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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Oracle Corporation, a leading software producer, missed its forecasted earnings per share (EPS) by two cents in the third quarter of its 2001 fiscal year, causing its stock price to drop. Plaintiffs, purchasers of Oracle stock during the quarter, alleged that this miss was due to an elaborate fraud scheme by Oracle and three of its officers, who purportedly misrepresented the quality of Oracle's Suite 11i software product and overstated earnings. The district court originally dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but this was reversed on appeal, leading to extensive discovery. Despite sanctions for spoliation of evidence against Defendants, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Oracle, concluding Plaintiffs failed to establish material misrepresentations or loss causation. Plaintiffs appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 by making false or misleading statements, including in Oracle's 3Q01 earnings forecast and intra-quarter statements.
  2. Whether Oracle's officers are liable as control persons under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.
  3. Whether Ellison and Henley are liable for contemporaneous trading under Section 20A of the Exchange Act.
  4. The scope and effect of evidentiary rulings, including spoliation sanctions and evidentiary objections.
  5. Whether Plaintiffs have established loss causation linking Defendants' alleged fraud to Plaintiffs' economic losses.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) Summary judgment burden of proof shifting Applied to explain that Defendants met their burden by showing absence of evidence supporting Plaintiffs' claims.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) Standard for evaluating evidence on summary judgment Used to emphasize that Plaintiffs must show evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in their favor.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) Elements of a §10(b) securities fraud claim Outlined the required elements Plaintiffs must prove, including material misrepresentation and loss causation.
Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) Reasonable basis for forward-looking statements Applied to assess whether Oracle's 3Q01 forecast was made without reasonable basis or knowledge of facts undermining it.
In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993) Incorrect predictions do not retroactively render statements false Supported the conclusion that Oracle's forecast was not a misrepresentation despite being incorrect in hindsight.
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) Loss causation requirement in securities fraud Applied to require Plaintiffs to show that the stock price drop was caused by disclosure of the fraud, not general poor financial health.
Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008) Loss causation and market reaction to fraud Used as analogous precedent to hold Plaintiffs failed to show that the market reacted specifically to the alleged fraud rather than Oracle's general financial condition.
Johnson v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2007) Requirements for Section 20A contemporaneous trading claims Applied to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 20A claims due to failure to establish underlying Exchange Act violations and loss causation.
United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007) Standard of review for evidentiary rulings Applied to review district court's exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) Abuse of discretion standard Used to assess whether district court's evidentiary rulings were illogical or implausible.
Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1988) Summary judgment must be based on admissible evidence Supported district court's exclusion of evidence not properly authenticated or admissible.
Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1980) Proper scope of spoliation sanctions Guided the district court's careful imposition of adverse inference sanctions without unfairly prejudicing Defendants.
United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1992) Doctrine of invited error Referenced to reject Plaintiffs' challenge to evidentiary rulings after failing to respond to objections below.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reviewing the district court's imposition of spoliation sanctions against Defendants for failure to preserve key evidence, concluding no abuse of discretion occurred as the sanctions were narrowly tailored to preclude Defendants from denying Ellison's knowledge of material facts. Turning to the merits, the court applied the summary judgment standard, emphasizing that Plaintiffs bore the burden to show genuine issues of material fact.

Regarding the alleged securities fraud, the court analyzed Plaintiffs' claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, requiring proof of material misrepresentation, scienter, connection to securities transactions, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation. The court found Oracle's 3Q01 earnings forecast was based on a rigorous "bottom-up" forecasting process incorporating sales data and management judgment, providing a reasonable basis for the forecast. Plaintiffs failed to show Defendants knowingly or recklessly made false statements or lacked reasonable basis.

Concerning intra-quarter statements reaffirming guidance, the court held these were supported by contemporaneous internal forecasts and contained appropriate qualifiers, negating claims of material misrepresentation. Plaintiffs' claims about Suite 11i defects and overstated 2Q01 earnings failed because Plaintiffs did not establish loss causation; the market's reaction to the March 1, 2001 earnings miss was attributable to general poor financial health and economic downturn, not disclosure of fraud.

For Section 20A contemporaneous trading claims, the court held these derivative claims failed due to Plaintiffs' inability to prove underlying Exchange Act violations or loss causation. The court also found no error in evidentiary rulings, noting Plaintiffs' failure to respond to numerous evidentiary objections and the district court's proper discretion in excluding inadmissible evidence.

Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants, concluding Plaintiffs did not produce sufficient admissible evidence to support their claims.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED.

The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Oracle Corporation and its officers, concluding Plaintiffs failed to establish material misrepresentations, scienter, or loss causation necessary to sustain their securities fraud claims under Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Exchange Act. The decision directly disposes of Plaintiffs' claims without setting new precedent beyond the application of existing securities law principles. The ruling reinforces the high evidentiary standards for proving securities fraud, particularly the requirement that Plaintiffs must demonstrate that market losses were caused by disclosures of fraud rather than general financial decline.

In re ORACLE CORPORATION SECURITIES LITIGATION, Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144; Drifton Finance Corporation; Robert D. Sawyer; Ryan Kuehmichel; Dzung Chu, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Oracle Corporation; Lawrence J. Ellison; Jeffrey O. Henley; Edward J. Sanderson, Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Oracle Corporation is the second-largest producer of software in the world. In the third quarter of its 2001 fiscal year, Oracle missed its forecasted earnings per share by two cents. Its stock price dropped. A legion of analysts blamed the miss on a late-quarter reaction by several key customers to the unfolding U.S. economic downturn that would become commonly known as the burst of the dot-com bubble. Plaintiffs, several intra-quarter purchasers of Oracle common-stock, brought this securities litigation against Oracle and three of its officers alleging the miss was actually caused by an elaborate scheme to defraud the public about the quality of Oracle products and the revenue gained therefrom. Because Plaintiffs have not developed evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that their losses were caused by the market's reaction to Defendants' alleged fraud, as opposed to Oracle's poor financial health generally, we affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Oracle.

I

Plaintiffs allege that: (1) Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5; (2) Oracle's Chief Executive Officer Larry Ellison, Chief Financial Officer Jeffrey Henley, and Executive Vice President Edward Sanderson are liable as control persons under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); and (3) Henley and Ellison are liable for contemporaneous trading under Section 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a). To support these allegations, Plaintiffs claim Defendants made false and misleading statements about a new software product, issued a false and misleading forecast for the third quarter of Oracle's 2001 fiscal year, made false and misleading intra-quarter statements, and fraudulently overstated earnings for the second quarter of the 2001 fiscal year. The following undisputed facts are relevant to those claims.

In May 2000, Oracle released integrated business software called Suite 11i, a suite of programs designed to work together to manage various company activities such as manufacturing, customer relations, sales, and accounting. Traditionally, enterprise resource planning ("ERP") applications performed functions such as accounting, human resources, and manufacturing. Customer relationship management applications ("CRM") performed functions such as managing call centers. Through the late 1990s, businesses that used enterprise applications software could not obtain ERP and CRM applications from the same vendor. Suite 11i was marketed as an innovative product that would combine the two types of applications.

The four quarters of Oracle's 2001 fiscal year were: from June 1 to August 31, 2000 ("1Q01"); from September 1 to November 30, 2000 ("2Q01"); from December 1, 2000, to February 28, 2001 ("3Q01"); and from March 1 to May 31, 2001 ("4Q01"). In 1Q01 and 2Q01, Oracle earned a combined $435 million in revenue from applications licenses. On December 14, 2000, Oracle announced 2Q01 earnings per share ("EPS") of 11 cents and 66% growth in sales of Suite 11i applications. The same day, Oracle issued public guidance for 3Q01 projecting EPS of 12 cents. This guidance was based upon an accounting process that had generated projections that Oracle had met or exceeded for seven consecutive quarters.

Historically, the majority of Oracle's sales were made in the final days of a quarter as customers waited for Oracle to significantly lower prices in an attempt to meet its quarterly projections. This trend was commonly referred to as "the hockey-stick effect" because plotting the quarterly sales on a graph resembled the shape of a hockey-stick — the sharp upswing at the end representing the bulk of quarterly sales.

Oracle generates numerous internal financial reports throughout any given quarter. Relevant to this litigation are intra-quarter reports projecting quarterly EPS — called internal forecasts — and intra-quarter reports aggregating the company's sales revenue at a given point in time — called flash reports. Internal forecasts are an aggregation of the revenue and growth data contained in flash reports. Whereas flash reports take a snapshot of revenue and growth at the time they are produced, internal forecasts are forward-looking and involve a degree of extrapolation based on the judgment and experience of corporate management.

From the beginning of 3Q01 on December 1, 2000, until February 5, 2001, every internal forecast that Oracle produced indicated that the company could fulfill its 3Q01 guidance. However, from February 5, 2001, until the end of the quarter, Oracle's internally projected EPS began to fluctuate. A February 5 internal forecast projected a potential EPS of 11 cents. A February 12 internal forecast returned the quarter's potential EPS to 12 cents. A February 19 internal forecast again lowered the potential EPS to 11 cents. Then, a February 26 internal forecast — prepared two days prior to the end of the quarter — again predicted a potential EPS of 11 cents. While Oracle had exceeded late-quarter internal forecasts in quarters past, the recurring surge in late-quarter sales historically resulting from the hockey-stick effect did not materialize this time.

On March 1, 2001, Oracle preliminarily announced a 3Q01 EPS of 10 cents — a two penny miss. The announcement quoted Ellison as saying,

License growth was strong in the first two months of Q3, and our internal sales forecast looked good up until the last few days of the quarter. However, a substantial number of our customers decided to delay their IT spending based on the economic slowdown in the United States. Sales growth for Oracle products in Europe and Asia Pacific remained strong. The problem is the U.S. economy.

On March 2, 2001, Oracle's stock price dropped from $21.38 to $16.88.

Earlier in the quarter, Ellison and Henley had exercised millions of Oracle stock options. Henley sold one million Oracle shares for a total of $32 million on January 4, 2001. Ellison sold 2.09% of his Oracle holdings between January 22 and January 31, 2001. A substantial amount of the shares sold were acquired through options set to expire in August 2001. In total, Ellison sold a little over 29 million Oracle shares for approximately $895 million. Importantly, these sales predated the first internal forecast indicating a potential EPS lower than the quarterly guidance of 12 cents.

II

The district court originally dismissed Plaintiffs' revised second amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that the allegations did not create a strong inference that intra-quarter statements made by Defendants were known to be false when made. See In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 01-CV-988, 2003 WL 23208956 (N.D.Cal. March 24, 2003). In November 2004 we reversed, holding that the operative complaint met the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"). See Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2004). Copious discovery ensued.

On September 2, 2008, as a result of Defendants' failure to preserve all its potential evidence, the district court issued an order concluding that Plaintiffs were entitled to adverse inferences with regard to two categories of evidence: Ellison's email files and materials created in the process of writing the book Softwar. As a sanction, the court ruled that Plaintiffs would be entitled to an inference that the spoliated evidence would demonstrate Ellison's knowledge of any material facts that Plaintiffs could otherwise establish.

Despite the absence of the missing Ellison emails and tapes, discovery proceedings in this case produced over 134 deposition days, countless discovery requests and answers, and over 2.1 million pages of documents. As the experienced district judge quipped, the word "voluminous" does not do justice to the record in this case. On October 20, 2008, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Prior to the hearing on summary judgment, Defendants made over eighty evidentiary objections. Plaintiffs never responded to those objections — notwithstanding the passage of four months between the summary judgment hearing and the district court's final order.

On June 19, 2009, the district court made several key evidentiary rulings and granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 01-CV-988, 2009 WL 1709050 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2009). The court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to (1) whether Oracle's 3Q01 forecast lacked a reasonable basis, (2) whether several intra-quarter statements were false or misleading, (3) whether Plaintiffs' loss was caused by Defendants' misrepresentations regarding Suite 11i, and (4) whether Plaintiffs' loss was caused by Defendants' misrepresentation of 2Q01 earnings. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

III

Not surprisingly, Plaintiffs pursue numerous evidentiary arguments on appeal.

A

We review the district court's exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 964 (9th Cir. 2007). A district court abuses its discretion if it reaches a result that is illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). A district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment may only be based on admissible evidence. Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

In this case, prior to the district court's ruling on Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs failed to respond to over eighty evidentiary objections made by Defendants. There is much disagreement between the parties as to whether or not each of these objections had been preemptively addressed by Plaintiffs. Irrespective of that dispute, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion on this record.

Plaintiffs, as the parties seeking admission of most of the evidence at issue, bore the burden of proof to show its admissibility. Pfingston v. Ronan Eng'g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002). Given the overwhelming volume of documents before the district court, once Defendants objected to the evidence Plaintiffs sought to be admitted, the onus was on Plaintiffs to direct the district court's attention to authenticating documents, deposition testimony bearing on attribution, hearsay exceptions and exemptions, or other evidentiary principles under which the evidence in question could be deemed admissible by the district court. Plaintiffs failed to do so. We cannot declare that the district court reached an illogical or implausible result by excluding apparent hearsay or documents without sufficient foundational support as the rules of evidence prescribe, or that the district court otherwise exceeded the permissible bounds of its discretion by failing to comb through the voluminous record searching for evidentiary bases to introduce the evidence at issue. That was Plaintiffs' obligation.

Plaintiffs now urge us to take judicial notice of certain deposition testimony that they claim bears on the propriety of the district court's hearsay rulings. We decline Plaintiffs' invitation. The proper place to call attention to any such testimony was in front of the district court, and furthermore, the content of a deposition is not a clearly established "fact" of which this panel can take notice. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007).

It behooves litigants, particularly in a case with a record of this magnitude, to resist the temptation to treat judges as if they were pigs sniffing for truffles. See Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1007 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United Stbid." The Customer's position in further discussions with the Buyer on July 14, 2003, was that if the Buyer built the corrugator and it "doesn't perform we [,the Customer,] will not pay the final 30% payment and [the Buyer] will be out roughly another $75K." At this point, Sonnentag did not doubt the Buyer's ability to manufacture the corrugator, but considered the Cascade contract to be "dead in the water." In a July 31, 2003, letter to the Customer's attorney, the Buyer's attorney called upon the Customer to share in the costs of further research and development, especially with regard to the square column application, if the Customer wished to proceed with the project. In a letter dated August 18, 2003, the Customer's attorney advised the Buyer's attorney that the Buyer had repudiated the Cascade contract by failing to provide assurances that it could produce the machine for which the Customer had contracted, and demanded the return of the Customer's down payment. In a letter dated August 27, 2003, the Buyer's attorney advised the Seller's attorney that "Modern is continuing to build the corrugator Cullom contracted to build and will tender it to [the Customer] when completed. Obviously, [the Customer] will not accept the tender." Therefore, the Buyer's attorney argued that the Seller should cooperate with the Buyer to resolve the dispute with the funds left in escrow. In a letter dated September 15, 2003, the Buyer advised the Customer's attorney that "the machine . . . will be available and tendered sometime in late November or the first week in December" and asked for verification that the Customer was willing to accept delivery. No such verification came. As we have stated, the Buyer did not build the machine. The assertion that it was being built was false.

As part of the APA, the Shareholders of the Seller leased real property to the Buyer. The Buyer did not make its rent payments and, in addition, damaged the property. On October 23, 2003, the Shareholders filed an action against the Buyer in Bradley County Circuit Court seeking to recover unpaid rent and property damage. That case was transferred to the trial court and consolidated with this case for trial. The Shareholders prevailed on their claim, and that judgment is not challenged on appeal.

The Buyer and its co-defendants maintain that if this appeal results in a judgment in their favor and against the Seller and its Shareholders, the judgment for unpaid rent and property damage in their opponents' favor would be treated as an offset. We will leave that detail to the trial court or remand.

On September 30, 2003, Sonnentag, as the sole shareholder of both Modern Tennessee and Modern Florida, orchestrated a transfer of all of Modern Tennessee's assets to Modern Florida, leaving Modern Tennessee judgment-proof. His wife loaned Modern Florida $1,950,000. Modern Florida paid Modern Tennessee $1,950,000 for its assets. In turn, Modern Tennessee paid Sonnentag the $1,950,000 that it owed him on a loan he had made to Modern Tennessee to fund the purchase of the Seller's assets. Modern Florida expressly excluded any liability for the Cascade contract and for the lease obligations to the Shareholders.

The Customer filed its complaint in the trial court on February 27, 2004, naming the Seller and the Buyer as defendants. The Buyer filed its answer and then, just a few days later, unbeknownst to the Customer, filed articles of dissolution authorized by the Buyer on September 30, 2003, with the Tennessee Secretary of State. The Buyer continued to defend this action and file pleadings and discovery responses as if it were still in business.

Approximately two years into the litigation, the Customer learned of the dissolution of Modern Tennessee and the transfer of its assets to Modern Florida. The Customer then amended its complaint to add Sonnentag and Modern Florida as parties. The Customer included a claim that the actions of the added defendants were unfair and deceptive and violated the TCPA. The Seller amended its pleadings to conform to the Customer's new allegation. Four days after filing its answer, Modern Florida transferred all of its assets to another entity solely owned and controlled by Sonnentag leaving Modern Florida without assets. The Customer later dismissed without prejudice all aspects of its claim against the Seller except its claim for breach of contract.

In January 2008, before the February 2008 trial, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Customer holding that the Cascade contract was a valid and enforceable contract. It also granted a motion in limine filed by the Customer excluding deposition testimony of Noirot that there was not a contract because of the parties' disagreement about what the Customer was to receive.

When the case came on for trial, the various claims other than the rent and property damage claims of the Shareholders were as follows:

The Customer's claims against Modern Tennessee, Modern Florida and Sonnentag:
Repudiation of the Cascade contract
Breach of the Cascade contract
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act
Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
Negligent and Fraudulent misrepresentation
The Customer's claims against the Seller and the Shareholders:
Breach of contract
The Seller and Shareholders' claims against Modern Tennessee, Modern Florida and Sonnentag:
Breach of the APA
Indemnification pursuant to APA
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act
Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
Common law fraud Promissory fraud
The Buyer's claims against the Seller and the Shareholders:
Breach of the APA
Indemnification pursuant to APA
Negligent and Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act

With respect to the Customer's claims, the court held that both the Seller and the Buyer breached the contract because they did not build the corrugator. However, the court held that the Seller's liability was secondary, as the assignor, and that the Buyer's liability was primary. The court found that the Buyer repudiated the Cascade contract by failing to provide assurances that the machine would "produce[] the quality needed" after the Customer justifiably asked for assurances. Also, the trial court found that the Buyer violated the TCPA by false and deceptive trade practices comprised of (1) fraudulent misrepresentations that the machine would be delivered when in fact the Buyer did not intend to build the machine, (2) fraudulent misrepresentations exaggerating the Seller's culpability, and (3) fraudulent conveyances of all its assets in order to insulate itself from judgment. Further, the court pierced the corporate veil of both Modern Tennessee and Modern Florida and held Sonnentag personally liable for the actions of Modern Tennessee. The court awarded the Customer judgment against Modern Tennessee, Modern Florida, and Sonnentag in the amount of $657,129.51. This amount represents the Customer's down payment of $113,290, trebled to $339,870; prejudgment interest of $54,526.68; and attorney fees of $262,732.83. The court awarded the Customer judgment against the Seller, as a surety, in the amount of $167,816.68, made up of the down payment and prejudgment interest.

The court stated:

[The Buyer] failed to prove its defense of impossibility of performance. Based on the actions of [the Buyer] in affirming the contract and then denying its ability to perform several times over several months and subsequently accusing [the Seller] of fraud and the shell game in moving assets, the court finds [the Buyer] intentionally misrepresented . . . its intentions regarding the contract and therefore violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and is thus liable to [the Customer] for attorney's fees. [The Buyer] is guilty of unfair and deceptive acts.

The court's reasoning was as follows:

A combination of several of the applicable factors mandates piercing of the corporate veil and the holding of Sonnentag personally liable for [the Seller's] and [the Customer's] claims. There is no dispute that Sonnentag is the sole shareholder of both Modern Tennessee and Modern Florida. As the sole shareholder of both corporations, Sonnentag fraudulently and secretly diverted Modern Tennessee's assets to Modern Florida to the detriment of Modern Tennessee's creditors.
Sonnentag consistently failed to maintain an arms-length relationship between Modern Tennessee and Modern Florida. The assets of both were commingled. For example, the money Sonnentag loaned to Modern Tennessee to buy [the Seller] was deposited into Modern Florida's bank account, and Modern Florida paid for [the Seller].
Moreover, Sonnentag testified that, from his perspective, there is no difference between Modern Tennessee and Modern Florida. As Sonnentag stated succinctly, "Modern is Modern." Both companies had the same employees and attorneys. It was an attempt to shield liability and responsibility.
Sonnentag's commingling of the two entities' assets and liabilities as well as his complete disregard for corporate formalities mandates a piercing of the corporate veil and a finding that Sonnentag is personally liable for [the Seller's] indemnification claim.

The court held that the same actions constituted fraudulent transfers of the Buyer's assets and common law fraud toward both the Customer and the Seller.

Based on the reasoning (1) that the Buyer breached the APA when it failed to perform the Cascade contract, (2) that the Buyer committed promissory fraud by misrepresenting its intention to perform the Cascade contract, and (3) then committed unfair and deceptive acts to try to avoid liability or insulate itself from liability, the court held Modern Tennessee, Modern Florida and Sonnentag liable to indemnify the Seller to the extent the Seller satisfies the Customer's judgment of $167,816.68 plus attorney's fees of $189,004.85.

The court held that even though the Seller negligently misrepresented the status of the Cascade contract by failing to disclose that the Customer had declared the project dead until further assurances were received, the misrepresentation was not material, and did not cause any damage to the Buyer. The court based its finding of no damages upon the fact that the Buyer did not build the corrugator. Based upon the same reasoning, the court found that the Seller did not breach the APA.

The court stated with regard to the misrepresentation as follows:

Although Nick Noirot informed Chris Turner on May 30, 2003, that the deal was "dead" and "on hold" until [the Seller] could produce acceptable samples from a corrugator with one drive, Chris Turner did not disclose it to [the Buyer] before the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement.
[The Seller] had a contractual and fiduciary duty to inform [the Buyer] of any development with the [Cascade] contract, particularly any developments occurring after the parties signed the Asset Purchase Agreement on May 28-29, 2003 and signing the closing documents on June 3, 2003.
[The Buyer] asked [the Seller] for all documents and information relating to the Cascade project. [The Buyer] clearly evidenced a desire to discover all information about this contract as it completed its due diligence before closing on the Asset Purchase Agreement.
The Court finds that [the Seller] did not intentionally mislead [the Buyer] about the status of the Cascade contract. The Court does find that [the Seller] negligently misrepresented the status of the Cascade contract; however, the omission was not material. The cost to correct the defect was insignificant in light of the totality of the circumstances. The complete contract price was over $200,000. But for [the Buyer] deciding the project was underbid, it could have completed the contract. [The Buyer] could have but never did exercise the option to rescind the Asset Purchase Agreement; therefore, [the Buyer] is responsible for and accepted the contract and all damages caused by the breach of the contract. It is therefore liable for damages caused by the breach. [The Seller] was no longer responsible for the Cascade project as between [the Seller] and [the Buyer] but was responsible to [the Customer].

The court entered a final judgment in accord with its findings in its memorandum opinion. The Buyer and its co-defendants, Modern Florida and Sonnentag, filed this timely appeal, challenging the adverse judgment and the trial court's failure to award judgment in favor of Buyer against the Seller and the Shareholders.

III.

Specifically, the Buyer, Modern Florida and Sonnentag raise the following issues which we have shortened and restated to conform to the arguments advanced in their brief.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the misrepresentation concerning the status of the Cascade contract was not material.
Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Seller and the Shareholders were not liable to the Buyer for its attorney's fees under the escrow agreement and indemnification provision of the APA because of the Seller's failure to disclose the Customer's declaration that the Cascade contract was dead until further assurances were made.
Whether the evidence preponderates against the finding that the Buyer committed promissory fraud.
Whether the trial court erred in holding the Buyer and its co-defendants liable under the TCPA based on actions that happened after the Customer executed the Cascade contract and declared the project dead and the contract in breach.
Whether the trial court erred in piercing the corporate veil of Modern Tennessee and Modern Florida and holding Sonnentag personally liable for the actions of the entities.

The Seller purports to raise an issue as to the trial court's finding of a "fiduciary duty" to the Buyer to disclose "any development" with regard to the Cascade contract. However, the Seller concedes that it had a duty to disclose material developments. Based on our conclusion that the Seller's failure to disclose that the Customer had declared the project dead until a demonstration of quality could be made was a material misrepresentation, we will not reach this inconsequential issue.

IV.

The interpretation of a written contract is a matter of law and not of fact. Wills Wills, L.P. v. Gill , 54 S.W.3d 283, 285 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, our review of the terms of a contract and the obligations it imposes on the parties is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id.

V.

The core of the Buyer's argument is that the trial court erred in reading into the Cascade contract an obligation in conflict with the explicit terms of the PA and one that was not even disclosed by the Seller to the Buyer as a point of contention with the Customer. The obligation the Buyer speaks of is the obligation to build a corrugator that will "produce[] the quality needed" by the Customer. The Buyer argues that the error permeated all aspects of the memorandum opinion which formed the basis for the judgment. The Buyer points out, correctly, that even though the court granted partial summary judgment holding that a valid and enforceable contracts exists, it did not identify the key provisions of the contract in either its order granting partial summary judgment or its memorandum opinion.

The Customer argues that the trial court got everything right, even going so far as to argue in support of the recovery by the Seller. The Customer stresses the bad actions of the Buyer and its co-defendants to the point of arguing that this case is not at all about the contracts, but a case about the bad acts of the Buyer and its cohorts. The Seller argues that the trial court erred in finding that it had a fiduciary duty to inform the Buyer of "any development" with the Cascade contract, but otherwise was correct in all respects. The Seller also focuses on the bad acts of the Buyer and its co-defendants.

We agree with the Buyer on several significant points, the first of which is that, even if all the factual findings of the trial court are accepted as true, the terms of the PA did not obligate the Buyer to build either a dual-drive corrugator or a corrugator that would "produce[] the quality needed" by the Customer. It is also clear that the corrugator the Customer expected, and upon which it demanded assurances, was something other than what it was entitled to receive under the Cascade contract. The deal was to build a horizontal corrugator per the Seller's quote "subject to the terms and conditions set forth in" the PA.

One of those "terms and conditions" explicitly speaks to when the obligation to build the corrugator arises: "[The Customer] shall approve [the Seller] prepared project definition form . . . prior to [the Seller] manufacturing [the corrugator]." The trial court found that the Buyer and the Seller breached the Cascade contract by not building a corrugator. It is undisputed that the Customer refused to approve the project definition upon learning that it described a corrugator with one drive rather than two. Therefore, the obligation to build the corrugator never ripened.

The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of a finding that the primary concern of the Customer was not the number of drives employed but, rather, that the machine it would pay for and receive under the PA would produce a product of acceptable quality. In essence this is what the trial court found:

Noirot was personally unfamiliar with the number of drives on corrugators and could not tell by looking at a corrugator how many drives it had. . . . [The Customer] would have bought the corrugator even if it had needed an additional drive as long as it produced the quality needed which [the Seller] said could be accomplished.

The problem with finding a breach by either the Seller or the Buyer based on the failure to build a machine that would produce a certain quality end product is that the PA explicitly negates such an obligation.

[The Customer] acknowledges that [the Seller] has not made and does not make any warranty or representations, either expressed or implied, or any kind whatsoever with respect to the ultimate product which may be obtained from the [corrugator].

The PA also excludes, in all capital letters, any "WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."

We have very little doubt that the Customer thought it was buying a machine that would produce acceptable quality porch columns. Once the Seller and the Customer joined forces against the Buyer, the Seller essentially stipulated that its deal with the Customer was to produce such a machine. However, the Seller's stipulation after the fact does not bind the Buyer to terms contrary to those in the contract, especially since the Buyer was not told of the Customer's expectations until after the closing. The question becomes whether the explicit terms of the contract were modified. The trial court did not make a specific finding as to whether the terms of the written contract were modified by oral discussions or the course of conduct or dealing between the Customer and the Seller. Regardless, the PA expressly speaks to any such possibility:

This Agreement represents the entire agreement of the parties and supersedes all previous discussions, representations, negotiations and writings. No Amendment to this Agreement is valid unless it is in a written instrument that is signed by authorized representatives to this Agreement. A course of conduct shall not be deemed an amendment to this Agreement.

We must hold, therefore, that while the Seller was free to make any concession to the Customer it chose while it was the entity responsible for making the corrugator, it was not legally bound, nor could it bind the Buyer, to manufacture a corrugator that would produce columns of a certain quality.

The Seller attempts to distinguish between a warranty or a representation that the machine would produce columns of a certain quality on one hand, and a demand for assurance that the machine would produce acceptable quality samples. The Seller argues "all . . . [the Buyer] had to do was produce samples on a single-drive corrugator that were as good as those previously approved by Cascade." We believe this is a distinction without a difference in the context of this case. The Buyer ran samples on a single drive machine that the Customer did not find acceptable. The Customer then took the position that any risk that the machine would not produce an acceptable end product was on the Buyer; Noirot testified, "I told [Karr] . . . if you build a machine and . . . it doesn't work, it doesn't hit our specs, then I'm not going to pay the last [payment of] 30%."

Since we have acknowledged that the Customer obviously had expectations of receiving a machine that would produce a certain quality product, we think it prudent to address any perceived unfairness in our holding. First, we note that the Customer was not a typical household consumer. It was an established business entity with a certain amount of sophistication. Its agents read the project definition carefully enough to detect that the corrugator being described employed only one drive unit. If it had read the PA as carefully, it would have seen the exclusionary provisions. The law presumes that the Customer did read and understand the PA. See Giles v. Allstate Ins. Co., Inc. , 871 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Second, and more importantly, the Customer was protected from "disaster" by an escape clause which gave it the ability to cancel the contract, in which event "[w]ork on the balance of the order will be stopped as promptly as reasonably possible" with the obligation only to reimburse the builder of the machine for its costs "plus a reasonable profit on such items." The Seller and the Buyer both acknowledge that since the Customer declared the project "dead," or repudiated as the case may be, before any materials were purchased or any work was done, the Customer is entitled to recover its down payment in its entirety.

The next key question in this case is from whom may the Customer recover its down payment. The answer is both the Seller and the Buyer. Neither the Seller nor the Buyer argue on appeal that there was not a contract with the Customer. The Buyer in fact argues that there was a written contract that protected it from the obligation of building a machine that matched the customer's expectations. The contract of which it took an assignment protected it from the Customer's unjustified expectations under our holding above. The only real argument that the Buyer makes against being held liable to the Customer for the down payment is that the Seller is the party that received the down payment. That is no answer. The same contract that protected the Buyer from the Customer's expectations obligated the Buyer, as the assignee of the Seller's covenants, to reimburse the down payment. The Seller remains liable to the Customer despite the delegation of its performance to the Buyer. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-210 (1) (2001) ("No delegation of performance relieves the party delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for breach."). There has been no challenge to the award of prejudgment interest tacked onto the amount of the down payment, therefore we will not disturb that part of the trial court's judgment.

It will be helpful in understanding the remainder of our analysis for us to clarify and summarize our holdings to this point. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the Buyer and the Seller breached the Cascade contract by not building a corrugator. That obligation did not arise because the Customer did not approve the project definition. The Buyer did not repudiate. Rather, the Customer cancelled the contract as it was allowed to do. At that point, the Buyer and the Seller became obligated to refund the Customer's down payment.

The next logical question is whether the Buyer should have been allowed indemnification under the APA and the escrow agreement. This implicates the issue of whether the Seller's misrepresentation was material. The misrepresentation of which we speak is the failure to disclose that the Customer had declared the project "dead" until further assurances were forthcoming. The trial court classified its finding of non-materiality as a conclusion of law. Under the facts of this case, we agree with the trial court's "classification" of this issue. Accordingly, we will review it de novo without a presumption of correctness. Gill , 54 S.W.3d at 285; Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen , 181 S.W.3d 292, 305 (Tenn. 2005) (standard of review of mixed questions of law and fact is de novo without presumption of correctness).

A concise way of stating the test of materiality is that "[a] misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so." Thoroughbred Motorcars, Inc. v. Draper , No. 01A01-9219-CV-000468, 1993 WL 135436, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S., filed April 30, 1993); see also, Patel v. Bayliff , 121 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). The primary reason given by the trial court for finding the misrepresentation not to be material is that the Buyer did not exercise its right to terminate and declare the APA null and void by June 15, 2003, the time window given in the APA. The Seller argues in support of the trial court's finding that the breach, or misrepresentation, must be viewed "in the context of [the Seller's] total obligations." Adams TV of Memphis v. Comcorp of Tenn. , 969 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Since the Buyer did not rescind the whole deal, the argument goes, the omission could not have been material in the context of the APA's totality. We are not persuaded. A buyer that is damaged by a breach of contract involving a misrepresentation can elect, as late as after the verdict comes in, between rescission of the contract and recovery of the purchase price, or damages. Goodman v. Jones , No. E2006-02678-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 103504 at *9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Jan 12, 2009). The Seller's argument, and the trial court's finding, amount to an incorrect election of remedies requirement.

The Buyer points out that terminating the APA after the closing would have been like trying to un-ring a bell. The substance of the Buyer's argument is that it is not fair to test materiality by whether it was willing to scrap the whole deal because of this one problem. One of the trial court's factual findings that indirectly supports the Buyer's position is that there were other things of value that the Buyer acquired that it did not want to lose.

We agree with the Buyer that the misrepresentation was material. It seems apparent to us that any reasonable party in the Buyer's position would want to know before assuming a limited number of obligations that a dispute had arisen concerning one of those obligations. The record in this case fully supports that conclusion. The trial court specifically found that the Buyer "clearly evidenced a desire to discover all information about this contract as it completed its due diligence before closing on [the APA]." The fact that the Seller specifically covenants under the APA not to misrepresent its obligations and that the parties included the indemnification clauses and the escrow agreement to provide relief for misrepresentations supports an interpretation that provides relief for an impairment of the bargain short of something that ruins every aspect of it. We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the Seller's failure to disclose problems with the Cascade contract was not material.

Before moving forward to another point, we will deal briefly with the trial court's reasoning that the Seller's omission was not material because all of the problems could have been cured by someone spending a mere $5,000 for a second drive. The Buyer takes issue with the amount, but we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding that the cost of a second drive would have been approximately $5,000. Rather, we hold that the finding was in error because it was a vast oversimplification of a complicated dispute. By the time the Buyer closed, the Customer was not demanding a second drive, but a demonstration that the machine to be built would produce samples of the same quality produced in the earlier demonstration. The Customer's demand included square columns even though the initial demonstration dealt only with round columns. The Customer never approved a project definition. By the time the matter came to a head, the Customer's position was that the Buyer was building the machine subject to the risk the Customer would not pay if the corrugator did not "meet . . . specs." Any reasonable entity in the Buyer's position would have wanted to know that the Customer had declared the project on hold, so as to be able to decide what to do about scenarios such as actually came to pass. We stand by our holding that the Seller's omission was material.

The trial court also held that the Seller could not be liable to the Buyer because the Buyer was not damaged. This finding will not withstand scrutiny under our holdings thus far. At the very least, rather than performing the contract that it assumed with at least some prospect of making a profit or minimizing its loss, the Buyer is now being held liable to refund the down payment. Moreover, the Buyer unknowingly purchased a lawsuit. It is now in a worse position than it would have been had the contract been performed. See GSB Contractors, Inc. v. Hess , 179 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (the proper measure of damages for breach of contract is to place the non-breaching party in the position it would have been in had there not been a breach).

Our holdings (1) that the contract the Buyer assumed did not include the obligation to supply a dual-drive corrugator or a corrugator that would make products of a warranted quality and (2) that the Buyer was damaged by a material misrepresentation of the Seller require that we hold the trial court erred in awarding the Seller indemnification and denying the Buyer indemnification. As the Buyer has pointed out, the trial court's error in enforcing a term that the PA did not include permeated the court's memorandum opinion and resulting judgment. The APA excludes from the Buyer's responsibility any "liability or obligation . . . which arises out of or is based upon any express or implied representation, warranty, agreement or guarantee made by [the] Seller, or alleged to have been made by [the] Seller, or which is imposed or asserted to be imposed by operation of law, in connection with any . . . product sold . . . by . . . [the] Seller on or prior to the Closing Date." The Buyer assumes only the obligations specifically listed and excludes "any other liability or obligation." The Seller and its Shareholders are required to indemnify the Buyer against any loss that results from (1) "any and all liabilities and obligations of [the Seller] . . . of any nature whatsoever . . . except those liabilities and obligations which [the Buyer] specifically assumes," and (2) "any misrepresentation, breach of warranty or nonfulfillment of any agreement or covenant . . . under this Agreement." Also, the escrow fund was created for the recognized purpose of providing security to the Buyer against any losses, damages or expenses, including litigation expenses, "arising out of or resulting from: (a) the breach of any warranty or representation of [the] Seller . . . or (b) any excluded liabilities . . ." We hold that provisions of the APA and the attached escrow agreement required that the Seller and the Shareholders indemnify the Buyer, and not vice-versa, for any losses and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in defending against the claim that the Buyer was obligated to build a machine that either had dual-drives or would produce an end product of the Customer's expected quality. We hold that the Buyer's right to indemnification most certainly includes the right to be indemnified against the amount of the down payment and prejudgment interest. We will leave it to the trial court on remand to determine the exact amount of the other elements of indemnification, including reasonable attorney's fees related to the "down payment" aspect of the case versus other aspects.

In view of our previous holdings, it may be that we could skip directly to our conclusion without directly addressing the promissory fraud, the TCPA claims, and the piercing of the corporate veil. We will, nevertheless, work our way through these points with brevity and clarity in mind, rather than exhaustive analysis.

The finding of promissory fraud against the Buyer is premised upon the idea that it never had the intention of building the machine. We disagree. Even if all the trial court's factual findings are correct, its legal conclusion was wrong. The thrust of the Buyer's communications were that it could build the machine that the Seller sold under the express terms of the PA but the Customer would most likely be dissatisfied because it demanded more. There was nothing wrong or inaccurate about those communications. This litigation has proven that the Buyer was correct. Moreover, we have held that in light of the Customer's refusal to approve the project definition, the obligation to build the corrugator was not triggered.

We also hold that the trial court erred in finding the Buyer liable for violations of the TCPA. Given our analysis to this point, the only thing other than defending itself in this litigation that the Buyer did that arguably caused harm to the Customer was in failing to promptly refund the down payment. There is plenty of documentary evidence in the record that the Buyer did actually try to facilitate repayment of the down payment through the Seller and the escrow fund. Since that is the same end result we have reached, we cannot reconcile holding the Buyer liable under the TCPA with our holding that the Seller is ultimately liable for the down payment out of the escrow fund. At most, the Buyer's refusal to refund the down payment out of its pocket was a failure to perform its obligation of refund under the contract. Not every failure to perform a contract is a violation of the TCPA. Hall v. Hamblen , No. M2002-00562-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1838180, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed Aug. 16, 2004). Even if the Buyer did misrepresent its true intentions with regard to building the machine, those misrepresentations did not cause a loss to either the Seller or the Customer. Under the TCPA, the "loss of money or property" must be "a result of . . . [the] unfair or deceptive act." Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(1)(2001); White v. Early , 211 S.W.3d 723, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). The Customer paid the money long before the Buyer's representations, and both the Customer and the Seller held to their respective positions after receiving those representations. In other words, the Buyer's alleged misrepresentation did not cause either the Seller or the Customer to do something that had not already been done. We find it interesting, also, that the Customer now so adamantly argues it was harmed by the Buyer's broken promise to build the corrugator, but prior to the litigation was adamantly, through Noirot, warning the Buyer that if it built a corrugator that did not satisfy Noirot, the Customer would not pay.

The final issue we must address is the Buyer's attempt to hide away its assets with the help of Modern Tennessee and Sonnentag. We do not in any way condone these actions. However, the end result is that these actions did not result in any harm to either the Customer or Seller. The Customer will recover its down payment with interest. These funds are available from the escrow fund and ultimately will come out of the Seller's pocket. The Buyer, by placing a portion of the purchase price in escrow, made available liquid funds to satisfy the judgment. The trial court therefore erred in placing personal liability on Sonnentag to satisfy obligations that either did not exist or were satisfiable through funds made available by the Buyer, Modern Tennessee. We will not discuss and do not decide whether, had the trial court been correct in entering a $600,000 plus judgment against Modern Tennessee, the court's analysis would have been correct. We do not render advisory opinions. McIntyre v. Traughber , 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

VI.

To summarize, we take these actions with regard to the trial court's judgment: (1) we reverse the judgment against Modern Florida and John Sonnentag; (2) we modify the judgment in favor of the Customer and against Modern Tennessee so as to provide that Modern Tennessee is not liable for breach of contract, promissory fraud or treble damages and attorney's fees under the TCPA, but is liable to the Customer for refund of the down payment in the amount of $113,290 plus prejudgment interest of $54,526.68 for a total of $167,816.68; (3) we modify the judgment in favor of the Customer and against the Seller to provide that Seller is not liable for breach of contract but that Seller is responsible for refund of the down payment plus prejudgment interest for a total of $167,816.68; (4) we reverse the judgment awarding the Seller indemnification and attorney's fees against the Buyer and award Buyer indemnification against the Seller and the Shareholders to include any amount Buyer pays the Customer and such further amount as determined by the trial court on remand; and (5) we affirm the judgment except as modified or reversed herein.

VII.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and modified in part. Those portions of the trial court's judgment not reversed by this opinion are affirmed as modified. Costs on appeal are taxed to appellants Cullom Machine Tool and Die, Inc., nka CMTD, Inc., Heinrich B Dickhut and Karen J. Dickhut. This case is remanded, pursuant to applicable law, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

the Defendant to select sections of the 9-1-1 call transcript that he wanted read to the jury. The court permitted each section chosen by the Defendant to be read to the jury.

The Defendant did not include the complete 9-1-1 tape in the appellate record. On appeal, he had "a duty to prepare a record which conveys a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to the issues forming the basis of the appeal." State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993) (citing State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983)). "Where the record is incomplete and does not contain . . . portions of the record upon which the party relies, an appellate court is precluded from considering the issue." Id. at 560-61 (citingState v. Roberts, 755 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)). We must presume that the trial court's determination not to play the entire tape was correct. See State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) ("In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this court must presume that the trial court's rulings were supported by sufficient evidence."); Roberts, 755 S.W.2d at 836. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence when it allowed him and Ms. Mudica to testify about an altercation between the victim and the Defendant two nights before the shooting. The State contends that the Defendant has waived this argument by asserting this theory of exclusion for the first time in his motion for a new trial and on appeal. We agree with the State.

At trial, the Defendant objected to admitting testimony regarding the altercation between himself and the victim on the ground that it was inadmissable character evidence. However, the Defendant contended in his motion for a new trial and on appeal that such testimony should be excluded because it was inadmissable hearsay. Additionally, we note that although the Defendant asserted this new ground for exclusion in his motion for a new trial, he did not address this ground during the motion hearing and instead argued that this testimony was impermissible character evidence.

This court has stated that "`a party is bound by the ground asserted when making an objection. The party cannot assert a new or different theory to support the objection in the motion for a new trial or in the appellate court.'" State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 765-66 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 634-35 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994));see also State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) ("It has long been established in this jurisdiction that an accused may not litigate an issue on one ground, abandon that ground post-trial, and assert a new basis or ground for his contention in this Court."). As a result, the Defendant has waived this issue.See Gilley, 292 S.W.3d at 765-66; State v. David Dwayne Smith, No. E2007-00084-CCA-R3-CD, Cumberland County, slip op. at 23-24 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2007) (stating that a defendant waived an issue regarding the admission of testimony when he asserted a hearsay theory of exclusion for the first time in his motion for new trial and on appeal), app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

IV

The Defendant contends that the State improperly withheld exculpatory evidence by failing to provide him with the measurements of the crime scene made by Detective Seals. The Defendant argues that these measurements would have helped establish his claim of self-defense and his claim that he was in the curtilage of his motor home when he shot the victim. The State contends that there was no error because the measurements were not favorable or material to the Defendant's case. We agree with the State.

In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution has a constitutional duty to furnish an accused with exculpatory evidence pertaining to either the accused's guilt or innocence or the punishment that may be imposed. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Failure to reveal exculpatory evidence violates due process when the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the prosecution's good faith. Id.

The "prosecution is not required to disclose information that the accused already possesses or is able to obtain." State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Although the State is not obligated to disclose the entirety of the investigatory police work in a case, the State is required to disclose all favorable evidence obtained by any person acting on the government's behalf. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972)). Evidence that is "favorable to the accused" includes evidence that is deemed to be exculpatory in nature and evidence that could be used to impeach the State's witnesses. State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 389 (Tenn. 1995);State v. Copeland, 983 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that in order to establish aBrady violation, four elements must be shown by the defendant:

(1) that the defendant requested the information (unless the evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case the State is bound to release the information whether requested or not);
(2) that the State suppressed the information;
(3) that the information was favorable to the accused; and
(4) that the information was material.
State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1995);see also Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 389. The Defendant must prove a Brady violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d at 389.

When considering whether there is a Brady violation, evidence is considered material only "`if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'"Id. at 390 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433). The question is not whether the Defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.

The record shows that during discovery, the Defendant requested all "documents . . . in the possession . . . of the State, and which are material to the Defendant in preparation of his defense." The record also shows that the State failed to provide this information to the Defendant before trial. On cross-examination, Agent Wilson testified that Detective Seals measured and recorded the distances between the victim's body and the door to the Defendant's home and between the victim's head and the pool of blood at the top of the embankment. The distances recorded were twenty-six and thirteen and one-half,

respectively, but the unit of measurement was not listed. The Defendant was not provided with a copy of Detective Seal's measurements until Agent Wilson testified on cross-examination that such measurements were made.

With regard to the measurement between the victim's body and the pool of blood on top of the embankment, we hold that the Defendant has failed to show that this measurement was material to prove that the Defendant acted in self-defense. Agent Wilson testified that there were pools of blood at both the top and bottom of the embankment, with a trail of blood moving about halfway down the embankment. Ms. Lewis testified that her autopsy revealed that the victim was eight feet away from the shotgun when he was shot in the arm and two to four feet away when he was shot in the chest. Their testimony established that the victim was moving toward the Defendant when he was shot, a fact not in contention at trial. The measurement between the victim's body and the pool of blood on top of the embankment would do nothing to bolster this uncontroverted conclusion. The record does not reflect that there is a reasonable probability that, had this measurement been disclosed to the Defendant before trial, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

With regard to the measurement between the victim's body and the door to the Defendant's home, we hold that the Defendant has failed to show that this measurement was material to prove that the shooting occurred within the curtilage of his home. Ms. Mudica testified that she found the victim's body five or six feet from the Defendant's home. The Defendant testified that the shooting occurred within six feet of his home. Numerous photographs introduced at trial showed the location of the victim's body near the Defendant's home. In deciding on which portions of the self-defense instructions to charge the jury, the trial court accepted that the shooting occurred within the curtilage of the Defendant's home. In rejecting the self-defense instruction dealing with the use of deadly force within a home, the trial court said, "This doesn't qualify as [a] residence . . . [c]urtilage is not the residence . . . it can't apply if something happened in a yard." Because the trial court accepted, and other evidence established, that the shooting occurred within the curtilage, the record does not reflect that there is a reasonable probability that, had this measurement been disclosed to the Defendant before trial, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

V

The Defendant contends the trial court erred when it declined to charge a portion of the self-defense instruction that states that a person using deadly force within his home is presumed to have had a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury when the deadly force is used against a non-family member who enters or has entered the home unlawfully and forcibly. See T.C.A. § 39-11-611(c) (Supp. 2007) (amended 2008); T.P.I.-Crim. 40.06(b) (11th ed. 2007). The State contends that there was no error because the shooting did not occur within a residence, dwelling, or vehicle. We agree that the trial court properly declined to charge this requested instruction.

In criminal cases, the trial court has the duty to charge the jury on all of the law that applies to the facts of the case.See State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 73 (Tenn. 1992) (citing State v. Thompson, 519 S.W. 2d 789, 792 (Tenn. 1975)). The defendant also "has a right to have every issue of fact raised by the evidence and material to his defense submitted to the jury upon proper instructions by the judge." Thompson, 519 S.W.2d at 792; see T.C.A. § 39-11-203(c) (2010) (entitling a defendant to have the issue of the existence of a defense submitted to the jury when it is fairly raised by the proof). An erroneous jury instruction may deprive the defendant of the constitutional right to a jury trial. See State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 433-34 (Tenn. 2000).

An instruction on a defense must be given if fairly raised by the proof regardless of whether the defense relies on the theory or requests that an instruction be given as to that theory.See State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2001);see also State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 187-88 (Tenn. 2002); Alfonzo Williams v. State, No. W2008-00106-CCA-R3-PC, Shelby County, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2009) (applying the supreme court's holding in Allen to conclude that an instruction on a defense must be given if fairly raised by the proof), app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2010). "In determining whether a defense is raised by the evidence, the court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant to determine whether there is evidence that reasonable minds could accept as to that defense." Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 9 (citingJohnson v. State, 531 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1975); State v. Bult, 989 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998));see also State v. Shropshire, 874 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). If evidence has been presented which reasonable minds could accept as a defense, "the accused is entitled to the appropriate instructions." Johnson, 531 S.W.2d at 559.

In denying the Defendant's request to instruct the jury on the presumption of reasonableness accompanying the use of deadly force within a home, the trial court stated

Curtilage is not the residence . . . the way I read [the self-defense statute], [it] is all dealing with structures, not dealing with just the open yard area . . . we're talking about entering into either a dwelling or a residence and that . . . does not extend to just some open area out and around, even though it may be titled in the name of the owner. . . .

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Defendant, the victim drove to the Defendant's home at midnight and attempted to sell the Defendant marijuana. The Defendant met the victim outside on the land adjoining his home and told the victim to leave. The victim threatened the Defendant and moved toward the Defendant, resulting in the Defendant shooting the victim.

We hold that the evidence did not support the jury instruction regarding the presumption of reasonableness accompanying the use of deadly force within a home. The self-defense statute states that the presumption applies to deadly force used within a "residence, dwelling, or vehicle." T.C.A. § 39-11-611(c); see T.P.I.-Crim. 40.06(b). The statute defines "residence" as "a dwelling in which a person resides . . . or any dwelling, building, or other appurtenance within the curtilage of the residence." See T.C.A. § 39-11-611(c). The curtilage itself is not defined as a part of the residence for purposes of the self-defense instruction.

We note that this court has held that the curtilage surrounding a home can constitute a part of the home for self-defense purposes.See State v. Bottenfield, 692 S.W.2d 447, 452 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Charles T. Edwards, No. 01-C-019007CR00171, Davidson County, slip op. at 6-7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 30, 1991), app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 24, 1991). Although these cases involved the use of deadly force within the curtilage, each of the victims had already entered or were in the process of entering the defendant's home unlawfully. See id. In this case, the record reflects that the victim did not enter or attempt to enter the Defendant's home. The entire altercation occurred outdoors on the land adjoining the Defendant's home. As a result, the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on the presumption of reasonableness accompanying the use of deadly force within a home. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

VI

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by considering probation violations and prior criminal convictions that were not proven by certified copies of conviction and were not disclosed to the Defendant before the sentencing hearing. At issue are a 1987 conviction for misdemeanor battery, a 1990 conviction for marijuana possession, and two probation violations. The State contends that the trial court properly considered this evidence when determining the application of enhancement factors. We hold that although one probation violation was not properly considered, each enhancement factor was proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the convictions and probation violations at issue were not used to establish the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender but were introduced by the state to establish enhancement factors (1) and (8).See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-114(1) (the defendant has a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range); 40-35-114(8) (the defendant failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community). The Defendant does not argue that these enhancement factors were improperly applied or that he did not commit the offenses underlying his convictions and probation violations. He argues that the convictions and probation violations at issue should not have been considered during sentencing because they were not proven by certified copies of conviction and were not disclosed to the Defendant before the sentencing hearing.

At a sentencing hearing, the trial court must afford the parties the opportunity to be heard and present evidence relevant to the sentencing of the Defendant. T.C.A. § 40-35-209(b). The state has the burden of proving all enhancement factors by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Gutierrez, 5 S.W.3d 641, 644 (Tenn. 1999). Reliable hearsay may be admitted at sentencing if the opposing party is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence. T.C.A. § 40-35-209(b). This court has consistently held the presentence report to be reliable hearsay. See State v. Baker, 956 S.W.2d 8, 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that the information contained in a presentence report "is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officer's research of the records, contact with relevant agencies, and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report"). Likewise, the person who prepared the presentence report may be a witness at the sentencing hearing. T.C.A. § 40-35-209(b). Certified copies of convictions or documents are also considered reliable hearsay. Id. This court has also held that certified copies of convictions are not necessary to prove prior criminal history and that courts can rely upon the presentence report and the testimony of the person who prepared the report. See State v. Richardson, 875 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

"Upon a defendant's request, the state shall furnish the defendant with a copy of the defendant's prior criminal record, if any, that is within the state's possession, custody, or control if the district attorney general knows — or through due diligence could know — that the record exists." Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). If a party fails to comply with discovery requests, the trial court may order an inspection of the item in question, exclusion of the item, or any other remedy as deemed appropriate under the circumstances. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). Although a court may order the exclusion of an item,

evidence should not be excluded except when it is shown that a party is actually prejudiced by the failure to comply with the discovery order and that the prejudice cannot be otherwise eradicated. [Rule 16] should not be employed to frustrate justice by lightly depriving the State or the defendant of competent evidence.
State v. Garland, 617 S.W.2d 176, 185-86 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (holding that although evidence was not disclosed prior to trial, it was properly submitted because there was no prejudice from nondisclosure).

Regarding the Defendant's probation violation in 1981, he had notice of it because the presentence report stated that he had a history of probation violations in Florida and listed the offenses leading to his probation in 1980 and its subsequent violation in 1981. Ms. Dotson testified that in 1981, the Defendant violated the terms of his probation by being convicted of possession of marijuana, possession of narcotic equipment, criminal mischief, and operating a motor vehicle without a valid registration. Ms. Dotson explained that she obtained this information by speaking with the circuit court clerk in Manatee County, Florida, and obtaining from the clerk a certified copy of a progress report listing the Defendant's offenses in Florida. The Defendant was accorded a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence of this violation and failed to do so. The Defendant did not contend that the presentence report or the testimony of Ms. Dotson was incorrect. As a result, the presentence report and testimony of Ms. Dotson were properly admitted by the trial court as reliable hearsay. See T.C.A. § 40-35-209(b). A certified copy of this probation violation was not required in order to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court properly relied on the presentence report and the testimony of Ms. Dotson. See Richardson, 875 S.W.2d at 677. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Regarding the Defendant's probation violation in 1986, we agree with the Defendant that this violation was not properly considered during sentencing because it was not established by a preponderance of the evidence. Although the presentence report stated that the Defendant had a history of probation violations in Florida, it did not list the offense or conduct leading to his probation in 1985 or its subsequent violation in 1986. Likewise, although Ms. Dotson testified that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation in 1986, she did not state the offense leading to probation or the cause of the violation. While this probation violation was not properly considered, the probation violation occurring in 1981 was sufficient to establish enhancement factor (8) because it proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(8); Gutierrez, 5 S.W.3d at 644.

Regarding the Defendant's prior convictions, Ms. Dotson testified that in 1990, the Defendant was convicted for marijuana possession. She said that she obtained this information from the National Crime Information Center in Phoenix, Arizona but that she was unable to obtain a certified copy of the conviction due to the expense involved in obtaining it. She said that she asked the Defendant about this conviction during the presentence interview and that he responded, "Yeah, I had some trouble with marijuana, but that was about 15 years ago." Additionally, the State introduced a certified copy of a progress report obtained from the circuit court clerk in Manatee County, Florida, reflecting that the Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor battery in 1987.

The State concedes that these two convictions were not mentioned in the presentence report and were not provided to the Defendant before the sentencing hearing. The record does not reflect, though, any prejudicial effect from this failure. The Defendant did not deny that he had these convictions. The presentence report reflected that the Defendant was convicted of nine misdemeanors, in addition to the two felonies used to establish his Range II status and the two misdemeanors at issue. These nine misdemeanors, including convictions for assault, resisting an officer with violence, and marijuana possession, were sufficient to establish the Defendant's history of criminal behavior by a preponderance of the evidence. As a result, the State's failure to comply with the Defendant's discovery request did not prejudice the Defendant and did not warrant the exclusion of this evidence. See Garland, 617 S.W.2d at 185-86.

Furthermore, the presentence report, the testimony of the person who prepared that report, and a certified court document reflecting that the Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor battery in 1987 were properly considered as reliable hearsay of the Defendant's prior criminal behavior. See T.C.A. § 40-35-209(b); Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 17. The Defendant was accorded a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence of these convictions and failed to do so. Certified copies of the Defendant's convictions were not necessary to prove his prior criminal history. The court could properly rely upon the presentence report and the testimony of Ms. Dotson in determining the Defendant's prior criminal history. See Richardson, 875 S.W.2d at 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

VII

The Defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by giving undue weight to the Defendant's prior convictions and failing to consider mitigating factors. The State contends that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. We agree with the State.

Appellate review of sentencing is de novo on the record with a presumption that the trial court's determinations are correct. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-401(d) and -402(d)(2006). As the Sentencing Commission Comments to these sections note, the burden is now on the appealing party to show that the sentencing was improper. This means that if the trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, made findings of fact that are adequately supported in the record, and gave due consideration and proper weight to the factors and principles that are relevant to sentencing under the 1989 Sentencing Act, we may not disturb the sentence even if a different result were preferred. State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

We note, though, "`the presumption of correctness which accompanies the trial court's action is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.'" State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 344-45 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991)). In this respect, for the purpose of meaningful appellate review, the trial court must place on the record its reasons for arriving at the final sentencing decision, identify the mitigating and enhancement factors found, state the specific facts supporting each enhancement factor found, and articulate how the mitigating and enhancement factors have been evaluated and balanced in determining the sentence. State v. Jones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tenn. 1994); see T.C.A. § 40-35-210(e).

Also, in conducting a de novo review, we must consider (1) any evidence received at the trial and sentencing hearing, (2) the presentence report, (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives, (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct, (5) any mitigating or statutory enhancement factors, (6) statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee, (7) any statement that the defendant made on his own behalf, and (8) the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210; see Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168; State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tenn. 1986).

In imposing a sentence within the appropriate range of punishment for the defendant:

[T]he court shall consider, but is not bound by, the following advisory sentencing guidelines:
(1) The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the sentence that should be imposed, because the general assembly set the minimum length of sentence for each felony class to reflect the relative seriousness of each criminal offense in the felony classifications; and
(2) The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, as appropriate, by the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114.

T.C.A. § 40-35-210. From this, "the trial court is free to select any sentence within the applicable range so long as the length of the sentence is `consistent with the purposes and principles of [the Sentencing Act].'" Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 343 (quoting T.C.A. § 40-35-210(d)).

The weighing of enhancement and mitigating factors is within the sole discretion of the trial court. See Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345. Thus,

even if a trial court recognizes and enunciates several applicable enhancement factors, it does not abuse its discretion if it does not increase the sentence beyond the minimum on the basis of those factors. Similarly, if the trial court recognizes and enunciates several applicable mitigating factors, it does not abuse its discretion if it does not reduce the sentence from the maximum on the basis of those factors.
Id.

The trial court found that the following enhancement factors applied pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114:

(1) the Defendant has a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range;
(8) the Defendant failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community;
(9) the Defendant possessed or employed a firearm during the commission of the offense;
(10) the Defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high.
See T.C.A. § 40-35-114 (Supp. 2007) (amended 2008). The court assigned great weight to factors (1) and (9) and gave little weight to factor (10).

The trial court found mitigating factor (2), the defendant acted under strong provocation, applicable but assigned it little weight.See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(2). The court stated, "The only factor in his favor is he was at his place, it was an odd hour, and it was possibly obnoxious conduct by the victim, but all that together pales in light of actually shooting a man twice . . . so I'm leaving the sentence at 10 years."

The Defendant first contends that the trial court afforded undue weight to the Defendant's prior convictions and enhancement factor (1). The weighing of enhancement and mitigating factors is within the sole discretion of the trial court. See Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345; State v. Devin Banks, No. W2005-02213-CCA-R3-DD, Shelby County, slip op. at 56 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2007) (recognizing that "[t]he 2005 amendment [to the Sentencing Act] deleted appellate review of the weighing of the enhancement and mitigating factors, as it rendered the enhancement and mitigating factors merely advisory, not binding, on the trial courts"). The record reflects that the Defendant was convicted of at least nine misdemeanors in addition to the two felonies used to establish his Range II status. The Defendant admitted owning firearms, despite being a felon. Additionally, Detective Seals testified that he found between three and five marijuana plants growing outside of the Defendant's home and marijuana seeds inside the home. This evidence was sufficient to establish the Defendant's history of criminal convictions and criminal behavior by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the trial court properly applied enhancement factor (1), we defer to the trial court's weighing of this factor. See Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345;Devin Banks, slip op. at 56. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

The Defendant also contends that, despite the trial court's application of enhancement factors (1), (8), (9) and (10), and mitigating factor (2), the court failed to consider additional mitigating factors. He argues that three mitigating factors were applicable: (3) substantial grounds existed tending to excuse or justify the Defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense; (11) the Defendant, although guilty of the crime, committed the offense under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely that a sustained intent to violate the law motivated the criminal conduct; and (13) he has been sufficiently punished by losing his job and home. See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-113(3), (11), (13).

Contrary to the Defendant's argument, the trial court did consider the above mitigating factors. The trial court rejected mitigating factor (3), stating, "There [are] some grounds [supporting the claim] that he might not have done this if the other man hadn't been somewhat provocative, but I don't think they [are] substantial . . . [if you] come out and ask somebody to leave and . . . shoot them twice . . . that's beyond the pale of excusing conduct." While the record reflects that the victim's actions were bothersome and irritating, it does not reflect that the victim's actions threatened immediate harm to the Defendant or otherwise justified the Defendant shooting the victim twice at close range with a shotgun. As a result, we conclude that the trial court properly refused to apply this mitigating factor.

The trial court rejected mitigating factor (11), stating that this factor was not met "simply because there [had] already been one confrontation. Apparently, if you just got in the area around this Defendant . . . he was . . . likely to come out and confront you . . . with a weapon, so I don't see how that's a mitigator in this case." The record does not reflect that this shooting was committed under unusual circumstances. An almost identical confrontation occurred two nights before the shooting, when the Defendant, naked and armed with a shotgun, confronted the victim for being near his home late at night. As a result, we conclude that the trial court properly refused to apply this mitigating factor.

The trial court rejected mitigating factor (13), stating that it did not find any other mitigating factors consistent with the purposes of the Sentencing Act to be applicable. Although the Defendant contends that he has been sufficiently punished by losing his job and home, the record does not reflect the circumstances surrounding the loss of the Defendant's job or the burning of his home. As a result, we defer to the presumptively correct finding of the trial court that this factor was inapplicable. See T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d).

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

ates v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, for Plaintiffs to fail to respond to Defendants' objections, and to then challenge the district court's evidentiary rulings on appeal, is to invite the district court to err and then complain of that very error. We cannot countenance such a tactic on appeal. Cf. United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The doctrine of invited error prevents a [party] from complaining of an error that was his own fault.").

B

The district court found that Defendants wilfully failed to preserve Ellison's email files and taped discussions with the author of the book Softwar, As a result, the district court gave Plaintiffs the benefit of an adverse inference that the emails and tapes would have proved Ellison's knowledge of any material facts that Plaintiffs were able to establish. Unsuccessful in their efforts to persuade the district court that material issues of fact actually existed, Plaintiffs now argue the adverse inferences should not have been limited to Ellison's knowledge. Instead, they urge the inferences should be sufficient to defeat a challenge to the insufficiency of their prima facie case.

We review a district court's imposition of spoliation sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995). On this record, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's construction and application of the adverse inferences. Over 2.1 million documents were produced during discovery. Although Ellison's email account files were not produced, the documents that were produced contained numerous email chains in which Ellison's correspondence was contained. If there were material issues of fact supporting securities fraud, Plaintiffs should have been able to glean them from the documents actually produced, the extensive deposition testimony, and the written discovery between the parties. An adverse inference would then properly apply to establish that Ellison must have known of those damaging material facts. Plaintiffs' problem here lies in the dearth of admissible evidence to show fraud.

A district court's adverse inference sanction should be carefully fashioned to deny the wrongdoer the fruits of its misconduct yet not interfere with that party's right to produce other relevant evidence. Campbell Indus, v. M/V Gemini 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir. 1980). In light of the enormous record developed in this case, the only conceivable benefit of Defendants' spoliation was the possibility of disclaiming Ellison's knowledge of any damaging facts underlying the purported fraud. The district court's sanction was carefully fashioned to deny Defendants that benefit. As a result, there was no abuse of discretion. See id.

IV

Turning to the merits of this dispute, we review the district court's order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment de novo. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2004). We are mindful of the shifting burden of proof governing motions for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. This burden is not a light one. The non-moving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party must do more than show there is some "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts at issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In fact, the non-moving party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In determining whether a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor, all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). The scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive with that of Section 10(b). SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 815 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 1899, 153 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). "In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation." Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated Section 10(b) by (1) issuing a 3Q01 forecast that lacked a reasonable basis, (2) making intra-quarter statements repeating the 3Q01 forecast and denying the effects of a slowing economy with knowledge of facts tending seriously to undermine those statements, (3) misrepresenting the functionality and success of Suite 11i, and (4) overstating 2Q01 earnings. Plaintiffs have not developed evidence that would allow a jury to reasonably conclude that Defendants' 3Q01 forecast or intra-quarter statements constituted material misrepresentations or omissions. As to their Suite 11i and 2Q01 claims, Plaintiffs cannot prove loss causation because they have not developed evidence sufficient to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that Defendants' purported misrepresentations were a substantial cause of the decline of Oracle's stock price on March 2, 2001.

A

For a forward-looking statement such as Oracle's 3Q01 public guidance to constitute a material misrepresentation giving rise to Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 liability, a plaintiff must prove either "(1) the statement is not actually believed [by the speaker], (2) there is no reasonable basis for the belief, or (3) the speaker is aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the statement's accuracy." Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1487 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their belief in Oracle's December 14, 2000, public guidance for 3Q01 because the guidance failed to account for the serious impact that purported Suite 11i defects had on sales or the effects of a declining economy. Oracle's 3Q01 forecast was based on a "bottom up" assessment of revenue that began with sales representatives and that had produced accurate but conservative forecasts for seven consecutive quarters. We describe it below. The structure of this process in and of itself refutes Plaintiffs' argument that the forecast did not account for negative sales trends resulting from alleged Suite 11i problems or the declining economy. As a result, Plaintiffs have not established sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in their favor.

On appeal, Defendants have disclaimed invocation of the PSLRA safe harbor exempting from liability forward-looking statements "containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items" that are also accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1)(A).

The bottom-up process began with sales representatives entering potential sales into a computer database. These potential sales were known as the "pipeline." Based on the pipeline, sales representatives would submit a forecast indicating what deals were likely to close and for how much. These forecasts were then adjusted up or down by regional managers based on that manager's assessment of the likelihood that those potential sales would close.

Regional forecasts were aggregated by Oracle's Senior Vice President of Global Finance and Operations, Jennifer Minton. Minton would aggregate a forecast that adjusted the underlying forecasts up or down depending on several factors. Those factors included: a license pipeline conversion analysis; a review of the status of certain large transactions and at times a request for executive involvement to ensure that a deal progressed and closed; conversations with "key financial personnel" in the field to seek their "independent thinking" as to whether or not the forecast was realistic; corrections to errors made in the underlying forecast when it was originally submitted; and an adjustment for "sandbagging," a label management applied to understated forecasts by certain salespersons and managers who consistently exceeded their forecasts in the hope of generating larger bonuses.

In light of this process, Plaintiffs' argument that Minton's forecast and Oracle's guidance failed to take into account the serious impact that purported Suite 11i defects had on sales finds no support in the record. Baseline sales information submitted by sales representatives necessarily included any alleged impact that Suite 11i problems had on sales. In addition, "the effects of the declining economy" were also necessarily included in the size of deals and the probability of closing that sales representatives estimated for the quarter.

Plaintiffs' strongest argument is that Minton took the aggregate volume of potential sales revenue in the pipeline for 3Q01 and simply applied the 3Q00 "conversion ratio" to come up with her 3Q01 forecast. Oracle's "conversion ratio" is calculated by dividing the potential sales revenue in the pipeline at a given point in a quarter by the actual amount of revenue closed at the end of a quarter. Plaintiffs thus maintain that if Oracle's 3Q01 guidance announced December 14, 2000, was solely established by applying the 3Q00 conversion ratio to 3Q01 pipeline information, then the guidance would have failed to have accounted for alleged Suite 11i problems and the effects of the declining economy that had developed between 3Q00 and 3Q01. While appealing in the abstract, this argument is unsupported by the record.

Oracle did not solely apply the 3Q00 conversion ratio to the pipeline at the outset of 3Q01 to come up with the forecast. While Minton indicated in deposition testimony that she heavily relied on the 3Q00 conversion ratio, Defendants introduced an expert report containing a chart comparing the actual conversion ratio at several points in 3Q00 to Minton's 3Q01 forecast's estimated conversion ratio for the same points in 3Q01. The two ratios are different at each interval. This comparison indicates that Minton took other factors into account — such as information gathered from conversations with key financial analysts within Oracle's various divisions as well as the likelihood of closing certain targeted large, deals — when determining the 3Q01 forecast. This conclusion is corroborated by the deposition testimony of several Oracle employees. While we must draw justifiable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, the undisputed chart renders unjustifiable any inference that Oracle's guidance was solely based on the 3Q00 conversion ratio.

As a result of Oracle's thorough forecasting process, Plaintiffs are unable to prove that Defendants lacked at least a reasonable basis for their belief in the 3Q01 forecast. Moreover, the fact that Oracle's forecast turned out to be incorrect does not retroactively make it a misrepresentation. See In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The fact that the prediction proves to be wrong in hindsight does not render the statement untrue when made.") (citing Marx v. Computer Scis. Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1974)); Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he Investors have not introduced evidence that GE Capital lacked at least a reasonable basis for their various representations, even though in hindsight they may now appear a little too rosy."). Therefore, a jury could not reasonably conclude that Oracle's 3Q01 forecast was a material misrepresentation giving rise to Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 liability.

Plaintiffs also argue that the 3Q01 forecast lacked a reasonable basis as a result of two purported accounting frauds that resulted in a fraudulently overstated EPS of 11 cents for 2Q01. First, we reject Plaintiffs' representation that the district court "found" a triable issue as to whether 2Q01 earnings were overstated. That representation is not supported by the district court's order. Second, in light of the forecasting process discussed supra, we reject Plaintiffs' argument that the 3Q01 fore-cast was rendered unreliable based upon fraudulently overstated 2Q01 earnings.

B

A statement can constitute a material misrepresentation giving rise to Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 liability if there is no reasonable basis for the speaker's belief in the statement's accuracy or if the speaker is aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the statement's accuracy. Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1487. Plaintiffs argue that several intra-quarter statements in which Defendants expressed confidence in the 3Q01 forecast or denied the effects of a weakening economy were material misrepresentations. In light of the district court's evidentiary rulings, however, Plaintiffs are only able to challenge the accuracy of two statements by Oracle management. We conclude as a matter of law that neither of these statements constituted a material misrepresentation.

Given our conclusion that Oracle's December 14, 2000, guidance had a reasonable basis, we do not address Plaintiffs' challenges to December 14, 2000, and December 15, 2000, statements reaffirming that guidance, which, unlike the district court, we view as part and parcel of the guidance itself.

Plaintiffs must "demonstrate that a particular statement, when read in light of all the information then available to the market, or a failure to disclose particular information, conveyed a false or misleading impression." In re Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1991). They must also show that Defendants engaged in "knowing" or "intentional" conduct or acted with "deliberate recklessness." South Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 2008). In the securities context, "an actor is reckless if he had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were misstated or omitted, but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such facts although he could have done so without extraordinary effort." Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

First, Plaintiffs allege that a February 13, 2001, statement made by Executive Vice President George Roberts was a material misrepresentation. Roberts purportedly said, "our guidance remains the same that we indicated at the beginning of Q3." As previously discussed, Oracle's internal forecasts began to fluctuate on February 5, 2001. Plaintiffs thus argue that Roberts' February 13 statement was a material misrepresentation.

While the February 5, 2001, internal forecast indicated a potential EPS of 11 cents, the February 12 internal forecast returned the potential EPS to the original forecast of 12 cents. Roberts' statement was therefore supported by the February 12 internal forecast. The fact that the February 13 prediction proved incorrect in hindsight does not make it untrue when made. In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d at 871. Rather, the question is whether Roberts lacked at least a reasonable basis for his representation when it was made, or whether he made the representation with knowledge of facts tending to seriously undermine its accuracy. Paracor Fin., Inc., 96 F.3d at 1158-59.

Plaintiffs base a considerable amount of their argument on a single flash report produced on January 17, 2001. This report indicates that, but for a single $60 million license deal with Covisint, the December FY01 growth rate would have been only six percent. With the Covisint deal, however, December growth was thirty-five percent — ten points better than the publicly forecasted twenty-five percent growth and twenty-five points better than the ten percent growth in December FY00. We see no reason why a successful transaction should be excluded from Oracle's forecasting model. Moreover, we note that information contained in such flash reports and internal emails was necessarily included in Oracle's internal forecasts throughout the quarter — including the February 12, 2001, internal forecast preceding Roberts' statement.

We have previously said that issuers need not reveal all internal projections. In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1411 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Companies generate numerous estimates internally, and they may reveal the projection they think best while withholding others, as long as the projection revealed had a reasonable basis. Id. The most recent internal forecast to precede Roberts' statement supported Oracle's 3Q01 guidance, and his statement therefore had a reasonable basis. In addition, viewing the totality of the information available to Roberts at the time he made the statement, a jury could not reasonably conclude that he had knowledge of facts tending seriously to undermine its accuracy.

Second, Plaintiffs allege that a February 21, 2001, public statement made by Henley, as repeated in a February 26, 2001, internal email, was a material misrepresentation. As reflected in the email, Henley purportedly said, "we do not expect the slowing economy, barring a serious slide to a recession, to significantly impact near term guidance." This statement is not unambiguous. The contingency, "barring a serious slide to a recession" and the modifier "significantly" attached to "impact near term guidance" leave a reader with a less-than-certain impression that Henley stood by Oracle's 3Q01 guidance. Furthermore, there is no dispute over the fact that the United States economy slid to a recession beginning in March 2001, when the dot-com bubble burst. See The Business-Cycle Peak of March 2001, National Bureau of Economic Research (Nov.26, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/ cycles/november2001/recessions.pdf. Henley's contingency therefore arose. His confidence in Oracle's guidance barring such a slide into a recession was not a material misrepresentation.

Unlike the district court, after de novo review, we view this statement as a forward-looking projection bearing upon Oracle's 3Q01 guidance. It is thus arguably subject to the PSLRA safe harbor. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1)(A). However, Defendants have not invoked that provision on appeal.

We note that this conclusion would also apply to Henley's December 14, 2000, statement in which he hedged, "So, you know, if we were to have a — I guess, a hard landing, a recession, depression, I mean certainly, that could have some impact," as well as his December 15, 2000, statement in which he hedged, "If the economy got really really bad then obviously that would probably have some effect on all of us."

C

At the heart of Plaintiffs' Suite 11i argument is their fundamental disagreement with the district court's theory of loss causation. In the end, if Plaintiffs cannot establish loss causation — the sixth element of a Section 10(b) violation — then a jury could not reasonably return a verdict in their favor on this claim. We see no error in the district court's application of precedent on this point.

Loss causation is the causal connection between a defendant's material misrepresentation and a plaintiff's loss. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344-45, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005). "A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a defendant's alleged unlawful act `caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.'" In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)). In Dura, the Supreme Court held that a person who misrepresents the financial condition of a corporation in order to sell stock is only liable to a relying purchaser for the loss the purchaser sustains when the facts "become generally known" and "as a result" share value depreciates. 544 U.S. at 344-45, 125 S.Ct. 1627. To adequately plead loss causation, the Court held, a plaintiff must allege that the "share price fell significantly after the truth became known." Id. at 347, 125 S.Ct. 1627.

The district court concluded that this case is analogous to Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008). We agree. In Metzler, the purported fraud was the manipulation of student enrollment figures at a college. Id. We applied Dura and indicated that loss causation is not adequately pled unless a plaintiff alleges that the market learned of and reacted to the practices the plaintiff contends are fraudulent, as opposed to merely reports of the defendant's poor financial health generally. Id. The market need not know at the time that the practices in question constitute a "fraud," nor label them "fraudulent", but in order to establish loss causation, the market must learn of and react to those particular practices themselves. Id. This reaction, in turn, must be the cause of a plaintiff's loss. Id. As the stock drop in Metzler was not adequately alleged to be a result of the market learning of and reacting to enrollment fraud, as opposed to the college's poor financial health generally, the plaintiffs had not adequately pled loss causation. Id. at 1064.

While Metzler addressed loss causation on a motion to dismiss, our discussion of loss causation applies with even greater force to our consideration of Defendants' motion for summary judgment in the present case. Plaintiffs take issue with our opinion in Metzler. Specifically, they assert that they should be able to prove loss causation by showing that the market reacted to the purported "impact" of the alleged fraud — the earnings miss — rather than to the fraudulent acts themselves. We reject that assertion. Loss causation requires more than an earnings miss. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 343, 125 S.Ct. 1627 ("To `touch upon' a loss is not to cause a loss, and it is the latter that the law requires."); Metzler, 540 F.3d at 1063 ("Loss causation requires more."). Loss causation is established if the market learns of a defendant's fraudulent act or practice, the market reacts to the fraudulent act or practice, and a plaintiff suffers a loss as a result of the market's reaction. See Metzler, 540 F.3d at 1063.

Evaluating the totality of evidence in this case, we hold that Plaintiffs are unable to create a triable dispute that Oracle's share price dropped as a result of the market learning of and reacting to Defendants' purported fraud, as opposed to Oracle's poor financial Health generally. Plaintiffs allege a fraud that consisted of statements misrepresenting the quality and success of Oracle's Suite 11i product. Even though Plaintiffs acknowledge that the market was already aware of initial rollout issues with Suite 11i, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' misrepresentations downplayed defects in the product. The alleged fraud in this case, therefore, concealed a purported "truth" about Suite 11i. According to the Plaintiffs, the March 1, 2001 earnings miss revealed this "truth": Suite 11i was defective and customers had not bought it as a result of the defects. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, the truth regarding Suite 11i "[became] generally known" on March 1 and the stock price dropped as a result. Dura, 544 U.S. at 345, 125 S.Ct. 1627.

Plaintiffs argue that Oracle's March 1 earnings announcement served as the final piece of the puzzle regarding Suite 11i from investors' point of view, such that previous disclosures about 11i's functionality do not eliminate a triable issue as to loss causation. In certain circumstances, it may be possible to prove loss causation even where the market reaction and loss occur some time after an initial public disclosure of the fraud. See Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1058. We merely conclude, as did the district court, that nobody could reasonably find, based on the evidence admitted into the record in this case, that Plaintiffs' losses were caused substantially by mis-statements separate and apart from other independent factors. See id. at 1055.

Plaintiffs' theory is unsupported by the record. The overwhelming evidence produced during discovery indicates the market understood Oracle's earnings miss to be a result of several deals lost in the final weeks of the quarter due to customer concern over the declining economy. Numerous analyst reports support this conclusion. To be sure, the miss was caused by customers not buying Oracle's products. But the market did not learn on March 1, 2001, that customers did not buy Suite 11i as a result of defects. Instead, the market learned that customers did not buy Oracle's products in the final weeks of the quarter as a result of uncertainty in an economy that would slide into a recession within the next month. In other words, the market reacted to reports of Oracle's "poor financial health generally." Metzler, 540 F.3d at 1063; cf. In re Daou Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding loss causation sufficiently pled where analyst reports specifically noted, "[y]ou have got to question whether they are manufacturing earnings"); see also In re Williams Secs, litig. — WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1139-40 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that loss causation was not established when a plaintiff failed to show that losses following public disclosures could be "reliably attributed to the revelation of fraud rather than to other factors").

While Plaintiffs did find two analyst reports purportedly questioning this explanation, these reports would not allow a jury reasonably to render a verdict in their favor in light of the agglomeration of evidence supporting a contrary conclusion. Moreover, "the market" must react to the fraudulent acts or practices. Metzler, 540 F.3d at 1063. Plaintiffs' two reports are not indicative of what "the market" learned of and reacted to. Over 130 pages of the record before this court consist of analyst reports — many based on independent interviews with Oracle's customers — confirming that late-quarter sales were lost as a result of customer concerns over a faltering economy. This overwhelming evidence renders unjustifiable an inference that Plaintiffs' two reports reflect the market's consensus. Plaintiffs' reliance on a single March 13, 2001, email written by an employee in Oracle's European division is equally unavailing. The email is not evidence of what the market learned of and reacted to on March 1, 2001. Finally, Oracle made $338 million in revenue from Suite 11i in 4Q01 alone. If "the market" learned of and reacted to fraudulently concealed Suite 11i defects at the end of 3Q01, surely Oracle's customers would have reacted as well.

We agree with the district court that Plaintiffs do not accurately describe the evidence they cite in support of their argument on this point. While Plaintiffs purport to have four analyst reports supporting "an 11i link," only two could fairly be construed to imply that product problems caused the March 1, 2001, earnings miss.

We also note that the email, written by Sergio Giacoletto, is insufficient to allow a jury reasonably to conclude that North American customers did not buy Suite 11i as a result of defects. Giacoletto opines that salespeople in Oracle's European division pushed "technology" sales over "apps" sales in 3Q01 as a result of Suite 11i rollout "problems" in 1Q01 and 2Q01. This email has no bearing on whether these "problems" were present in Oracle's North American division or whether they persisted throughout 3Q01. Despite serving over one hundred subpoenas on Oracle's customers, Plaintiffs have not developed evidence to support a conclusion that North American customers declined to buy Suite 11i in 3Q01 as a result of defects. Giacoletto's email is inadequate to support such a conclusion.

Plaintiffs cannot establish loss causation. Their Section 10(b) claim alleging misrepresentations of Suite 11i's quality and success fails as a result.

D

Plaintiffs also argue that their losses were caused by fraudulently overstated 2Q01 earnings. This claim fails for the same reasons as Plaintiffs' Suite 11i claim. There is simply no evidence to support the conclusion that Oracle's stock price dropped as a result of the market's reaction to learning of fraudulently overstated 2Q01 earnings on March 1, 2001, as opposed to Oracle's poor financial health generally. Metzler, 540 F.3d at 1063. Oracle's 2Q01 earnings have never been revised downward. To the extent Plaintiffs argue that the purportedly fraudulent 2Q01 earnings statement caused the 3Q01 earnings miss, we reiterate that an earnings miss alone is insufficient to establish loss causation. See id.; Dura, 544 U.S. at 343, 125 S.Ct. 1627. As control-person liability under Section 20(a) requires a pre-requisite Section 10(b) violation, Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claim fails as well. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).

Plaintiffs argue that a fraudulent transaction with Hewlett Packard was part of the 2Q01 accounting fraud, and that the district court erred by denying Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to include this transaction. We do not need to address this argument, however, because even including this transaction with the purported 2Q01 "debit memo accounting fraud" that the district court considered, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the market learned of and reacted to a 2Q01 fraud when Oracle announced its 3Q01 earnings miss.

V

Plaintiffs separately allege that Ellison and Henley are liable for contemporaneous trading under Section 20A of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a). Under that section, "Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information shall be liable . . . to any person who . . . has [contemporaneously] purchased . . . securities of the same class." Id. "Claims under Section 20A are derivative and therefore require an independent violation of the Exchange Act." Johnson v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs "must demonstrate that the alleged fraud occurred `in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.'" Id. at 782 (quoting Ambassador Hotel Co., Ltd. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999)). As with their Section 10(b) claim, Plaintiffs "must prove both actual cause (`transaction causation') and proximate cause (`loss causation')." Id.

Plaintiffs' inability to establish a triable issue on loss causation for their Suite 11i and 2Q01 claims ends their Section 20A claim. See Johnson, 490 F.3d at 782. Moreover, as all of Ellison's trades were completed prior to the first internal forecast indicating that Oracle might miss its 3Q01 guidance, the district court's adverse inference merely imputes to Ellison the knowledge that Oracle was on track to fulfill its forecast. Plaintiffs' contemporaneous-trading claims fail as a result.

VI

The district court properly granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

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ORACLE CORP. SEC. LIT. v. ORACLE CORP
(Nov 16, 2010)