORTIZ, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GARY SWATZELL, Defendant, and GUILLERMO GARCIA, Warden, Defendant-Appellant.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

D.C. No. 5:12-cv-01089-BRO-SP MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Beverly Reid O'Connell, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 7, 2016 Pasadena, California Before: TROTT, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). --------

Guillermo Garcia, former Warden at the California Institution for Women, appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by plaintiffs Jossie Ramos and Melissa Ortiz alleging deliberate indifference to their safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that, in 2010, Garcia failed to take reasonable measures to protect them as inmates from sexual abuse by a correctional officer. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We review de novo a district court's order denying summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000), and we affirm.

As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether we have jurisdiction to review this interlocutory appeal. This court's jurisdiction to review a denial of qualified immunity is limited to questions of law, and a district court's determination "that the parties' evidence presents genuine issues of material fact is categorically unreviewable on interlocutory appeal." George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 834, 836 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009)). However, "[w]here disputed facts exist, . . . we can determine whether the denial of qualified immunity was appropriate by assuming that the version of the material facts asserted by the non-moving party is correct." Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). Further, whether governing law was "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity, and whether specific facts constitute a violation of established law, are appealable legal questions. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014). Therefore, we have jurisdiction to determine, based on the facts as alleged by plaintiffs, whether Garcia is entitled to qualified immunity.

To determine whether qualified immunity applies, we consider: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 235-36 (2009).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the district court properly determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Garcia violated plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights by failing to take reasonable measures in response to the substantial risk that plaintiffs would be sexually abused. See Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer is a violation of the Eighth Amendment."); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 837 (1994) (holding that "[a] prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment," and a prison official acts with deliberate indifference when "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety").

In addition, it was clearly established in 2010 that the failure to protect inmates from sexual abuse violated the Eighth Amendment. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) ("In the simplest and most absolute of terms, the Eighth Amendment right of prisoners to be free from sexual abuse was unquestionably clearly established prior to the time of this alleged assault, and no reasonable prison guard could possibly have believed otherwise."); see also Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing supervisor liability). Garcia argues that the law governing his duty as a supervisor was not clearly established because it did not alert him that the actions he took in response to the complaints would be insufficient. But his argument depends on accepting his version of the facts—not the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as our precedent requires. See Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 903.

Accordingly, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Garcia.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED.