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LINDA L. KETTERING, Plaintiff, v. DIAMOND TRIUMPH AUTO GLASS, INC., et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

DAN AARON POLSTER, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 25). Plaintiff Linda L. Kettering filed the above-captioned case alleging that a co-worker of her former employer, Defendant Diamond Triumph Auto Glass, Inc. ("Diamond"), sexually harassed her and that Diamond fired her in retaliation for complaining to management about it. She also alleges that a statement written by Defendant Susan Parris at Diamond's request, which was submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") pursuant to its investigation of Kettering's administrative charge, constitutes defamation.

I. FACTS

Linda L. Kettering was hired as a sales representative for Diamond Triumph Auto Glass on November 4, 1996. Diamond supplies and installs automobile glass for private and commercial consumers. Kettering was initially hired to represent Diamond's Akron, Ohio store. Not much later, she was assigned the representation of Diamond's Mansfield, Ohio store as well, without an increase in pay.

It was Kettering's job to cultivate new accounts and increase sales in the Akron and Mansfield territories. As such, she visited between 20-25 businesses per day. In a 40-hour work week, she spent approximately 30-60 minutes, two days a week, in the Mansfield store. She spent approximately 1-2 hours, two days a week, in the Akron store.

Kettering's supervisor was Gina Bennington, who was based at corporate headquarters in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Bennington was supervised by Keith Omaits, Diamond's District Manager for the Northern District of Ohio and the person who hired Kettering. The employees at the Akron store were Keith Newbauer (branch manager), Mike Benbow (customer service representative), and Dave Korosa and Frank Hilton (glass installers). Kettering claims that she got along with everyone in Akron except Newbauer. The testimony generally indicates that Newbauer was a difficult person to work with. He was described as "hyper," and at times uncivil and demeaning to co-workers and customers alike. Although branch manager of the Akron store, Newbauer had no supervisory capacity over Kettering. Kettering Depo. at 58.

The first alleged incident of sexual harassment occurred on April 25, 1997. According to Kettering, Newbauer "fondled [her] right leg and said how nice her leg felt." Kettering Depo. at 89-90. She told him to stop. Id. When she later bent over to pick something up, Newbauer said, "Oh, and while you're down there . . .," to which Kettering responded, "I don't believe you," and walked away. Id. at 90. She immediately reported this incident to Bennington, who allegedly exclaimed that it was "sexual harassment" and that Kettering did not have to "take that from Newbauer or anyone else." Bennington later told Kettering that Newbauer had been told to straighten up.

This quote and the following uncited quotes all come from a diary that Kettering started keeping after the first alleged incident of sexual harassment. She edited the diary herself and deleted the parts that she felt were not relevant. The diary is located in full at Answer Brief of Plaintiff, Kettering Depo., Exh. A.

According to Kettering, shortly after the April 25th incident, Newbauer began a campaign of "harassment" against her. For example, after she told Newbauer that she had made 26 calls one day, Newbauer replied sarcastically, "Is that all?" As another example, Newbauer told Kettering to call on the Allstate Insurance Office. When Kettering questioned why she should stop there as Allstate used a network of glass installers that did not include Diamond, he replied, "Bull-fucking shit. If he wants you to call on him, you better fucking call on him." Kettering alleges that, on another day, Newbauer threw a tantrum when she told him that District Manager Omaits directed her to run the Akron shop the next day because an installer would be off and Newbauer would have to fill in. Newbauer ranted that he wanted someone from Cleveland to come in "who knows what he's doing." On yet another occasion, Newbauer kept interrupting Kettering when she was on the phone with a customer. When she asked him to let her finish her conversation with the customer, Newbauer replied loud enough for the customer to hear, "This is fucking important." Finally, Newbauer told the customer service representative in the Mansfield shop that he thought Kettering "dressed like a slut." This comment, however, was made over the telephone and outside Kettering's presence.

On May 9, 1997, Kettering allegedly received a call from Omaits in which he stated, "Everything is negative on your part, not Keith Newbauer's. Our figures the past two months in Akron have been the highest ever. You are more disrespectful to Newbauer than he is to you. Ohio is the best store in most of the nation now and you seem to be the crux of the problem. I will not allow negativism to pull this store down." He also told her that Bennington told him Newbauer was bordering on a sexual harassment charge due to the incident in April, saying, "You have absolutely no grounds for a sexual harassment charge and [you] have made Newbauer very uncomfortable." He concluded, "I like you a lot and think you're a good rep." After this conversation, says Kettering, "Newbauer apparently got the message as he did not directly harass [her]; however, he did it surreptitiously and behind [her] back." Answer Brief of Plaintiff (Doc. No. 29) at 6.

Omaits denies that he ever knew about Newbauer's complaint.

On September 19, 1997, Kettering, Newbauer and Benbow were in the Akron store discussing the importance of good customer relations. Kettering stated that she felt it was very important to have follow-up visits with customers thanking them for their business soon after making a sale. Newbauer allegedly replied, "I'll bet you really take care of them . . ." — after which he made a motion with his hand and mouth suggesting oral sex. Kettering told Newbauer she was insulted. Three weeks later, on October 6, 1997, she reported the incident to Bennington during a meeting in Cincinnati. The next day, Bennington called Rich Rutta, one of the owners of Diamond, and informed him about the incident. She told Kettering that Newbauer would be spoken to about the incident and promised that it would be handled according to company policy. District Manager Omaits investigated the incident (which Newbauer denied) and admonished Newbauer not to make any inappropriate remarks to Kettering or anyone else. Motion, Omaits Aff ¶ 4. He filed a written employee disciplinary report in Newbauer's personnel file on October 9, 1997. See Id., Exh. A. On October 17, Bennington asked Kettering how Newbauer was treating her, to which she replied, "He's very distant and speaks very little to me."

On February 3, 1998, a meeting was held in the Akron store with Kettering, Benbow, Newbauer, Bennington and Omaits in attendance. Kettering was criticized for lagging sales in the Akron territory as well as improperly identifying new customers on her weekly reports.

On June 10 and 11, 1998, Omaits sent Susan Parris, the sales representative for Diamond's Cleveland, Ohio store, on sales calls with Kettering in Kettering's territory. Kettering claims that Omaits sent Parris "to be [his] eyes and ears" and to unofficially critique her performance. Parris reported to Omaits that Kettering refused to call on certain businesses and spoke too highly of her previous employer, a competitor of Diamond, at some of the accounts.

On June 13, 1998, Omaits came to the Akron store and fired Kettering. According to Kettering, Omaits told her that she was being fired because she had not increased sales in Akron or Mansfield and because of her sales technique. Further, "You scared the hell out of us with your sexual harassment threats . . . Keith Newbauer became the victim and you're too sensitive." According to Omaits, Kettering was terminated because she made little or no impact on sales in the Akron territory, she generated very little new business and improperly reported new accounts. It was either lay someone off, fire someone, or cut back on store hours. Diamond decided to fire Kettering because it could not justify her salary.

On November 13, 1998, Kettering filed an administrative charge of sexual harassment and retaliation with the EEOC. In the ensuing investigation, the EEOC requested information from Diamond. Diamond asked Parris to prepare a statement summarizing her observations of Kettering's work. Parris wrote that Kettering refused to call on certain businesses, spoke too highly of her previous employer at some of the accounts, dressed inappropriately and made some lewd comments. Omaits Aff, Exh. A. This statement was forwarded to the EEOC along with various other materials responding to the EEOC's information request.

On June 11, 1999, Kettering filed the instant lawsuit alleging federal and state hostile environment sexual harassment and retaliation claims against Diamond, and a defamation claim against Parris.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). All facts and inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). If, after reviewing the record as a whole, a rational fact finder could not find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate since there is no genuine issue of material fact for determination at trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Ultimately, the Court must decide "whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment

Kettering contends that Newbauer's conduct constitutes hostile environment sexual harassment. In Ohio, the legal standards for establishing unlawful sexual discrimination are the same under the Ohio Revised Code as they are under Title VII of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Laderach v. U-Haul of Northwestern Ohio, 207 F.3d 875, 828 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Little Forest Med. Ctr. of Akron v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 61 Ohio St.3d 607, 609-10 (1991). Thus, the following analysis applies to Kettering's state and federal discrimination claims. Laderach, 207 F.3d at 828 (citing Norbuta v. Loctite Corp., 181 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1999)).

In order to establish a prima facie claim of hostile environment sexual harassment, Kettering must provide sufficient evidence to show that (1) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based upon her gender; (3) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work or created a hostile or offensive environment that was severe and pervasive; and (4) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and unreasonably failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action. Fenton v. HiSan, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 829-30 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998) and Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)). Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at discrimination occurring because of the plaintiffs gender. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). Nor is Title VII designed "to purge the workplace of vulgarity." Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997 (quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)). Simple teasing, offhand comments and isolated incidents, unless extremely serious, do not give rise to an actionable discrimination claim. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Both objective and subjective standards must be applied when determining whether conduct constitutes a "hostile environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993). "Conduct must be so severe and pervasive that both a reasonable person and the actual victim find it abusive." Blough v. Hawkins Market, Inc., 51 F. Supp.2d 858, 864 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-23). Factors the court should consider in making this determination include the frequency of the alleged conduct, its severity, its verbal or physical nature, and whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs work performance. Id. Based on this well-established law, the Court concludes that Kettering has failed to establish a prima facie claim of hostile environment sexual harassment for several reasons.

There are only two occasions on which Newbauer's alleged harassment could even be deemed "sexual." The first is the April 25, 1997 incident when Newbauer allegedly fondled Kettering's leg and suggested oral sex. The second is the September 19, 1997 incident when Newbauer allegedly suggested that Kettering showed gratitude to her customers by providing oral sex. The other allegations of misconduct cannot be characterized as anything other than insensitive, rude, or crass. (Newbauer's comment that Kettering dressed like a slut was not even made to Kettering, but to an individual at another store.) Other than the two sexually-charged incidents, Kettering acknowledged that Newbauer shared his generally disagreeable conduct with everyone (except perhaps Omaits) and indicated that a male co-worker, Benbow, got the worst of it. Kettering Depo. at 69-72. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the two isolated incidents of sexual harassment, separated by five months, are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to the reasonable person to sustain a hostile environment claim. See, e.g., Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000) (harassment held insufficiently severe or pervasive where supervisor told dirty jokes in plaintiffs presence, made a verbal sexual advance related to plaintiffs evaluation, referred to plaintiff as "Hot Lips" on one occasion, and made isolated comments about plaintiffs state of dress).

Nor has Kettering shown that these incidents were sufficiently severe and pervasive to her. Kettering spent only 2 to 4 hours per week at the Akron shop. While she testified that it was "difficult at times" to get along with Newbauer, Kettering Depo. at 63-64, she also admitted that she "thoroughly enjoyed" her job. Id. at 96. It took her three weeks to report the second alleged incident to her supervisor. The undisputed evidence shows that once she reported the matter to management, the allegation was investigated and resolved within three days, after which there were no further incidents. When asked at deposition, Kettering testified that Newbauer never indicated he wanted to have sex with her and she never thought he wanted to have sex with her. Kettering Depo. at 86-87. She has provided absolutely no evidence that her work environment in Akron negatively impacted the performance of her job and, in fact, maintains that she did a good job.

Kettering cannot establish a sexual harassment claim under Title VII for another reason. In a "deferral state," such as Ohio, Title VII requires a plaintiff to file an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the time the discriminatory act allegedly occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers' Int'l Union of North America, 177 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1158 (2000) (citation omitted). However, where there is an ongoing, continuous series of discriminatory acts, they may be challenged in their entirety as long as one of those acts falls within the limitations period. Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 677 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Based on the foregoing analysis of Newbauer's conduct, the Court rejects Kettering's argument that the alleged sexually discriminatory acts were ongoing or continuous. Accordingly, because the November 1998 EEOC charge was filed more than 300 days after the April 1997 and September 1997 discriminatory acts allegedly occurred, the Title VII sexual harassment claim must be dismissed as a matter of law.

B. Retaliation

In order for Kettering to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, she must show that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) Diamond knew of this exercise of her protected rights, (3) Diamond took an employment action adverse to her, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 860 (6th Cir. 1997); Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. Canitia, 903 F.2d at 1066. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then show that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for the real reason, i.e., retaliation. Id. To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason either had no basis in fact, did not actually motivate the discharge, or was insufficient to motivate discharge. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994).

It is undisputed that Kettering complained to management about Newbauer's alleged sexual harassment, that Diamond knew about this exercise of her protected rights, and that Diamond ultimately fired her. The question is whether there was a connection between her complaints of harassment and her termination.

Diamond argues that Kettering did not engage in "protected activity" because she did not file an EEOC charge until after she was discharged. However, it has provided no Sixth Circuit case law supporting this position.

To show a causal connection, Kettering must provide sufficient evidence for the Court to infer that Diamond would not have fired her had she not complained about Newbauer's conduct. Stein v. Kent State Univ., No. 98-3278, 1999 WL 357752 *7 (6th Cir. May 11, 1999) citing EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997) and Zanders v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990). Temporal proximity can show an employer's retaliatory intent, although closeness in time alone may not support such an inference. See Moon v. Transport Drivers, Inc., 836 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 1987); Cooper v. City of North Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1986) ("The mere fact that [Plaintiff] was discharged four months after filing a discrimination complaint is insufficient to support an inference of retaliation."). In making this determination, the Court may consider the employee's employment record prior to the alleged retaliation for evidence that refutes her claim. Canitia, 903 F.2d at 1066-67.

Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Kettering was fired eight months after her second and last sexual harassment complaint was investigated and resolved. This eight-month gap is insufficient to establish the requisite causal connection. Cooper v. City of North Olmsted, 795 F.2d at 1272. However, Kettering also alleges that Omaits told her that she "scared the hell out of us with [her] sexual harassment threats" on the day that he fired her. The Court finds that this alleged statement is sufficient to establish a causal connection between Kettering's termination and her complaints of sexual harassment. Thus, Kettering has established her prima facie case.

Having done so, it is Diamond's burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Kettering's discharge. Omaits testified at length at deposition regarding the reasons for firing Kettering. According to Omaits, Kettering was originally hired to increase sales in Akron. However, upon realizing that the Akron budget alone could not support her salary, he had her cover the Mansfield territory as well — splitting her salary between the budgets for the Akron and Mansfield stores. Diamond fired Kettering because she had little or no impact on sales in Akron and, therefore, Diamond could not justify her salary. Omaits testified that Benbow told him that, unlike sales representatives in other territories, Kettering's name was never mentioned by customers. Omaits also testified that he was under pressure from Diamond owner Rich Rutta, who was constantly asking him about new accounts. He could not tell Rutta that Kettering was generating new accounts because she was not properly reporting them, and because there was no appreciable difference in sales in Akron before or after she was hired. He testified that he met with Kettering in February 1998 and discussed his concerns with her at that time. He further testified that he sent Parris to work with Kettering for a few days in Akron and that Parris reported to him that she (Parris) had procured sales in a car dealership that Kettering had declared "locked out" by the competition, that Kettering appeared reluctant to go into an auto parts store that Parris believed might generate some sales, and that Kettering seemed to promote the interests of her former employer over Diamond. Shortly thereafter, he fired Kettering. The Court finds that Diamond has successfully articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Kettering's termination.

Kettering has the burden of providing sufficient evidence to show that Diamond's reason for firing her was simply a pretext for retaliation. In order to refute Diamond's position that she had little impact on sales in Akron, Kettering would have to show that the sales during her tenure were significantly greater than they were before she came on board. She has not produced the relevant records. Instead, the only tangible evidence that Kettering has provided are records of sales in March and April 1998 while she was still employed by Diamond, and in August 1998 after she was fired. These sales records are inconclusive. The fact that they show that the Akron store turned a profit while she was there says absolutely nothing about whether she increased sales. Further, records of sales in August are not relevant in that Kettering was no longer employed by Diamond, and they lead to no conclusion because the August numbers are both higher than before her termination (March), and lower (April). Kettering has utterly failed to show that the reasons proffered by Diamond had no basis in fact or were insufficient to motivate her discharge.

In addition, although Omaits' alleged statement that Kettering "scared the hell out of us with [her] sexual harassment threats" at the time of her discharge is sufficient to establish Kettering's prima facie case, it is insufficient, standing alone, to show that Diamond's proffered reason did not actually motivate her discharge. Importantly, counsel for Kettering did not develop this alleged statement at Omaits' deposition. Not only did counsel not ask Omaits whether he actually made the statement, counsel did not ask what Omaits meant by it, who the "us" was that Kettering allegedly scared by her "threats," and whether that had anything to do with Kettering's discharge. Kettering herself admitted that Omaits did not say that he fired her `because of' her sexual harassment complaints. Kettering Depo. at 135. Likewise, Omaits was not asked whether he sent Parris out with Kettering on sales calls, as Kettering alleged, for the sole purpose of getting negative feedback in order to fire Kettering, or whether it was related to Kettering's sexual harassment complaints. While the Court must assume for summary judgment analysis, that Omaits made the alleged statement, the Court concludes that, standing alone, Omaits' statement is insufficient to show that Diamond's business justification was just a pretext.

C. Defamation

Kettering's defamation claim focuses solely on the written statement of defendant Susan Parris that was procured by Diamond and submitted, along with other materials, to the EEOC pursuant to its information request. Under Ohio law, a defamation action has five elements: (1) a false statement, (2) defamatory to the plaintiff, (3) published to a third party, (4) by a defendant who was at least negligent, (5) damaging the plaintiffs reputation. New Olde Village Jewelers, Inc. v. Outlet Communications, Inc., No. 98-4407, 2000 WL 64942 *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2000) (citing Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 176 (1987)). Diamond argues that Parris' statement is privileged and, regardless, is not defamatory because it constitutes her opinion of Kettering's work performance.

The only case in Ohio that addresses this issue holds that communications made to the EEOC in the course of an investigation are absolutely privileged. Lal Salini v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., No. 51913, 1987 WL 11098 *4 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. May 14, 1987). Furthermore, Ohio law has long held that communications between an employer and an employee concerning the conduct of a former employee, made in good faith concerning a matter of common interest are protected by a qualified privilege. Gaumont v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 61 Ohio App.3d 277, 289 (1989). Parris' statement constitutes a communication requested by her employer regarding a former employee concerning a matter of common interest. With respect to the issue of good faith, although Kettering alleges that Omaits sent Parris out on a mission to dig up negative information about her work, this allegation about Omaits is insufficient to demonstrate bad faith or malice on the part of Parris.

Additionally, truth is a complete defense to a claim for defamation, Ed Schory Sons, Inc. v. Soc. Natl. Bank, 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 445 (1996), and opinions are not actionable. Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 280 (1995). Parris reported to the EEOC that, during the two days she worked with Kettering, Kettering refused to call on certain businesses and spoke highly of a competitor at some accounts. Parris also generally commented on Kettering's demeanor.

Kettering herself has admitted that she refused to call on businesses if she felt her safety was jeopardized, and does not dispute that Parris sold a windshield to a car dealership Kettering did not want to call on because she felt Diamond was locked out of the competition. Indeed, Kettering earlier admitted that she questioned Newbauer when he told her to call on Allstate Insurance for the same reason. See supra at 3. Nor does Kettering deny complimenting her former employer. That Parris concluded she felt Kettering was promoting her former employer over Diamond is Parris' opinion. Regarding Kettering's demeanort, Kettering herself has admitted to referring to co-workers and customers as "doofuses" and "buttholes." Kettering Depo. at 79-80. The evidence just does not present sufficient disagreement to require submission of this claim to a jury on the issue of truthfulness. Terry Barr Sales Agency, 96 F.3d at 178 (citation omitted). Thus, even if privilege does not protect Parris' statement, Kettering has failed to sufficiently establish that the statement was defamatory.

Being "locked out" of the competition has never prevented a successful sales person from making sales calls.

IV.

In short, the two alleged isolated incidents of sexual harassment separated by five months are simply insufficient to state a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment as a matter of law. Kettering has failed to produce sufficient evidence that her termination, nine months after the second and final incident of sexual harassment of which she complained to management, is actionable retaliation. Finally, Parris' statement regarding Kettering's performance, submitted as part of a package Diamond sent to the EEOC in the course of its investigation, are privileged, and even if not, Kettering has failed to produce sufficient evidence of bad faith or malice on Parris' part, that her observations were untruthful, or her opinions actionable. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ( Doc. No. 25) is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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KETTERING v. DIAMOND TRIUMPH AUTO GLASS
(Jul 5, 2000)