CASTLEBERRY v. GOOLSBY BLDG. CORP

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Docket Number

No. B-9999.

Advocates

Connor McCollough, J. Parker McCollough, Georgetown, Judge Brown, Phil Brown, Amarillo, for petitioner. Dyer Redford, David J. Dunn and Cecil D. Redford, Corpus Christi, for respondent.

Judges

Robert M. Campbell

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Richard Ernest Castleberry was employed by Goolsby Building Corporation and was killed in an industrial accident on June 5, 1978, while performing his job duties. Clarence E. Castleberry, as surviving natural parent and Administrator of Richard's estate, filed suit against Goolsby Building Corporation and the City of Corpus Christi. The cause of action against Goolsby Building Corporation was severed, and a final judgment was rendered in favor of Goolsby Building Corporation. The trial court granted summary judgment that the Administrator take nothing against Goolsby Building Corporation, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this judgment. This appeal followed to the Supreme Court of Texas.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Workers' Compensation Act bars a deceased employee's cause of action for intentional injuries that survive to the estate under Article 5525, the Texas Survival Statute.
Whether the Administrator's pleadings sufficiently allege an "intentional injury" by Goolsby Building Corporation to survive the summary judgment.

Arguments of the Parties

Administrator's Arguments

The Workers' Compensation Act does not bar a deceased's cause of action for intentional injuries surviving under Article 5525.
The pleadings sufficiently allege an "intentional injury" through allegations of willful or gross negligence.

Goolsby Building Corporation's Arguments

The Administrator failed to state a cause of action, warranting summary judgment in their favor.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1966, writ ref'd n. r. e.)	Interpretation of Article 5525, Texas Survival Statute allowing survival of common law actions for damages.	Supported the survival of the deceased employee's cause of action asserted by the estate.
Paradissis v. Royal Indemnity Co., 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1974)	Workers' Compensation Act exempts employers from common law liability for negligence except for exemplary damages in death cases.	Clarified the limited exceptions to employer immunity under the Act.
Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. 1980)	Employers are not exempt from liability for intentional injuries under the Workers' Compensation Act; such cause of action is constitutionally guaranteed.	Confirmed that the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar intentional injury claims surviving to the estate.
Middleton v. Texas Power Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916)	Distinction between negligence and intentional injury liability under Texas law.	Supported the principle that intentional injury claims are not barred by the Workers' Compensation Act.
Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977)	Pleadings sufficiency standard requiring fair notice to opposing party.	Applied to determine that pleadings must give fair notice of intentional injury claims.
McCamey v. Kinnear, 484 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n. r. e.)	Purpose of pleadings is to provide fair and adequate notice of the nature of the claim.	Used to evaluate sufficiency of Administrator's pleadings in alleging intentional injury.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court acknowledged that Article 5525 permits survival of common law actions for damages that the deceased could have brought, allowing the estate to assert those claims. It recognized that the Workers' Compensation Act exempts employers from liability for negligence but not for intentional injuries, which are constitutionally protected causes of action. The Court agreed with the Administrator that the Act does not bar survival claims for intentional injuries. However, the Court analyzed the pleadings under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 45 and 47, which require pleadings to give fair notice of the claim. The Court found that allegations of willful or gross negligence do not amount to allegations of intentional injury. Since the pleadings failed to fairly notify the opposing party that an intentional injury claim was asserted, the Administrator's pleadings were insufficient to survive summary judgment.

Holding and Implications

The judgments of the trial court and Court of Civil Appeals are affirmed.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Administrator's cause of action against Goolsby Building Corporation was properly dismissed because the pleadings did not sufficiently allege an intentional injury claim to overcome the protections of the Workers' Compensation Act. The Court did not establish new precedent beyond affirming existing principles regarding survival of claims and pleading sufficiency.

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Clarence E. CASTLEBERRY, Petitioner, v. GOOLSBY BUILDING CORPORATION, Respondent.

CAMPBELL, Justice.

This is a suit for actual and exemplary damages under Article 5525, the Texas Survival Statute. The trial court rendered summary judgment that Plaintiff Clarence E. Castleberry take nothing as to Defendant Goolsby Building Corporation. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 608 S.W.2d 763. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.

All statutory references are to Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated.

Richard Ernest Castleberry was employed by Goolsby Building Corporation. On June 5, 1978, he was killed in an industrial accident while in the course of his employment. Clarence E. Castleberry, Individually as surviving natural parent and as Administrator of the Estate of Richard Ernest Castleberry, Deceased, (Administrator) sued the City of Corpus Christi and Goolsby Building Corporation.

The cause of action against Goolsby Building Corporation was severed from the cause of action against the City of Corpus Christi and a final judgment was rendered in favor of Goolsby Building Corporation. The City of Corpus Christi is not a party to this appeal.

The Administrator alleged Richard's death was caused by certain "acts and/or omissions to act, which . . . constitute gross, wanton, and willful negligence," "grossly negligent acts," "negligent, or grossly negligent, acts and omissions" and "ordinary or gross negligence." Goolsby Building Corporation alleged in its motion for summary judgment that the Administrator failed to state a cause of action. The trial court rendered summary judgment that the Administrator take nothing against Goolsby Building Corporation.

The Administrator argues the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar a deceased's cause of action for intentional injuries which survive to the estate under Article 5525, the Texas Survival Statute. We agree.

Article 5525 provides for the survival of a common law action for damages which could have been instituted by the deceased for injuries resulting in death. The action may be asserted by the heirs or administrator in behalf of the estate. Article 5525; Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1966, writ ref'd n. r. e.).

The Workers' Compensation Act exempts employers from common law liability based on negligence or gross negligence, except in death cases for exemplary damages as provided for in Article 8306, § 5. Paradissis v. Royal Indemnity Co., 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1974). The Act does not exempt employers from common law liability for intentional injuries. Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. 1980); Middleton v. Texas Power Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916). This cause of action is guaranteed to the employee by the Texas Constitution and cannot be taken away by the Legislature. Tex.Const. art. I, § 13; Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, supra. We hold the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar a deceased's cause of action for intentional injuries which survive to the estate under Article 5525.

The Administrator further argues the pleadings are sufficient to allege an "intentional injury" to Richard Castleberry by Goolsby Building Corporation.

Under Rules 45 and 47, pleadings are sufficient if they give the opposing attorney fair notice of the claim involved. Tex.R.Civ.P. 45 and 47; Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977). The object and purpose of pleading is to give fair and adequate notice to the party being sued of the nature of the cause of action asserted against him so he may adequately prepare his defense. McCamey v. Kinnear, 484 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n. r. e.). The Administrator's allegations are insufficient to give the opposing attorney fair notice that this cause of action was for an "intentional injury."

The Administrator contends an allegation of willful negligence or willful gross negligence is sufficient to allege an "intentional injury." An allegation of willful negligence or willful gross negligence is an allegation based upon negligence and is insufficient to allege an "intentional injury." An injury caused by willful negligence or willful gross negligence is not an intentional injury necessary to avoid the effect of the Workers' Compensation Act.

The judgments of the courts below are affirmed.