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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FIRME HASSAN HAJJAJ, Defendantand Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHIRA SCHEINDLIN, District Judge I. INTRODUCTION

Eville Vargas brings this action against six named and two unnamed Depart of Corrections officers for allegedly assaulting him in violation of his Constitutional rights. Vargas now moves to amend his Complaint to name the previously unnamed officers, and also moves for an extension of time to complete service on the two named officers not previously served. For the following reasons, Vargas's motion to amend is denied, and his motion for additional time to complete service is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

On October 26, 2009, Vargas filed this action pursuant to Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, alleging that on January 17, 2007, he was illegally and brutally assaulted by a number of Department of Corrections officers. His Complaint listed six named officers (John Ciarletta, Eddie St. Bernard, William Serrano, Ronnie Rosario, Denise Robinson, and Darryl Lago) and two unnamed officers (John Does #1 and #2) as defendants. Because Vargas was incarcerated, the U.S. Marshals served his Complaint on Ciarletta, Rosario, Robinson, and Lago. However, because St. Bernard and Serrano had letired, they could not be located at that time and neither were served.

See Complaint ¶¶ 24-35.

See Docket Nos. 8-11.

See Endorsed 3/19/10 Notice of Motion for Extension of Time to Serve, at 1.

On March 19, 2010, this Court ordered defendants' counsel to help Vargas locate the two retired defendants and identify the two unnamed defendants. Further, this Court ordered Vargas to serve the Complaint on the remaining defendants within sixty days of obtaining this information. Accordingly, on April 1, 2010, defendants' counsel provided Vargas with the addresses of the two retired defendants and a number of documents enabling him to identify the two John Doe defendants.

See id. at 2.

See id.

See 9/28/10 Letter from Defendants to the Court in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend at 2.

On September 10, 2010, Vargas moved to amend his Complaint to replace the two John Doe defendants with two officers he identified from the documents. Further, because the June 1, 2010 court-ordered deadline to serve the retired defendants had expired and they had not yet been served, Vargas also moved for additional time to complete service.

See 9/10/10 Motion for Leave to Amend and Extension of Time ("Pl. Motion") at 1.

See id.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Leave to Amend

Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he Court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." However, "in determining whether leave to amend should be granted, the district court has discretion to consider . . . the apparent `futility of amendment.'" Specifically, if the claims the plaintiff seeks to add would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations, amendment would be futile and leave to amend should be denied.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).

Grace v. Rosenstock, 228 F.3d 40, 53 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

See id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Claims added subsequent to the expiration of the statute of limitations may still be timely, however, if they "relate back" to the date the original complaint was filed. Rule 15(c) states, in relevant part, that where "the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted," relation back is allowed if the party to be brought in by amendment "(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity."

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c).

Id.

With regard to mistaken identity, the Second Circuit has held that defendants who were not named due to the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of their identities are not "mistaken" parties within the meaning of Rule 15(c)(3)(B). Rather, "[this] rule is meant to allow an amendment changing the name of a party to relate back to the original complaint only if the change is the result of an error, such as a misnomer or misidentification." In sum, "Rule 15(c) does not allow an amended complaint adding new defendants to relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities."

See Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466, 469-70 (2d Cir. 1995).

Id. at 469.

Id. at 470.

B. Timing of Service

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) states, in relevant part, that "[i]f a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the court . . . must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service to be made within a specific time." However, "if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period." To determine whether a plaintiff has shown good cause under Rule 4(m), courts generally consider whether "(1) the plaintiff made reasonable efforts to serve the defendant, and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by the delay in service." At the same time, a showing of good cause is not necessarily even required for a time extension — "district courts have discretion to grant extensions even in the absence of good cause."

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).

Id. (emphasis added).

Spear v. Hugles, No. 08 Civ. 4026, 2009 WL 2176725, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Zapata v. City of New York, 502 F.3d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 2007).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Leave to Amend

"`John Doe' pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a `John Doe' with a named party constitutes a change in the party sued." Therefore, unless Vargas's proposed amendment either falls within the applicable statute of limitations or relates back to his original Complaint, his proposed amendment is futile and leave to amend should be denied.

See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

The statute of limitations on claims brought under section 1983 "is found in the general or residual state statute of limitations for personal injury actions." With regard to Vargas's claim, the relevant statute of limitations is three years. Because Vargas filed his motion to amend on September 10, 2010, or approximately eight months after the statute of limitations for his claim expired, his proposed amendment is time barred.

Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).

See id. (citing N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(5)). Accord Dominguez v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 2620, 2010 WL 3419677, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010).

Further, Vargas's proposed amendment cannot relate back, because he did not made a mistake in identifying any party. Rather, he seeks to add "new names . . . to correct a lack of knowledge." Therefore, because his proposed amendment would be futile, leave to amend is denied. As harsh as this rule might seem, statutes of limitations always act to bar claims, and Vargas assumed this risk when he decided to file his action a mere two and a half months before the statute of limitations deadline.

Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470.

B. Timing of Service

Vargas asked the Pro Se Office for materials to serve the retired defendants promptly upon discovering their addresses, and attempted to follow up his request with the Office a month and a half later after he received no response. In light of his pro se status and incarceration, I find that he has made reasonable efforts to serve the retired defendants. Vargas has shown good cause for the delay and is therefore entitled to a time extension to serve defendants St. Bernard and Serrano.

See 4/20/10 Letter from Plaintiff to Pro Se Office, attached to Pl. Motion.

See 6/2/10 Letter from Plaintiff to Pro Se Office, attached to Pl. Motion.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Vargas's motion to amend is denied, and his motion for additional time to complete service is granted. The Pro Se Office is directed to provide Vargas with the materials requested in his April 20, 2010 letter, and Vargas is directed to prepare and deliver these materials for service within thirty days after receipt of the materials. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion (docket # 24). A conference is scheduled for Wednesday, January 19, 2011, at 4:30 PM.

SO ORDERED:

Dated: New York, New York

November 4, 2010

oning decisions by boards of supervisors when the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Wright v. Mayor and Comm'rs of City of Jackson, 421 So.2d 1219, 1223 (Miss. 1982); City of Oxford v. Inman, 405 So.2d 111, 112 (Miss. 1981); Hughes v. Mayor and Comm'rs of City of Jackson, 296 So.2d 689, 691 (Mis. 1974). See also Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Conerly, 509 So.2d 877, 886 (Miss. 1987); Cloverleaf Mall, Ltd. v. Conerly, 387 So.2d 736, 741 (Miss. 1980); Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So.2d 384, 387-88 (Miss. 1966); Cockrell v. Panola County Bd. of Supervisors, 950 So.2d 1086, 1095 (Miss.Ct.App. 2007).

¶ 29. Rezoning hearings are informal in nature. Woodland Hills Conservation Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 443 So.2d 1173, 1180 (Miss. 1983). To determine the factual issues in rezoning requests, a board may consider information provided at the rezoning hearing, its own common knowledge, and its own familiarity with the area. Faircloth, 592 So.2d at 943; see also Childs, 1 So.3d at 860. The rules of evidence are misplaced in rezoning matters. Woodland Hills, 443 So.2d at 1180. The board also may consider any hearsay evidence that is admitted when it makes its decision. Id. at 943-44. "It is both proper and desirable that rezoning decision makers consider information they have acquired outside the hearing room." Id. In Board of Aldermen of Town of Bay Springs v. Jenkins, 423 So.2d 1323 (Miss. 1982), this Court stated that "[t]he hearing should be an informal, nonadversary proceeding in which the rules of evidence are not applicable" and reaffirmed that the mayor and board of aldermen were permitted to consider both sworn and unsworn statements at the hearing and their common knowledge and familiarity with the area. Id. (quoting R. Khayat and D. Reynolds, Zoning Law in Mississippi, 45 Miss. L.J. 365, 372-73 (1974)). Notwithstanding that informality is acceptable in rezoning proceedings, the governing body still must "find the necessary criteria for rezoning by clear and convincing evidence[,]" and that the evidence is contained in the record. Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Conerly, 509 So.2d at 885.

¶ 30. This Court has provided some guidance to determine what constitutes substantial evidence. In Board of Aldermen, City of Clinton, this Court held that a governing board needs a minimum of evidence, such as a map, changes in the area, statistics demonstrating a public need, and other, evidence to make an informed judgment. Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton, 509 So.2d at 886. Subsequently, in Sea Lands, this Court stated that "it is impossible to articulate or design a particular test for determining what is sufficient evidence to show a material change and a public need to support rezoning." Sea Lands, 759 So.2d at 1227-28. As stated in Sea Lands, while there is no test to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood and public need, without comparable evidence, such as maps showing a change or recent rezoning in the area, statistics or other evidence of growth in the neighborhood, and charts showing the quantity of construction, the record lacks comparable evidence to show a material change in the neighborhood or a public need. Id.; Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton, 509 So.2d at 886.

¶ 31. However, this Court also recognizes that zoning is not stagnant. "Because communities grow and changes occur, municipal officials possess the power to rezone." Woodland Hills, 443 So.2d at 1180. A good comprehensive plan "contemplates a dynamic community" and recognizes change that balances growth with individual property interests. Id. at 1179. The Court has held:

[A]ll presumptions must be indulged in favor of the validity of zoning ordinances. It is presumed to be reasonable and for the public good. It is presumed that the legislative body investigated it and found conditions such that the action which it took was appropriate. The one assailing the validity has the burden of proof to establish that the ordinance is invalid or arbitrary or unreasonable as to his property, and this must be by clear and convincing evidence.
Edwards v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 22 So.3d 268, 279 (Miss. 2009) (quoting Childs, 1 So.3d at 861). "Again Rhyne also points out: `Zoning is not static, and zoning restrictions are subject to change. Thus, a municipality may amend its zoning ordinance whenever it deems conditions warrant such change.'" Edwards, 22 So.3d at 275 (citing City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646, 654, 139 So.2d 660, 663 (1962)). Mississippi Code Section 11-1-17(1)(a) states, in part:

The governing authority of each municipality and county may provide for the preparation, adoption, amendment, extension and carrying out of a comprehensive plan for the purpose of bringing about coordinated physical development in accordance with present and future needs. . . .

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-17(1)(a) (Rev. 2002).

¶ 32. The Board's order provides little insight into its reasoning for granting rezoning. However, the order adopted the Commission's recommendation to rezone and grant a special exception with limitations. The order also recited who made presentations and who provided testimony for and against rezoning. The trial court affirmed the Board's decision granting rezoning and granting a special exception to Aldridge. In determining that there was substantial evidence to permit rezoning, the trial court stated:

The Baard's January 14, 2008, order stated:

On January 14, 2008, there came on for consideration by the Board of Supervisors of Panola County, Mississippi, an appeal filed by Lent E. Thomas, Jr., of a decision of the Panola County Land Development Commission dated December 10, 2007, recommending that five (5) acres be reclassified from agricultural to industrial and approving a special exception for the operation of a junk yard/salvage yard/recycling business on said five (5) acres. Attorney Larry O. Lewis presented the matter on behalf of Chris Aldridge and introduced various exhibits which are incorporated herein by reference. Chris Aldridge testified in his own behalf. Attorney Michael Craves presented matters on behalf of Lent E. Thomas, Jr., which exhibits are incorporated herein by reference. The testimony of Brenda Solomito and John Fiser was offered in opposition to reclassification and special exception. Amy Thomas testified that she objected to the proposal and presented letters to the Board which are incorporated by reference. After discussion, Supervisor Avant made a motion, which was seconded and unanimously adopted, that the five (5) acre tract described in the application belonging to Chris Aldridge in Section 23, Township 9 South, Range 8 West, be reclassified from agricultural to industrial and that the special exception be granted upon the same terms and conditions as approved by the Panola County Land Development Commission.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED by the Board of Supervisors of Panola County, Mississippi, that the five (5) acre tract located in Section 23, Township 9 South, Range 8 West belonging to Chris M. Aldridge be and the same is hereby re-classified from agricultural to industrial. The application for special exception filed by Chris Aldridge for the operation of a junk yard/salvage yard is hereby approved upon the same terms an (sic) limitations as set forth by the Panola County Land Development Commission Resolution dated December 10, 2007.

The record before the Panola Land Development Commission as well as the Panola County Board of Supervisors is that there are numerous businesses along [H]ighway 6 west from Batesville. Some are industrial; some are commercial. Some are supply companies. Many are related to the retail sale of . automobiles. There are lumber supply companies, schools, and private homes, farms as well as others. Therefore, there was ample evidence before the board of heavy industrial business as well as recent industrial and commercial expansions.
This Court is of the opinion that there was ample evidence before the Board of Supervisors for a finding by the Board that there is an ongoing material change in the character of the neighborhood and the change has continued since the adoption of the Panola County Land Use Ordinance in 2002:
The Board of Supervisors had sufficient evidence before them, as revealed by the record, to find there is a public need in Panola County for an additional company to buy and dispose of scrap metal. The Board had the right to consider the ongoing expansion of industry in Panola County and the need for private citizens as well as other commercial and industrial entities to have another outlet for scrap metal. The record reveals that there is only one other scrap metal collector in Panola County.
The Board of Supervisors had more than sufficient evidence before it to find by clear and convincing evidence that the character of the neighborhood has substantially changed and continues to change since the adoption of the Land Use Ordinance in 2002 and there is a public need existing for rezoning to better care for the needs of the people and businesses in the area to dispose of scrap metal. Mayor and Board of Aldermen v. Estate of Lewis, 963 So.2d 1210 (Miss.Ct.App. 2007).
This Court cannot say that based upon the evidence before the Board of Supervisors that their decision is not "fairly debatable".[sic] Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So.2d 902, 906 (Miss. 1987). Also Town of Florence v. Sea Lands Ltd, 759 So.2d 1221, 1224 (Miss. 2000).

¶ 33. Thomas contends that the evidence provided by Aldridge did not demonstrate a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood. We disagree. Aldridge provided various maps to the Board. The aerial map showed the location of his property in relation to other landowners. Aldridge discussed the location of current commercial and industrial businesses in relation to his facility. It is evident that the area has a mixture of agricultural, commercial, and industrial uses, despite its agricultural zoning. The Board already had granted a special exception in the area to operate a used car lot since the adoption of the ordinance. Indeed, the Board was made aware that Aldridge's property had been used for a number of years as an industrial business, a concrete plant, prior to its use as a junkyard. In addition, the Board was aware that Aldridge had been granted a special exception to operate the junkyard previously, although the circuit court had reversed that Board decision because the land was not zoned industrial at the time and in accordance with the ordinance. In other words, the Board was familiar with the land at issue and was aware that it had not been used as agricultural land for many years.

¶ 34. The land-use map showed the current land use for the whole county, with agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial, and flood-plain classifications. As noted above, a special exception to operate a used car lot was granted in the area since the adoption of the Panola County Land Use District Ordinance in 2002. In regard to the land use for the county, it was brought to the Board's attention that the Commission had determined that approximately ninety-nine percent of Panola County was designated as agricultural, with very limited industrial zoning. Additionally, the Board was made aware that the current zoning was problematic for all the businesses along Highway 6, including Aldridge's property, because the agricultural zoning did not coincide with the actual use of the properties.

¶ 35. The Panola County zoning ordinance likewise provided the formal, written guide that Panola County adopted to have orderly planning and classification of its land, and it provided the procedure to rezone land and request a special exception. The handwritten list of businesses in the county and city limits provided a reference point in connection with Aldridge's property at issue. Aldridge's counsel stated the surrounding businesses near Aldridge's property and addressed expansions of some businesses. The numerous photographs depicting Aldridge's facility and the surrounding area and other businesses provided a reference for determining how the facility was used and what area businesses were nearby. The photographs also showed that many parcels of land were used for purposes other than agriculture.

¶ 36. At the hearing, Aldridge's counsel referenced the growth in the area as evidenced by building and occupancy permits. He requested that the Board consider all documents in control of Panola County demonstrating population, business, and commercial growth. Further, Aldridge listed and requested any minutes of any agency in Panola County, including the minutes of the Panola County Land Development Commission and the minutes of the Board of Supervisors, that had any connection with Aldridge's application for rezoning and special exception. The record does contain a copy of the Board's order granting the rezoning and special exception, a copy of Aldridge's application, deed, maps, and photographs. This Court has stated that a board may draw from its own common knowledge and its own familiarity with the area when making zoning decisions. Faircloth, 592 So.2d at 943; Childs, 1 So.3d at 860.

¶ 37. This Court finds that the issue of whether there was a change in the character of the neighborhood was fairly debatable. The record contained many documents, including maps, photographs, and the transcript of the January 14 Board hearing. Aldridge's land had been used for industrial purposes for many years prior to his rezoning request. Unfortunately, the January 14, 2008, order by the Board provided no insight into the basis for the Board's decision to rezone and grant a special exception. However, the Planning Commission had recommended the rezoning and the special exception and two representatives appeared before the Board at the hearing with this recommendation. The Board adopted the Commission's recommendation, including the Commission's suggested limitations. Likewise, the Board heard and considered the evidence, including expert testimony, both for and against the rezoning, and granted the rezoning requests.

3. Public need

¶ 38. During the hearing, the Board heard arguments and testimony concerning public need. Aldridge claimed that his business provided a nearby place for the public to sell batteries, aluminum cans, and old, unwanted metal objects. Further, the facility would help the environment by providing a depository for these materials instead of having them discarded in the county, where they could harm the environment. In addition, the Board heard that the facility would benefit the public. Aldridge contended that the public would have a convenient place to dispose of its materials, such as batteries, and the Board and taxpayers would not have to dispose of the materials in landfills or other locations. Further, the issue of economic development and growth was discussed in relation to the zoning ordinance.

¶ 39. On the other hand, Thomas asserted that Panola County had no need for another scrap-metal facility because one already existed in the county. The closest scrap-metal yard is approximately ten miles from Aldridge's business. Thomas mentioned a number of other scrap-metal yards that are various distances from Aldridge's business. Further, Thomas argued that Aldridge had only his personal need for the business, as evidenced by Aldridge's request to rezone no more than his five-acre parcel to help industrial development in Panola County. Thomas also asserted that he owned all the property surrounding Aldridge's property. He claimed that the junkyard would promote increased traffic, road hazards, and the like.

¶ 40. The trial court order stated:

The Board of Supervisors had sufficient evidence before them, as revealed by the record, to find there is a public need in Panola County for an additional company to buy and dispose of scrap metal. The Board had the right to consider the ongoing expansion of industry in Panola County and the need for private citizens as well as other commercial and industrial entities to have another outlet for scrap metal. The record reveals that there is only one other scrap metal collector in Panola County.

¶ 41. This Court cannot say that the Board's decision to rezone was arbitrary and capricious, as the record showed substantial evidence of change in the character of the neighborhood and public need for the junkyard. The appellate courts are not "super-zoning commission[s]" and should not consider themselves to be zoning boards for governing bodies. McWaters v. City of Biloxi 591 So.2d 824, 828 (Miss. 1991). "Whatever may be the personal opinion of the judges of an appeal court on zoning, the court cannot substitute its own judgment as to the wisdom or soundness of the municipality's action." Barnes v. Bd. of Supervisors, DeSoto County, 553 So.2d 508, 510 (Miss. 1989). A board may draw from its own common knowledge and its own familiarity with the area when making zoning decisions. Faircloth, 592 So.2d at 943; Childs, 1 So.3d at 860. This Court cannot over-turn a zoning decision when substantial evidence supports both sides of a rezoning application, because it would be difficult to determine that the decision was not fairly debatable. Edwards, 22 So.3d at 274. The Board had evidence of the former industrial use of the property, the changes in the area, the high agricultural versus commercial or industrial ratio of county lands, the lack of industrially zoned land, and the varied uses of land in the area despite its agricultural zoning, among other things. The Board had substantial evidence before it to support its decision to rezone, and the decision was fairly debatable and cannot be disturbed on appeal.

II. Spot-Zoning

¶ 42. Thomas argues that the trial court erred by affirming the board's rezoning because it constituted spot-zoning. Thomas contends that the rezoning was for no other reason than "to favor" Aldridge. The Board contends that it did not engage in spot-zoning, because it found a public need for the rezoning and, the rezoning was for the betterment of Panola County, not only Aldridge. We agree with the Board.

¶ 43. On the issue of spot-zoning, the trial court stated:

The Appellant, Lent Thomas, Jr., claims that the rezoning and the special exception for the operation of a scrap metal business constitutes impermissible "spot zoning." Impermissible "spot zoning" occurs when a Board rezones a particular "spot" which is not in character with the zoning of the surrounding properties. McKibben v. City of Jackson [,] 193 So.2d 741 (Miss. 1967).
The Panola County Zoning Ordinance gives to the Land Development Commission and the Board of Supervisors the authority to make a special exception for scrap metal collection or "junk yard" on property located in an industrial zone if "controlled as to number, area, location or relation to the neighborhood, would promote public health, safety welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity or general welfare."
This Court must review the findings of the Board of Supervisors and grant a "presumption of validity" and whether or not the issue is "fairly debatable."
Appellant Thomas claims that the special exception and the change in zoning from "agricultural" benefit only Aldridge and his company and is therefore "spot zoning". . . .
Viewed under the above standards, the record as a whole supports the finding of the Board of Supervisors by a preponderance of the evidence. The Land Commission and the Board of Supervisors placed limitations as to time, use, no burnings, fence, all of which indicates a considered judgment rather than an "arbitrary and capricious" discriminatory, illegal act or an act not supported by substantial evidence. This court cannot overturn the Board and judicially call their action "spot zoning". . . .

¶ 44. This Court has found a distinction between spot-zoning and a zoning ordinance that has been validly amended by a governing body. McKibben v. City of Jackson, 193 So.2d 741, 744 (Miss. 1967). "The term `spot zoning' is ordinarily used where a zoning ordinance is amended reclassifying one or more tracts or lots for a use prohibited by the original zoning ordinance and out of harmony therewith." Id. The specific facts of each case dictate whether an amendment to the ordinance is considered void. Id. The caselaw consistently has invalidated zoning ordinances on the basis of spot-zoning, where the zoning ordinances "were designed `to favor' someone." Id. See 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice §§ 8-1 to 8-3 (3d ed. 1965). Recently, this Court stated "an example of an arbitrary or discriminatory zoning decision is `spot zoning.'" Modak-Truran v. Johnson, 18 So.3d 206, 209-10 (Miss. 2009). This Court has defined spot-zoning as "a small island of relatively intense use surrounded by a sea of less intense use." Id. (quoting 2 E.C. Yokley, Zoning'Law and Practice § 13-2 (4th ed. 2000)). h However "[t]he mere fact that an area is small and is zoned at the request of a single owner and is of greater benefit to him than to others does not make out a case of spot zoning if there is a public need for it or a compelling reason for it." Cockrell v. Panola County Bd. of Supervisors, 950 So.2d 1086, 1097 (Miss.Ct.App. 2007) (quoting 2 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 13-5 (4th ed. 1978)). Likewise, this Court has stated that "[w]e are of the opinion that although a zoning ordinance or amendment creates in the center of a large zone a small area or a district devoted to a different use, it is not spot zoning if it is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan." Ridgewood Land Co. v. Simmons, 243 Miss. 236, 252, 137 So.2d 532, 538 (1962).

¶ 45. In order to grant the rezoning, the Board determined that a public need existed for the rezoning. The Board's decision was considered to be "fairly debatable," and this Court will not disturb it on appeal. While Thomas's argument has a degree of merit, and the rezoning may provide Aldridge a benefit, as a rezoning logically always does to one party or another, the Board nevertheless found a public need for rezoning and, on that basis, the decision cannot be considered spot-zoning.

III. Special Exception

¶ 46. Thomas argues that no substantial evidence supported the Board's approval of the special exception. He claims that the record contains no evidence that the special exception "would promote any of the requirements/factors as stated in the ordinance, being `the public health, safety, welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity, or general welfare.'" Aldridge argues that the special exception had numerous restrictions and the record had substantial evidence to support the decision.

¶ 47. The ordinance provides:

Special Exception: A special exception, as used in this Ordinance, is granted by the Land Development Commission and is limited to those special exceptions specifically set forth in this Ordinance. A special exception is a use that would not be appropriate generally or without restriction throughout the Land Use district but which, if controlled as to number, area, location or relation to the neighborhood, would promote the public health, safety, welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity, or general welfare.

Panola County, MS, Panola County Land Use District Ordinance (March 22, 2002).

¶ 48. When this Court is faced with a special-exception case, the party opposing the special exception has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the board acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Perez, 882 So.2d at 219. Special exceptions are "also sometimes referred to as conditional use permits or variances." Perez, 882 So.2d at 224 (Carlson, J., specially concurring). However, when dealing with a special exception, as opposed to rezoning, the case is "adjudicative in nature while zoning ordinances are legislative acts." Barnes, 553 So.2d at 510. The applicant for the special exception has "to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they have met the elements/factors essential to obtaining" the exception. Id. at 511; see also Nichols v. Madison County Bd. of Supervisors, 953 So.2d 1128, 1130 (Miss.Ct.App. 2006). The appellate courts are bound by a board's decision where it is based on substantial evidence. Id. "[T]he Board's decision must have been made in light of a `fairly debatable' issue. We are without authority to supplant the municipality's legislative action if the decision was made in this light." Perez, 882 So.2d at 220.

¶ 49. We find that the Board, and thus the circuit court, in affirming the Board's decision, did not err by granting the special exception. The ordinance provided a two-step process. First, a special exception may be permitted where it is "controlled as to number, area, location or relation to the neighborhood." The ordinance provided for industrial zones and contemplated and provided for the specific special exception of a junkyard within the industrial zone. The Board allowed this one junkyard in the area with the limitations that the special exception was granted only for five years before another review, restricted operation from 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. for six days a week, and permitted no burning on the premises. Second, a special exception may be permitted where, if controlled, it would promote the public health, safety, welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity, or general welfare. While Thomas argues that the record is devoid of substantial evidence, the record provides testimony as to some of these factors. Notwithstanding this, the ordinance does not require that all of the factors be demonstrated, as indicated by the word "or" in the factor list. The record showed that the junkyard would provide a public benefit by its convenience for residents. The junkyard provides a nearby location to dispose of unwanted materials during someone's workday. Aldridge also pointed to the public need for the facility as evidenced by the fact that his business had a successful year in operation. The Board also heard that there was an all-around public benefit. The community had a place to dispose of its used property, and the Board and taxpayers did not have to pay for its disposal in landfills. Aldridge's counsel also made the argument that having another junkyard met public safety and health standards. Specifically, the facility promoted public safety and health because it provided a place of disposal for discarded batteries otherwise left in ditches. These discarded items would harm the environment and would lower property values. While all these facts were not explicitly cited under an exact factor, the Board had proof that the junkyard met the factors as listed in the ordinance. It is true that Thomas presented evidence, testimony, and hearsay that the junkyard promoted some of the negative factors by possibly increasing crime, creating an eye-sore, and increasing traffic, nonetheless, the decision, at the very least, was proven by a preponderance of the evidence and was fairly debatable. Therefore, the Board's decision, and thus the circuit court's decision, is affirmed by this Court.

IV. Constitutionality of the Ordinance

¶ 50. Thomas contends that the trial court erred by ruling that the ordinance was not impermissibly vague. He asserts that his due-process rights were violated because the special-exception provision contained in the ordinance was impermissibly vague and provided no parameters to guide the Board in its decision, thus making the Board's grant of the special exception arbitrary and/or capricious and/or unconstitutional.

¶ 51. Thomas contends that the elements or factors for a special exception should be set forth in a definite and sufficient manner in order to ensure the provision is applied equally and uniformly, or in other words, constitutionally. Thomas takes exception to the ordinance's special-exception provision, which he claims provides no guidance as to the type of evidence the Board must require to validly grant an exception and lists the "requirements" with a disjunctive "or."

¶ 52. A challenger of the constitutionality of a law must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the law is unconstitutional. Trainer v. State, 930 So.2d 373, 377 (Miss. 2006); Jones v. State, 710 So.2d 870, 877 (Miss. 1998) ("A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove his case by showing the unconstitutionality of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt"); Burge v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pearl River County, 213 Miss. 752, 765, 57 So.2d 718, 722 (1952) ("the unconstitutionality of a law must appear beyond a reasonable doubt before we would be justified in striking down the same").

¶ 53. This Court has analyzed a zoning ordinance, as opposed to a statute, for vagueness within the last few years. In Mayor Board of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Welch, 888 So.2d 416, 420 (Miss. 2004), this Court determined whether a zoning ordinance was vague and stated:

When a governmental entity presumes to prohibit otherwise legal activity on a citizen's private property, the constitution requires only that there be a legitimate governmental purpose. City of Jackson v. McPherson, 162 Miss. 164, 138 So. 604 (1932), citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). However, the restriction must be reasonably clear, enabling a citizen to understand what is allowed, and what is not. See generally City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999).
Welch, 888 So.2d at 420. An ordinance is vague "where it fails to provide persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits." Id. (citations omitted); see also Richmond v. City of Corinth, 816 So.2d 373, 377 (Miss. 2002).

¶ 54. While the special-exception provision is stated in the previous issue, it bears repeating for the sake of convenience and to better illustrate the language at issue. The ordinance provides:

Special Exception: A special exception, as used in this Ordinance, is granted by the Land Development Commission and is limited to those special exceptions specifically set forth in this Ordinance. A special exception is a use that would not be appropriate generally or without, restriction throughout the Land Use district but which, if controlled as to number, area, location or relation to the neighborhood, would promote the public health, safety, welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity, or general welfare.

Panola County, MS, Panola County Land Use District Ordinance (March 22, 2002).

¶ 55. First, Thomas raises no issue as to lack of due process through notice or hearing. Second, the ordinance is not so vague as to fail to provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand clearly what conduct is permitted and what conduct is not permitted. Welch, 888 So.2d at 420. The ordinance was not vague beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, Thomas's argument that the ordinance is vague and provides no guidance is without merit. In the preceding issue, we addressed the process set forth in the ordinance to obtain a special exception. The special exception was restricted by the Board in number, area, location, or relation to the neighborhood, and proof was provided as to the promotion of the public health, safety, welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity, or general welfare.

¶ 56. Thomas's assertion that the trial court erroneously justified the constitutionality of the ordinance by referencing the limitations recommended by the Commission and adopted by the Board is without merit The ordinance provided a method to grant a special exception, and the record supports the method by restricting the junkyard and providing testimony on the promotion of public health and the like. This issue is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶ 57. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Panola County, Second Judicial District, which affirmed the Board of Supervisors' grant to rezone Aldridge's five-acre parcel of land from an agricultural to an industrial classification and grant of a special exception to operate a junkyard on Aldridge's property.

¶ 58. AFFIRMED.

CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., KITCHENS AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DICKINSON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J. LAMAR, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

DICKINSON, Justice, dissenting:

¶ 59. To legally rezone real estate, a board of supervisors must find either a mistake in the original zoning or a change in the character of the neighborhood. The Panola County Board of Supervisors found the latter, and the majority of this Court agrees. But the record contains no evidence of any change in the character of the neighborhood — and the majority has pointed to none — so I must dissent.

Edwards v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors. 22 So.3d 268, 274 (Miss'2009).

No recent commercial expansion.

¶ 60. The only evidence in the record of change in the area — as distinct from change in the character of the area — is that in 2002, a used-car lot opened, and at some point, an existing car dealership added a 1,000-square-foot addition to its building.

¶ 61. Most of the majority's discussion actually concerns the absence of change. It quotes the circuit court as follows:

The record before the Panola Land Development Commission as well as the Panola County Board of Supervisors is that there are numerous businesses along [H]ighway 6 west from Batesville. Some are industrial; some are commercial. Some are supply companies. Many are related to the retail sale of automobiles. There are lumber supply companies, schools, and private homes, farms as well as others. Therefore, there was ample evidence before the board of heavy industrial business as well as recent industrial and commercial expansions.

¶ 62. The reference to "recent industrial and commercial expansions" is justified (as far as the record is concerned) by no more than the addition of one car dealership and a modest increase in the size of another. The rest of the commercial activity described by the circuit court had existed, unchanged, for quite some time.

No change in the neighborhood's character.

¶ 63. The majority cites as evidence for change in the neighborhood's character the following: Aldridge provided various maps to the Board. The aerial map showed the location of his property in relation to other landowners. Aldridge discussed the location of current commercial and industrial businesses in relation to his facility. It is evident that the area has a mixture of agricultural, commercial, and industrial uses despite its agricultural zoning. The Board already had granted a special exception in the area to operate a used car lot since the adoption of the ordinance. Indeed, the Board was made aware that Aldridge's property had been used for a number of years as an industrial business, a concrete plant, prior to its use as a junkyard. . . . In other words, the Board was familiar with the land at issue and was aware that it had not been used as agricultural land for many years.

Maj. Op. at ¶ 33.

¶ 64. As with the circuit court's findings, I see no evidence of change in character and, indeed, very little of change at all. The first four sentences of the above passage merely describe the status quo at the time of the hearing. The next sentence mentions one of the car dealers. The last two support my concern: the property's use had not changed for "a number of years." "It had not been used as agricultural land for many years." Perhaps that last sentence shows that the zoning was wrong in the first instance, but that misses the point entirely. This case, the majority correctly holds, does not implicate the mistake clause of the Edwards opinion. The only question before us concerns whether the character of the neighborhood has changed. Based on evidence in the record, it has not.

Maj. Op. at ¶ 26.

¶ 65. The majority writes that "[a]t the hearing, Aldridge's counsel referenced the growth in the area as evidenced by building and occupancy permits." The record contains no data on how much growth — or how little — had occurred, or of what type. Growth does not necessarily (although it can) cause a neighborhood's character to change. For instance, the expansion and growth of a small neighborhood into a large neighborhood would not per se indicate a change in character. Here, we have no evidence of the magnitude or the nature of the alleged growth. So we cannot say that it caused a change in character.

Maj. Op. at ¶ 36.

¶ 66. The majority may be correct that "the current zoning was problematic for all the businesses along Highway 6, including Aldridge's property because the agricultural zoning did not coincide with the actual use of the properties." But while this perhaps could have been grounds for re-zoning because of mistake, it provides no evidence of a change in the character of the area.

Maj. Op. at ¶ 34.

¶ 67. The record evidence supporting the Board's decision to rezone does not rise even to the level of a scintilla. Under Edwards, the rezoning was illegal and we should reverse and render. Therefore, I dissent.

WALLER, C.J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

( Ibid.)

The original judge's court had been designated "nontraffic" and the case going to trial was a traffic matter. ( Sanchez, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 809.)

In concluding that the circumstances of the case rendered dismissal appropriate, our decision in Rhinehart adopted the Sanchez test relating to what constitutes being "brought to trial," commenting that it "gives substance to the rights embodied in section 1382," thereby "ensuring] compliance with both the letter and the spirit of the statute." ( Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 779.) In this way, we discouraged trial courts from "merely paying lip service to the legislative mandate embodied in section 1382." ( Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 779.) This court noted the "circumvention of section 1382" that would be invited by an alternative conclusion: "If a trial court could impanel a jury and delay a trial days or even weeks, then the statutory guarantee of a speedy trial would be rendered a nullity, and an accused's rights under section 1382 would be eviscerated." ( Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 779.)

The Rhinehart decision concluded that past cases "compel the holding that an accused is `brought to trial' within the meaning of section 1382 when a case has been called for trial by a judge who is normally available and ready to try the case to conclusion. The court must have committed its resources to the trial, and the parties must be ready to proceed and a panel of prospective jurors must be summoned and sworn." ( Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 780, fns. omitted.) Applying this standard, we held that the criminal case under review had not been "brought to trial" on the last permissible day, because the jury was impaneled in order to avoid dismissal and the court was not "available or ready to try the case to conclusion." ( Ibid.) Instead, the trial court intended to recess for several days so it could complete another trial.

Applying the decision in Rhinehart to the present case, we disagree with any argument that defendant would have been "brought to trial" on the last day of the statutory period if, at 4:15 p.m. on July 28, 2008, the trial court had assigned the case to the Indio court for trial. Although as of 4:15 p.m. a Riverside Superior Court courtroom and a judge in Indio no longer were occupied with other court proceedings, they were not available to commence defendant's trial in any meaningful sense, because defendant and his attorney (along with the assigned prosecutor) could not, before the close of business on the last day of the statutory period, travel to the distant Indio courthouse from the calendar court — where they had been required to appear and remain throughout the day on July 28 awaiting an open courtroom.

The Rhinehart decision teaches that section 1382 requires more than mere lip service to the fundamental right to a speedy trial; it requires that the elements vital to undertaking a trial be present. One of these vital elements is the presence of the parties and their counsel. In order to commence trial, the parties must be "ready to proceed" ( Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 780); logically, a party is not ready to proceed if he or she cannot be present in the courtroom, along with counsel. Indeed, there are constitutional and related statutory provisions requiring the defendant's presence. (See People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 81 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 418, 193 P.3d 1172] [describing defendant's state and federal constitutional rights to be present at trial in the absence of waiver or certain misconduct, along with his or her statutory rights under §§ 977 1043 to be present]; see also People v. Howze (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394-1396 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 887] [acknowledging that a defendant has a statutory right to be present at the commencement of trial, but finding the right may be waived]; People v. Granderson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 703, 707-708 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 268] [acknowledging that defendants have a right to be present at the commencement of trial, which is defined as occurring when the impaneling of the jury begins].)

To declare that defendant could have been "brought to trial" within the meaning of section 1382 on the last day of the statutory period under the circumstances of the present case would be to accord significance to a "mere device to avoid the impact of the statute." ( Amati, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. Supp. 12.) Through no fault of the defense, defendant and defense counsel could not be "ready to proceed" in the Indio court; there could be no "`good faith start'" ( Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 777-778, italics omitted) to the proceedings. A courtroom that cannot be reached by the parties prior to the close of business is for practical and legal purposes unavailable for bringing the accused to trial. To conclude otherwise — that defendant could have been brought to trial on July 28 — would endorse the view that a defendant may be brought to trial, within the meaning of the speedy trial protections of section 1382, in an unavailable courtroom. This result, in the understated language employed by the trial court, would be "highly artificial." Indeed, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion in this respect, summarily rejecting the People's claim to the contrary.

We next consider the question of what constitutes "good cause" within the meaning of section 1382. If the defendant is not "brought to trial" within the statutory period, dismissal is required unless the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, determines that good cause has been demonstrated. (§ 1382(a); Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 545; Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 629; Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 561, 570.) In order to avoid dismissal, the prosecution must meet the burden of demonstrating good cause for delay. ( Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 781.)

As we recently observed, section 1382 does not define good cause, "but numerous California appellate decisions that have reviewed good-cause determinations under this statute demonstrate that, in general, a number of factors are relevant to a determination of good cause: (1) the nature and strength of the justification for the delay, (2) the duration of the delay, and (3) the prejudice to either the defendant or the prosecution that is likely to result from the delay. [Citations.] Past decisions further establish that in making its good-cause determination, a trial court must consider all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case, `applying principles of common sense to the totality of circumstances. . . .' [Citations.] The cases recognize that, as a general matter, a trial court `has broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to grant a continuance of the trial' [citation], and that, in reviewing a trial court's good-cause determination, an appellate court applies an `abuse of discretion' standard. [Citations.]" ( Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 546, fn. omitted.)

Good cause within the meaning of section 1382 exists, for example, when the delay beyond the statutory period is caused by the conduct of the defendant or occurs for his or her benefit, or there are unforeseen circumstances such as unexpected illness, unanticipated unavailability of counsel, or the absence of a witness despite due diligence to secure his or her attendance. ( Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 570; see Owens v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238, 251, 253 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 466, 617 P.2d 1098]; 5 Witkin Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, §§ 308-312, pp. 457-463.)

It is settled that, although a broad variety of unforeseen events may establish good cause under section 1382, the unavailability of a number of judges or courtrooms sufficient to handle the court's caseload, due to chronic congestion of the court's docket, does not establish good cause, absent exceptional circumstances. ( Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1163; see Stroud v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 952, 969 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 4 P.3d 933].) The view we expressed 30 years ago in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, holds true today, as we confirmed in Engram: "`A defendant's right to a speedy trial may be denied simply by the failure of the state to provide enough courtrooms or judges to enable defendant to come to trial within the statutory period. . . . "[U]nreasonable delay in run-of-the mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the State's criminal-justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn." [Citation.]'" ( Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1163, quoting Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 571-572.)

It is quite evident that routine congestion was the cause of the delay in the present case. At the hearing conducted in the late afternoon of the last permissible day to bring the case to trial, the prosecutor challenged the court concerning the availability of any courtrooms or judges to try the five last-day cases then on the court's calendar, suggesting, among other examples, that the calendar court consider recalling any criminal case from a trial court if that case was not subject to dismissal for delay; assigning the last-day cases to criminal court judges handling pre-preliminary-hearing negotiated dispositions or to judges assigned to the mental health court or the drug court; or assigning the cases to civil court judges hearing probate or family court matters, or to judges hearing traffic cases. The prosecutor suggested that the court's presiding judge and pro tern judges could assume the function of criminal calendar judges, thereby freeing the latter to conduct trials. The prosecutor asked whether the court "has done everything possible and has diverted all civil resources to criminal matters," including interrupting civil trials, and suggested the court could order one of the judges then sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6, subd. (e)) to interrupt ongoing civil trials to preside over the trial of one of the last-day cases.

The response given by the court affords striking evidence of the congestion facing the Riverside criminal courts. It explained convincingly that there were no open criminal courtrooms: "There are not, to the very best of my ability and the ability of my staff to check and recheck all day long sending e-mails and making phone calls, no, there just aren't." The court stated there were no criminal trials being tried "that have remaining time available to where they can be recalled." The court rejected the proposal that certain judges handling negotiated dispositions in criminal cases be reassigned, explaining that such functions were essential to the court system if dismissal of criminal cases on timeliness grounds was to be avoided: "[I]f a judge is settling ten cases a day or fifty a week — that's fifty times as much effect in terms of avoiding the dismissal as if he's trying a case a week."

The court continued: "And the criminal calendar courts know we're not going to take a criminal calendar court judge off in order to have him do a trial. For one thing, many of those are commissioners who can't do trials there. For another thing, all of the criminal calendar courts are resolving cases like crazy. Again, more cases would be dismissed, not less, if we were to disrupt the criminal calendar courts." The court added that it would not recall judges from vacation and that it did not believe any judges were absent for training.

The court went on: "Pro terns, to handle a calendar — we're burning out our pro terns right and left. . . . [T]hese are good people who volunteer but . . . but they don't want to volunteer all the time because their overhead is running at their office." The court added: "No, we are not going to call the P.J. [(presiding judge)] in. . . . [¶] If we don't have somebody administering [the court system], then again, it will lead to inefficiencies, which lead to more dismissals, not less."

The court noted that the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council had been informed of the situation facing the Riverside courts, adding that the court would not press into service for the last-day criminal cases those judges who had been assigned by the Chief Justice to relieve the pressure on civil departments caused by the overwhelming volume of criminal trials. The court emphasized the "human issues" involved in civil cases, including probate and family matters, as well as in traffic cases, and declined to send the last-day cases to those courts for trial.

Moreover, we concluded in our decision in Engram — which examined the very situation in which the Riverside Superior Court found itself during the period here in question — that the severe court congestion then affecting the processing of criminal cases constituted a chronic problem, attributable to the state, that did not constitute good cause within the meaning of section 1382. ( Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1165.) We stated that "when the unavailability of a judge or courtroom is fairly attributable to the fault or neglect of the state, such unavailability does not constitute good cause within the meaning of section 1382." ( Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1163.)

We said of the case then before us in Engram, as well as with reference to other cases involving the congestion in Riverside, that in each of these cases "arising out of the same general circumstances prevailing in the Riverside Superior Court during the relevant period, the trial court properly could find that the congested criminal caseload represented a chronic condition rather than an exceptional circumstance, and further that the lack of available courtrooms and judges was attributable to the Legislature's failure to provide a number of judges and courtrooms sufficient to meet the rapidly growing population in Riverside County." ( Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1164.)

We concluded by pointing out: "The calendar congestion that produced the circumstance in which the numerous last-day criminal cases pending in the superior court exceeded the resources available to the court unquestionably constituted a chronic condition. It cannot properly be characterized as an `exceptional circumstance' as that term was used in our decision in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 571-572." ( Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1165.)

The Court of Appeal in the present case acknowledged that court congestion ordinarily does not constitute good cause for delay. In the view of the appellate court, however, "the physical distance of the available and ready Indio branch courtroom from the court's location in the City of Riverside, which made it impossible for this criminal case to be brought to trial late in the afternoon of the last statutory day for trial, constituted good cause for the court to order Hajjaj, his counsel, and the prosecutor to appear in the Indio court for the commencement of trial beyond the time limit set under section 1382(a)."

The reviewing court assumed that at 4:15 p.m. on July 28, 2008, a jury panel was available and could be sworn that same day. Under these assumed facts, according to the Court of Appeal, "the circumstance that both prevented Hajjaj, his defense counsel, and the prosecutor from appearing before Judge Hawkins for trial on July 28 in the available criminal courtroom at the Indio court and prevented a panel of prospective jurors from being summoned and sworn there that afternoon was the physical remoteness of the Indio court from the Riverside Hall of Justice." The court added: "We are persuaded that had Judge Hawkins's courtroom been located at the Riverside Hall of Justice, this case would have been brought to trial within the statutory time period governed by section 1382(a)."

The record docs not indicate whether or not there was a jury panel available in Indio that could be summoned and sworn for the commencement of voir dire so late in the day.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court, in a proper exercise of its discretion, should have permitted a one-day delay of the commencement of trial to permit an out-of-custody defendant, along with defense counsel and the prosecutor, to travel to the Indio courthouse. The reviewing court, asserting that defendant would not have suffered any prejudice thereby, asserted that the trial court "overlooked the fact that in a large and populous county like the County of Riverside, which is served by a superior court consisting of a central criminal courthouse (the Riverside Hall of Justice) and various outlying branch facilities (such as the Indio court), the administration of justice and the efficient utilization of limited judicial resources may require the parties to a criminal proceeding to travel to a distant court facility." (Italics added.)

The Court of Appeal announced as its holding: "[W]hen, on the last day of the statutorily prescribed time period for commencement of trial in a criminal case, a courtroom becomes ready and available for trial in the late afternoon at a branch court that is physically remote from the criminal calendar court at the main courthouse and that remoteness prevents the parties and counsel from appearing for trial that day, the physical remoteness constitutes good cause within the meaning of section 1382(a) to commence the trial the next day at the branch court."

We disagree with the analysis and conclusion rendered by the Court of Appeal on the issue of good cause. As we have seen, the state bears the duty of supplying judicial resources sufficient to bring defendants to trial within the statutory period. Extended distances and lengthy travel time between a court's calendar department and remote trial departments are circumstances that confront court administrators attempting to fulfill this duty. Thus geography and travel time, being constant obstacles in a large county, are conditions for which court administrators must plan. The neglect of the state in not providing resources adequate to enable the Riverside court to bring cases to trial in a timely manner in the face of these routine, consistent, predictable obstacles represents a "fault or neglect of the state." ( Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1163.) This failure to account for routine and constant circumstances cannot be compared with the events ordinarily underlying a finding of good cause under section 1382, such as actions on the part of the defendant that cause delay, or unexpected or one-time occurrences such as the sudden illness of defense counsel or failure to appear by a witness who has been subpoenaed to testify. (See Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 570.) The logistical difficulty that occurred in the present case was not brought about by any failure on the part of defendant to allocate sufficient time in which to reach a distant assigned court. Instead, it was physically impossible for defendant to travel from the calendar court, where he was required to appear, to the remote courtroom and judge characterized by the district attorney as "available," in time to commence the trial in a timely fashion.

That it was chronic court congestion that caused the problem can be seen from the colloquy that took place between the trial court and the prosecutor concerning the court's fruitless efforts to identify a single open courtroom, and the prosecutor's suggestion that civil trials should come to a halt in order to avoid dismissals of the five last-day cases. The congestion that prevailed into the last hour of the last day for trial — a condition without which the court would not have needed to consider the efficacy of sending defendant's case to the remote courthouse location — did not constitute good cause for exceeding the statutorily prescribed period for trial.

We are unaware of any authority supporting the proposition that the geographical distance between court facilities and the extended travel time required to reach them constitute good cause within the meaning of section 1382, especially when the need to resort to a distant court is caused by chronic court congestion.

In support of our own conclusion, however, we have identified one case bearing some resemblance to the current matter, where neglect attributable to the state's heavy burdens related to the administration of justice prevented the defendant from being present in court in a timely manner. In Jackson v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1391 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 545] ( Jackson), the last day for trial under section 1382 was February 11. The defendant was not present when the case was called, however, because the sheriff failed to transport the in-custody defendant to court until after the trial court's 9:30 a.m. deadline, following which the trial court continued the matter due to the defendant's nonappearance. The lower court viewed the sheriffs failure to transport the defendant to court in time to meet the trial court's deadline as good cause within the meaning of section 1382, but the Court of Appeal disagreed. The court observed that the right to speedy trial "cannot be stifled by procrastination or neglect by public officials." ( Jackson, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 1393.) Although the People pointed to the logistical difficulties faced by the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department in daily transporting approximately 2,000 inmates to court appearances throughout a large and populous county, the Court of Appeal responded: "The risk of delay caused by those charged with official action rests with [the] People, not the defendant." ( Id. at p. 1394.)

As suggested by the court in Jackson, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d 1391, it is the state's obligation to resolve the routine logistical difficulties it faces in bringing defendants to trial in a timely manner. As has been stated, distance and travel time between calendar courts and trial courts are routine matters that must be taken into account by the state in fulfilling its duties. In the present case, had the state committed sufficient resources to criminal trials in Riverside County, it would have provided a courtroom in which defendant actually could be brought to trial within the statutory period; it would not have been necessary to rely upon a proposal to transfer the present case to a distant courthouse at 4:15 p.m. on the last permissible day for trial. The circumstance that a single courtroom and judge became available late in the afternoon of the last day for trial somewhere in the expansive geographical area served by the Riverside County Superior Court does not constitute "good cause" under section 1382 to delay defendant's trial beyond the presumptive statutory period.

The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal does not find support in the circumstance, that "had Judge Hawkins's courtroom [in Indio] been located at the Riverside Hall of Justice, this case would have been brought to trial within the statutory time period governed by section 1382(a)." Judge Hawkins's court was not located in the City of Riverside, and because of the distance between Riverside and the Indio courtroom, his courtroom simply was not available to bring defendant to trial on July 28.

Nor, contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeal, was the trial court required to find good cause for continuance because a courtroom would be open on the day following the expiration of the statutory period. Such a rule would undermine the periods prescribed by the Legislature to provide substance to the defendant's right to a speedy trial — at least in geographically expansive counties.

Although the Court of Appeal essentially ignored court congestion as the cause of the delay, the People — in a slight modification of the Court of Appeal's analysis — contend that, even under circumstances of chronic court congestion, "if there is an available courtroom on the statutory last day, then a defendant can be ` brought to trial.'' However, if the parties cannot reach the courtroom due to `physical remoteness,' then that is an `exceptional circumstance' establishing good cause for a continuance under section 1050." (Italics added.)

We cannot agree that distance and ordinary travel time between two courts in which a defendant is required to appear constitute "exceptional circumstances" within the meaning of our case law, any more than they constitute good cause. Distance and ordinary travel time are quite distinct from the kind of extraordinary, unanticipated, nonrecurring events, discussed in Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, that may constitute "exceptional circumstances" excusing delay caused by court congestion. In that decision, we cited a discussion appearing in the American Bar Association standards for speedy trial: "`Although it is fair to expect the state to provide the machinery needed to dispose of the usual business of the courts promptly, it does not appear feasible to impose the same requirements when certain unique, nonrecurring events have produced an inordinate number of cases for court disposition.'" ( Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 571, italics added, quoting ABA Project on Standards for Crim. Justice, Stds. Relating to Speedy Trial (Approved Draft 1968) pp. 27-28 (ABA Standards).) For example, such "`unique, nonrecurring events'" might include "`a large-scale riot or other mass public disorder'" resulting in "`an inordinate number of cases'" that are simultaneously scheduled for trial. ( Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1163-1164, fn. 12, quoting ABA Standards, p. 28.) A similar understanding of the kind of exceptional circumstances needed to justify delay under section 1382 is found in Government Code section 68115, subdivision (h), a provision that permits extension of the time provided for trial in Penal Code section 1382 "[w]hen war, insurrection, pestilence, or other public calamity, or the danger thereof, or the destruction of or danger to the building appointed for holding the court, renders it necessary, or when a large influx of criminal cases resulting from a large number of arrests within a short period of time threatens the orderly operation of a superior court. . . ." (Gov. Code, § 68115.) Although other unanticipated but less calamitous circumstances may be designated as "exceptional" under the circumstances of a particular case, a constant feature — such as the distance and ordinary travel time between two courthouses in which the defendant is required to appear — cannot qualify.

In addition, as the People conceded at oral argument, their rationale would permit disparate application of section 1382 depending upon the size of the county in which the defendant's trial was proceeding. In a small county, defendants would have the benefit of the speedy trial period specified by the statute, whereas defendants in Riverside and other large counties would be subject to having the period extended by an additional day to accommodate travel time.

In sum, we are not persuaded by the People's circular argument that, because a trial court was not actually available to bring defendant to trial until one day following the conclusion of the statutorily prescribed period, due to routine court congestion, exceptional circumstances existed justifying a one-day delay. To adopt the People's position would permit chronic court congestion and institutional shortcomings, such as those we refused to condone in Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th 1131, to serve — in certain counties — to extend routinely the periods specified by the Legislature in section 1382.

III

For the reasons discussed above, the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal is reversed.

Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.

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PEOPLE v. HAJJAJ
(Nov 4, 2010)