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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Luis Angel MANSO–CEPEDA, Defendant.

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA

Motion denied.

Normary Figueroa–Rijo, U.S. Attorneys Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff. Hector E. Guzman–Silva, Victor J. Gonzalez–Bothwell, Federal Public Defender's Office, Hato Rey, PR, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


FRANCISCO A. BESOSA, District Judge.

On April 21, 2014, a trial commenced against defendant Luis Angel Manso–Cepeda (“Manso”) for aiding and abetting Lisander Casillas–Sanchez (“Casillas”), a convicted felon, in the unlawful possession of a firearm, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 922(g)(1). (Docket Nos. 12 & 64.) At the conclusion of the government's case, Manso moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Criminal Rule of Civil Procedure 29 (“Rule 29”). (Docket No. 64.) The Court denied the defendant's motion, and the defense rested. Id. After closing arguments the next day, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on statements made during the government's rebuttal. (Docket No. 67.) The Court denied the defendant's motion and submitted the case to the jury. Id. Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a guilty verdict as to count one of the indictment. (Docket No. 71.)

Defendant Manso has filed a timely, consolidated motion for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, arguing (1) that the government failed to meet its burden of production and persuasion at trial, and (2) that the government's closing arguments misrepresented the law to the jury. (Docket No. 75.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES defendant's motions and

A defendant may move the Court for judgment of acquittal within fourteen days after a guilty verdict or after the discharge of the jury, whichever is later. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1). A motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence must also be filed within fourteen days of the verdict. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(2). In this case, the guilty verdict and jury discharge occurred on April 22, 2014. (Docket No. 67.) Because defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on May 6, 2014, his motions are timely.

SUSTAINS

the jury verdict.

(Docket No. 75 at pp. 2–3) (citing Rosemond, 134 S.Ct. at 1249–50).

3. On the one hand, Manso claims that the government “failed to present any proof of when Casillas took possession of the firearm,” but he also argues that Casillas had possession “prior to the chase.” (Docket No. 75 at p. 2.)

Manso's interpretation regarding the elements needed to prove his intent is unavailing. The Supreme Court in Rosemond explained that aiding and abetting requires both a culpable act and culpable intent, and stated that intent “must go to the specific and entire crime charged.” See Rosemond, 134 S.Ct. at 1248. In light of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (“section 924(c)”)'s “double-barreled” nature, a defendant charged with violating section 924(c) must intend to participate in the underlying crime as well as intend that a gun be used in furtherance of that crime. Id. The aider-and-abettor's “foreknowledge” of the gun, as well as the exact time at which he or she knows about the gun, therefore, is particularly relevant to an assessment of guilt. See United States v. Jefferson, 2014 WL 1745027, *7–9, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61135, **24–29 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014) (surveying the three “foreknowledge” concepts set forth in Rosemond ). Rosemond is factually distinguishable from defendant Manso's conviction because in the context of a 922(g)(1) “single-barreled” offense, aiding and abetting defendant's intent need only go to the assistance of a felon's firearm possession. As discussed above, the evidence presented at trial supports a finding that he had that intent. Furthermore, a footnote following the passage that defendant relies upon from Rosemond is telling:

A violation of section 924(c) requires (1) the use or carrying of a firearm (2) when engaged in a predicate crime of violence or drug trafficking. Rosemond, 134 S.Ct. at 1245.

Of course, if a defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun was displayed or used by a confederate, the jury can permissibly infer from his failure to object or withdraw that he had [advance] knowledge. In any criminal case, after all, the factfinder can draw inferences about a defendant's intent based on all the facts and circumstances of a crime's commission.
Id.
at 1250 n. 9. That was the case here. It is reasonable to infer from the evidence that Casillas displayed his sawed-off shotgun as he entered the Protégé, and that all of Manso's subsequent behavior behind the wheel conveys an intent to assist Casillas in possessing (and ditching) the weapon. Viewed in totality, the evidence belies Manso's argument that he was merely present in the car and took no affirmative act of participation. ( See Docket No. 74 at p. 7) (“[A]ll that Luis did that night is gave Lisander a ride.”). Sufficient evidence supports the reasonable inference that defendant Manso drove his car intending to provide knowing aid to Casillas, who was committing a federal crime by being in possession of a firearm, and Manso had the intent to facilitate Casillas' crime. Therefore, he committed a crime himself, Rosemond, 134 S.Ct. at 1245, and his conviction stands.

C. Conclusion

For the reasons expressed above, the Court finds that “the total evidence, including reasonable inferences, is sufficient to warrant a jury to conclude that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” See United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 966 (1st Cir.1982). Accordingly, defendant Manso's motion to set aside the verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal as to count one is DENIED.

II. Motion for New Trial A. Standard

“Motions for a new trial are directed to the discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir.1980). A trial court “may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). A defendant may base his or her motion for a new trial on newly discovered evidence or on other grounds. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b). But, “[t]he remedy of a new trial must be used sparingly and only where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” United States v. Del–Valle, 566 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir.2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

A prosecutor's trial statements constitute reversible error only if they were (1) improper and (2) “prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 113 (4th Cir.1990). Factors pertaining to whether a defendant's substantial rights were so prejudiced include: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks tended to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters; (5) whether the prosecutor's remarks were invited by improper conduct of defense counsel; and (6) whether curative instructions were given to the jury. United States v. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 203–04 (4th Cir.2012) (citing United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321 (4th Cir.2010)).

B. Analysis

Manso's Rule 33 argument is that during rebuttal, the prosecutor misstated the law by making the following statements:

And if [Manso] tried to help Lisander get rid of this gun, that means, that period of time that he was driving, he was aiding and abetting in the possession of that firearm. If he knew that when Lisander got in his car and that he had this gun, and that he was going to drive him from one place to another, he is guilty of aiding and abetting in the possession of that firearm.
(Docket No. 74 at p. 14.)

He knew it was there, and he knew that when Lisander got in his car, that he was helping him take this gun from wherever they were to the next place. And if you find that he attempted to help Lisander get rid of this gun when the police attempted to pull him over, then you must find him guilty.
Id. at p. 16.

The Court finds that the prosecutor's statements were not improper. Throughout trial, defense counsel communicated a theory that defendant Manso merely gave Casillas “a ride” and took no affirmative action to assist Casillas' possession of the shotgun. In his closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Manso did not assist Casillas in “getting the gun in the car,” and “[n]obody is saying that Luis touched the weapon, held the weapon, ... bought the weapon, lent the weapon.” (Docket No. 74 at p. 10.) He also argued, “[n]one of the agents saw him looking at the gun, holding the gun, doing anything with the gun at any time.” Id. at p. 8. “And nothing Mr. Manso did assisted [Casillas] in possessing [the gun]. If anything, he assisted him in getting rid of it....” (Docket No. 74 at p. 12.) The prosecutor's rebuttal was geared specifically towards refuting that theory, and ensuring that the jury understood that affirmative acts also could be found through Manso's ongoing behavior. Simply because Manso never touched or held the firearm, or never assisted Casillas in procuring the firearm for that matter, did not preclude a finding that he had intent, and Manso's maneuvering of the Protégé to evade police and allow Casillas to ditch the weapon were precisely the kind of affirmative actions sufficient to demonstrate that intent. Viewed in context, the prosecutor's statements were not misstatements and were not improper.

In defense counsel's own words, Manso “is being accused of doing something to help Lisander Casillas–Sanchez possess the gun.” The government's theory was that Manso “did something to help” by driving around the PRPD cars, pulling over to the opposite shoulder so that a passenger could throw a firearm into weeds, and speeding away from the police. The jury was at liberty to interpret Manso's behaviors behind the wheel as affirmative acts of help, and the government's statements were not in error. Defendant Manso's motion for a new trial, therefore, is

DENIED. CONCLUSION

The Court finds sufficient evidence to conclude that defendant Luis Angel Manso–Cepeda is guilty of aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm. Accordingly, Manso's consolidated motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 and for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33, (Docket No. 75), is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. -------- Notes:

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United States v. Manso-Cepeda
(Jun 11, 2014)