Constitutional law — Due process — Bill of Rights — Regulation of businesses — Public interest — Milk business — Price fixing — Delegation of legislative power — Act of January 2, 1934, P. L. 174 — Title — Article I, section 9, of Constitution — Article II, section 1 — Article III, section 3 — Construction of statutes.
1. The Milk Control Law of January 2, 1934, P. L. 174, which regulates the milk industry by requiring dealers to be licensed by a board created under its provisions, prohibiting those not so licensed from dealing in milk and milk products, and giving said board the right to fix the minimum prices to be paid the producer and the minimum and maximum prices to be charged the consumer, does not violate article I, section 9, of the state Constitution, which provides that no one can be deprived of his liberty or property unless by the law of the land, nor section 1, of the Bill of Rights, which provides that the people have the inherent and indefeasible right of enjoying and defending life and liberty and of acquiring, possessing and protecting property. [260-76]
2. The milk industry, under conditions existing to-day, is of public concern and may be regulated in the public interest, in the exercise of the police power of the State. [264-6]
3. The power of the State to regulate industry may be enlarged, as conditions change, so as to embrace new industries, or narrowed so as to take away the right of regulation previously exercised. [263-4]
4. The fact that a statute enacted primarily for the benefit of the general public may also produce special benefit or advantage to a particular class does not in itself operate to render the act unconstitutional. [272-3]
5. The Act of 1934 is not unconstitutional on the ground that it contains an unlawful delegation of the legislative power in violation of article II, section 1, of the Constitution. [277-9]
6. Party who stipulated that the procedure of the board before the date of the revocation of his license as a milk dealer was regular, that the facts found by the board were correct, and that the only question before the appellate court was the constitutionality of the Act of 1934, held precluded on appeal from asserting the alleged failure of the board to make complete and definite findings of fact. [279-80]
7. The Act of 1934 is not in violation of article III, section 3, of the Constitution in that its title contains no reference to the right of the Milk Control Board to revoke for cause a license issued by it. [280-81]
8. In determining the constitutionality of a state statute, the inquiry is as to whether the state legislature is forbidden, either by the federal Constitution or by its own state Constitution, to legislate on the subject and pass the act under review. [259-60]
9. In order to declare an Act of the General Assembly unconstitutional, its want of authority to pass the act must clearly appear, — to doubt is to decide in favor of its constitutionality. [260]
Mr. Justice SCHAFFER and Mr. Justice DREW dissented.
Argued May 25, 1936.
OPINION BY MR. CHIEF JUSTICE KEPHART, June 26, 1936:
The majority of the members of this court, Mr. Justice SCHAFFER and Mr. Justice DREW dissenting, agree that the decision certified to us by the Superior Court should be reversed on the dissenting opinion written by President Judge KELLER of that court, reported in 121 Pa. Super. 281. Mr. Justice SCHAFFER and Mr. Justice DREW are of opinion that the decision of the Superior Court should be affirmed on the opinion of Judge PARKER of that court.
Judgment reversed.