The opinion of the court was delivered by ALLCORN, P.J.A.D.
We concur in the conclusions of the Appeal Tribunal, approved by the Board of Review, holding that the claimant was discharged by the hospital and that she did not leave work "voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). This, despite the fact that the hospital was compelled to discharge her from her job as a licensed practical nurse, by virtue of the regulations of the New Jersey Board of Nursing, N.J.A.C. 13:37-9.5(a), (b), when she failed to pass the second of two consecutive licensing examinations, and there being no other jobs available. Quite plainly, the claimant had no intention of resigning or quitting, as the Appeal Tribunal found; her employment was terminated by the hospital. In such circumstances, the claimant was eligible for benefits. Compare Michael v. Long Island College Hospital, 60 A.D.2d 438, 401 N.Y.S.2d 591 (App.Div. 1978), leave to app. den. 45 N.Y.2d 708, 409 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 381 N.E.2d 614 (Ct.App. 1978).
In our view, neither Echols v. Michigan Empl. Secur. Comm'n, 380 Mich. 87, 155 N.W.2d 824 (Sup.Ct. 1968), nor Przekaza v. Employment Secur. Dep't, 392 A.2d 421 (Vt.Sup.Ct.), is here apposite. Both cases concern the right of chauffeurs to unemployment benefits after their discharge because of job disqualification due to revocation of driving license as a result of voluntary and deliberate violations of the traffic laws — which reach results contrary to one another. Nor do we subscribe to the philosophy or interpretation of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in its unreported decision of Cranford v. Parker, filed November 20, 1979.
Accordingly, the determination of the Board of Review is affirmed.