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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the decision of the Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board denying Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc.'s petition to cancel Registration No. 524,413 for the trademark "HY-CROSS," registered to Percy J. Osborne. The petition to cancel was filed on June 16, 1958, more than five years after the registration date of April 25, 1950. The petition was based solely on the claim that the mark had been abandoned, which is a ground for cancellation under section 14(c) of the Lanham Act.

The Board found that the mark had not been abandoned and denied the petition, a decision which was adhered to on a Request for Reconsideration. The case was heard on the pleadings, the respondent's registration, and testimony and exhibits introduced in a related Opposition proceeding between the same parties. This court reviews the Board's decision on the issue of abandonment, which is the sole legal question presented.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trademark "HY-CROSS" had been abandoned within the meaning of section 14(c) of the Lanham Act, thus justifying cancellation of the registration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The assignment of the trademark from Percy J. Osborne to Joseph H. Welp was a "naked assignment" without transfer of any business, chickens, eggs, or breeding formula, and thus invalid.
  • Because the assignment was invalid, Osborne's acts in attempting the assignment constituted abandonment of the mark by him.
  • Any rights Welp may have acquired are new and unrelated to the original registration.
  • Osborne used the mark on one type of chicken, whereas Welp used it on a different type, potentially causing public deception.
  • Welp admitted he did not acquire any part of Osborne’s business, chickens, eggs, or breeding formula, only the mark name, which should be considered abandonment despite the assignment language.

Appellee's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's legal arguments, as appellee did not file a brief or participate in oral argument.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal Inc., 171 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y.) Abandonment of a trademark prior to assignment; necessity of assigning some "business" with a trademark for a valid assignment (pre-Lanham Act context). Distinguished from current case as abandonment occurred prior to assignment; pre-Lanham Act cases do not control under current statutory framework.
Nettie Rosenstein, Inc. v. Princess Pat, Ltd., 220 F.2d 444, 42 CCPA 806 (1955) Assignment of trademark prior to Lanham Act; laches and estoppel issues; assignment by a party with no going business. Found inapplicable because the assignment there was pre-Lanham Act and involved no active business, unlike Osborne's assignment here.
Kelly Liquor Co. v. National Brokerage Co., Inc., 102 F.2d 857, 26 CCPA 1110 (1939) Effect of transfer on abandonment; pre-Lanham Act assignment principles. Cited for the proposition that transfer does not necessarily constitute abandonment; court noted that abandonment issue was not before it in that case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused on whether the assignment of the trademark from Osborne to Welp constituted abandonment under section 14(c) of the Lanham Act. The court noted that the registration had been in effect more than five years before the petition to cancel was filed, requiring the petitioner to establish abandonment to proceed.

The appellant's primary argument was that the assignment was invalid because it was a "naked assignment" lacking transfer of the business or goodwill, and thus Osborne abandoned the mark. The court examined the assignment language, which explicitly conveyed the trademark, its registration, and "that part of the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark," consistent with the requirements of section 10 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1060).

The Board's factual findings, which the court accepted, showed that Osborne was using the mark at the time of assignment, that Welp's partnership used the mark continuously after assignment, and there was no evidence of non-use or abandonment. The court rejected appellant's argument that the absence of transfer of chickens, eggs, or breeding formula amounted to abandonment, noting no authority supported that a trademark assignment without transfer of all business components is invalid or constitutes abandonment.

The court further reasoned that the difference in chicken types sold under the mark by Osborne and Welp did not constitute deception nor invalidate the assignment, as the breed was indicated by other designations and Osborne had no obligation not to change the breed sold under the mark.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the appellant failed to demonstrate abandonment and that the assignment was valid under the Lanham Act.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board denying the petition to cancel the "HY-CROSS" trademark registration.

The direct effect of this decision is that the registration remains valid and enforceable, and the appellant cannot pursue cancellation based on abandonment. The opinion does not establish new precedent but clarifies that an assignment of a trademark with the goodwill connected to the mark, as required by the Lanham Act, does not constitute abandonment even if not all elements of the business (such as physical goods or formulas) are transferred.

HY-CROSS HATCHERY, INC., Appellant, v. Percy J. OSBORNE (Joseph H. Welp, Assignee, Substituted), Appellee.

RICH, Judge.

This appeal is from the decision, adhered to on Request for Reconsideration (129 USPQ 232), of the Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board denying appellant's petition to cancel Registration No. 524,413, on the Principal Register, dated April 25, 1950, for the trademark "HY-CROSS" (the quotation marks being part of the mark) for "Live Poultry for Breeding Purposes and Eggs for Hatching," issued to Percy J. Osborne.

The petition to cancel was filed June 16, 1958, as of which date Reg. No. 524,413 had been in effect more than five years. A combined affidavit under section 8(a), accepted pursuant to section 8(c), and section 15 of the Lanham Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1058(a, c), 1065, was filed on March 20, 1956. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for the petitioner to meet at least one of the requirements of section 14(c), permitting the filing of a petition to cancel "at any time." The sole provision of section 14(c) relied on by petitioner is that the registered mark "has been abandoned."

The board held that the mark, "HY-CROSS," had not been abandoned and, after considering an extensive Request for Reconsideration, said:

"The Board remains of the opinion that the record is insufficient to establish that the registered trademark "HY-CROSS" has been abandoned * * *."

Whether the board was correct in so deciding is the sole issue in the case, for in the absence of a showing of abandonment the petitioner has no right under the statute to pursue this cancellation proceeding.

This case was heard and decided below on the pleadings, respondent's registration, and testimony and exhibits introduced into this cancellation on motion from Opposition No. 36611 between the same parties, entitled Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Welp, 120 USPQ 323 (TT A Bd., 1959). In this court petitioner-appellant filed a brief and appeared for oral argument. Respondent-appellee did neither. We have therefore not had the benefit of such light as might have been shed on the issue by an answer to appellant's arguments, which, it seems to us, deal to a large extent with irrelevant questions. We would point out that this is a wholly statutory matter, determined by provisions of the Lanham Act which did not come into effect until July 5, 1947, modifying in many ways aspects of trademark law discussed in earlier cases such as some of those cited and quoted from in appellant's brief. The registration sought to be cancelled enjoys a status, having been in effect more than five years before the petition to cancel was filed, which no registration enjoyed prior to the effective date of said act. Appellant, having elected to bring itself within the provisions of section 14(c) by showing abandonment of the registered mark, cannot prevail unless abandonment has been shown. We turn now to that question.

Appellant predicates abandonment primarily on an assignment of the trademark from the original registrant, Percy J. Osborne, to Joseph H. Welp, dated October 10, recorded November 1, 1955. The primary argument is that this was "no more than a naked assignment," of the "bare mark," which assignment is "invalid" because, to quote appellant, " no business is transferred" with it. As we understand appellant's contention with respect to the relation of this contention to the issue of abandonment, it is that Osborne's acts in attempting to make an assignment, which assignment is invalid, constituted an abandonment of the mark by him and that whatever rights the assignee, Welp, may have as a result of use subsequent to the assignment are new rights, unrelated to the original mark and its registration. A subsidiary argument is that Osborne used "HY-CROSS" on one type of chicken and Welp uses it on a different type of chicken.

The assignment, omitting the "Whereas" clauses, reads:

"BE IT KNOWN that for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) and other good and valuable consideration to him in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, said Percy J. Osborne by these presents does sell, assign and transfer unto the said Joseph H. Welp the entire right, title and interest in and to the said trademark and the registration thereof, No. 524,413, together with that part of the good will of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark."

Section 10 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1060 provides, in part:

"A registered mark or a mark for which application to register has been filed shall be assignable with the goodwill of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark, and in any such assignment it shall not be necessary to include the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by any other mark used in the business or by the name or style under which the business is conducted: * * *." [Emphasis ours.]

The board found as facts (and we do not find that appellant disputes these findings) that there is nothing in the record to show that Osborne, the assignor, was not using "HY-CROSS" at the time when he assigned that mark, or that he used the mark after the assignment, or that Welp's Hatchery (the business enterprise, a partnership, operated by the assignee) did not use the mark continuously after the assignment. It is on these facts that the board made its finding of no abandonment.

Appellant's argument that there was abandonment is stated thus in its brief:

"The facts relied upon by Petitioner, in support of its position, are the clear admissions made by the Respondent, Welp, that he did not acquire:

"(1) Any part of the business of Osborne,

"(2) Any chickens or eggs from Osborne, or

"(3) Any formula or principle for breeding chickens of the type sold by Osborne as `Hy-Cross' chickens.

* * * * * *

"Welp received only the name `Hy-Cross' — that was all he wanted — and nothing more whatever was acquired. Welp wasn't even interested in knowing the Osborne `Hy-Cross' breeding formula. These facts should prevail over the wording of the assignment."

Appellant would apparently have us hold "abandoned" a trademark which has never been out of use because Osborne did not transfer to Welp any "business" or any chickens or eggs or any know-how or trade secrets, notwithstanding there was an assignment, in the precise words of section 10 of the Lanham Act, of "that part the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark" which was assigned, as well as the assignment of the mark and the registration thereof. No case has been cited to support that precise proposition. Appellant quotes at length from the opinion of the District Court for the Southern District of New York in a trademark infringement suit, Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal Inc., D.C., 171 F. Supp. 293, in which case it admits there was abandonment of the trademark prior to an attempted assignment thereof. The quoted portion of the opinion, dictum for the most part, refers to a number of pre-Lanham Act cases on the necessity of assigning some "business" with a trademark in order to have a valid assignment. Nothing quoted tends to show that an invalid assignment is, ipso facto, an abandonment of a mark. One case subsequent to the Lanham Act, cited in the Avon case and further discussed by appellant, is the decision of this court in 1955 in Nettie Rosenstein, Inc. v. Princess Pat, Ltd., 220 F.2d 444, 42 CCPA 806. There was a purported assignment to the applicant of a trademark, discussed in that opinion on a subsidiary issue of laches, by one Rubin, not a party to the opposition. The alleged assignment was dated February 7, 1947, which was prior to the effective date of the Lanham Act. The application assigned was filed under the Act of 1905 and was abandoned by the assignee. But of most significance was the finding by the court that at the time of the alleged assignment Rubin had no going business and had not sold any perfume (the mark was for perfume) for five years prior to the purported assignment. In all of this the court said it could find no basis of a finding for laches and acquiescence on the part of opposer amounting to an estoppel of opposer's right to oppose. The case is a long way from the issue in this case. The part quoted and most relied on by appellant was in turn a quotation from the opinion of the Examiner-in-Chief citing another decision of this court, in 1939, Kelly Liquor Co. v. National Brokerage Co., Inc., 102 F.2d 857, 26 CCPA 1110. In that pre-Lanham Act case the court pointed out ( 102 F.2d 857, 26 CCPA 1115):

Aff'd. 2 Cir., 279 F.2d 607.

"By reason of the particular facts in this case, however, we do not hold that the claimed transfer from Kelly Brothers Company to appellant constituted an abandonment of its trade-mark by Kelly Brothers Company. That question is not before us."

We do not find, therefore, any authority in support of the contention that Osborne's assignment, even if it did not effect a valid transfer, necessarily resulted in an abandonment of the mark within the intent of section 14(c).

However, we do not believe that the assignment was invalid. Unlike the cases relied on, Osborne, so far as the record shows, was using the mark at the time he executed the assignment of it. He had a valid registration which he also assigned. With these two legal properties he also assigned, in the very words of the statute, "that part of the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark * * *." He was selling chicks which his advertising of record shows were designated as "No. 111 HY-CROSS (Trade Mark) AMERICAN WHITES." As part of his assignment, by assigning the goodwill, he gave up the right to sell "HY-CROSS" chicks. This had been a part of his "business." By the assignment Welp, the assignee, acquired that right. The record shows that he began selling "Hy-Cross Hatching Eggs" and chicks designated as "HY-CROSS 501," "HY-CROSS 610," and "HY-CROSS 656." Thus, what had once been Osborne's business in "HY-CROSS" chicks became Welp's business. We do not see what legal difference it would have made if a crate of eggs had been included in the assignment, or a flock of chickens destined to be eaten.

As for the argument that the transfer should have been held illegal because Osborne sold one kind of chick and Welp sold another another under the mark, whereby the public would be deceived, we think the record does not support this. The type of chick appears to have been otherwise indicated than by the trademark, as by the numbers above quoted as well as by name. Osborne, moreover, was not under any obligation to the public not to change the breed of chicks he sold under the mark from time to time.

For the foregoing reasons we believe that appellant has failed to show error in the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and it is affirmed.

Affirmed.

MARTIN, J., did not sit or participate because of illness.

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HY-CROSS HATCHERY, INC. v. OSBORNE
(Jun 15, 1962)