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Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves two appeals by Charles W. Smith from jury convictions in two separate trials. In the first trial (No. 74-2936), Smith was convicted on one count of conducting illegal gambling under 18 U.S.C. § 1955. In the second trial (No. 74-2937), Smith was convicted on three counts: conspiracy to distribute heroin with five others on August 12, 1973, under 21 U.S.C. § 846; unlawful use of a telephone to facilitate a conspiracy to distribute heroin on the same date under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); and willful use of a telephone to facilitate the distribution of marijuana, also under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Smith received concurrent sentences, with the longest being eight years on Count I of the second case. The appeals challenge various evidentiary and procedural rulings made during the trials.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the government met the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c) before obtaining court orders authorizing wiretaps.
  2. Whether statements of alleged co-conspirators or joint venturers were admissible against Smith absent prior proof of the conspiracy and his participation.
  3. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support the convictions.
  4. Whether the admission of expert testimony regarding the meaning of certain language used by Smith during recorded phone calls was erroneous.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The government failed to satisfy statutory prerequisites under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 for wiretap authorization.
  • The statements of co-conspirators or joint participants were inadmissible because the conspiracy and Smith’s participation were not independently proven.
  • The evidence was insufficient to convict Smith beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • The trial court erred in admitting expert testimony interpreting coded language used by Smith in recorded conversations.

Appellee's Arguments

  • The government complied fully with the statutory requirements for wiretap authorization, supported by affidavits and judicial findings.
  • Independent evidence of conspiracy and participation existed, allowing admission of co-conspirators’ statements.
  • The evidence was sufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
  • The expert testimony was properly admitted and any challenges to its weight or credibility were matters for the jury.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914 (D. Del. 1971) Congressional intent to restrict wiretaps to those reasonable and necessary Supported the court's recognition that wiretap authorization requires judicial discretion and strict compliance with statutory standards.
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) Wiretap procedures not to be routinely employed initially, but not required as last resort Confirmed that government need not exhaust all investigative techniques before wiretap authorization.
United States v. Kerrigan, 514 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1975) Wiretap statutory interpretation consistent with Giordano Supported the court’s conclusion that statutory requirements were met.
United States v. Staino, 358 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1973) Wiretap statutory interpretation consistent with Giordano Further supported the court's holding on wiretap authorization.
Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1973) Requirement of independent evidence of conspiracy before admitting co-conspirator statements Applied to affirm admissibility of co-conspirators’ statements after independent evidence was presented.
United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1973) Jury must first determine existence of conspiracy or joint venture before considering statements against defendant Cited to confirm proper jury instructions and sequencing of evidence admission.
United States v. Knight, 416 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1969) Trial court discretion on order of evidence admission regarding conspiracy Supported that admitting co-conspirator statements before independent proof is not reversible error.
United States v. Calarco, 424 F.2d 657 (2nd Cir. 1970) Necessity of evidence aliunde to support conspiracy before co-conspirator statements considered Referenced in support of procedural safeguards and jury instruction adequacy.
United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2nd Cir. 1969) Requirement of independent evidence before admitting co-conspirator statements Used to support the court’s procedural analysis on evidence admission.
United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 925 Requirement of independent evidence before admitting co-conspirator statements Supported the court’s ruling on procedural safeguards in conspiracy evidence.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) Standard for sufficiency of evidence viewed in light most favorable to prosecution Applied to reject appellant’s claim of insufficient evidence.
United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1975) Permissibility of expert testimony relying on otherwise inadmissible information Supported admission of expert opinion based on reports and statements not independently admissible.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Use of scholarly works containing theories and conclusions as evidence Cited to illustrate acceptance of expert materials that contain both facts and conclusions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each of appellant's arguments in turn. First, it found that the government fully complied with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c) for wiretap authorization. The court emphasized Congress’s intent to restrict wiretaps to reasonable and necessary cases, while recognizing judicial discretion in granting wiretap orders. The multiple affidavits and judicial findings in both cases satisfied these requirements. The court rejected appellant's claim that wiretaps had to be a last resort, citing precedent that the statute does not impose such a strict limitation.

Second, regarding the admissibility of co-conspirators' statements, the court held that such statements are admissible if there is independent evidence of the conspiracy and the defendant’s participation. The court explained that independent evidence need not precede the statements’ admission but must be introduced before the jury considers the statements in determining guilt. The trial court’s jury instructions clearly explained this sequencing, and the evidence, including recorded conversations, independently established appellant’s involvement.

Third, the court found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, referencing the well-established standard from Glasser v. United States.

Finally, the court considered the admission of expert testimony interpreting coded language in recorded conversations. It noted that qualified experts may base opinions on information beyond their personal knowledge, including inadmissible reports, if such opinions assist the jury. The court held that any challenge to the expert’s credibility or the weight of his testimony was for the jury to decide and did not render the testimony inadmissible. The trial court did not err in admitting this evidence.

Holding and Implications

The court AFFIRMED all convictions against Charles W. Smith.

The direct consequence of this decision is the upholding of Smith’s convictions and sentences. The court’s ruling reaffirms the standards for wiretap authorization, the admissibility of co-conspirators’ statements conditioned on independent evidence, the sufficiency of evidence review standard, and the admissibility of expert testimony based on underlying inadmissible information. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts of this case.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. CHARLES W. SMITH, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

OPINION

BARNES, Circuit Judge:

These are two appeals by the same appellant from his two jury convictions in two separate trials, the first (No. 74-2936) from a jury verdict on one count of conducting illegal gambling ( 18 U.S.C. § 1955), and the second (No. 74-2937) from a jury verdict convicting him on three counts — Count I charging a conspiracy with five other persons on August 12, 1973, to distribute heroin ( 21 U.S.C. § 846); Count III charging the unlawful use of a telephone to facilitate a conspiracy to distribute heroin on August 12, 1973 ( 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)), and Count VII charging the wilful use of a telephone to facilitate the distribution of marihuana ( 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)). Appellant was sentenced on each count to concurrent sentences, the longest being 8 years on Count I of 74-2937.

Appellant urges on each appeal: A. That the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c) were not met by the government before obtaining the court's order for the wire taps; B. that the statements of alleged joint co-conspirators or participants were not admissible against appellant because the conspiracy and joint venture were not proven by other testimony; C. the insufficiency of the evidence to convict; and D. (in No. 74-2937) error in the admission of an expert's testimony as to the meaning of certain language used by the defendant during phone calls, and particularly in his August 12, 1973, recorded conversation with co-defendant Gordon Tadashi Yamashiro.

A. We consider each of appellant's arguments. We hold that the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c) were fully complied with by the government.

We recognize that Congress in order to prevent abuse by government agents, laid down strict rules for the obtaining of judicial approval before telephone interception would be permitted. It was the Congressional intent to restrict wire taps to those that were not only reasonable but necessary. United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914, 921 (D. Delaware 1971). Obviously, however, considerable discretion rests with the judge to whom the application for permission to wire tap is made.

On the wire taps relating to No. 74-2936, Judge Samuel P. King was satisfied with the several showings made to him by affidavits and ordered the original taps by several orders, each supported by examination of new affidavits which had been filed.

Later when Judge Pence issued on August 1, 1973, the orders permitting wire taps relative to the subsequent prosecution presently before us on appeal, No. 74-2937, Judge Pence had before him not only a 26-page affidavit in support thereof, but had heard other testimony under oath, which led him to make findings on probable cause, limited the order to 20 days or less if successful, and required reports by the government at the end of 5, 10 and 15 days. This order was extended, upon proper showing, on August 23, 1973, based upon a further 38 page affidavit, covering the information gathered by surveillance and wire taps in which appellant Smith figures prominently.

Congress, in its wisdom, did not attempt to require "specific" or "all possible" investigative techniques before orders for wire taps could be issued. As United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1827, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), states — wire tap "procedures were not to be routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation," but it is equally true "that the statute does not require the government to use a wire tap only as a last resort." United States v. Kerrigan, 514 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Staino, 358 F. Supp. 852, 856-7 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

We find no merit in appellant's objection to the procedure by which the wire taps were authorized.

B. We hold that the acts and declarations of the co-conspirators and joint venturers were admissible.

Obviously, there must be independent evidence of a conspiracy or a joint venture, and of the defendant's participation in it, before the extrajudicial declarations of a co-conspirator or joint participant can be considered by the trier of fact against the defendant. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 735, et seq. (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1973). But this does not mean that either all evidence of the existence of the conspiracy or joint venture, or all evidence of the defendant's participation in it, must be first introduced into evidence before the extrajudicial statements can be presented to the jury. They may be introduced later on during the trial, but must be introduced before the trier of fact — here, the jury — acts on the evidence.

It has been held that the order of the admission of proof is within the discretion of the trial court and that consequently it is not reversible error if acts or declarations by co-conspirators are admitted before the existence of the conspiracy is established by independent evidence. United States v. Knight, 416 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1969).

The August 12 conversation, No. 668, in which the defendant-appellant spoke with co-defendant Gordon Yamashiro, clearly indicates the defendant-appellant's involvement, exclusive of any other wire tap evidence containing declarations of the defendant-appellant's co-conspirators made in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its pendency. The information already before the court at the hearing of the motions to suppress disclosed the totality of the Government's evidence against defendant-appellant to the judge.

Of course, the trier of fact must first determine the existence of a conspiracy, before it passes on the defendant's alleged participation in it.

In compliance with the dictates of United States v. Calarco, 424 F.2d 657, 660 (2nd Cir. 1970); United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2nd Cir. 1969); and United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471, 477 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925, 88 S.Ct. 860, 19 L.Ed.2d 987 (1968), concerning the necessity that evidence aliunde of the defendant's guilt be considered by the jury before the acts and declarations of co-conspirators, Judge Pence, after concluding in his own mind that such proof was in evidence, put the issue to the jury for consideration. The court's very first instruction charges in pertinent part:

". . . Thus you must determine, solely from the conversations numbered 65, 178, 377, 436, 688 and 1267, whether or not the government as [sic] proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith was in fact a participant in a conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States regulating the possession and distribution of heroin. Unless you first so find, you must acquit the defendant as to Count I because you cannot consider any of the other conversations on the tapes between any of the alleged co-conspirators, Inoue, Rogers, Oshima, and Rodriguez, or any other evidence in this case until you have first been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy, as alleged, did exist between defendant Smith and Yamashiro. If you find that such a conspiracy did exist, then you may consider any or all of the evidence in the case as you may find it relates thereto." (C. T. 58).

This instruction adequately defines the issue, the procedure necessary to resolve it and the alternative conclusions that the jury might reach depending upon their findings. Compare United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973).

There was sufficient independent evidence of a joint venture in No. 74-2936 to allow the trier of fact to consider the statements of the alleged joint venturers and that the Court's instruction on this matter was adequate.

We quote with approval from the Government's Brief:

"Early in the trial (Tr. 7), the court's attention was called to the case of United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244 (C.A.), where it was said at page 1245:
`As with its twin brother conspiracy, the trier of fact first must determine the existence of the joint venture as a prerequisite foundation to the admission of any statements against the accused. Here the question was presented to the jury, but the trial court neglected to instruct that the joint venture must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Here the court followed the Ushakow admonition in its charge (Tr. 237-239):
`Now in connection with the evidence in this case and the proof of the government, before — now listen carefully to this because it's very important: Before you can consider any other evidence in this case, you must first determine whether or not the government has proved to you and your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the words in the recorded conversations of November 16, 1972, at, I think, 9:09 P.M. and one on December 2nd, 1972, at 11:18 a. m. — that those words on those recordings were in fact spoken by Nobuhara and the Defendant Charles William Smith.
`Now it has been stipulated [sic] that Nobuhara was one of the speakers. It has also been stipulated that the call of November 16th was an outgoing call from Nobuhara to a telephone number listed under the name of Peggy C. Smith at 3950 Ala Ilima Place, Apartment 303, in Honolulu. It has been also stipulated that Defendant Charles William Smith resided at the same address during the period November 11th to December 17th 1972. Now William Dickson has testified that the voice in each of these two tapes was that of the Defendant Charles William Smith. So, if you find from that evidence that you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith spoke to Nobuhara as recorded, then and then only may you consider the contents of those two conversations.
`Now what I've said there in simple effect is: If you don't believe that that's Smith's voice, then you can't consider the contents and you must right then stop. If you aren't convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the words purported to be those of Smith were his — that was his voice — then if you're not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, just stop right there and you have to find him not guilty.
`Next, if you find and if you're satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that those were his words, next you must determine solely from the conversations contained in those two tapes whether or not the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith was in fact a participant in a joint venture or business of running a gambling book — of bookmaking — that is, in gambling [sic] Unless you first so find, then you must, of course, acquit the defendant.'
"As if this were not enough, the court said it was going to repeat it, and did repeat it in somewhat briefer from (Tr. 239-240). More to the same effect was later repeated to the jury in answer to a question put to the court after the jury had retired, to which instructions there were no objections, following which the two tapes were replayed (Tr. 254-258).
"It thus appears that the rule for which defendant contends was fully complied with by the trial court."

C. We find no merit in the appellant's position that the evidence to prove the conspiracy, and to prove appellant's participation in it, was insufficient, viewing it, as we must, in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed.2d 680 (1942).

D. We next consider admission in No. 74-2937 of expert testimony.

Any qualified expert, and usually, only such a qualified expert, may express an opinion, and not be restricted in his testimony to facts of which he knows of his own knowledge.

Certain non-expert witnesses, in certain Circumstances, may express an opinion, such as an intimate acquaintance's opinion as to a person's sanity; or birth, marriage, divorce, ancestry; etc.
California Evidence Code, §§ 870 and 1311.

"In regard to some matters of expert opinion an expert must, if he is going to give an opinion that will be helpful to the jury, rely on reports, statements, and other information that might not be admissible."
Comment, Law Revision Commission, California Evidence Code, § 801. (Emphasis in original.) See also United States v. Sims, [514] F.2d [147], Slip Op., April 2, 1975."

Myrdal's opus, "An American Dilemma" was cited by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495, note 11, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873. Myrdal's volume included his theories and conclusions as well as facts.

Appellant's objection to the expert's opinion herein is good argument to a jury or other trier of fact. It goes to the weight of the expert's testimony, and to his truthfulness and integrity, and the ultimate worth of his testimony, but does not make the evidence inadmissible.

Appellant on cross-examination was entitled to draw to the jury's attention, as he did, the differences existing between defendant's Exhibit S-2 (Glossary of Terms in the Drug Culture) and the expert's opinion testimony, but the jury was not required to reject testimony of witness Lee, including his opinions.

We find no error on this final matter.

All convictions are affirmed.

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UNITED STATES v. SMITH
(Jul 2, 1975)