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Hauenstein v. Lynham

Factual and Procedural Background

Solomon Hauenstein, a Swiss citizen, died in Richmond in 1861 or 1862, intestate, unmarried, and without children, owning substantial real estate there. Although he had moved to Virginia, there was no proof that he had ceased to be a Swiss citizen; the Court therefore presumed that his original citizenship continued. [1][2]

The district escheator obtained a verdict and judgment of escheat. As he prepared to sell the property, the plaintiffs in error petitioned under Virginia law for payment of the sale proceeds to them as Hauenstein’s heirs. The trial court dismissed their petition, holding that even established heirship would not support recovery. The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed, and the heirs sought review by writ of error. [1]

The heirs were Swiss citizens. The Court found their proof of heirship entirely satisfactory, and the parties disputed no facts; their disagreement concerned only the governing law. [2]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Article V of the 1850 treaty between the United States and the Swiss Confederation entitled the Swiss heirs to recover the property or its proceeds notwithstanding Virginia’s restrictions on inheritance by aliens. [3][4][5][6][7]
  2. Whether the treaty’s allowance of such time to sell as state law permitted defeated the heirs’ rights because Virginia had prescribed no applicable time limit. [8][9]
  3. Whether the treaty validly displaced contrary state-law consequences under the Constitution’s treaty provisions. [7][10][11]
  4. What compensation the escheator and counsel could receive from the disputed fund if the heirs prevailed. [12][13]

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs in Error

  • The heirs relied on Article V of the 1850 treaty as the basis for their claim. The Court described that provision as the central point of the parties’ controversy. [4][8]

Defendant in Error

  • The defendant argued that because Virginia had fixed no period within which the treaty right to sell could be exercised, no sale could occur under the treaty, rendering its protection inoperative. [8]

Common Ground

  • The parties did not dispute the facts or the heirs’ status. They also did not dispute that, if the treaty applied, its efficacy was complete; the contested question was its construction. [2][11]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch, 603 Common-law restrictions on alien ownership and inheritance, including sovereign divestiture through office found. Established the common-law background against which the treaty operated. [14]
Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242 When a treaty permits both restrictive and liberal constructions of protected rights, the liberal construction is preferred. Supported rejection of a construction that would nullify the heirs’ rights; also cited in the discussion of federal law’s place in state law. [15][16]
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 242
Treaty supremacy over conflicting state law and constitutional recognition of treaties made before adoption of the Constitution. Supported the treaty’s controlling force. The Court qualified its quotation from Justice Chase by declining to endorse everything in it. The additional citation appeared in a quoted discussion of treaty power over alien landholding. [10][17][18][19]
Chirac v. Chirac (2 Wheat. 259) A treaty may remove alienage disabilities and permit foreign citizens to purchase and hold land as citizens could. Supported giving the Swiss treaty effect notwithstanding state restrictions. [19]
Carneal v. Banks (10 id. 181) Reaffirmation of the French treaty’s removal of alienage disabilities. Provided additional support for treaty protection of foreign citizens’ property rights. [19]
Hughes v. Edwards (9 id. 489) Comparable protection of alien property rights under the British treaty of 1794. Supported the constitutional efficacy of treaty provisions affecting landholding. [19]
Orr v. Hodgeson, 4 id. 453 A treaty stipulation may protect an alien’s land from escheat under state law. Directly supported treaty protection against the state-law forfeiture asserted here. [19]
Fairfax's Devisees v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch, 627 The constitutional treaty power permits removal of state-law impediments arising from alienage. Appeared in a quoted authority supporting the validity of treaty protections for alien landowners. [19]
Foster Elam v. Neilson, 2 id. 253 Federal constitutional, statutory, and treaty law forms part of the law of every State. Cited as additional support for that general principle, without separate analysis. [16]
The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616 Federal constitutional, statutory, and treaty law forms part of state law. Cited with other authorities supporting that principle, without separate analysis. [16]
The People, c. v. Gerke Clark, 5 Cal. 381 Federal constitutional, statutory, and treaty law forms part of state law. Cited as additional support, without separate discussion of its facts or holding. [16]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Virginia law alone did not establish the heirs’ entitlement.

Virginia retained the common-law rule barring aliens from taking land by descent except as modified by statute. The statutory provision allowing alien heirs to qualify through a recorded declaration did not apply because the plaintiffs had made no such declaration. Another provision concerning treaty rights applied only to subsequently acquired property, whereas Hauenstein had acquired all the property before that enactment. The parties did not claim that the later 1873 Code affected the case. [14][20][21][22][3][23]

2. The treaty expressly protected heirs unable to hold land because of alienage.

Article V addressed real estate falling to a citizen of one contracting country who could not hold it in the other because of alienage. It secured an opportunity to sell and the freedom to withdraw and export the proceeds, subject only to charges payable by a local inhabitant in a similar case. The Court held that the plaintiffs fell squarely within this provision. [5][24]

3. State legislative silence did not extinguish the treaty right.

The Court read the treaty as securing an absolute right to sell and withdraw the proceeds, qualified only by the time for exercising that right. Reading the absence of a state deadline as a prohibition would contradict the provision’s purpose: its language contemplated some opportunity to act, not none. The rule favoring liberal construction of treaty rights reinforced that conclusion. [8][25][15]

The earlier 1847 treaty had expressly allowed at least three years for disposition. The 1850 treaty instead left limitations periods to individual States and cantons. A jurisdiction could apply an existing limitation or enact one, but until an applicable limitation existed, lapse of time supplied no bar. Virginia had no such limitation, so the heirs could assert their rights without a time bar. [24][26][9]

Article VI further supported this reading by directing that disputes among succession claimants be resolved under the laws and by the judges of the country where the property was located. [27]

4. The treaty controlled despite contrary state-law consequences.

The fact that Virginia law, standing alone, would place the fund in the State’s treasury did not defeat the heirs’ treaty remedy. The Constitution makes treaties supreme over contrary state law, and prior decisions recognized that treaties could remove alienage disabilities and protect land against escheat. [7][10][19]

The Court also explained that the Constitution’s recognition of treaties was retrospective as well as prospective, encompassing treaties made before its adoption. It concluded that the Swiss treaty fell within the constitutional treaty power and required full effect, while declining to explore limitations on that power unnecessary to decide this case. [17][11]

5. Deductions from the fund were limited.

The escheator could claim no compensation in that capacity, but could receive the ordinary statutory percentage for selling real property. Under the Court’s settled rule, counsel for neither side could be paid from the disputed fund. [13]

Holding and Implications

REVERSED AND REMANDED as to the plaintiffs’ claim, with further proceedings required to conform to the opinion. [28][29]

The treaty removed the heirs’ alienage disability sufficiently to protect their right to sell the property and obtain its proceeds; Virginia’s failure to prescribe a limitations period did not bar that right. Any compensation from the fund was limited to the escheator’s ordinary sale allowance, with no payment to counsel. [30][9][13]

HAUENSTEIN v. LYNHAM.

1. In the absence of proof that an alien has become a citizen of the United States, his original status is presumed to continue. 2. A., a citizen of Switzerland, died in 1861 in Virginia intestate and without issue. For want of an heir capable under the statutes of the State to inherit the lands there situate whereof he died seised in fee, they were sold by the escheator of the proper district. A.'s next of kin, B., a citizen of Switzerland, filed a petition to recover the proceeds of that sale. Upon consideration of the treaty between the United States and the Swiss Confederation of Nov. 25, 1850 ( 10 Stat. 587), — Held, 1. That the treaty is the supreme law of the land, and by its terms the incapacity of B. as an alien was so far removed as to entitle him to recover and sell the lands and "withdraw and export the proceeds thereof." 2. That his rights thus secured are not barred by the lapse of time, inasmuch as no statute of Virginia prescribes the term within which they must be asserted. 3. That where a treaty admits of two constructions, — one restrictive as to the rights that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, — the latter is to be preferred. 4. That the treaty-making clause of the Constitution is retroactive as well as prospective. 5. That, in view of B.'s rights in the premises, the escheator is entitled only to the amount allowed by law for making sales of real estate in ordinary cases. 6. That counsel cannot be paid out of the fund in dispute.

ERROR to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

Solomon Hauenstein died in the city of Richmond in the year 1861 or 1862, intestate, unmarried, and without children. The precise date of his death is not material. At that time, he owned and held considerable real estate in the city of Richmond. An inquisition of escheat was prosecuted by the escheator for that district. A verdict and judgment were rendered in his favor. When he was about to sell the property, the plaintiffs in error, pursuant to a law of the State, filed their petition, setting forth that they were the heirs-at-law of the deceased, and praying that the proceeds of the sale of the property should be paid over to them. Testimony was taken to prove their heirship as alleged, but the court was of opinion that, conceding that fact to be established, they could have no valid claim, and dismissed the petition. They removed the case to the Court of Appeals. That court, entertaining the same views as the court below, affirmed the judgment. They thereupon sued out this writ of error.

The plaintiffs in error are all citizens of Switzerland. The deceased was also a citizen of that country, and removed thence to Virginia, where he lived and acquired the property to which this controversy relates, and where he died. The validity of his title is not questioned. There is no proof that he denationalized himself or ceased to be a citizen and subject of Switzerland. His original citizenship is, therefore, to be presumed to have continued. Best on Presumptions, 186. According to the record his domicile, not his citizenship, was changed. The testimony as to the heirship of the plaintiffs in error is entirely satisfactory. There was no controversy on this subject in the argument here. The parties were at one as to all the facts. Their controversy was rested entirely upon legal grounds.

The common law as to aliens, except so far as it has been modified by her legislature, is the local law of Virginia. 2 Tucker's Blackst., App., Note C. By that law "aliens are incapable of taking by descent or inheritance, for they are not allowed to have any inheritable blood in them." 2 Bla. Com., 249. But they may take by grant or devise though not by descent. In other words, they may take by the act of a party, but not by operation of law; and they may convey or devise to another, but such a title is always liable to be devested at the pleasure of the sovereign by office found. In such cases the sovereign, until entitled by office found or its equivalent, cannot pass the title to a grantee. In these respects there is no difference between an alien friend and an alien enemy. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch, 603.

The law of nations recognizes the liberty of every government to give to foreigners only such rights, touching immovable property within its territory, as it may see fit to concede. Vattel, book 2, c. 8, sect. 114. In our country, this authority is primarily in the States where the property is situated.

The Revised Code of Virginia of 1860, c. 115, sect. 1, provides that an alien upon declaring on oath before a court of record that he intends to reside in the State, and having the declaration entered of record, may inherit or purchase and hold real estate there as if he were a citizen.

Sect. 2 of the same chapter provides that such alien may convey or devise his real estate, and if he shall die intestate that it shall descend to his heirs, and if the alienee, devisee, or heir shall be an alien, that he may take and hold, by being in the State and making under oath and having recorded, within five years, a like declaration with that prescribed by the preceding section.

The sixth section declares that when by a treaty between the United States and any foreign country a citizen of such country is allowed to sell real estate in Virginia, he may sell and convey within the time prescribed by the treaty; and when by such treaty citizens of the United States are allowed to inherit, hold, sell, and convey real estate situate in such country, the citizens and subjects of that country may in like manner inherit, hold, sell, and convey real estate lying in Virginia, provided that these several provisions shall apply only to real estate acquired thereafter by the citizens or subjects of such foreign country.

Sect. 2 has no application to the present case, because the declaration which it permits has not been made by the plaintiffs in error, and sect. 6 has none, because all the real estate of the deceased was acquired before the date of the act.

The Revised Code of 1873 has obliterated nearly all the distinctions between aliens and citizens with respect to their rights as to both real and personal property. See c. 4, sect. 18, p. 130, and c. 119, sects. 4 and 10, pp. 917, 918. As it is not claimed that any of these provisions affect the present case, we shall pass them by without further remark.

This brings us to the consideration of the treaty between the United States and the Swiss Confederation, of the 25th of November, 1850. 11 Stat. 587. The fifth article has been earnestly pressed upon our attention, and is the hinge of the controversy between the parties.

The first part of the article is devoted to personal property, and gives to the citizens of each country the fullest power touching such property belonging to them in the other, including the power to dispose of it as the owner may think proper. It then proceeds as follows: —

"The foregoing provisions shall be applicable to real estate situate within the States of the American Union, or within the cantons of the Swiss Confederation, in which foreigners shall be entitled to hold or inherit real estate.

"But in case real estate situated within the territories of one of the contracting parties should fall to a citizen of the other party, who, on account of his being an alien, could not be permitted to hold such property in the State or in the canton in which it may be situated, there shall be accorded to the said heir, or other successor, such term as the laws of the State or canton will permit to sell such property; he shall be at liberty at all times to withdraw and export the proceeds thereof without difficulty, and without paying to the government any other charges than those which, in a similar case, would be paid by an inhabitant of the country in which the real estate may be situated."

The plaintiffs in error are exactly within the latter category. This is too clear to require discussion. A corresponding provision for like cases is found in article 2, in the previous treaty of the 18th of May, 1847, between the same parties. 9 Stat. 902. By that article it is declared "that if, by the death of a person owning real property in the territory of one of the high contracting parties, such property should descend, either by the laws of the country or by testamentary disposition, to a citizen of the other party, who, on account of his being an alien, could not be permitted to retain the actual possession of such property, a term of not less than three years shall be allowed him to dispose of such property and collect and withdraw the proceeds thereof, without paying to the government any other charges than those which, in a similar case, would be paid by an inhabitant of the country in which such real property may be situated."

It was clearly the intention of the clause in question in the treaty of 1850 to secure to the beneficiaries absolutely the right "to sell said property," and "to withdraw and export the proceeds thereof without difficulty." Otherwise the language used is a sham and a mockery. The only qualification is as to the time within which the right must be exercised. It has been earnestly contended, in behalf of the defendant in error, that the State, having fixed no time within which this must be done, it cannot be done at all, and that the entire provision thus becomes a nullity, and is as if it were not.

The terms of the limitation imply clearly that some time, and not that none, was to be allowed. If it had been proposed to those who negotiated the treaty to express in it the effect of this construction in plain language, can it be doubted that it would have been promptly rejected by both sides as a solecism and contrary to the intent of the parties?

Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be preferred. Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242. Such is the settled rule in this court.

It was well remarked in the able opinion of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, that if this case were to be decided under the treaty of 1847, there could not be a doubt as to the result. In this we concur, and we think the case is equally clear under the treaty of 1850, which governs the rights of the parties.

The provision as to time in the earlier treaty is, in effect, a statute of limitation. It applied with Procrustean sameness in all the States and in all the cantons. In the latter treaty this limitation was dropped, and the time was to be such "as the laws of the State or canton will permit." In other words, it was left to the laws of the several States and cantons respectively to fix the limitation in this as in other cases. This was consonant to the policy of our judiciary act of 1789, which gave to the State statutes of limitation the same effect in the local courts of the United States which they had in the courts of the States respectively that enacted them. The Procrustean uniformity prescribed by the former treaty was thus abandoned, and it is fair to presume that the harmonious results in this respect which must necessarily follow, everywhere within the territory covered by the treaty, both at home and abroad, were the considerations by which those who made the change were animated. If a State or canton had a law which imposed a limitation in this class of cases, nothing more was necessary. If it had not such a law, it was competent to enact one, and until one exists there can be no bar arising from the lapse of time. A party entitled can sue whenever he chooses to do so, and he is clothed with all the rights of any other litigant asserting a claim where there is no statute of limitation applicable to the case. This we understand to be the position of Virginia, and such are the legal consequences necessarily flowing from it.

This construction of the treaty derives support from the fact that the treaty provides (sixth article) that any controversy which may arise among the claimants to the succession, "shall be decided according to the laws and by the judges of the country where the property is situated."

It remains to consider the effect of the treaty thus construed upon the rights of the parties.

That the laws of the State, irrespective of the treaty, would put the fund into her coffers, is no objection to the right or the remedy claimed by the plaintiffs in error.

The efficacy of the treaty is declared and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. That instrument took effect on the fourth day of March, 1789. In 1796, but a few years later, this court said: "If doubts could exist before the adoption of the present national government, they must be entirely removed by the sixth article of the Constitution, which provides that `all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.' There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established; and they had the power to change or abolish the State Constitutions or to make them yield to the general government and to treaties made by their authority. A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is, of all the United States, if any act of a State legislature can stand in its way. If the Constitution of a State (which is the fundamental law of the State and paramount to its legislature) must give way to a treaty and fall before it, can it be questioned whether the less power, an act of the State legislature, must not be prostrate? It is the declared will of the people of the United States that every treaty made by the authority of the United States shall be superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual State, and their will alone is to decide. If a law of a State contrary to a treaty is not void, but voidable only, by a repeal or nullification by a State legislature, this certain consequence follows, — that the will of a small part of the United States may control or defeat the will of the whole." Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199.

It will be observed that the treaty-making clause is retroactive as well as prospective. The treaty in question, in Ware v. Hylton, was the British treaty of 1783, which terminated the war of the American Revolution. It was made while the Articles of Confederation subsisted. The Constitution, when adopted, applied alike to treaties "made and to be made."

We have quoted from the opinion of Mr. Justice Chase in that case, not because we concur in every thing said in the extract, but because it shows the views of a powerful legal mind at that early period, when the debates in the convention which framed the Constitution must have been fresh in the memory of the leading jurists of the country.

In Chirac v. Chirac (2 Wheat. 259), it was held by this court that a treaty with France gave to her citizens the right to purchase and hold land in the United States, removed the incapacity of alienage and placed them in precisely the same situation as if they had been citizens of this country. The State law was hardly adverted to, and seems not to have been considered a factor of any importance in this view of the case. The same doctrine was reaffirmed touching this treaty in Carneal v. Banks (10 id. 181), and with respect to the British treaty of 1794, in Hughes v. Edwards (9 id. 489). A treaty stipulation may be effectual to protect the land of an alien from forfeiture by escheat under the laws of a State. Orr v. Hodgeson, 4 id. 453. By the British treaty of 1794, "all impediment of alienage was absolutely levelled with the ground despite the laws of the States. It is the direct constitutional question in its fullest conditions. Yet the Supreme Court held that the stipulation was within the constitutional powers of the Union. Fairfax's Devisees v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch, 627; see Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 242." 8 Op. Att'ys-Gen. 417. Mr. Calhoun, after laying down certain exceptions and qualifications which do not affect this case, says: "Within these limits all questions which may arise between us and other powers, be the subject-matter what it may, fall within the treaty-making power and may be adjusted by it." Treat. on the Const. and Gov. of the U.S. 204.

If the national government has not the power to do what is done by such treaties, it cannot be done at all, for the States are expressly forbidden to "enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation." Const., art. 1, sect. 10.

It must always be borne in mind that the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the law of every State as its own local laws and Constitution. This is a fundamental principle in our system of complex national polity. See also Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242; Foster Elam v. Neilson, 2 id. 253; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616; Mr. Pinkney's Speech, 3 Elliot's Constitutional Debates, 231; The People, c. v. Gerke Clark, 5 Cal. 381.

We have no doubt that this treaty is within the treaty-making power conferred by the Constitution. And it is our duty to give it full effect. We forbear to pursue the topic further. In the able argument before us, it was insisted upon one side, and not denied on the other, that, if the treaty applies, its efficacy must necessarily be complete. The only point of contention was one of construction. There are doubtless limitations of this power as there are of all others arising under such instruments; but this is not the proper occasion to consider the subject. It is not the habit of this court, in dealing with constitutional questions, to go beyond the limits of what is required by the exigencies of the case in hand. What we have said is sufficient for the purposes of this opinion.

During the argument here, our attention was called to the amount that might be taken from the fund for compensation to the escheator and to his counsel in the event of our judgment being in favor of the plaintiffs in error.

Under the circumstances, the escheator can have no claim as such, but he may properly receive the percentage allowed by law for making sales of real property in ordinary cases. It is a settled rule in this court never to allow counsel on either side to be paid out of the fund in dispute.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, so far as it concerns the claim of the plaintiffs in error, will be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion; and it is

So ordered.

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HAUENSTEIN v. LYNHAM
(Oct 1, 1879)